STREET CHECKS AND CARDING:

AN EXPLORATION OF A SERGEANT'S CAPACITY TO ACHIEVE POLICY CONFORMANCE FROM FRONTLINE POLICE OFFICERS

by

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M.A., University of Guelph 2011

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A dissertation

presented to Ryerson University

in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Ph.D. Policy Studies

in the Program of

Policy Studies

Ryerson University

Toronto, Ontario, Canada

September 11, 2018

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Street Checks And Carding:
An Exploration Of A Sergeant's Capacity To Achieve
Policy Conformance From Frontline Police Officers

Doctorate of Philosophy 2018

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Abstract

This study aims to fill a void in the extant policy implementation literature that has overlooked the contribution of sergeants to the successful adoption of policy decisions at the frontlines. By focusing on the Regulated Interactions Policy of the Toronto Police Service and adopting a sociological institutionalism perspective, 17 sergeants representing each of the 17 divisions of the Toronto Police Service were interviewed. This research does not aim to assess the efficacy of this policy, but rather, examines its implementation. The findings show that there are a number of perceived internal and external factors that operate to facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular. Further, these perceived factors are contextualized across the police organization. Prevalent external factors include media portrayals of the police, civilian oversight, perceived levels of respect, and relationship between the police and citizens. Dominant internal factors include supervision, internal discipline, policy and procedure, and top-down command. The findings also demonstrate the methods used by sergeants to positively influence the conformance of frontline officers in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular. Key methods include communication and translation, rewarding, disciplining, and being present. The findings have three broad

implications. First, police officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline. Second, sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers by blending the payoffs of an authoritative approach and a supportive approach. Third, the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive.

Acknowledgements

I am forever grateful to Tuna Baskoy, Tammy Landau, Sara Thompson, Nicole Neverson, and Laura Huey for lending me their expertise and support.

To Chief Mark Saunders, Deputy Chief Rick Stubbings (Ret.), Staff Superintendent Mario Di Tommaso, Superintendent Rob Johnson, Carrol Whynot, and Lina Nykorchuk for the opportunity to conduct interdisciplinary and evidence-based research with the Toronto Police Service.

To Joycelyn Amos for her teachings of all things coding-related.

And last, but certainly not least, to my family, friends, and colleagues who encouraged me to be my best – especially my Dad who continues to inspire me.

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The police are only as strong as the weakest sergeant.

- Captain Les Kachurek (Ret.) (2018)
City of Niagara Falls Police Department

Chapter One – Introduction

1.1 Introduction of the Organization: The Toronto Police Service

The Toronto Police Service (hereafter TPS) is the police service responsible for municipal policing in the City of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. The TPS serves as the focal organization informing this policy research. The organization was formed in 1834 (Wardle, 2002, p. 6) and is currently the fourth largest police service in North America (Toronto Police Service, 2018, par. 4). The most recent statistical publication released to the public by the TPS recorded a total employee strength of 7,802, with 5,457 employees listed as police officers and 2,345 employees listed as civilian (2013c, p. 3). Since this publication, the number of police officers has been reduced due to the recommendations from an organizational action plan, entitled, *The Way Forward*, planning to reduce the number of police officers to 4,750 by 2019 (Gillis, 2017, "Approved by the police board"). The reasons for the reduction given by TPS include the adoption of a modernized policing model for the City of Toronto that is "innovative, sustainable, and affordable". Components of this model include the increased use of intelligence-led police operations, better deployment of resources, changes to the existing organizational culture, and a focus on communities and partnerships to enhance the TPS' capacity to police a large city with limited public funding (Toronto Police Service, 2016a, pp. 6, 8). The rationale for the reduction of officers is summed by the Chief of Police within the action plan as a TPS effort to modernize and "be where the people of Toronto need us most…" (p. 5). On the other hand, the police association that represents TPS officers claims that the plan to modernize is nothing more than cost-cutting measures governed by city politicians (Carnegie, 2017, "Stop the Toronto Police Cuts").

Toronto spans 630 square kilometers and has a population 2,929,896 (City of Toronto, 2018, "Indicators"). The TPS is the largest municipal police organization in Canada and third largest in North America (Vella, 2015, "I've got"). The Toronto Police Services Board is responsible for the administration of the TPS, including overseeing the Service's objectives, priorities, and policies (Toronto Police Services Board, 2017a, par. 3). The Toronto Police Services Board is composed of three members appointed by the Provincial government, the Mayor of Toronto or designate, two Toronto city councilors, and a citizen selected by City of Toronto Council (Toronto Police Services Board, 2017b, "The Police Services Act"). The circumstances that have inspired this policy research are presented next.

1.2 Overview of the Policy Issue

Achieving commitment and appropriate responses from frontline workers to policy decisions made by government officials is a common challenge in public sector organizations (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 187). For policy-makers, this public management issue remains relevant for the reason that the necessary commitment and responses of street-level "implementers" is key to achieving the desired policy outcomes (Ewalt & Jennings, 2004, p. 452). Since the seminal writings of Lipsky (1980) which focused on the administrative discretion of the "street-level bureaucrat", policy researchers have sought to explain the failure of frontline workers to commit and respond to explicit policy decisions furnished and implemented from the "top" (May & Winter, 2009, p. 453; Riccucci, Meyers, & Lurie, 2005, p. 438). In response, a growing scholarship now focuses on the influence that frontline supervisors may have on the commitment and responses of frontline workers in relation to conformance with organizational policy (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005; Ford, 1999; Young, 2000).

Comparatively, police organizations have also been charged with "implementation failures" inherent to the unpredictable and conflicting commitment and responses of frontline police officers (frontline officers) to policy decisions (Skogan, 2008, p. 26). Resonant in policing scholarship is the finding that general resistance to policy implementation by police officers is common and fierce (Phillips, 2015, p. 375; Skogan, 2008, p. 24; Stanko, 2007, p. 217; Warren & Tomaskovic‐Devey, 2009, p. 365). Routinely police officers fail to conform to new policies, which in turn results in policy failures more often (Buerger, 2002, p. 385). Much of this phenomenon may be attributed to external and internal factors that exist in a police organization that facilitate or hinder conformance to policy decisions. Internal factors stem from the unique authoritative structure and composition of police organizations: one that is hierarchical, professionalized, centralized, and differentiated from other organizations by common frames of reference, common language, and assumptions – forming a unique culture (Schein, 1993, p. 42) and contributing to a unique sociological perspective among police officers. The conceptualization of 'police culture' has long been acknowledged as a significant contributor to the "informal norms and values" which shape the "everyday decisions and practices" of police officers (Loftus, 2010b, p. 1). External factors stem from the relations that exist between the police and the public. The literature suggests that the public's perception of the legitimacy of the police impacts the conformance choices of police officers (B. Brown & Benedict, 2002, p. 545; O'Connor, 2008, p. 578; Reith, 1952, p. 157; Tyler, 2005, p. 322). Therefore, it is important to understand how factors in a police organization influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. Understanding these factors may help us better explain policy implementation success or failure in police organizations. This

knowledge is especially important for police administrators, who are predominantly tasked to implement a multitude of new or reformed policies efficiently and successfully at the frontlines.

To explore the above, this dissertation examines the Regulated Interactions Policy, implemented by the TPS on January 1st, 2017. This policy is mandated and comes as a result of the introduction of racial profiling legislation[1] by the Ontario government. Its implementation is a Province-wide effort to intervene and standardize the practices of "street checks" and "carding" in Ontario (Benzie, Brennan, & Rankin, 2015, par. 1-8). Intentions of this legislation are to regulate and establish oversight in order to prohibit police officers from requesting identifying information from members of the public in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016b, par. 1), and stop any perceived abuse of the controversial practice (Benzie et al., 2015, par. 1-8). All police services across Ontario were responsible for the implementation of a similar internal policy.

Notwithstanding, just over a year later, there is evidence to suggest there has been a problematic implementation of similar policies by some Ontario Police Services at the street level. For instance, a report authored on February 27, 2018, by the Peel Regional Police, to the Peel Police Services Board, showed that this police service had documented two interactions for the entire year of 2017 (Peel Regional Police, 2018, 13/03). In previous years, the Peel Regional Police was averaging 26,000 documented interactions per year (Douglas, 2018, par. 1). Likewise, a report authored on January 29, 2018, by the Ottawa Police Service, to the Ottawa Police Service, showed that this police service had documented five interactions between March 28, 2017, and December 31, 2017 (Ottawa Police Service, 2018, p. 4). This is a police service

[1] While the Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services does not specifically refer to this new Provincial policy as such, legislation or policies designed to "prevent racial profiling" have are referred to in this research as "racial profiling legislation" (see Buerger, 2002).

that conducted over 45,000 documented interactions between 2011 and 2014 (Cossette, 2018, "Between 2011"). It is expected that a similar report, authored by the TPS, will be released to the public sometime in 2018, and will also demonstrate a dramatic decrease in documented interactions. It has been argued by TPS officials that this decrease is the direct result of training inadequacies and uncertainty in relation to policy and legislation reform, an emphasis by the TPS on "quality" police-citizen interaction rather than quantity, and the simultaneous integration of a new electronic record management system named *Versadex* (Rankin & Winsa, 2014, par. 18-28). Alternatively, the police association posits that the drop in documented interactions relates to an officer's concern that interacting with members of the public may lead to public complaints, internal discipline, and exposure on "the cover of the Star" ("But as Mike McCormack"). This sentiment has received recent support from PhD candidate Gregory Brown (2018), who in his unpublished study of 18 police services across Canada, proposes that officers are choosing not to engage in documented police-citizen interaction to avoid racial profiling and breaches of human rights allegations, media scrutiny, internal discipline, and legal findings related to Charter breaches – a manifestation of officer self-preservation. What is clear is that these internal policies mandate the documentation of regulated interactions. The above suggests that there may be certain factors in these police organizations that are hindering the implementation of this policy at the street level.

With the above in mind, this research further explores the policy implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy by frontline officers at the street level in Toronto. The intent of this exploration is to better understand the perceived factors (factors) that operate to facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and whether this influence is positive. Also important are the methods used by sergeants to achieve

conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. To be clear, this research does not aim to assess the efficacy of any policy implementation by the TPS. However, this research does provide a rich inquiry into a sergeant's perspective on aspects of the given policy and the factors perceived to influence their own capacity to achieve policy conformance front frontline officers. It is hoped that this research will enable police administrators to leverage the influence of sergeants when implementing policies to improve their chances of 'policy success' (defined below).

1.3 The Significance of this Policy Research

Police organizations rely on frontline supervisors to achieve operational success (Engel, 2001, p. 341). Frontline supervisors, often referred to as sergeants, act as a facilitating layer of management and are tasked with administering policy at the street level (Skogan, 2008, pp. 25-26). Consistent with the public management literature, policing scholarship demonstrates that the support of sergeants is critical to the successful implementation of, and conformance to new or reformed policy (Britz & Payne, 1994; Charles, Falcone, & Wells, 1992; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; Phillips, 2015; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Alternatively, it has been acknowledged that sergeants possess the ability to impede policy implementations at the street level (Mark, 1976; Sherman, Milton, & Kelley, 1973; S. Walker, 1993). Not surprisingly, the literature suggests that sergeants represent the most "proximate and perhaps most potent bureaucratic force" related to policy implementation and conformance at the frontlines of policing (Engel & Worden, 2003, p. 133).

While the majority of literature reviewed in this work demonstrates a sergeant's capacity to positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers, a small amount of dated literature suggests this influence may be limited (Allen, 1982, p. 105; M. K. Brown, 1988, pp.

97-107; Reuss-Ianni, 1983, p. 63; Van Maanen, 1983, p. 277). This literature, however, is important as it explores "street cop culture" and explains how environmental and structural factors influence the relationship between officers and their sergeants (Reuss-Ianni, p. 62). The contrast in empirical data suggests the need for more research to clarify these mixed findings surrounding supervisory and policy conformance issues. This need is also acknowledged in that the occupation of policing over the past several years has experienced and continues to experience "disruptive" (Campeau, 2015, p. 675) and dramatic change (Loftus, 2010b, p. 3). For instance, there has been a major shift towards 'community policing' (Correia & Jenks, 2011, p. 6; Glaser & Denhardt, 2010, pp. 309-310) and the occupation itself has become more professionalized, subjecting officer behavior and decision-making processes to increased scrutiny from government oversight, the media, and the public (Campeau, 2015, pp. 674-675; Chan, 1996, p. 232). Consequently, there is a need to unpack the broader environment or 'institution' in which the sergeant operates to examine and improve our understanding of the contextual nature of the factors that may influence a sergeant's capacity as it relates to internal policy conformance. After all, police culture is not static and the sergeant does not make decisions, operate, or provide direction to frontline officers from within a vacuum.

Policy research conducted at the initial stages of implementation is significant as it can assist administrators "navigate the increasing complexity of issues", enrich any conclusions reached, and later bolster the legitimacy of any evaluative processes (Hendriks, 2012, pp. 443-444). Second, with early implementation comes the recent mandatory completion of training for all sergeants and frontline officers in the areas of bias awareness, discrimination, racism, public interactions, and the collection of information from members of the public (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016c, Part III). Consequently, policy knowledge

and awareness are more likely to be rich and current at this stage of implementation. The Regulated Interactions Policy must be implemented and adhered to by police services, including the TPS, by January 1st, 2017 (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016a, par. 3). The purpose of the next section is to improve our understanding of the social issues and history that have contributed to the policy issue under investigation and the significance of the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy

1.3.1 Racial Profiling

This research does not examine the practice of racial profiling. However, and as discussed below, the introduction of policy regulating the practices of "street checks" and "carding" responds to a large and growing body of evidence that demonstrates bias in the manner police officers stop, search, and document contact with racialized persons, which has been and continues to be a controversial issue in Canadian Society (S. Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011, p. 395). Contributing public opinion and condemnation of racially biased decision-making reinforce scholarly findings and suggest that police officers continue to practice overt and unconscious racial prejudice and bias towards racialized persons – responses by police officers that have been publicly labeled 'racial profiling' (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002, p. 250). Racial profiling has been characterized in literature as the most recent expression of hostility that defines the problematic relationship between the police and racialized communities (Glover, 2007, p. 239; K. K. Russell, 2001, pp. 80-81; C. C. Smith, 2007, p. 55; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002, p. 452, 2004, p. 305). It has been suggested that racial profiling functions as a modern-day system of surveillance and control which "creates racial inequities by denying…[racialized persons]…privacy, identity, place, security, and control over their daily life" (Cross, 2001, p. 5).

The Ontario Human Rights Commission defines racial profiling in its broadest condition to include:

> Any action undertaken for reasons of safety, security or public protection that relies on stereotypes about race, colour, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, or place of origin rather than reasonable suspicion, to single out an individual for greater scrutiny or different treatment". (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003, p. 6)

Although anyone can experience profiling, racialized persons are the primary targets (p. 7). A report authored by the Ontario Human Rights Commission (p. 7) documented experiences of racial profiling from persons who self-identified as African Canadian, Indigenous, Arab, Chinese and South East Asian, Latin America, South Asian, and Muslim. Similarly, Smith (2007, p. 8) refers to the negative discourse that has been "officially" constructed inside Canada's borders, associating people of African descent, Indigenous, Arabs, South Asian, and Muslims with criminality and a propensity towards crime. Likewise, evidence of racism in Canada's criminal justice system is consistently depicted by the dramatic overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in correctional facilities across the country (C. C. Smith, 2006, p. 83). Equally concerning is the more recent process of "browning", which characterizes "browned bodies" as "threats to the security of the nation" post-September 11, 2001 (Ameeriar, 2012, p. 192; Lugo-Lugo & Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009, p. 111). Why? Because national security work has become increasingly localized ('national preparedness') (Crosby & Monaghan, 2018, p. 15; Pelfrey, 2009, pp. 262-263), which means that "browning" is happening at the local level as well. Further, racialized women (Berlatsky, 2014; Crenshaw & Ritchie, 2015; Humphries, 1999; Judge & Wood, 2014; Lundman & Kaufman, 2003; Newsome, 2003; Women of Color Policy Network, 2003), low income women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQ) people of

colour (Hanssens, Moodie-Mills, Ritchie, Spade, & Vaid, 2014; Irlbeck & Walker, 2002; Kraska & Kappeler, 1995; Manatu, 2003; Mogul, Ritchie, & Whitlock, 2011; Movement Advancement Project and Center for American Progress, 2016; Ritchie & Jones-Brown, 2017; Stinson, Liederbach, Brewer, & Mathna, 2014) continue to report experiencing gender- and sexuality-specific forms of racial profiling in the context of contemporary police-citizen interactions.

In Canadian jurisprudence racial profiling has been defined as "…a phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an identified group in society on the basis of race…resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group" (Rosenberg, 1999, par. 24). Similarly, Harris (2002, p. 8) suggests that racial profiling is "the use of race or ethnic appearance as a factor in deciding who merits police attention as a suspicious person". Racial profiling has evolved into an expression of the unwavering hostile relationship between police and racialized communities (C. C. Smith, 2007, p. 55). Its association with abusive police practices (Gross & Livingston, 2002, p. 1415; Ramirez, McDevitt, & Farrell, 2000, p. 3; Tanovich, 2006, p. 13) has led to the popular term "Driving while Black" (Harris, 1997, p. 546) and an emphasis on "Black crime", "Black criminality" (Tator & Henry, 2006, p. 20), and "…Blackness as an indicator of criminal tendencies" (Carter Jr., 2004, p. 20).

Contemporary research suggests that present-day police organizations interact disproportionately with racialized persons and contact with the police can produce negative assessments of the police by the public (Cheurprakobkit, 2000, p. 331; Decker, 1981, p. 83; Murty, Julian, & Smith, 1990, p. 255; D. A. Smith, Graham, & Adams, 1991, p. 25). In the case of the most commonly reported type of interaction with police, racialized motorists (especially in urban areas) are subjected to police stops and subsequent investigations at much greater rates (Meehan & Ponder, 2002, pp. 399-400). Disproportionate stops and investigations of racialized

persons have also been reported in contexts other than driving such as walking or bicycling, riding a bus, boarding a plane, or proceeding through customs (Ahmed & Rezmovic, 2001; David Cole, 1999; Engel et al., 2002; D. Johnson et al., 2011; K. K. Russell, 1998; Tanovich, 2006). The increase of police patrols, undercover investigations, surveillance, and targeted enforcement operations (stings) within racialized communities has also been attributed to racial profiling by police (Engel et al., 2002; Harris, 1999; Meehan & Ponder, 2002; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002). Scholarly work suggests that racialized persons are disproportionately represented when arrested or ticketed (Kochel, Wilson, & Mastrofski, 2011; Langton & Durose, 2013), searched (Eith & Durose, 2011; Engel & Johnson, 2006; Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; Higgins, Jennings, Jordan, & Gabbidon, 2011; Higgins, Vito, & Walsh, 2008; Langton & Durose, 2013), and disproportionately subjected to overcharging, poor character assessments, and greater levels of police use-of-force (Eith & Durose, 2011; Engel & Calnon, 2004; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Roberts & Doob, 1997; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). The impact of racial profiling for members of society is significant and is discussed in the next section.

1.3.2 Impacts of Racial Profiling

Reported impacts of racial profiling include a decrease of public confidence in institutions, including police services, leading to the mistrust of police officers and the criminal justice system in its entirety (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003, p. 23; C. C. Smith, 2007, p. 63). A mistrust of policing institutions has been shown to produce a number of outcomes, including an unwillingness to cooperate with police, report crime, pursue a career in law enforcement, increase conflict with or hostility towards police, a loss of respect for police officers, a negative impact on one's willingness to comply with the law, and a loss of confidence in police credibility and testimony (Henry, 1994, p. 224; James, 1998, pp. 171-174; Melchers,

2003, p. 348; Ontario Human Rights Commission, pp. 26-28). Outcomes associated with a loss of public confidence in the criminal justice system include inappropriate responses to police interaction, retaliation for past-perceived injustices, an increase in officer-safety concerns, civil unrest, and jury trial acquittals (Ontario Human Rights Commission, p. 12).

Psychological impacts have also been reported by victims of racial profiling, which include a diminished sense of citizenship, pride, dignity, and increased feelings of alienation from Canadian society (African Canadian Legal Clinic, 2012, p. 25; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003, pp. 30-31, 43). Victims of racial profiling report being burdened by the possibility of future deprivations of liberties and loss of privacy (Ontario Human Rights Commission, p. 33). In order to avoid police scrutiny or future incidents of racial profiling by police, racialized persons report having to change their behaviour and alter their daily actions (2003, pp. 37-40). This phenomenon is referred to as "survival techniques" (Jernigan, 2000, p. 135; Ontario Human Rights Commission, pp. 37-40). Furthermore, victims of racial profiling have reported feelings of perpetual injustice, inner conflict, disempowerment, stress, embarrassment, and inferiority (African Canadian Legal Clinic, p. 24; M. Brown, 2006, p. 176; Ontario Human Rights Commission, pp. 35, 43). Racial profiling has also been shown to have a negative impact on spousal relationships, the mental health of family members, and the quality of friendships (Ontario Human Rights Commission, pp. 45-47).

In some cases the psychological impacts of racial profiling manifest physically. For instance, victims may endure a sense of physical violation as a result of frisks or strip searches by police, discomfort during interactions with police, and injuries as a result of the use of force by police (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003, pp. 48-49). Other exhibitions may include poor mental and physical health, higher levels of anxiety and worry, psychosis, depression, heart

disease, hypertension, high blood pressure, and respiratory illness (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2002, pp. 626-630; Kelaher et al., 2008, p. 1632; Krieger & Sidney, 1996, p. 1374; Paradies, 2006, p. 895).

The literature also evidences the financial impact of racial profiling on its victims. These include legal fees from criminal charges or civil suits, reduced job prospects, or loss of income (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003, pp. 47-48). Racial profiling has also been reported to influence disparities in employment, economic status, housing, and education (Canadian Council on Social Development, 2000, p. 26). One mechanism to explain this influence is the disempowering effect that incidents of racial profiling have on its victims. This sense of powerlessness has been shown to negatively impact an individual's ability and willingness to self-advance (Ontario Human Rights Commission, pp. 35-36). Consequently, racialized individuals have difficulty achieving positions of authority or power in society and fail to represent their communities at crucial socioeconomic discussions (p. 35). This includes discussions surrounding the impacts of racial profiling in society (p. 35). Another mechanism that explains how racial profiling influences the above disparities is the outcomes of racialized persons choosing to neglect careers in law enforcement, justice, politics, law, and social services as a result of racial profiling incidents experienced either personally or by a friend, relative, or role model (pp. 35-36). Further, it has been demonstrated that racial profiling incidents create divisions within racialized communities, causing an unwillingness to identify with one's community, resulting in a lack of role modeling, community pride, and support (p. 36).

It is also important to acknowledge the most visible impact of racial profiling and cause for regulation in Canadian society. The inequity in the level of police enforcement of racialized persons has led to the overrepresentation of racialized persons being investigated, charged, and incarcerated in the Canadian criminal justice system (S. Wortley & Tanner, 2003, p. 373).

Between 2010 and 2011, while only representing 2.5% of Canada's population, "African Canadian" offenders represented 9% of the federal prison population – a 52% increase over 10 years (Alison Crawford, 2011, par. 1-4). As expected, the African Canadian Legal Clinic (2012, p. 26) attributes this overrepresentation to a racist criminal justice system and the impact of racial profiling by Canadian police services. In Ontario, it has been suggested that it is the act of racial profiling which continues to represent the expression of animosity and hostility that defines the current and enduring relationship between the police and racialized persons, especially those who are Black (Glover, 2007, p. 239; K. K. Russell, 2001, pp. 80-81; C. C. Smith, 2007, p. 55; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002, p. 452, 2004, p. 305). In Toronto, reports of racial profiling have also been documented and are discussed below.

1.3.3 Racial Profiling in Toronto

In addition to the growing volume of research (Ben-Porat, 2008; Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 2016; Closs & McKenna, 2006; Commission on Systemic Racism, 1995; Foster, Jacobs, & Siu, 2016; James, 1998; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Lewis, 1992; Roberts & Doob, 1997; Stenning, 1994; The Environics Institute, 2017; S. Wortley, 1994, 1996, 1997), over the past three decades there has been increased media attention dedicated to allegations of racial bias on the part of Canadian police, overwhelmingly specific to policing in Toronto. In 1991, a series of articles appeared in the Globe and Mail that not only anecdotally addressed the controversy surrounding the collection of race-based statistics, but also questioned the relationship between racialized persons and crime in Toronto and the overrepresentation of racialized persons in Toronto's courts (Appleby, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). Appleby (1991, par. 3; 1992a, par. 25) emphasized the visible disparity related to the overwhelming number of young Black men being paraded at drug court in Toronto and the propensity for the police to

associate violent crime with "Jamaican-borns". For instance, Appleby (1992b, par. 18) reported that at least forty percent of Toronto's robberies involve "Blacks" – a number that also matched the number of Black persons confined to Toronto jails. He also noted that at least six of the eight Blacks persons wounded or killed by the police in Toronto over a four-year period were of Jamaican descent (1992c, par. 46). Chiefly, Appleby (1991, par. 5, 26) brought attention to the notable absence of ethnic crime data available in Canada versus the United States and the police chief's refusal to release race-based figures for fear of "scarring" entire communities.

Beginning in 2002, the Toronto Star published a series of articles containing both anecdotal and empirical data supporting allegations that the TPS had been more aggressively charging and detaining Blacks - essentially engaging in racial profiling (Rankin, Quinn, Shephard, Simmie, & Duncanson, 2002, para. 1-4). The data published by the Toronto Star relied on an analysis of the TPS Criminal Information Processing System (CIPS), which was conducted by York University's Institute for Social Research and involved arrest data collected between the years 1996 and 2002 (Melchers, 2006, p. 44). Later, in 2010, after conducting an additional analysis of documented public contacts by Toronto Police officers between 2003 and 2008, the Toronto Star printed a series of articles claiming that the TPS practiced racial profiling. In the first article of the series, it was reported that Black persons are three times more likely to be stopped and documented by officers than White persons (Rankin, 2010, par. 1-2). In 2012, as part of the same series of racial profiling articles, the Toronto Star published another analysis of documented public contacts by Toronto Police officers between 2008 and 2011, reporting that young Black men were stopped and documented at much higher rates than their demographic representation in local census data (Rankin & Winsa, 2012a, par. 6). As a result, publications have remained conspicuous in local media concerning any policy developments at the federal,

provincial, or municipal level aiming to regulate systemic racism within the criminal justice system and the negative treatment of racialized persons by the police. To understand how these findings came to be, it is important to consider the evolution of "street checks" and "carding" in Toronto, which is discussed next.

1.3.4 The Evolution of Street Checks and Carding

The adoption of the practices of "street checks" and "carding" by the TPS dates back to 1957 when local police services amalgamated and formed the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force (Rankin, 2015, par. 3). Initially contact cards were distributed to police officers so that information regarding interactions with "persons of interest" could be documented and forwarded to detectives (par. 3). Internal policy governing the practices of "street checks" and "carding" was developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s and police officers were given more discretion to document additional information including "investigations of persons" or if the person was "already known to police" (par. 4-5). By the late 1990s, the practices of "street checks" and "carding" had become deeply engrained in police investigative methodology, requiring a documented record of any encounter when investigating a person when the circumstances were deemed appropriate (par. 7). By the late 2000s, these circumstances included a multitude of interactions of interest to police (par. 8-9). Eventually, "street checks" and "carding" became conventional terms used by Toronto Police Officers (and later the public and media) to describe Toronto's most recorded type of police-citizen interaction (Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. 23). The practices of "street checks" and "carding" also included entering all "contacts" into a police database (p. 23).

It was not long before "street checks" and "carding" became terms associated with the "systematic process of racialization" – a process responsible for influencing criminal justice

outcomes by increasing police attention towards and decisions to engage racialized persons (S. Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011, pp. 401-402). This association was supported by scholarly research suggesting that racial differences did exist in the frequency of documented police-citizen interactions in Toronto (Closs & McKenna, 2006; Commission on Systemic Racism, 1995; James, 1998; Melchers, 2006; Neugebauer, 2000; S. Wortley, 1994, 1996, 1997). Accordingly, a growing discourse emerged affirming that certain racial groups were surveilled, arrested, and charged more often by police. Additional uncertainties also arose regarding the legality of, the use of, access to, and the retention of information collected by the police as a consequence of documented police-citizen interactions (Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. 35).

Beginning in 2002, the Toronto Star published a series of articles containing both anecdotal and empirical data supporting allegations that the TPS had been more aggressively charging and detaining Blacks (Rankin et al., 2002, para. 1-4). The Toronto Star conducted an investigation of how racialized persons were treated by police, and in doing so learned that in police-citizen interactions, police officers were classifying people by racial categories; "Black", "white", "brown" (referring to people of South Asian descent), and "other" (referring to people of Chinese and other Far Eastern origin") (para. 1-4). Concerns of critics became amplified when the Toronto Star conducted its analysis of 1.7 million "contact cards" filled out by Toronto Police officers between 2003 and 2008, reporting that Black persons were three times more likely to be stopped and documented than White persons (Rankin, 2010, par. 1-2). Politicians, the Toronto Police Service Board, the media, special interest groups, and members of the public expressed concern that the policy of the TPS that regulated the practices of "street checks" and "carding" promoted biased-based interaction and arbitrary stops indicative of racial profiling (Rankin & Winsa, 2012b, par. 9; Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. iii).

In response to public concerns, in March of 2012, the Chief of the TPS acknowledged that racial bias existed among the TPS (Rankin, 2010, par. 9-10; Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. 48) and ordered a review of all internal policy related to the practices of "street checks" and "carding" (2013b, p. iii). This review included an internal report entitled, "Police and Community Engagement Review" (PACER). In this report, the TPS justified the continued use of "street checks" and "carding" in the interest of public safety, however, acknowledged the concerns of the public and the systemic biases of police officers (2013b, pp. iii-iv, 28, 47). However, despite promises from the Chief of Police to change policies regulating the practices of "street checks" and "carding", community advocates remained unsatisfied (Winsa, 2014, par. 8-11; Winsa & Rankin, 2015, par. 4). Amid continued controversy and political and public pressure, the Chief of Police suspended the practices of "street checks" and "carding" on January 1, 2015 (Winsa & Rankin, 2015, pp., par. 1-2). Next, a policy solution and implementation were developed by police administrators to address public concerns, which is discussed in the following section.

1.3.5 The Implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy

After the practices of "street checks" and "carding" were officially suspended by the TPS, strong advocacy from critics for either reform or abolishment of the practices continued. Critics of "street checks" and "carding" included the Toronto Mayor, the Chair of the Toronto Police Services Board, prominent Liberals, Toronto city-builders, federal politicians, Members of Provincial Parliament, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, academics, legal groups[2], civil rights groups[3], activists, journalists and community leaders (Benzie et al., 2015; Brennan &

[2] Including the African Canadian Legal Clinic (Winsa, 2015)
[3] Including the Anti-Black Racism Network (Winsa, 2015) and Black Lives Matter Toronto (Battersby, 2016)

Ferguson, 2015; Grewal, 2015; Mukherjee, 2015; Perkel, 2015; Winsa, 2015). In response to tenacious advocacy for the above, the Ontario government announced it would intervene and introduce legislation that would standardize and govern the practices of "street checks" and "carding" across the Province for all police services (Benzie et al., 2015, par. 1-8). Subsequent provincial legislation was drawn up in Ontario. Entitled, "Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties" (Appendix 9.3), the legislation sets out consistent regulations for a variety of police-citizen interactions where police are seeking to collect identifying information from members of the public (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016c). The intent of this legislation is to ensure voluntary police-citizen interactions are conducted without bias or discrimination and that the arbitrary race-based collection of identifying information by the police is banned (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016d, par. 1, 2).

Further contained in this legislation are several new policy measures that reform the practices of "street checks" and "carding". For instance, police officers must not attempt to collect information about an individual for arbitrary reasons based on race, if the individual declines to answer a question or attempts to end the interaction, or solely because an individual is in a high-crime location (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016a, par. 2). Officers are also now required to provide a receipt to members of the public (2016c, Part III). Additionally, officers are required to participate in enhanced diversity training (2016c, Part III). The Province has also commissioned internal review and independent oversight mechanisms to ensure implementation of this legislation by all Ontario police services (2016c, Part IV).

Beyond regulating the collection of information from individuals, the above provincial legislation radically reforms how police officers investigate general criminal activity, suspicious

activity, and intelligence gathering (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016a, par. 1). Other significant reform of police practices includes a ban on stopping members of the community without a lawful reason - especially racialized persons or persons who reside in high crime areas (2016c, Part II). Additionally, the legislation places an onus on police officers to ensure all individuals who are investigated are properly informed of the reasons for their investigation and their legal rights (2016c, Part III). The legislation further forces the dissolution of all performance targets and evaluations associated with the collection of information from individuals (2016c, Part III). Lastly, in an effort to hold police officers more accountable, code of conduct violations for lack of conformance are to be instilled into the relevant internal policy (the Regulated Interactions Policy), which governs the above practices (2016c, Part III). As of January 1st, 2017, this newly introduced internal policy of the TPS, (Appendix 9.1) reads with the provincial racial profiling legislation described above, and functions to regulate the police practices of "street checks" and "carding".

With the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy, the TPS officially acknowledged that there is no place for racial profiling in any public interaction (Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. 34). The TPS further acceded that all non-detention, non-arrest interactions between the police and the public must be voluntary (p. 34). However, despite these official acknowledgements, many from the police ranks have suggested that the new internal policy will come at a great cost to public safety (Gillis, 2015, par. 6, 10). Rank and file officers continue to argue that the proactive collection of information is necessary to keep the community safe, is lawful, and adheres to the statutory duties found in municipal[4] and provincial legislation[5] that require the police to "preserve the peace, prevent crime, and protect the public and assist

[4] Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act – R.S.O. (1990) c. M-56
[5] Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-15, s. 42 "Duties of a Police Officer"

victims" (Toronto Police Service, p. 35). The narrative emanating from prominent members of Ontario's law enforcement community has been: "if it's done right, it protects people" (Gee, 2015, par. 5).

The implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy has been met with mixed reviews. Many non-police critics, including some members of Toronto's racialized communities, have hailed the introduction of the provincial legislation and the subsequent internal policy of the TPS as "progressive, historic, and overdue" (Gillis, 2015, par. 6). Notwithstanding, other critics do not believe the new policy of the TPS will stop the practices of "street checks" and "carding" and remain convinced that all historic data collected by the police must be destroyed – a requirement not mandated by the new Provincial legislation (Gillis, 2016, par. 3-4). Other opponents of this policy implementation suggest that the Regulated Interactions Policy is only an "incremental gesture" demonstrating the "reaffirmation of police carding in Toronto" and a means to discriminate against and "control [the] Black population" (Desmond Cole, 2016, par. 1, 8-9). Despite this contention, the originators of the Regulated Interactions Policy (the Toronto Police Services Board) purport that this policy reform goes even further than what was required by Provincial legislation to ensure the rights of Toronto's racialized public are protected (Gillis, 2016, par. 1). It is expected that the controversy surrounding the implementation of this policy will continue to persist throughout this research.

1.4 The Significance of the Public Perception of Police

While this research focuses on the perceptions of sergeants, it is important to consider how the perceptions of those that are policed (external factors) may impact policy conformance in a police organization. Positive police relations is defined as "favourable public attitudes toward and increased familiarity with the police" (Murphy & Worrall, 1999, p. 328). Police

relations, also referred to in the literature as police-community relations or police-public relations, is impacted by the "social perception" of the part of members of the public; how the public goes about understanding the police (Jussim, 2017, p. 1). Police relations also refers to the perceived legitimacy of the police organization: the recognition by the public, that the police, whether represented as an individual police officer or an organization, is "succeeding at or fulfilling [his/her/its] raison d'etre" (Greene, 2017).

The importance of positive perceptions of the police is made plain in the Peelian Principles: "the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions, and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect" (Reith, 1952, p. 157) and later, by the volume of research devoted to assessing this construct. Bellman (1935, p. 75) developed the first internal scale to rate a "police organization according to certain standards". Parratt (1937, 1938) took to improve Bellman's scale, developing a survey instrument to measure citizen's evaluations of the police. He (1938, p. 739) argued that the assessment of an "effective sector of citizen opinion" is more compelling than the potentially biased internal measurements of police administrators. As a result, the presumption that a proper assessment of police relations must be "objective and subject to criticism and discussion" (Parratt, p. 756) has spurred decades more research by police scholars.

With the advent of community policing strategies under the Anglo-American policing model, police-community relations has taken on a new significance, emphasizing a reciprocal and trusting relationship between the police and the public (Frank, Smith, & Novak, 2005, p. 207; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998, p. 547). Tyler (2005, p. 322) suggests that positive police relations assist policing efforts in three related ways: (1) By reporting crimes and the identities of perpetrators; (2) by creating joint initiatives to reduce local crime; and (3) by supporting the

appropriation of public resources to the police. Similarly, Gaines and Kappeler (2011, p. 412) discuss a variety of benefits of good police-community relations, which include political support for the police (programs, salaries, recruiting, resources) and crime-related legislation, public participation in crime reduction programs, and improved working relations with citizens. Worrall (1999, p. 47) notes that a "constructive working relationship must exist between law enforcement officials and citizens" if the public is to be served "effectively and acceptably".

Lai and Zhao (2010, p. 685) suggest that the public's assessment of police relations is considered meaningful on the grounds that police services require a favourable level of support to be recognized as a legitimate institution within the community. On the other hand, a failure of police services to appear legitimate can be extremely harmful. In such instances, the public is less likely to abide by the law and more willing to challenge police authority (Tyler, 2003, p. 286). For this reason, Moore (1997, p. 27) argues: "the loss of popular legitimacy for the criminal justice system produces disastrous consequences for the system's performance. If citizens do not trust the system, they will not use it". Unsurprisingly, the regular administration of citizen attitude surveys has proven an effective research method to assess and communicate the status of police-public relations (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994, pp. 3, 12).

Cox and Fitzgerald (1992, p. 3) propose that negative attitudes towards the police can be conducive to social tensions. Furthermore, Brown and Benedict (2002, p. 545) suggest that a distrusting public may negatively impact the police's ability to control crime, contributing to a "cycle of reduced police effectiveness, increased crime, and further distrust of the police". For this reason, many police services have adopted the philosophy that its police officers are only "as good as the public thinks" (Bayley, 1994, p. 99). Moreover, as the value of public opinion increases - tied to a conceivable shift from "police service" to "service provider" - the state of

police relations has become a crucial part of the process to improve police policies, practices, performance, and accountability measures (B. Brown & Benedict, p. 546; O'Connor, 2008, p. 578). Finally, in discussing the injurious impact of negative police relations, Brown and Benedict (2002, p. 545) stress that police officers "ought to be concerned about how they are viewed by the public, if for no reason other than preservation of their careers".

The outcomes of negative perceptions of the police (a low public perception of police legitimacy) highlight the importance of its study by academics and the police. For instance, we may for a moment consider the urban riots and protests that have occurred during the last half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Most of these riots have been attributed to unfavourable police actions and negative perceptions of police (Chernega, 2016, pp. 234-235; Cox & Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 143). The riots of Miami in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1992 were triggered by the police beatings of racialized males in racialized communities (Arthur McDuffie and Rodney King respectively) and a combination of the subsequent changes in trial venues, acquittals of the involved officers, a "long-standing" hostility towards the police and government, and "negative police-community relations" (Monroy & Myers, 2004, The Riots; Murty, Roebuck, & Armstrong, 1994, pp. 86, 97). More recently, the death of Trayvon Martin and the police-related deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, and other racialized persons in the United States, have sparked movements and countless protests bringing mass-attention to the "disparate contact with police and policing strategies" faced by racialized communities (Pratt-Harris et al., 2016, p. 381). Similarly in Canada, protests against police actions have followed the police-related deaths of Jermaine Carby, Andrew Loku and Marc Ekamba-Boekwa (Battersby, 2016, par. 1, 7, 18; Gallant & Gillis, 2015, par. 1). There is little doubt that "history has demonstrated that when relationships between police and minority

communities are strained, a single critical incident can have deleterious effects" (Jefferis, Kaminski, Holmes, & Hanley, 1997, p. 391).

Notwithstanding the above, other recent studies have reported that the general public tends to view the police positively (Benedict, Brown, & Bower, 2000; Cotter, 2015; J. R. Davis, 1990; Kaminski & Jefferis, 1998; Shaw, Shapiro, Lock, & Jacobs, 1998). For instance, the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Office of Community Oriented Police Services surveyed 14,000 residents of 12 cities and concluded "80% or more of the residents in each city were satisfied with the police in their neighbourhood" (S. K. Smith, Steadman, Minton, & Townsend, 1998, p. v). In Canada, data from the 2013 General Social Survey on Social Identity (Statistics Canada) demonstrated that "76% of Canadians have a great deal or some confidence in the police, making it the institution with the highest level of public confidence" (Cotter, p. 3). Combined with the above, these findings reconfirm that different segments of the population perceive the police differently.

1.4.1 Perspectives that Challenge the Peelian Approach

Whereas the act of policing is a universal aspect of social relations present in all societies, the presence of a specialized police institution is not. It has been suggested from a critical perspective that the emergence of the professional police (Peel's police) was, and remains a condition of the existence of "social order"– a permanent inequality present in society (Reiner, 2010, p. 39). Three interpretations of the enactment of the professional police (see Reiner, chap. 2) hold several assumptions, which attempt to explain the construction of the professional police under the Anglo-American policing model. In this section, I will briefly discuss how each interpretation takes a unique approach to a conceptualization of police relations, attempting to account for the state of police relations that we find in contemporary society.

The Traditional Interpretation

The traditional interpretation of the enactment of the professional police is mainly associated with conservative assumptions and accepts much of the historical developments of the role of modern police credited to Peel (see Rawlings, 2002, pp. 113-114). To that end, the orthodox literature is essentially an informative recount of the history of the development of the modern police in England, Canada, and the United States. Included in the orthodox literature are works of historians who pioneered the investigation of the development of the Anglo-American policing model in England (see Lee, 1901; Reith, 1938, 1940, 1943, 1948, 1952, 1956) and those that continued the investigation in Canada (Juliani, Talbot, & Jayewardene, 1983, 1984; Kelly & Kelly, 1976; Stenning, 1981). These works, while variable in degree of detail and measure, share traditional assumptions explored in this section.

The traditional interpretation has it that the enactment of the professional police was a rational response to dealing with the realization of dual societal pressures: (1) the urban and (2) industrial revolutions (Reiner, 2010, p. 40). Among the public, these pressures imparted fear of rising crime rates, disorder and mob violence, the threat of riots, and declining moral standards (p. 42). The traditional interpretation relies on an additional assumption that despite some initial and short-term opposition to the establishment of the modern police, public opinion largely "veered in favour of the police" (Critchley, 1978, p. 55). Furthermore, the orthodox view suggests that overwhelming public approval came as a result of the professionalization of the police and their "preventative policing" mandate: regular patrolling to deter crime, to reduce disorder, and to safeguard the public in a rational and efficient manner (Reiner, p. 43; Reith, 1952, p. 171; Wilson, 1973, p. 589). The traditional interpretation cites evolving relations between the police and the public as beneficial; bringing to the public "peace and security…in

place of the turmoil and lawlessness of centuries" (Critchley, pp. 55-56). The traditional view promotes the idea that "the emergence of a municipal police force…" assuaged the problem of "growing levels of civil order" (Wilson, 1973, p. 589). Moreover, this view maintains that the public would have been undoubtedly appreciative of the modern police, especially for its role in protecting individual victims of crime (Reiner, p. 44). The traditional interpretation of the enactment of the professional police represents an uncritical account of police relations. Instead, it affirms that the developed relationship between the police and the public is ideal - advanced rationally, serving the interests of all society's classes, especially those who are poor, oppressed, and underrepresented. It presents a view of police relations that I suggest would be considered obsolete and held by the few in contemporary society. I have not given the orthodox view much consideration when attempting to explain contemporary police relations in this research. It is well accepted that the criminal justice system "reflects and promotes" interests of more powerful members in society and that "social and racial stratification" is embedded in policing methods and initiatives that sustain the unfair treatment of marginalized and racialized groups (F. Henry & Tator, 2010, p. 161)

The Revisionist Interpretation

The revisionist interpretation of the enactment of the professional police represents a more critical account of the development of police relations and challenges the Peelian approach. Akin to the traditional interpretation, the revisionist interpretation acknowledges the role of societal pressures (the urban and industrial revolution) towards the enactment of the professional police. However, unlike the orthodox ideology, the revisionist interpretation frames these societal pressures within a capitalist structure, emphasizing class division and social conflict attributed to the "rise of capitalism" (Jones, 1983, p. 153; Reiner, 2010, p. 48). Consequently,

the revisionist interpretation assumes that the source of disorder and crime in society stems from the advancement of a capitalist agenda (Reiner, p. 50). It further assumes that the enactment of the professional police was a result of the increasing inability of the pre-existing urban policing system to meet the needs of a capitalist society influenced by class relations (p. 50).

The revisionist interpretation suggests that the capitalist agenda grew urban cities and increased the segregation between social classes (Harring, 1983, p. 15; Monkkonen, 1981, p. 23; Reiner, 2010, p. 48; Spitzer & Scull, 1977, p. 21). In doing so, the lower class "political articulation" clashed with "new bourgeois standards" and society's aristocrats came to perceive the migrant poor as a "potentially dangerous class" (Brogden, 1987, pp. 5-6). The revisionist interpretation also departs from the orthodox notion that the "people" control the police and that the police are part of the community (an ordinary citizen in uniform) (Reiner, 2010, pp. 52-53). Rather, the revisionist interpretation critically diagnoses a newly policed society; a professional police representative of a central power, conducting "potentially violent supervision" in bureaucratic fashion (Silver, 1967, p. 8). This interpretation accounts for what Comack (2012, p. 28) refers to as "racialized policing": police participation in the governance (reproducing order) of race and racialization in society. In summary, the revisionist interpretation of the enactment of the professional police represents a critical account of police relations by recognizing the influences of both class and power structure in society. It presumes that the enactment of the professional police was "instrumental" for the capitalist class of society to manage disorder, control crime and morality, and subdue political nonconformism in the interest of a plutocrat agenda (2010, p. 53). I submit that the revisionist interpretation presents a useful explanation to account for the current state of contemporary police relations in Canada. This interpretation concedes that contemporary Canadian society operates under a capitalist agenda and that the

presence of class conflict, poverty, and marginalization are factors that contribute to the existing inequalities among its citizenry and the disposition that tends to dissociate the police from the public. However, in reducing institutions to the needs of capitalism, this interpretation ignores that the police were born prior to a capitalist agenda and as such may adopt a blind view to the significance of institutions.

The Post-Revisionist Interpretation

The post-revisionist interpretation of the enactment of the professional police presents a more sophisticated account of the development of police relations than those of the traditional and revisionist. Referred to by Reiner (2010, p. 65) as a "neo-Reithian revisionist synthesis", the post-revisionist interpretation criticizes both traditional and revisionist assumptions, instead synthesizing a more complex account of the enactment of the professional police. In critique of the traditional assumptions, the post-revisionist interpretation questions whether the enactment of the professional police was indeed a rational response to the unmanageable crime and disorder attributed to the urban and industrial revolutions (Emsley, 2007, pp. 130 ,133, 2008, p. 81; Rawlings, 2008, p. 66; Reiner, p. 61). The post-revisionist interpretation is equally critical of the revisionist assumptions. It questions (1) the revisionist's bid to dismiss any amicable relationship between the citizenry and the professional police as "artificially constructed", "manipulated", or a "temporary truce" (Reiner, 2010, pp. 55, 57, 63-64), (2) whether revisionists exaggerate the degree to which the elite was panicked in response to any social disorder (Brogden, 1987, p. 5; Monkkonen, 1981, p. 51), and (3) if the courts only served the "elite" (Langbein, 1983, pp. 97, 120). Lastly, in critique of both traditional and revisionist interpretations, the post-revisionist view questions whether the enactment of the professional

police was associated with any true reform of policing standards (Emsley, 2007, p. 133, 2008, p. 76; Field, 1981, pp. 44-46; Reynolds, 1998, pp. 118-123).

In summary, both traditional and revisionist views assume that the state of police relations is reflective of the type of police institution necessary to meet the control requirements of either an industrial/revolutionist or a capitalist society (Reiner, 2010, p. 56). However, a hybrid view - the post-revisionist interpretation - adds broth to these divorced perspectives by considering: (1) the crime and disorder issues generated by rapid urbanization and industrialization and (2) the multitude of contextual factors that impact societal relations. Consideration of these contextual factors, or the factors pertaining to the institutional environment, functions to restrain the uncritical discourse related to the enactment of the professional policy by recognizing class conflict, clashing social interests, and the various political philosophies that exist in society (p. 65). While awarding credit to the pioneers of police reform, the post-revisionist interpretation remains critical of the orthodox view, which fails to acknowledge the role of the police in conflict associated with inequality and privilege in a structurally integrated liberal-democratic society (pp. 55-57). Even today, the police continue to perform an antagonistic role: managing the problems of an advanced industrial society in its capitalist form. On the other hand, the revisionists have overstated the role of the police institution concerning the political control of population segments, in particular, the lower class. Revisionists have further fallen short by failing to concede to the possibility of any willful degree of societal pacification from all segments of society – even from the oppressed (due to the benefits of police-public cooperation and crime reduction mandates) (p. 65).

Returning to this research, for the reasons indicated, I adopt the post-revisionist interpretation to account for the enactment of the professional police and the trending police

relations that have ensued in contemporary society. I suggest that the post-revisionist interpretation is hypersensitive to the growing divide between the police and the public and the inequalities faced by present-day racialized communities. I further maintain that racialized communities represent the segment of society most invested in the outcomes related to the policy issue under investigation. Therefore, while it is necessary to acknowledge traditional factors such as crime rates and urbanization in this research, I also intend to recognize the power imbalances and inequalities in society – factors that are important for understanding perceptions of the police held by community members; in particular, those who belong to racialized and marginalized groups. For instance, a greater recognition of the above helps inform the next section, which focuses on how certain racialized groups tend to view the police, how these views are significant for the given policy, and the influence (external factors) that low levels of perceived police legitimacy may have on policy conformance issues in police organizations.

1.4.2 The Racialized Perception of the Police

Decades of research have led to a general consensus that certain racialized groups tend to view the police more negatively than do whites (Gaines & Kappeler, 2011, p. 414). For instance, a number of scholars support the position that Blacks are more likely to report negative perceptions of the police and lower levels of police legitimacy (Brunson & Miller, 2007; Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996; Correia, Reisig, & Lovrich, 1996; J. R. Davis, 1990; Decker, 1985; Dowler, 2003; Flanagan & Vaughn, 1996; Frank et al., 2005; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Hurst, Frank, & Browning, 2000; Jefferis et al., 1997; Kaminski, 1993; Kaminski & Jefferis, 1998; Kusow, Wilson, & Martin, 1997; Lasley, 1994; Leiber, Nalla, & Farnworth, 1998; Murphy & Worrall, 1999; Murty et al., 1990; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Scaglion &

Condon, 1980; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997; Samuel Walker, 1997; Webb & Marshall, 1995; Weitzer, 1999, 2000, 2002; Weitzer & Tuch, 1999, 2005, 2006; Winfree, Turner, Taylor, & Esbensen, 2001; Worrall, 1999). Walker (1997, p. 221) conducted focus groups to explore citizen perceptions of police officer misconduct, confirming "the powerful effect of race…on perceptions of the police…[and noted] deep hostility to the police among African-American adults and students". Cochran and Warren (2012, p. 2007) attempt to account for this perception, theorizing that it is largely related to the "disadvantages that racial and ethnic minorities experience across the justice system, along with any gratuitous treatment that they may have experienced during their encounters with police". Similarly, Davis, Ortiz, Gilinsky, Ylesseva, & Briller (2004, p. 24) suggest that "differential experience with the police…[is] a major reason why minorities view police in more negative terms than Whites". Therefore, it seems appropriate that Webb and Marshall (1995, p. 58) assert "race and ethnicity as the strongest and most important factor bearing upon attitudes toward the police".

Studies demonstrating the negative attitudes of racialized participants toward the police are not confined solely to the United States. Similar findings have been reported in Britain (G. Barrett, Fletcher, & Patel, 2014; A. Crawford, Jones, Woodhouse, & Young, 1990; Jefferson & Walker, 1993; Mayhew, Aye Maung, & Mirrlees-Black, 1993; Skogan, 1990, 1994; D. J. Smith, 1983, 1991; Waddington & Braddock, 1991) and Canada (Cao, 2011; Commission on Systemic Racism, 1995; Cotter, 2015; Henry & Tator, 2010; James, 1998; Neugebauer, 2000; O'Connor, 2008; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003; Sprott & Doob, 2009; S. Wortley, 1994, 1996, 1997). For instance, in Canada, racialized persons rated the elements of policing involving interpersonal relationships ("being approachable and easy to talk to and treating people fairly") lower than whites (Cotter, p. 11). Canadian researchers Henry and Tator (2010, p. 152) suggest

that police relations can be viewed in society as "the flashpoint, the means to gauge the general climate of racial bias and discrimination".

In some cases of Canadian research, there is a custom to include Indigenous persons in the category of racialized individuals (whereas the studies in the United States and the United Kingdom tend to focus on the Blacks) (Cao, 2011; O'Connor, 2008; Sprott & Doob, 2009). This attribute of Canadian research may be explained due to the tendency of Indigenous persons to identify more closely with Black racialized perceptions of the police (Cao, 2011, p. 15). This is likely a function of the population composition in Canada resulting in Indigenous persons and communities being over-represented in the criminal justice system, over-policed, and under-protected (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 417; Comack, 2012, p. 162; Crosby & Monaghan, 2018, p. 3; Fitzgerald & Carrington, 2008, pp. 547-548; Perry, 2009, pp. 278-279). However, it is also important to acknowledge that Indigenous identification and self-identification in Canada remains complicated, has a complex history, and is therefore, inconsistently applied when categorizing racialized participants or respondents in research (Educational Policy Institute, 2008, p. 3). For example, in a study of race, racialization and indigeneity in Canadian universities, Henry et al. (2017) distinguish between racialized and Indigenous participants and their separate perspectives on power, prestige, and influence. This is suggestive of an Indigenous population that may not uniformly identify with the perceptions of racialized persons in Canada.

Not all members of racialized groups report unfavourable attitudes toward the police. Contradictory research has been produced findings in the United States (Chandek, 1999; D. Dean, 1980; Frank, Brandl, Cullen, & Stichman, 1996; Jesilow, Meyer, & Namazzi, 1995; Murty et al., 1990; Peek, Lowe, & Alston, 1981; Sims, Hooper, & Peterson, 2002), in Britain (Clancy,

Hough, Aust, & Kershaw, 2001; Hayes & Brewer, 1997; Keenan, 2009), and in Canada (O'Connor, 2008; Roberts, 2004, 2007; Tufts, 2000) that report positive perceptions of the police and citizen attitudes toward the police. For instance, much of the Canadian research demonstrates that citizens rate the police most positively when compared to other components of the criminal justice system such as the court, prison, or parole systems (Roberts, 2004; Tufts, 2000). Similarly, findings of Sims et al. (2002, p. 468) suggest that the more citizens are concerned for "physical and social incivilities" (crime in their neighbourhood) the more positive are their attitudes toward the police.

In summary, public attitudes toward the police in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom tend to vary by a number of individual level and contextual level variables; the most prominent variable (and the most meaningful to the given policy) being race. These perceptions may have important implications for the policy issue under investigation. For instance, this inquiry may allow us to understand whether negative perceptions of the police are more likely to cause police officers to conform to, or break the rules, to avoid further loss of perceived police legitimacy. Consequently, considering the citizens' perception of police-community relations may further our understanding of (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization; (2) the ways used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance; (3) and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. Now that the significance of the policy issue, given policy, and public perception of the police are understood, the importance of this research can be discussed.

1.5 Importance of this Research

Research on policy conformance in police organizations is of significant interest to government and police administrators. This is because implementation success is critical for any organization including the police. Therefore, if sergeants can be leveraged to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers, it is important for police administrators to know in what context and in what ways this can be done. Despite the literature reviewed above that demonstrates a sergeant is critical in achieving conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions, Engel (2001, p. 343) notes, "[the] police supervision literature is limited in scope and fails to answer many conceptual and empirical questions regarding field supervision [and] questions regarding differences in supervisory styles." This compels the researcher to unpack the broader environment or "institution" in which the sergeant operates and examine the contextual factors, or the factors pertaining to the institutional environment, that influence the sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance.

In terms of the given policy, this research is important because restrictive policies implemented by police organizations have demonstrated the ability to control or at minimum influence police responses and discretion (Klinger, 2004, p. 128). For example, research in the United States has supported increases in conformance by police officers to policy related to firearm discharges (Fyfe, 1979, p. 322) and mandatory arrests in domestic violence investigations (Hirschel, Buzawa, Pattavina, & Faggiani, 2007, p. 297; Phillips & Sobol, 2010, p. 112; Simpson, Bouffard, Garner, & Hickman, 2006, p. 312). In reference to the latter, research shows that domestic violence policies have served to clarify the duties and responsibilities for police officers, in particular, by mandating the consistent elimination of officer discretion during domestic violence investigations when there are grounds to lay charges (Mignon & Holmes, 1995, p. 438). Similarly, restrictive policies prohibiting racial profiling have been reported to

promote more racially equitable policing and have improved relations between police officers and racialized communities (Miller, 2013, p. 32). It has been suggested that these reported outcomes stem in part from the additional oversight that accompanies policies associated with racial profiling legislation (Buerger, 2002, p. 382). For instance, a number of studies in the United States have revealed that almost 80% of law enforcement agencies possess some version of an internal racial profiling policy (Miller, p. 49). However, despite the results indicating that the implementation of such policies has been shown to improve police relations, the question of whether such policies influence the responses of police officers remains inconclusive and requires further exploration (Fridell, Lunney, Diamond, & Kubu, 2001; Klinger; Miller; Schultz & Withrow, 2004). This research aims to fill this void, producing rich and thick perceptions of sergeants that may inform our understanding of (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance; (3) and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. Next, the research questions that frame this inquiry are posed.

1.6 Research Questions

This research explores police organizations, supervision, and policy implementation in new ways, seeking to confirm theorizations that have emerged from the gaps in the extant literature. Employing a sociological institutionalism perspective, this research relies on sergeants of the TPS to inform this inquiry. The research questions explored in this study include:

1a) What are the factors that facilitate or hinder policy conformance in a police organization?

1b) Do sergeants have the capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers?

1c) Are there contextual factors operating in a police organization, influencing a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers?

1d) Do those contextual factors vary across a police organization?

Based on the review of the literature, this research hypothesizes that the factors that may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers vary across a police organization (from one division to another). This is dependent on the literature that confirms the variability of the environments in which a frontline officer operates (Chan, 1996, p. 112; Mastrofski, 2004, p. 102; Paoline, 2003, pp. 200-201; Reiner, 2010, p. 116; Reuss-Ianni, 1983, pp. 6-7) and the various styles and strategies of supervision that may also influence an officer's working conditions (Engel, 2001, pp. 341-344; Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 55; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990, pp. 213-214). This research also hypothesizes that sergeants positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. This relies on the policing literature that suggests that frontline supervisors are relied upon to achieve operational success, representing the most powerful bureaucratic pressure in a police organization (Engel, 2001; Engel & Worden, 2003; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). In addition to the above, it is intended that the findings of this research make a relevant contribution to the sociological institutionalism literature – the conceptual framework of this research, which is introduced below.

1.7 Introduction of the Conceptual Framework: Sociological Institutionalism

From a theoretical perspective, this research employs sociological institutionalism – a branch of new institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism conceptualizes police organizations as institutions, making sense of the "structural and cultural dimensions that shape the life-world" of police officers and sergeants as "individuals" and as a "collective" (Abrutyn, 2014, p. 98). Its theoretical focus is the "cultural and ideational causes" that shape "organizational society" (Amenta & Ramsey, 2010, pp. 15, 17). Consequently, in this application it is theorized that

sociological institutionalism ought to "penetrate" and expose in "multiple and complex ways" the "cultural and organizational materials" (Meyer, 2008, p. 792) that exist in a sergeant's environment and help us understand how sergeants may utilize their capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. When using sociological institutionalism to understand the inner workings of a police organization, it is helpful to consider the concept of police culture. Police culture acts as an entry point to comprehending the internal factors that operate in a police organization and may influence whether police officers choose to conform to new or reformed policy decisions. An introduction to police culture is presented next.

1.8 Introduction to Police Culture

Police culture has been studied for over 40 years, originally emerging from ethnographic studies of everyday police work (see Cain, 1973; Holdaway, 1983; Manning, 1997; Reiss, 1971; Wilson, 1968). Police culture is suggestive of the manner in which police officers "think and act" which leads to common frames of reference, ideas, and approaches to achieving objectives (Kingshott, Bailey, & Wolfe, 2004, pp. 188-189). The elements of police culture complement the conceptual underpinnings of sociological institutionalism, namely, by identifying and explaining "culturally-specific practices" (Hall & Taylor, pp. 946-947) and the "logic of appropriateness" (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 30).

Classic depictions of police culture (see Banton, 1964; Cain, 1973; Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Westley, 1970) portray a monolithic culture, exhibiting shared attitudes, values, and norms that persist among police officers. This depiction focuses on "coping mechanisms" which are thought to protect police officers from the threats of the two policing environments: occupational (interactions with the public); and organizational (relationship with supervisors and

other formalized components) (Paoline, 2003, pp. 200-201). Adherence to this culture includes negative and cynical attitudes towards the public, negative and suspicious attitudes toward police administration (supervisors) and the police bureaucracy, skeptical attitudes toward legal institutions, negative attitudes toward any legal restriction that counters crime-fighting efforts, and aggressive and authoritative approaches to serving the community (J. K. Cochran & Bromley, 2003, p. 89). In his analysis of a police officer's "working personality", Skolnick (1966, p. 44) highlights two elements of police culture: (1) the always-present element of danger (coping with violence) and (2) the continued adherence to authority by appearing efficient at all times (to produce results – related to the professionalization of the organization). Laws enforced by police officers in a cultural context may deviate from those in writing, for instance, the existence of the "ways and means act" and "contempt of cop" (Reiner, 2010, p. 110). Other attributes of police culture include the "code of silence" that is posited to exist among police officers, emphasizing secrecy, an "us versus them" mentality, and a "brotherhood in blue" - inspiring "unquestioning loyalty to all cops everywhere" (Bouza, 1990, p. 74). Henry and Tator (2010, p. 152) suggest that racist ideology is deeply rooted in police culture. These scholars and several others (discussed in Chapter Two) suggest that a developed culture and value system within the police institution reinforces discrimination and racial bias (p. 152). This ideology is evident in the discretionary decisions and behaviour of officers; notably during incidences of "stop-and-search" (p. 163). The cultural manifestations of racism in policing are suggested to include: racialization of crime; overpolicing and racial profiling; use of force; lack of professional competence; underpolicing; lack of accountability; and poor police-community relations (p. 155).

It has only been of recent that the "unquestioned orthodoxy" (D Sklansky, 2007, p. 20) of classic police culture has been questioned by scholars (Chan, 1996; Paoline, 2004; Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000). Contemporary research has argued that the depiction of a singular, universal culture that unites police officers and ascribes "normal" attitudes and outlooks may be overstated (Paoline, 2003, p. 199; Paoline et al., 2000, pp. 576-577). Instead, changes in the composition of police organizations and philosophies over the past three decades such as professionalization and centralization, bringing increasing standards of education, more racialized and female officers, more officers from different social and cultural backgrounds, and other developments in policing services (a shift to community policing models and a customer-service orientation) (Loftus, 2010a, p. 2) have led a number of scholars to argue that police culture should be conceptualized in the plural.

Research also suggests variation in culture between ranks (Paoline, 2003). For instance, Reuss-Ianni (1983, pp. 6-7) notes the existence of two cultures in policing: "street cop culture and management cop culture". Similarly, Manning (1993, as cited in Chan, 1996, p. 111) recognizes three subcultures in police organizations: "command, middle management and lower participants". These conceptualizations suggest that this "contingent nature of effects" (Mastrofski, 2004, p. 102), meaning the variable social environment, situational context, and the influence of rank may impact the conformance choices of police officers. In summary, understanding the cultural considerations within a police organization may assist in the conceptualization of how internal factors influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. It can be further submitted that an improved understanding of police culture (internal factors) may be vital for explaining (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization; (2) the

methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance; (3) and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction.

1.9 Operationalization and Methodology

In this dissertation, the majority of terms are defined within the relevant chapter. However, there are some terms that may be helpful to define at the outset. Throughout this dissertation, 'the police', 'police organization' and 'police service' are used interchangeably. These three terms refer to an organization and institution that engages in activities to "maintain security or social order while empowered by either public or private contract, regulations or policies, written or verbal" (Law Commission of Canada, 2002, p. 8). These terms also are associated with the "modern police" under the Anglo-American policing model. In other words, those institutions, police organizations, and police services prescribed by Bayley (1985, p. 11) as public, specialized, and professionally organized. Second, throughout this dissertation, 'police officers' are defined as those individuals who hold the legal designation in Canada as 'peace officers' and who are employed by either a police organization or police service as defined above (p. 7). In this study, police-citizen interaction refers to an actual physical interaction between frontline officers and members of the public – interactions or investigations that may, or do lead to "street checks" and "carding" as defined above.

Throughout this dissertation, the terms 'police relations' and 'police-community relations' are used interchangeably. These terms both refer to the public attitudes toward and familiarity with the police (Murphy & Worrall, 1999, p. 328). These terms also correspond with the "social perception" of the public, meaning how the public goes about understanding the police (Jussim, 2017, p. 1). Positive police relations refers to a recognition by the public that the police, whether represented as an individual police officer or an organization, are acting

legitimately (Greene, 2017). Next, this dissertation focuses on police sergeants. Sergeants are first-level supervisors of a police organization, representing management at the frontlines (Skogan, 2008, pp. 25-26). Specifically, this research considers patrol sergeants or "street sergeants". These are sergeants who spend their time in uniform in the field directly monitoring police officers (Van Maanen, 1983, pp. 298-299).

This dissertation explores a public policy issue. A policy can be defined as an intended plan of action or inaction adhered to by an actor or several actors when confronting a problem or concern (Anderson, 2015, p. 7). In public policy, the actor(s) are required to be of government or of an equivalent authority (Weible, 2014, p. 4). The policy process of focus in this dissertation is policy implementation. Policy implementation is the stage of the policy cycle where "policy decisions are translated into action" (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 185). Typically in police organizations, policy implementation proceeds in a 'top-down' direction via a chain of command through sergeants to frontline officers (Witte, Travis, & Langworthy, 1990, p. 2). However, this dissertation will also discuss the potential effectiveness of other policy implementation approaches, including the 'bottom-up' approach. In this approach, "street-level bureaucrats" may modify policy in effective ways, despite any demands placed upon them from the top (Applegate, 2006, p. 369). Throughout this dissertation, there is a discussion of 'policy conformance', meaning conformance to the directives of a given policy or policy decision. Conformance is a term used to represent the degree of adherence or compliance to written internal directives in a police organization. Conformance is operationalized in this research as "the appropriate commitment and responses from frontline workers to policy decisions" (R. R. Johnson, 2011, p. 296). A positive influence in policy conformance can be defined as any perceived increase in compliance behaviours to a given policy or goal (adapted from

Kellermann, 2004, p. 397). 'Policy success' adopts the above criteria and is defined as the occasion when implementers at the street level are complying with the directives of a given policy. When considering the perceived factors (factors) in a police organization that 'facilitate' or 'hinder' policy conformance, 'facilitate' refers to improving policy conformance and 'hinder' refers to decreasing policy conformance. However, in the case of the Regulated Interactions Policy, 'hinder' may also represent the act of frontline officers intentionally failing to engage in the acts ("street checks" and "carding") regulated by this policy. For instance, one cannot conform to a policy that is not utilized. In this dissertation, it is submitted that occasions when implementers are not complying with directives of a given policy, or are failing to engage in the act(s) that the given policy regulates may be defined as 'policy failure'.

Lastly, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the policy issue under investigation, the culture and structure of police organizations are referred to throughout this dissertation. The occupational culture of police officers is suggestive of the manner in which police officers "think and act" which leads to common frames of reference, ideas, and approaches to achieving objectives (Kingshott et al., 2004, pp. 188-189). The structure of police organizations is one that is professionalized and centralized. Professionalization refers to the structural configurations of police organizations that "maximize access to and control over resources in a given sector of knowledge and practice" (Jackson, 1970, p. 10). Centralization refers to the degree which the decision-making capacity within police organizations is concentrated either by one individual or group of individuals who reside at the top (Maguire, Shin, & Hassell, 2003, p. 254). From a theoretical perspective, a police organization is represented as an institution. Institutions can be characterized by "formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which individuals, corporations…and other

organizations operate and interact with each other" (Campbell, p. 1). Contextual factors are the factors that may exist in the institutional environment in varying degrees that influence the conformance choices of actors to policy decisions or directives. They may be structural, cultural, or social.

Using a qualitative approach, this research examines the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder policy conformance in a police organization with an emphasis on a given policy (the Regulated Interactions Policy) and the role of sergeants. To do so, 17 sergeants, each representing a different division of the TPS, are interviewed (semi-structured and face-to-face). The interviews across divisions capture varying factors that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance and any differing degrees of resistance or conformity from frontline officers to the given policy. In addition, a survey questionnaire that is administered to sergeants supplements the data collected from the interviews. The questionnaire elicits from sergeants demographic data, work experience, leadership style, communication style, policy knowledge, and other self-reported beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. The survey questionnaire further serves to confirm data collected during interviews. The data analysis that follows employs the coding process to facilitate the conceptual abstraction of data and its reintegration as theory. The ensuing thematic analysis reveals important themes for inclusion in the findings and fosters emerging explanation and meaning for the policy issue under investigation.

1.10 Summary of Chapter Outlines

In Chapter Two, the literature related to policy implementation and culture is reviewed. The chapter begins with a review of the extant literature related to the policy implementation stage of the policy process. The various approaches to policy implementation are then reviewed. Next, the literature related to the top-down approach to policy implementation taken by police

organizations is presented. This is followed by a review of the literature that suggests that police organizations may benefit from a bottom-up approach to policy implementation. Next, a review of policy implementation as it concerns frontline supervision in public sector organizations is conducted. This is followed by a review of the literature related to the capacity of sergeants to influence policy implementation in police organizations. Lastly, the existing literature is reviewed that relates to the impact police culture may have on the capacity of a sergeant to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization.

In Chapter Three, the conceptual framework – sociological institutionalism, is presented. This chapter begins by presenting an overview of institutional theory and related concepts. In this overview, a summary of new institutionalism, which is the conceptual root of sociological institutionalism, is provided. The assumptions of sociological institutionalism – a branch of new institutionalism - are reviewed and discussed. This aim of this chapter is to expose the assumptions of sociological institutionalism and the advantage of this perspective for understanding the inner workings of police organizations and the relevant components of this research. Lastly, this chapter presents the research methodology, including the research questions and research design.

In Chapter Four, the focus is the TPS. This chapter explores how structural and cultural elements of this organization aid to inform our understanding of the inner workings of this police organization, in particular, the policy issue under investigation. To do so, this chapter discusses the structural and cultural elements of the TPS and the policy process of this police organization. Positions are supported with relevant empirical evidence, including archived literature. Key findings are presented that conceptualize how the above elements are interconnected with the policy implementation process of the TPS.

In Chapter Five and Six, the findings are presented. Chapter Five presents the findings as they pertain to our understanding of the perceived factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular. In chapter Six, the findings are presented that relate to the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. These findings are perceived by, and represent the perspectives of the participants, which in this case, are sergeants employed by the TPS. The findings provide empirical support for the acceptance of the research hypotheses.

In Chapter Seven, two main discussions are presented in relation to: (1) The factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization and (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance. For each discussion, the relevant findings are summarized, the relevant literature is integrated, the theoretical implications are discussed, and implications for the policy process in police organizations are examined. Following these two main discussions, a third discussion focuses on the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction is presented. This chapter concludes with a synthesis of these three discussions surrounding any policy implications for police organizations brought to light by this research. The three arguments made in this chapter are: (1) Police officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline (2) sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, by blending the payoffs of two approaches: an

authoritative approach and a supportive approach; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive.

Chapter Eight is a concluding chapter that recaps the research questions and key findings. Also presented in this chapter are limitations and delimitations and recommendations for future research.

Chapter Two – Literature Review: Policy Implementation and Police Culture

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extant literature related to policy implementation in police organizations and consider the effectiveness of the top-down approach while acknowledging the value of a bottom-up perspective. Gaps in the literature are also remedied that help explain the broader police environment and speak to the capacity of sergeants to leverage occupational culture and policy processes to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. To begin, I review the literature related to policy implementation and culture. I begin with a review of the extant literature related to the policy implementation stage of the policy process. I then incorporate in this review the various approaches to policy implementation. Next, I review the top-down approach to policy implementation taken in police organizations. I then discuss the literature that suggests that police organizations may benefit from a bottom-up approach to policy implementation. This is followed by a review of policy implementation as it concerns frontline supervision in public sector organizations. I then further the above, by conducting a review of the literature related to the capacity of sergeants to influence policy implementation in police organizations. Lastly, I review the existing literature that relates to the impact police culture may have on the capacity of a sergeant to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization.

2.2 Policy Implementation and the Policy Process

In this section, I review the main approaches to policy implementation found in the literature to provide for a greater understanding of how policy is implemented in organizations. In reviewing these approaches, conceptual insight emerges that informs the practical aspects of

policy implementation in organizations. This section concludes by highlighting the gap in the policy implementation literature that this research intends to address.

Anderson (2015, p. 7) defines a policy as an intended plan of action or inaction adhered to by an actor or several actors when confronting a problem or concern. In public policy, the actor(s) are required to be of government or of an equivalent authority (Weible, 2014, p. 4). Similarly, Ostrom (2005, p. 19) suggests that public policies characterize the manner in which all public services are delivered.

Policies are delivered via a policy process. The policy process can be conceptualized as a framework commonly identified in the literature as the "policy cycle" (Anderson, 2015, pp. 3-4). Within the policy cycle, a number of stages are distinguished. The policy implementation stage is the most relevant stage for my research objectives. Policy scholars Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) define policy implementation as the following:

> The carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem to be addressed, stipulates the objectives to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, structures the implementation process... (pp. 20-21)

Alternatively, Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p. 185) refer to policy implementation as the stage of the policy cycle where "policy decisions are translated into action". They further submit that successful implementation requires proper allocation of funding, personnel, and the development of rules of procedure (p. 185). Peters (2015, p. 90) emphasizes that a policy implementation requires compliance from its implementers – an action that is often impacted by the perceived legitimacy of a policy and the implementing bureaucracy. When a policy is unsuccessfully implemented, the result is "policy failure" (Younis & Davidson, 1990, p. 3). Policy failure can

be particularly concerning for policymakers and public institutions when changes in individual or institutional behaviours are not achieved despite the administration of a democratic policy process (p. 3). With this in mind, the early works of Hood (1976), Dunsire (1978), Hanf and Scharpf (1978), Gunn (1978), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), and Pressman and Widavsky (1973) popularized the conception that policy failures can be attributed to factors that transpire during the implementation stage of the policy process.[6] Accordingly, considerable effort has been made by policy scholars to analyze and understand the factors that lead to, or constrain successful policy implementations (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, pp. 4-7).

Approaches to policy implementation are primarily divided between top-down (Bardach, 1977; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1979, 1980, 1989; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975) and bottom-up (Elmore, 1980; Hjern & Hull, 1982; H. Ingram, 1977; Lipsky, 1971, 1980/2010). In describing the top-down approach (also referred to as the "blackbox model") (W. Parsons, 1995, p. 2), a rational management perspective reinforces the idea of a rigid bureaucracy employing control, coercion, and compliance to obtain the desired implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, p. 291). The top-down approach assumes a series of commands carried down the chain of bureaucracy (M. Clarke, 1992, p. 222). In this approach, leaders of political influence clearly articulate the desired implementation and this preference is carried out with increased specificity as it reaches the lowest levels of the organization (p. 222). Under the guise of "scientific administration" this approach has been described as optimal in matching political intent and administrative action (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 189).

[6] See Natesan and Marathe (2015, pp. 221-226) for a broad review of the seminal literature on implementation theory across each of its three generations and in the context of strategic public management.

Several scholars have theorized "perfect policy implementation" under a top-down approach. For instance, Hood (1976, p. 6) suggests that "one way of analysing implementation problems is thinking about what 'perfect administration' would be like." Hood (1976, pp. 6-7) proposes five key conditions to achieve perfect implementation: (1) A unitary administrative system – a huge army – that has a single line of authority; (2) uniform rules and norms enforced by a system with clearly ascertainable objectives for officials to undertake; (3) perfect obedience and administrative control; (4) perfect communication and coordination between administrative areas; and (5) a lack of time pressure. These key conditions enable policymakers to think and plan systematically for a policy implementation despite the conditions themselves being impractical and unrealistic to attain in an actual institutional setting. On the other hand, Gunn (1980, p. 5) theorizes a more practical approach to implementation. He formulates ten preconditions to achieve perfect implementation. In summary, these conditions emphasize the need to minimize restraints while ensuring adequate time and resources are available at each stage of an implementation. Further, Gunn proposes that policy implementations should rely upon a valid theory of cause and effect with few intervening links. Gunn also suggests that the number of implementing agencies be minimized and that the implementing agency act as independently as possible. Lastly, Gunn stresses that all policy objectives must be agreed upon, detailed, delineated, perfectly communicated, and impeccably adhered to. This includes the ability of those in authority to command perfect obedience. However, Gunn's list of preconditions would also be difficult to achieve in reality. This is mainly because of Gunn's emphasis on the need to ensure bureaucrats remain in control of all aspects of an implementation by constantly delegating downward through a path that offers 'no' resistance. Elmore (1978, p. 605), who suggests that policymakers should not attempt to gain total compliance when

implementing policy, highlights this difficulty. Alternatively, he suggests that implementers should rely on human talent and professional experience while injecting other strategies into the implementation that relate to funding and support (p. 605).

In examining the factors that facilitate or hinder a policy implementation in an organization, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1979, pp. 484-485) devise a number of conditions to improve success, which include: (1) the basis for sound theory and objectives; (2) unambiguous policy directives for the target group; (3) political commitment from leaders; (4) appropriate support from stakeholders; (5) and the absence of conflicting policies. Alternatively, to avoid policy failure in an organization, Ham and Hill (1984, p. 99) suggest that implementers must ensure the following: (1) that a clear policy exists; (2) that implementation structure is kept to a minimum size; (3) that outside interference is avoided; (4) and that total control over the implementing actors is maintained. Importantly, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, pp. 458-459) make a unique conceptualization in relation to the above, by proposing that the degree to which a new policy deviates from previous policy and the amount of organizational change required will have a negative affect toward the likelihood of a successful implementation. This conceptualization is particularly important to this research, which examines a policy implementation (the Regulated Interactions Policy) that deviates significantly from the previous policy implemented at the street level.

Criticism of the top-down approach centers on limitations of the programmed and hierarchical control of policy-makers over local actors and implementers (Ham & Hill, 1984, p. 106; Sabatier, 1986a, p. 25; Younis & Davidson, 1990, p. 8). For instance, Elmore (1980, p. 603) critiques the "implicit and unquestioned assumption that policymakers control the organisational, political and technological processes that affect implementation." Similarly,

Fischer, Miller and Sidney (2007, p. 91) criticize the top-down approach for its tendency to ignore the influence of street-level implementers on policy outcomes. Additional criticisms relate to the assumption that political leaders always provide implementers with clear goals and direction (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 189). For instance, it is suggested that policy intentions are often vague, involve compromise, and are contradictory in objectives and orders (S. M. Barrett & Fudge, 1981, p. 89; Ham & Hill, 1984, pp. 102-103; Howlett & Ramesh, pp. 189-190). Another critique to the top-down approach is its assumption that political leaders remain involved during the entire implementation process (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 190). Constant involvement of policymakers during a policy implementation would generally be considered an inaccurate depiction of day-to-day policy delivery at the frontlines of an organization (p. 190).

In summary, criticisms of the top-down approach interrogate a number of relied upon assumptions, casting doubt upon the imperviousness of the Weberian model of modern public administration (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 101). Notwithstanding, it remains accepted in the literature that careful program design, planning, and monitoring of an implementation using the top-down approach may still achieve effective implementation under "suboptimal conditions" (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1979, pp. 503-504).

By contrast, the bottom-up approach views successful policy implementation as dependent upon the participation of all those involved in both the policy formulation and implementation stages (Berman, 1978, p. 29). Bottom-up methodology emphasizes service delivery, a process of negotiation, and the ideas and values of local actors (S. M. Barrett, 2004, p. 253; Matland, 1995, p. 145; Sabatier, 1986a, p. 32; Younis & Davidson, 1990, p. 3). An advantage of the bottom-up approach is that it acknowledges both formal and informal relationships at all levels and among all actors during the implementation stage (Howlett &

Ramesh, 2003, p. 190). Moreover, the bottom-up approach ensures the actions and influence of street-level employees are taken into account when predicting policy outcomes (p. 190). In support of the above, Barrett and Hill argue:

> To understand the policy-action relationships we must get away from a single perspective of the process that reflects a …managerial view…and try to find a conceptualisation that reflects …the complexity and dynamics of the interactions between individuals and groups seeking to put policy into effect…and those whose interests are affected…" (S. M. Barrett & Hill, 1981, p. 19)

The bottom-up approach rejects the approach to implementation subscribed to by top-down scholars. Instead, this approach advances an empirical representation and explanation of the activities and problem-solving techniques of actors engaged in policy delivery (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 94). For example, Elmore (1978, p. 605) suggests that the bottom-up approach permits problems to be solved by those close to the issue. In other words, "policy acts to direct an individual's attention toward a problem and provide them with an occasion for the application of skill and judgement" (p. 605). In short, the bottom-up approach reflects the everyday decisions and problem-solving strategies of "street-level bureaucrats" (Lipsky, 1980/2010, p. 8).

Criticisms of the bottom-up approach center on the underestimation of the policymaker's influence over the types of strategies used by implementers and the accompanying goals (Sabatier, 1986a, p. 34; Younis & Davidson, 1990, p. 12). Critics of the bottom-up approach question the tendency to overestimate the local autonomy of street-level implementers (Matland, 1995, p. 150). For example, Matland (p. 150) notes that in relation to the freedom of street-level bureaucrats "…all actions may fall within a limited range where the borders are set by centrally determined policy". Lastly, it has been suggested that a bottom-up approach fails to cultivate

any theoretical knowledge that goes beyond detailed narratives of the immense discretion available to street-level implementers (Sabatier, 1986b, p. 315).

Both top-down and bottom-up approaches rely heavily on models of principal-agent (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 191) and rational choice (W. Parsons, 1995, pp. 466-467). In each of these models, principals and agents are propelled by self-interest and self-seeking behaviours (utility maximization), requiring a necessary level of agent-supervision and agent-incentive to achieve initial policy objectives (Spillane, Reiser, & Reimer, 2002, p. 390). Major criticisms directed at both models of principal-agent and rational choice primarily concern the principal-agent relationship and the potential for an implementation to result in poorly translated policy objectives (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 191). This is in part due to the indirect and inherently weak control implementation officials have over administrators and street-level policy implementers (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 191; Peters, 2015, p. 96). Other criticisms of the principal-agent relationship include: (1) the amount of discretion the agent is able to exude when charged with an implementation; (2) interference as a result of the agent's own understanding, knowledge, aspirations and preferences, or capacity and budgetary considerations; and (3) the creation of "inter-organizational" layers such as governing committees which have the power to influence outcomes or confuse accountability and reporting structures (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, pp. 25, 191; Spillane et al., 2002, p. 390).

By combining perspectives of top-down and bottom-up approaches, scholars such as Elmore (1985), Sabatier (1986a, 1988, 1991), Sabatier and Pelkey (1987), and Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O'Toole (1990) have furthered the application of the above two approaches to policy implementation. These scholars have selected complementary insights from both approaches to develop testable hypotheses surrounding implementation methodology and the factors that

influence the implementation process. More recently, "hybrid" models of policy implementation have gained popularity by incorporating approaches from top-down and bottom-up approaches and combining them with other theories (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 90). For instance, integrated, contingency-based models have been advanced that are more sensitive to the influence of relationships and communication channels inside government, political dynamics and multi-level constraints, an ambiguity of goals and means, and conflict (Goggin et al., 1990; H. Ingram, 1990; Matland, 1995). In addition, democratic models have been proposed emphasizing the impact of networked governance, sociopolitical contexts, new public management, and collaborative building towards more meaningful public participation and consensus – "the democratization of the policy sciences" (deLeon, 1997, p. 50) in shaping implementations (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009; deLeon, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Fischer, 2003). Of recent, Rice (2012) has proposed a "micro-institutionalist" approach to policy implementation, which emphasizes the role of the individual actor in both the manner in which policy is adapted and delivered and the overall shaping of policy outcomes. Literature suggests that these latter "hybrid" approaches have gained popularity due to their increased attention and integrated view of the unique conditions in which policy is implemented. These conditions consider the likelihood that contextual factors, or the factors pertaining to the institutional environment, may influence the implementation of policy; for instance, the difficulty supervisors may have to effectively monitor an implementation and the variable impact of relevant actors during the policy implementation process (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009; Matland, 1995). With so much variability in approaches to policy implementation, it is no wonder that Barret and Hill note:

> Many so-called implementation problems arise precisely because there is a tension between normative assumptions of government – what ought to be done and how it

should happen – and the struggle and conflict between interests – the need to bargain and compromise – that represent the reality of the process by which power/influence is gained and held in order to pursue ideological goals (S. M. Barrett & Hill, 1981, p. 145)

The diversity of implementation approaches presented here reflects distinct perspectives related to the significance and influence of networks, relationships, multiple actors, interactions and other contextual factors that may influence the policy implementation process. Where these approaches bind together is the recognition of the inevitable influence of a "central authority" on a number of aspects of the implementation process. For example, despite the clarity of a policy or other sociopolitical influence(s), policies will almost always require a source of initiation, funding, and clarity of jurisdiction (Matland, 1995, p. 171). However, as Parsons (1995, p. 487) notes, some of the differences between top-down and bottom-up approaches are so distinct that attempting to merge them conceptually can be likened to combining "incommensurate paradigms". However, from the above review of implementation approaches, I suggest that I have furnished support for Elmore's (1978, p. 55) position: that none of the above approaches are in total agreement with each other and no single approach is likely to capture all essential features of implementation in an organization.

While policy implementation is a process of goal setting and attainment, I submit that the prescriptive and unrealistic apolitical nature of the top-down approach may fail to effectively account for a successful policy implementation in an organization. Accordingly, I propose that the value of a bottom-up approach to policy implementation should be considered in any organizational implementation. Incorporating both approaches in organizations encourages a recognition of "a continuation of the complex processes of bargaining, negotiation and interaction which characterise the policy-making process" (Ham & Hill, 1984, p. 109). To

further this proposition, the literature related to policy implementation in police organizations is reviewed next.

2.3 Top-Down Policy Implementation in Police Organizations

In this section, I review the literature related to policy implementation in police organizations. In doing so, I highlight several challenges that are unique to policy implementations in the policing environment. As one might expect, a paramilitary[7] police organization is inherently top-down in managerial style and compatible with Weberian bureaucratic principles (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 45; G. D. Russell, 1997, p. 569). In the traditional police organization, administrators issue directives and orders which proceed down the chain of command through supervisors to frontline officers (Witte et al., 1990, p. 2). Sklansky (2007, p. 31) notes that policing remains one of the few administrations that continue with unwavering support for Taylorism and the predictable outcomes of "scientific management". Similarly, Toch (2008, p. 62) draws attention to the "hyper-bureaucratic military organizational attributes" of police organizations – "those of formal rank, formal hierarchy, and a chain of unquestioned and unquestioning command".

For top-down implementation to be successful in police organizations, effective and authoritative communication must flow down the chain of command (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 47). Goldstein (1990, p. 27) notes that there is a tendency for police bureaucracies to view their police officers as "automatons" tasked with "nonthinking compliance." Consequently, contemporary police administration is often characterized by its need to acquire jurisdiction over frontline officer discretion, not to liberalize it (D. Sklansky, 2007, p. 31). To account for the

[7] The term paramilitary can be understood by suggesting the prefix "para", meaning "closely related", is appended to the noun "military", defining an organization that shares key attributes of the military (M. Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 12)

unwavering nature of the top-down directorate, Klockars (1985, pp. 52-55) suggests that the command structure exhibited by police organizations has endorsed an indissoluble ability to resist political influence, limit the abuse of authority, weed out the lazy, disobedient, and incompetent, and avoid corruption. Consequently, the approach to policy implementation in police organizations is generally carried out by managerial personnel who compose top-down initiatives for lower ranking frontline officers to enact (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 46). The objective of such administration is for these initiatives to become institutionalized, meaning "to establish as normal or make something a customary and accepted part of the organization" (Boba & Crank, 2008, p. 384). The top-down approach ensures that the "policies, practice, and organizational structure of a police organization contribute to the goal" of the specific implementation, which then becomes "an integral part of the organizational mission" (Boba & Crank, pp. 384-385).

Despite this seemingly efficient top-down approach to policy implementation, police organizations remain charged with frequent 'implementation failures'. The literature suggests that routinely frontline officers fail to conform to new policies, which in turn fail to be adopted into practice (Buerger, 2002, p. 385). Furthermore, resonant in policing scholarship is the finding that general resistance to policy implementation by police officers is common and fierce (Phillips, 2015, p. 375; Skogan, 2008, p. 24; Stanko, 2007, p. 217; Warren & Tomaskovic‐Devey, 2009, p. 365).

Several attributes ascribed to police organizations and their employees (police officers) are associated with the failure of proposed policy initiatives. These findings demonstrate that frontline officers are particularly resistant to reform and difficult to mobilize to effectuate change (Boba & Crank, 2008, p. 382; Goldstein, 1990, pp. 29-31; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008, p.

145). Skogan (2008, p. 26) emphasizes the unpredictable and conflicting commitment and responses of frontline officers to any type of policy decisions furnished from the top. Toch (2008, p. 60) expands on this point, claiming that resistance to change is characteristic of frontline officers who often feel that their views are ignored while experiencing non-inclusion in the design and implementation of organizational reform. This view is shared by Gau and Gaines (2012, p. 46) who suggest that a serious problem with top-down strategies is that those at the frontlines - "the ones on whom effective implementation depends" – may not be supportive of the desired policy outcomes. Lack of support from frontline officers can manifest as resistance eventually leading to resentment from officers toward new policy decisions. For instance, frontline officers are often quick to ascertain whether politics and politicians are influencing the decisions of their leaders (Toch, 2008, p. 62). Political pressures are viewed negatively by frontline officers and contrary to the institutionalized "politics-administration dichotomy" which has been designed to shield police administrators and officers from the outside influence of political agendas (G. D. Russell, 1997, p. 569). As suggested by J. R. Greene (as cited in G. D. Russell, 1997, p. 570), the separation of politics from administration has subjected police leaders to a variety of regulatory mechanisms limiting their executive control; however, this has also served to reinforce the inflexible culture and structure of the police organization and its officers – who often remain resistant to reform attempts from the political outside. Officers remain protective of the "conceptual firewall" that shields policy-setting mechanisms and discretionary decision-making from elected officials (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, & Licari, 2012, pp. 18-19). This can be considered a "coping mechanism", designed to maintain autonomy at the street level and resist what is perceived by officers as illegitimate interests (Lipsky, 1980/2010, p. 19). Therefore, the politics-administration dichotomy reinforces the leeway that officers have to

exercise increasing discretion as one moves down the organizational hierarchy, with the greatest discretion exercised at the frontlines (Chan, 1996, p. 44; Van Maanen, 1983, p. 277). Lastly, Scrivner (1995, p. 428) suggests that police leaders who choose to implement reform are often subject to significant criticism from their own rank and file as well as from the community.

Frontline resistance to policy implementation is further complicated by the discretionary nature of policing, which includes the fundamental ability of police officers to make important decisions on the streets, often far removed from their supervisors, and often in situations that are not clearly resolved in legislation or policy (Applegate, 2006, p. 369; Mastrofski, 1988, pp. 58-59; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008, pp. 145-146). Manning (1997, p. 238) concurs, noting that officer discretion, at any point in the "informational flow system", modifies the impact of a policy. In these situations, Reuss-Ianni (1983, p. 65) justly summarizes the dilemma of the police leader: "while rank in a paramilitary structure confers unquestioned authority, it does not also confer unquestioned obedience." Additionally, another component of the policing environment; the police union, has been considered a potential hindrance to successful policy implementation in police organizations (Flynn, 2004; Skogan, 2004). For instance, Flynn (p. 144) suggests that union-management collaboration from the outset of an implementation can have a positive impact on successful implementation initiatives – the opposite condition may sideline any progress.

In their empirical case study of the implementation of domestic violence policy in a police organization, Brunetto and Farr-Wharton (2005, pp. 223-225) identify three factors that exist that may impact how frontline officers conform to new policy. These factors are: (1) the impact of "New Public Management" on available resources, funding, and accountability models; (2) the level of support, rewarding behaviours, and messages from senior, mid-level, and

supervisors across the organization in support of new practices; and (3) the impact of "real" vs. "superficial" culture on the decisions of police officers. Alternatively, in reviewing studies of operational policy failure within police organizations, Kirby (2013, pp. x-xi) attributes the ineffectiveness of a variety of policies on: (1) the complexity of the policing environment (primarily the influence of internal and external factors) and (2) the difficulty of translating theory into practice (praxis) in operational policing. In reference to "problem-oriented policing" initiatives, Kirby (2013, p. 51) discusses nine reasons that policy failure may occur at the frontlines of police organizations. In summary, he blames the tendency of frontline officers to be cynical toward change - instead prioritizing emergencies, routine incidents, enforcement and detection rather than new initiatives and changes in behaviour (p. 51). Kirby (p. 51) also refers to the inadequate leadership provided in police organizations – leadership that is susceptible to high turnover and political influence. He brings attention to the lack of support felt by frontline officers from management and the failure of frontline officers to develop effective external partnerships when implementing initiatives and to adopt new policies when they are believed to fall outside of "real police work" (p. 51).

Consequently, a lack of alignment between command and frontline officers carries the potential for the latter to undermine new policies, defeating any planned policy initiatives (Braga & Bond, 2008, p. 599; Mark Moore & Braga, 2004, p. 449). Nevertheless, contemporary police organizations remain "centralized in their decision-making, structurally vertical, rule bound, and mired in power relationships" (Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008, p. 145). While it can be acknowledged that policy implementation in a police organization does not occur in a vacuum, frontline officers continue to operate under strict hierarchical direction with minimal autonomy in the policy design and delivery process.

In this review of the literature related to policy implementation in a police organization, there is a strong indication that the top-down approach to policy implementation is commonplace and perceived among police administrators as the most efficient approach to direct frontline officers to adopt initiatives and policy objectives. However, what is not demonstrated in the literature is how and why the factors in a police organization described above, influence top-down initiatives, resulting in policy failure. Further, the literature is weak in demonstrating whether these potential inhibiting factors that exist in a police organization are contextualized. This research aims to fill these gaps in the literature by eliciting rich perspectives of how factors in a police organization influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions and whether those factors are contextual. Despite, the strong support for the use of the top-down approach to policy implementation in police organizations, it is also important to consider and review the literature related to the bottom-up approach as it pertains to police organizations, which is done in the next section.

2.4 Bottom-Up Policy-making in Police Organizations

In this section, I consider the literature related to the bottom-up approach to policy implementation in police organizations. In doing so, I highlight any possible benefits this approach may for the given policy under examination in this research. While much of the literature suggests that it may be the prescribed norm in police organizations to assume top-down control over policy decisions, oftentimes in reality, implementation as a result of perfect compliance is difficult to operationalize. For instance, Applegate (2006, p. 369) questions the effectiveness of the top-down approach to implementation in police organizations, instead suggesting that policy-making is effectively continuous at the frontlines where it is adapted or altered due to a perceived need to slow down or ration services. Applegate (p. 369) further

submits that bottom-up approaches to policy implementation allow police officers acting as "street-level bureaucrats" to modify policy in more effective ways, despite any demands placed upon them from the top. Similarly, Fridell (2004, p. 7) proposes that the increased involvement of officers from all ranks (including the frontline) in decision-making processes can lead to higher commitment to organizational initiatives. For this reason, Toch (2008, p. 60) advocates that the credibility of frontline officers can be gained in relation to policy decisions when officers are enlisted as "change agents" and encouraged to get involved in the design and implementation of change.

Steinheider and Wustewald (2008, p. 146) examine the benefits of "participative management" in police organizations – a concept that incorporates collaborative decision-making from all ranks to increase commitment and mitigate officer resistance to policy initiatives. They conclude from their research that participation across a police organization has the potential to increase frontline commitment to organizational goals (p. 161). Moreover, they claim that "bottom-up democratic reform of police organizations is not only possible but in fact may already be at hand" (p. 161).

Additional studies of police organizations have also confirmed the willingness of employees from all ranks to participate in decision-making processes (Adams, Rohe, & Arcury, 2002; Witte et al., 1990; Wycoff & Skogan, 1994). Notwithstanding, the scholarly literature in support of bottom-up approaches to policy implementation in police organizations is weak and has had little impact on the authoritarian mechanisms of police organizations. On the contrary, contemporary police administrators continue to ignore scholarly findings that promote the value of bottom-up policy implementation, preferring to defer to the voluminous literature that

characterizes those employees at the frontline as "instruments of policy"; requiring no channel to affect policy decisions (Witte et al., 1990, p. 3).

Interestingly, the literature suggests that policy reforms often implemented by police organizations are not frequently self-generated and are more likely reactive. Police services can be forced to introduce new policies, often as a result of changing sociological standards or changes in public perception regarding the appropriate behaviour of police officers (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 222). To illustrate this point, we only have to consider the causes for regulation that have led to the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy by the TPS. To corroborate this point, Bayley (2006, p. 1) notes: "…police organizations themselves have not been the source of significant reform ideas. Police reform has not been self-generated. It has been instigated by people, or events, outside the police themselves…top-down and outside-inside". The source of reform is significant when hypothesizing why it is that the top-down approach to policy implementation continues to lead in police organizations despite the presence of literature that supports the use of bottom-up methodology.

Consequently, I argue that implementing policy in a police organization cannot rely solely on top-down methods. Nor can it ignore the influence that street-level police officers exert when implementing policies. Furthermore, what is missing in the relevant police-focused literature is an analysis of the contextual factors, or the factors pertaining to the institutional environment, that are critical for understanding how police officers implement policies. It is no wonder that Barrett and Fudge (1978, p. 1) describe "implementation as a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over time between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends." This research aims to fill this void in the literature, which fails to postulate in what context and combination is

it appropriate to implement policy using either a top-down or bottom-up approach in police organizations. This is important because the extant literature is much more focused on developing policy implementation approaches than explaining the practical details and factors that may lead to policy success (Gunn, 1978, p. 169) – which represents a lack of knowledge in an area of policy implementation research that this dissertation plans to rectify. Now that the literature related to the approaches to policy implementation and policy implementation in police organizations has been reviewed, it is important to include a review of the literature that supports the influence of frontline supervision in general, and in a police organization in particular. The next two sections accomplish this task and identify the gaps in knowledge that emerge from the existing literature.

2.5 Frontline Public Sector Supervision and Policy Implementation

In this section, I conduct a review of the literature that informs the linkage between frontline public sector supervision and policy implementation. I am attempting to draw support for the main hypothesis of this research while also identifying the gaps in the extant literature that this dissertation may remedy. The literature suggests that achieving commitment and appropriate responses from frontline workers to policy decisions made by government officials is a common challenge in public sector organizations (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 187). For policy-makers, this public management issue remains relevant since the necessary commitment and responses of street-level "implementers" is key to achieving the desired policy outcomes (Ewalt & Jennings, 2004, p. 452).

Since the seminal writings of Lipsky (1980/2010) which focused on the administrative discretion of the "street-level bureaucrat", policy researchers have sought to explain the failure of frontline workers to commit and respond to explicit policy decisions furnished and implemented

from the "top" (May & Winter, 2009, p. 453; Riccucci et al., 2005, p. 438). In addition, policy scholars have also realized the significance of the frontline supervisor's capacity to achieve policy conformance in public sector operations. For instance, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 473) suggest that "goal consensus between administrators and implementers" can stimulate unanimity towards a policy decision. Similarly, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989, p. 34) acknowledge that the "commitment and leadership skills of implementing officials" can procure a commitment from their frontline workers. Lastly, Goggin et al. (1990, p. 130) stress that "skillful and committed program management" can foster buy-in and the appropriate responses from those at the street level. Consequently, a growing contemporary scholarship focuses on the influence that frontline supervisors may have on the commitment and responses of frontline workers in relation to conformance with organizational policy (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005; Ford, 1999; Young, 2000).

Frontline supervisors are defined by the National Academy of Public Administration as "individuals responsible for the work of non-supervisory employees" (2003, p. 2). The literature suggests that there are a number of factors that may explain why supervisory influence may be key in securing conformance. For instance, supervisors are uniquely positioned at the operational level of complex organizational hierarchies. It is at this level that frontline supervisors represent a conduit of information and knowledge with respect to policy decisions that impact frontline workers, mediate between management and the street-level, and act as informal policy-makers (Brewer, 2005, p. 507; May & Winter, 2009, p. 469). Research demonstrates that during an organizational change process, supervisors are a major source of power in determining the outcomes (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 222). For instance, supervisors are known to engage in activities labeled "managerial resistance" when they perceive

that an organizational change may negatively impact on their potential power or work opportunities (Young, 2000, p. 378).

An examination of public sector scholarship reveals that frequent attempts by public sector organizations to introduce profound policy changes, especially those dealing with frontline practices often result in failure (Brewer, 2005, p. 507; M. Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 10). Many of these unsuccessful implementations have been attributed to measures under the influence of frontline supervisors. For example, inside the public sector, it has been suggested that poorly developed goals, inferior reward systems, unsupportive leadership, and ineffective supervision can hamper policy implementation (Champy, 1995; Hammer & Champy, 1993). These factors, combined with the propensity for frontline workers to provide differential and perhaps even discriminatory service delivery (S. M. Barrett, 2004, p. 256; Lipsky, 1980, p. 3) can pose serious issues when introducing new policy into organizations.

Recent studies of public sector organizations have also demonstrated support for the capacity of frontline supervisors to achieve policy conformance. For example, an administrative emphasis of policy objectives by frontline supervisors has been reported to positively impact the goal-alignment and work performance of frontline workers (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Brewer, 2005; Ewalt & Jennings, 2004, p. 453; C. J. Hill, 2006; Riccucci et al., 2005). Not surprisingly, it has also been suggested that frontline supervisors are well-positioned to facilitate the conformance of frontline workers to implementation decisions (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 236). For instance, Young (1999, p. 588) suggests that due to their hierarchical position, frontline supervisors are privy to important knowledge concerning the actual divide between official and unofficial behaviors exhibited by employees towards a given policy and the presence of any formal versus informal rules. This perspective is consistent with public management

literature that advocates “management matters” (Boyne, 2003; Brewer, 2005; Meier & O'Toole, 2002; Moynihan, 2005). Therefore, it would seem justifiable that public management literature acclaims the frontline supervisor to be the “critical nexus between human capital and high performance” in the public sector (Brewer, p. 506).

In summary, the extant literature shows strong support for the positive impact that frontline supervisory influence may have on non-supervisory employees when attempting to secure a commitment in the public sector. What is lacking in the literature is an identification of the factors that exist in the public sector environment that support the capacity of frontline supervisors to positively influence conformance behaviours of “street-level” bureaucrats. Further scholarship needs to be conducted that helps us understand how the environment of public sector organizations, both internal and external, shapes the behaviours of employees and influences the role of the frontline supervisor when attempting to gain conformance to policy decisions. This research aims to fill this void in the extant literature and seeks to identify such factors that may exist in police organizations. Accordingly, in the next section, the literature is reviewed that supports the positive influence of frontline supervision on the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions in police organizations.

2.6 The Capacity of Sergeants to Influence Policy Implementation

In this section, I review the literature that supports the positive influence that sergeants may have on policy implementation and the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions. Police organizations rely on frontline supervisors to achieve operational success (Engel, 2001, p. 341). Frontline supervisors are known as sergeants; who act as a facilitating layer of management, tasked with administering policy at the street level (Skogan, 2008, pp. 25-26). Consistent with public management literature, the support of sergeants is critical to the

successful implementation of, and conformance to new policy (Britz & Payne, 1994; Charles et al., 1992; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; G.L. Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Phillips, 2015; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Importantly, it has also been acknowledged that sergeants possess the artifice to impede policy implementations at the street-level (G.L. Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Mark, 1976; Sherman et al., 1973; S. Walker, 1993). Unsurprisingly, the literature strongly argues that sergeants represent the most "proximate and perhaps most potent bureaucratic force" related to policy implementation and conformance at the frontlines of police organizations (Engel & Worden, 2003, p. 133)

While the majority of literature demonstrates a sergeant's capacity to positively influence the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions, a small amount of dated literature suggests this influence may be limited (Allen, 1982, p. 105; M. K. Brown, 1988, pp. 97-107; Reuss-Ianni, 1983, p. 63; Van Maanen, 1983, p. 277). This contrast in the scholarly opinion suggests that more research is needed to further explore these supervisory and policy conformance issues. This need is also acknowledged in that the occupation of policing over the past several years has experienced, and continues to experience "disruptive" (Campeau, 2015, p. 675) and dramatic change (Loftus, 2010b, p. 3). For instance, there has been a major shift towards "community policing" (Correia & Jenks, 2011, p. 6; Glaser & Denhardt, 2010, pp. 309-310) and the occupation itself has become more professionalized, subjecting the responses of officers to increased scrutiny from government oversight, the media, and the public (Campeau, 2015, pp. 674-675; Chan, 1996, p. 232).

Frontline police work is unique and creates challenges for sergeants particularly in relation to their critical role of assessing and achieving conformance (J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011, p. 222). Johnson (2015, pp. 1156-1157) suggests that the supervision of frontline officers

is complicated by three issues. First, the complexity, work task ambiguity, and the subjectivity of (police officer) responses to citizen needs, make it problematic for supervisors to provide consistent and effective feedback. Second, police officers are constantly juggling conflicting goals and performing duties of a contradictory nature, rendering it difficult for supervisors to supply specific guidance to officers on how best to execute their responsibilities. Finally, due to the larger number of police officers relative to supervisors and the general low visibility of officer assignments, it is not possible to acquire consistent firsthand knowledge of how officers are performing. Additional challenges for sergeants stem from frontline officers' ability to exercise high degrees of discretion both in their choice of self-initiated activities during "unassigned time" (Famega, Frank, & Mazerolle, 2005, p. 543) and in their judgements related to how, when, and to who they apply internal policy or legislation (selective enforcement) (R. Wortley, 2003, pp. 538-539).

Chan (1996, p. 12) emphasizes the sizable amount of discretion that characterizes frontline policing and suggests that these working conditions combined with low visibility and minimal supervision are a recipe for police practices that tend to bypass or defy legal procedures and formal policies. Despite the "militaristic bureaucracy" that structures police organizations, ironically it is the street-level officer operating at the lowest levels of the formal chain of command who enjoys the highest amount of unsupervised activities and discretionary decision-making (Chan, p. 44; Van Maanen, 1983, p. 277). Compounding this phenomenon is the anomalous relationship that exists between frontline officers and their supervisor – one often defined by uncertainty, suspicion, cynicism, and distrust as a result of the potential for scrutiny and punitive outcomes for failure to conform to departmental policy or the law (R. R. Johnson, 2015, p. 1161; Paoline, 2003, p. 201). When a "disconnect" exists between the supervisor and

frontline officers, negative implications for policy implementation may occur. For instance, frontline officers may develop feelings of detachment from the organization; breeding a lack of will to alter their routine behaviour or invest personally toward achieving policy objectives (Gau & Gaines, 2012, pp. 47-48).

In addition to the above, the channels of communication (written or spoken) between a sergeant and frontline officer can have a significant impact on the success of policy implementations. It rests on the sergeant to formally communicate information about new policies to officers during meetings. However, it is the "informal, non-hierarchical means of communication" between sergeant and officer that "fill in the holes" between what officers want to know and what they are actually informed and understand in relation to policy decisions (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 226). To emphasize the influence of the sergeant's communication strategy (degree of formality, repetition, style, and the degree to which feedback is sought) on the successful implementation of new policy decisions, Brunetto and Farr-Wharton note:

> Information about how to undertake policing tasks occurs via training and official policies. In addition, the police officer gains new information from conversations with peers and…sergeants…that may either reinforce or question the official messages. It is for this reason that…sergeants…are so powerful in the change equation…they have power in the way they communicate a message to employees…about a new policy/program…and in so doing may negate [its]…legitimacy… (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 226)

Not surprisingly, scholarly findings have reported that the support of sergeants towards policy decisions is critical for achieving conformance in police organizations (Britz & Payne,

1994; Charles et al., 1992; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; Phillips, 2015; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Scholarship corroborating the above has been demonstrated in policy areas such as community policing, (Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997), the pursuit of vehicles (Britz & Payne, 1994; Charles et al., 1992), and the use of deadly force (Fyfe, 1988). Walker (2006, p. 12) concludes that sergeants "play a critical role in directing and controlling the behaviour of officers in police-citizen encounters". Similarly, Goldstein (1990, p. 157) asserts that "…the quality of an officer's daily life is heavily dependent on how well the officer satisfies the expectations and demands of his or her immediate supervisor". Most befittingly, Skogan (2008, p. 25) concludes that sergeants posses the ability to interpret for frontline officers the operational sense of a new policy, duly becoming the "transmission belt that translates policies …into action".

Research in the fields of management and policing has further demonstrated that the style employed by sergeants may influence the capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers (see Engel, 2001, pp. 341-344). Engel (2001) develops four distinct supervisory styles of sergeants; traditional, innovative, supportive, and active. Engel (pp. 347-350) reports that distinct supervisory styles led to variable outcomes in terms of police behaviour. A 'traditional' supervisory style places importance on measurable outcomes and is focused on controlling situations and the behaviours of their subordinates through departmental rules and the chain of command. Outcomes of the traditional style include highly instructed frontline officers who are more likely to be controlled, less likely to be rewarded for performing, and less engaged in community policing activities. An 'innovative' supervisory style values community-relations and innovative changes in policing while showing less concern with rules and regulations and other enforcement tasks. Outcomes of the innovative style include frontline officers who are

more accepting of a new policy or policing initiatives and more sensitive to the needs of community members. A 'supportive' supervisory style is characterized by a high degree of concern for frontline officers, especially in relation to unfair or unnecessary discipline. Outcomes of the supportive supervisory style include frontline officers that are less concerned with disciplinary action or the potential for criticism. The supportive supervisory style has been considered problematic, as it has been associated with promoting solidarity and secrecy among officers, which can lead to misconduct or corruption. Lastly, the 'active' supervisory style features positive views of frontline officers and the desire to actively participate in the field and engage in police work. Outcomes of the active supervisory style include greater levels of direct supervision and influence over the conformance choices of frontline officers.

Continuing with their research, Engel and Calnon (2003, pp. 135-136) develop two theoretical models that explain the sergeant's capacity to influence the behaviour of police officers: the command model and the exchange or bargaining model. In the 'command' model, supervisory influence relies on formal authority to achieve policy conformance with rules and procedures. The behaviour of police officers is controlled by sergeants through the enforcement of compliance with policy and procedure and by ensuring that any standards of performance are met. In the 'exchange' or 'bargaining' model, the capacity to achieve policy conformance is proportionate to the rewards offered to subordinates. In this model, mutual dependency is emphasized in that the sergeant relies on police officers to conform to policy in exchange for small rewards such as preferred assignments, cars, or partners. Therefore, the command model differs from the exchange or bargaining model by influencing officer behaviour through the formal chain of command rather than the use of reciprocity.

In a study examining the implementation of order-maintenance policy in a municipal police organization, Gau and Gaines (2012, p. 55) suggest three strategies that police supervisors may employ to increase the likelihood of the conformance of frontline officers to a given policy decision. The first strategy is to repeatedly expose frontline officers to positive messages concerning a given policy so that affirmative attitudes toward the policy are reinforced. The second strategy is for supervisors to find out from frontline officers any obstacles and seek out any hurdles that may dampen an officer's attitude towards a given policy. The third strategy is for supervisors to regularly communicate with frontline officers any successes in relation to the implementation of a given policy and the methods that were used to achieve success.

Alternatively, Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1990, pp. 213-214) identify six ways that police supervisors can influence frontline conformance to organizational initiatives. First, supervisors should link frontline knowledge with the power that exists at the top of the organization. For instance, frontline officers should be encouraged to communicate community problems with management in exchange for organizational acknowledgement and additional resources. Second, supervisors should encourage open communication from frontline officers, whether positive or negative, toward the objectives of any policy decision. In the same regard, supervisors should also accept failures and address them in a manner that supports the values of the organization while protecting officers who are acting in good faith. Third, supervisors should use rules and procedures that normally hinder frontline officers to inspire and guide them towards policy objectives. In doing so, supervisors draw attention to the informative aspects of administrative guidelines rather than their disciplinary nature. Fourth, supervisors should refrain from quashing new ideas from frontline officers directed at delivering policy decisions - "never kill an idea" (p. 214). Fifth, supervisors should harness the creative abilities of frontline officers,

encouraging them to tackle policy decisions; and empower them by communicating to frontline officers that the organization supports their efforts and relies on their expertise. Lastly, supervisors should ensure that the discretionary behaviours afforded to frontline officers when conforming to policy decisions are appropriate and aligned with organizational values.

Other studies of police organizations have also identified attributes of sergeants that may influence their capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. For instance, literature suggests that a sergeant's degree of presence, attitude, management skills, personal workload, and manner of communication (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002; Engel & Worden, 2003; Famega et al., 2005; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; R. R. Johnson, 2011), degree of monitoring policy conformance (Buerger, 2002, p. 385; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011, p. 222; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008, p. 307; Stanko, 2007, p. 217), ability to demonstrate role modeling behaviours (Huberts, Kaptein, & Lasthuizen, 2007, p. 238; R. R. Johnson, 2008, p. 347, 2011, p. 302), amount of feedback and support (R. R. Johnson, 2015), ability to amass loyalty (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 54), degree of alignment of goals and objectives with frontline personnel (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 237), and perception of the policy (Correia & Jenks, 2011, p. 30) may influence their capacity to affect conformance. For instance, Bradstreet (1997) conducted 20 structured interviews with frontline supervisors from the Austin Police Department to elicit perspectives related to the implementation of 'community policing policy'. He found that factors such as empowering officers to make choices, teamwork, coaching, tailoring efforts to individual officers, incorporating police traditions, keeping objectives small, public recognition, having practical and modest expectations, and working with the community, positively impacted the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions (pp. 2-5). On the other hand, it was noted that factors such as increased demands to complete

paperwork, a lack of training, and the use of fear tactics had a negative impact on such conformance (pp. 2-5). Importantly, this study also concluded that frontline supervisors are best positioned in a police organization to provide objective assessments of a policy implementation and conformance to policy decisions (p. 6).

N. Iannone, M. Iannone, and Bernstein (2009, pp. 10-15) discuss how the administrative functions of a sergeant support the "effective accomplishment of organizational objectives", including direction, control, and securing compliance. These authors cite Gulick's (1937, p. 13) work related to "administration" and "management" (POSDCORB), suggesting that sergeants delegate to their subordinates through the following executive-type functions: Planning; organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, and reporting. A sergeant's ability to effectuate an orderly arrangement among officers promotes a "unity of purpose" that ensures adherence to policing goals.

In contrast to the above, Brown (1988, pp. 97-107) argues that the sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from police officers may be limited. This is mainly due to a sergeant's unavoidable reliance on the frontline officer to get work done, the nature of the work itself, and the solidarity that exists among police officers. Similar findings of ethnographic studies were reported by Allen (1982, p. 105), Reuss-Ianni (1983, p. 251) and Van Maanen (1983, p. 277) who suggested that the high degree of control that a supervisor is assumed to have over a police officer may be overstated. In general, however, the literature that shares this view is dated and contradicts a much larger volume of scholarly work that supports the capacity of a sergeant to achieve policy conformance from their officers.

In conclusion, the literature shows strong support for the critical role that sergeants play during the successful implementation of policy and the conformance to policy decisions at the

frontlines of police organizations. However, the literature also shows that this influence may be limited and at times non-existent should a sergeant desire to maintain the status quo in relation to any desired reform or intended policy outcome. What is not clear from the literature are the motivations (internal or external) that may exist in a police organization that may compel sergeants to use their influence to hinder conformance to policy decisions at the frontlines. The literature is also weak in explaining how the factors that exist in a police organization influence the various techniques or styles that a sergeant may employ to gain conformance from subordinates. This is largely the result of an extant literature that fails to seek the perspective of sergeants. This research aims to fill this void in the extant literature by unpacking the broader environment or 'institution' in which a sergeant operates and examine the contextual factors that influence a sergeant's capacity as it relates to internal policy conformance. After all, police culture is not static and sergeants do not make decisions, operate, or provide direction to frontline officers from within a vacuum. Consequently, in the next section of this literature review, the literature surrounding the influence of police culture on policy implementation in a police organization is considered in hopes of furthering our understanding of the environment in which a sergeant operates.

2.7 Police Culture and Policy Implementation

The purpose of this section is to review the existing literature on police culture to further our understanding of how the broader police environment or institution is composed and may operate and how this may influence the capacity of sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. The development of cultures and sub-cultures is a normal progression for any organization (Kingshott et al., 2004, p. 188). Organizational culture characterizes the basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed from within an organization in order to

cope with problems of “external adaptation and internal integration” – assumptions that are deemed normative and suitable for new members to acquire (Schein, 1983, p. 14). Culture in an organization can be conceived as a “collective construction of social reality” (Sackmann, 1991, pp. 33, 40) reinforced or changed by organizational processes becoming important habits of thought and action (Chan, 1997, p. 68).

Core characteristics of police officers who identify with the classic police culture include a sense of mission, a cynical outlook, suspicion, solidarity, isolation, conservative morality and politics, pragmatism, and an inflated sense of masculinity (Reiner, 2010, pp. 118-138). Additionally, it has been argued in the literature that racial prejudice is an aspect of police culture - a prominent theme found in studies of police officers and in other literature (see Chan, 1997, chap. 2; Henry & Tator, 2010, chap. 6; Reiner, 2010, chap. 4, "Racial Prejudice"; Skolnick, 1966, chap. 4, "The Racial Bias of Police"; Westley, 1970, chap. 3, "The Different Publics of the Police"). For example, the insinuation of racial prejudice as an aspect of police culture is noted in a Canadian study by Ericson (1982). He (p. 66) suggests that police officers attribute deviant behaviour at a culturally-cognitive level to racialized persons. Henry and Tator (2006, p. 93) theorize that this attribution may be the result of officers - even prior to their recruitment - absorbing “society’s racialized assumptions, stereotypes, and commonsense understandings” about particular racialized groups (for instance, the Blacks, the Indigenous, and the Muslims). These assumptions are further socialized among officers - racial biases become embedded images and belief systems that are popularized through training and reinforced by organizational norms (p. 96). This leads to a racist system of beliefs among officers, allowing skin colour, accent, and other ethnic characteristics of members of the public to signify efficient means of identifying criminal behaviour (pp. 96-97). Tanovich (2006, p. 14) refers to this as the

“usual offender” stereotype. This stereotype, while not a cultural embodiment that explicitly instructs officers to target racialized persons, implies that officers subscribe to a “racialization of street crime”, meaning an understanding that racialized persons have a propensity toward committing crimes, which warrants additional police resources (pp. 14-18). Comack and Brickey (2007, p. 6) demonstrate the tendency for police officers to criminalize the behaviour of women who often share physical characteristics of being: young; racially marginalized; Indigenous; and impoverished. Palmater (2016, pp. 282-284) and Comack (2012, p. 162) focus on the racialized and sexualized violence perpetrated against young and Indigenous women by the police, suggesting that these behaviours are the result of the deeply embedded racist, sexist, and violent cultural roots of the police institution. Chrismas (2016, pp. 44-45) and Crosby and Monaghan (2018, p. 9) discuss the injustices Indigenous communities have experienced due to settler colonialism and generations of systemic and disproportionate arrests and prosecutions by Canadian police and government. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that studies (see Chapter One) suggest that racialization underlies the Canadian criminal justice system and the stop and search practices of the police (S. Wortley, 1996; S. Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2009, 2011). Maynard’s (2017, pp. 12-13) critical discussion of the historical and present policing of Black and Indigenous “bodies” links the subjugation and dehumanization or racialized persons to state violence and anti-Black state practices. She contends (chap. 3) that Canadian police services authorize - often without scrutiny - oppressive activities (including the use of discretion by officers) that have the effect of “managing” Black populations, for instance, disproportionately surveilling and punishing Black offenders. This includes the institutional denigration and devaluation of Black women through dehumanizing treatment and violence at the hands of the police (several examples are provided) (chap. 4). Maynard (pp. 84, 111) further

suggests that the "conflation of Blackness with criminality" is a well-established cultural facet of the police and the broader criminal justice system. Maynard (pp. 88-89) also refers to the practices of "street checks" and "carding" of the TPS, suggesting that these practices promote the "demonization of Black communities", validating the socially constructed view that racialized persons commit more crime and are therefore dangerous. Aspects of a police culture that relate to racial prejudice are important for this research given the policy under examination and the need to understand the broader environment or institution (external and internal factors) in which a sergeant operates and how this may influence policy conformance.

The extant literature also argues that in some respects, police culture may be fluid. To help explain the contextual nature of police culture, Reiner (2010, p. 116) conceptualizes the existence of "subcultures" that develop within the broader police culture, influenced by the unique experiences and biographies of police officers. Similarly, Paoline (2004) argues for a typology approach to documenting and understanding police culture and identifies a number of different cultural orientations in addition to the "classic view" popularized by Westley (1970). Chan (1996, p. 112), Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1990, pp. 133-134) and Cain (1973, chap. 2 & 3) also refer to the unique social, political, legal, and organizational contexts that differ among officers and that may operate to shape the particular culture that emerges in a given time and place or from a particular community the officer is assigned to. The literature suggests that culture is "neither monolithic, universal, nor unchanging" and embodies the distinctive problems which operate in an officer's environment (Reiner, pp. 116-117).

Conceptualizations of police culture that relate to policy conformance include the "values, norms, perspectives, myths, and craft rules" which inform police conduct (Reiner, 2010, p. 117) and the "accepted practices, rules, and principles of conduct that are situationally applied,

and generalized rationales and beliefs" (Manning, 1989, p. 360). The literature suggests that aspects of a police culture that promote a resistance to reform may negatively influence policy conformance in a police organization (Chan, 1996; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; G. Dean, 1995; Paoline, 2003). For example, negative and suspicious attitudes towards service policies and procedures often stall any reform efforts that police administrators attempt to introduce (J. K. Cochran & Bromley, 2003, p. 89). Furthermore, the literature has demonstrated that officers may be quick to resist new directives and often justify their defiance by citing formerly failed reforms or the common belief that "civilians" cannot write policy for police officers (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, p. 316). This sentiment stems from feelings of resentment when officers are not consulted about internal matters or police business and cynicism about interference, political or otherwise when planning new programs (p. 316). Poor attitudes toward new policies can also be explained by a common perception among officers that more rules and restrictions prevent them from doing their job (Crank & Caldero, 1991, p. 344). As summarized by Manning (1993, as cited in Chan, 1997, p. 67), "the tensions apparent in the occupational culture generally and between the organization and the environment are the dialectic source of change in policing".

In summary, there is strong support in the literature for the notion that police culture has the ability to promote or stall policy implementation in a police organization. However much of the literature does not explain how the fluidity of police culture across a police organization may either support or frustrate policy implementation or conformance to new or reformed policy once implemented. This gap in the literature is likely due to the complexity involved in unpacking the broader policing environment or institution and assessing what aspects of police culture influence the various aspects of policy implementation alone or in combination. This research aims to fill this void in the extant literature by examining the perceptions of sergeants as it

pertains to the policing environment in which they work, eliciting important cultural understandings that may improve our knowledge of how policy is shaped and implemented in police organizations. With this in mind, the next section reviews the literature that helps to explain how police culture may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization.

2.8 Police Culture and the Capacity of Sergeants to Achieve Policy Conformance

In this section, the existing literature is reviewed that relates to the impact police culture may have on the capacity of a sergeant to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization. This section is important, because in order to unpack the broader policing environment in which a sergeant operates, it is necessary to consider any potential influence that culture may have on a sergeant's ability to supervise subordinates and accomplish organizational objectives; namely, achieve conformance to policy decisions.

At first glance, the literature appears to show strong support for the ability of a sergeant to leverage occupational culture, in particular, the aspects of rank-structure, to achieve policy goals. This is primarily due to the inherently top-down managerial style of traditional police organizations that subscribe to a top-down bureaucratic model of deployment (Chan, 1997, p. 90). Akin to the military, officers wear uniforms, adhere to a chain of command, desire to advance in rank, are expected to conform to policies and procedures, and receive the formal training necessary to execute their duties (Chan, p. 90). Within this cultural context, it is the sergeant's role to direct frontline officers in their day-to-day activities and make sure officers are aware of, and conform to organizational objectives and rules (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1994, p. 245) and obey a paramilitary chain of command (Witte et al., 1990, p. 2).

Notwithstanding, a significant amount of literature suggests that despite the above, frontline officers tend to deviate from both the law and organizational policy in their everyday interactions with the public (Chan, 1997, p. 88; Reiner, 2010, p. 115). Such deviations are thought to be the result of the discretionary decisions of officers that are difficult for supervisors to monitor and control (Famega et al., 2005, p. 543). This aspect of police culture presents challenges for sergeants who find that the military structure of police organizations hinders their ability to consistently monitor the "individual judgment, localised responses, and discretionary decisions" of frontline officers under their command (as discussed below) (Chan, 1997, p. 90). As James Q. Wilson notes:

> [As] all police officers and many citizens recognize, discretion is inevitable - partly because it is impossible to observe every public infraction, partly because many laws require interpretation before they can be applied at all, partly because the police can sometimes get information about serious crimes by overlooking minor crimes, and partly because the police believe that public opinion would not tolerate a policy of full enforcement of all laws all the time…[The] police department has the special property…that within it discretion increases as one moves down the hierarchy. (Wilson, 1968, p. 7)

In police organizations, the problem of officer discretion is magnified because the opportunities to commit deviant acts are greater due to the minimal amount of direct supervision that frontline officers receive from their sergeants (Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 74). For instance, it is not uncommon for a sergeant to be tasked with supervising five to ten officers at a time (p. 74). Moreover, frontline officers are generally dispersed over a large geographic area, resulting in minimal, or even zero contact with subordinates throughout the course of a shift (p. 74). The

problem of officer discretion worsens, when one combines the inadequate level of face-to-face supervision with other elements of police culture, which include informal exchange (Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 74), the code of silence (Klockars, Haberfeld, & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004, p. 27), and avoiding trouble (Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 74; Reuss-Ianni, 1983, p. 15). For instance, by highlighting some of the more negative aspects of police culture, Reuss-Ianni (see 1983, pp. 13-16) defines an informal "cop code"[8] and "maxims" that account for the decisions of a "street cop" and the relationship that may exist with his or her sergeant. Many of the maxims describe the "taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, pp. 14-15) that are tolerated within police culture and enable frontline officers to diverge from policy directives without penalty.

In addition to the literature that theorizes the negative implications that police culture has for the ability of sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers, there is also a body of literature that informs this issue, aiding to conceptualize how sergeants may leverage occupational culture to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular. For instance, in consideration of the police organization, Schein (2017, pp. 181-182) conceptualizes the ways in which leaders and managers of organizations may transmit the various assumptions, beliefs, and values to subordinates that are conducive to an organization's structure and processes. In doing so, leaders and managers function to align the behaviour of their subordinates with an organization's "macro culture": the many "levels of observability" from which an organization's culture can be seen and defined (pp. 3-5). According to Schein (pp. 182-183), leaders and managers are able to 'embed' beliefs, values, and assumptions in subordinates, by delivering crafted "messages". These messages

[8] Deduced from two years of ethnographic research involving the New York City Police Department.

have the effect of promoting a policy's adoption within the existing macro culture. To accomplish this effect, Schein suggests that leaders and managers may employ six primary mechanisms to influence how subordinates "perceive, think, feel, and behave…" about an embedded message. The primary mechanisms are: (1) what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis; (2) how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises; (3) how leaders allocate resources; (4) deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching; (5) how leaders allocate rewards and status; and (6) how leaders recruit, select, promote, and excommunicate (see 2017, pp. 183-196).

From the above, I suggest that sergeants (who act as both managers and leaders in a police organization) may also use these six primary mechanisms combined with the literature reviewed at the beginning of this section, to effectively support the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy of the TPS at the frontlines in the following ways: Beginning with the first mechanism (what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis), I propose that if sergeants "consistently" bring attention to the Regulated Interactions Policy by "measuring, controlling, rewarding, questioning, and remarking" on its importance, it sends a powerful communication that conformance to this policy is appropriate and valued by the organization (p. 184). On the other hand, if sergeants ignore the Regulated Interactions Policy, or send inconsistent or conflicting messages to officers relating to its importance, the opposite effect may transpire (pp. 188-189). Continuing with the second mechanism (how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises), I propose that if a sergeant identifies the state of police relations as a "crisis" and frames the introduction of the Regulated Interactions Policy as a collective way to resolve the "crisis", officers are more likely to ritually adopt the policy and accompanying practices (p. 190). In reference to the third mechanism (how leaders allocate

resources), I suppose that sergeants who set goals (measurements), the means to reach them (training), and the process to achieve them (proper allocation of resources), impart a message that the assumptions endorsing the Regulated Interactions Policy are valued and therefore should be adopted (p. 192). Conversely, improper allocation of goals, means, and processes may lead to alternative assumptions and practices that fail to endorse conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (p. 193). I propose that the fourth mechanism (deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching) prescribes an approach that increases the conformance of officers to the Regulated Interactions Policy. This mechanism responds to a sergeant's formal and informal "visible behaviour" that conforms to the given policy and sets an example for frontline offices to follow (p. 193). Pertaining to the fifth mechanism (how leaders allocate rewards and status), I suggest that sergeants might be sensitive to the nature of how an organization rewards (for instance, positive performance appraisals) and punishes (for instance, the form and severity of discipline) officers. This ensures that officers are rewarded within a status system that is sensitive to policy objectives (p. 195). In terms of the last mechanism (how leaders recruit, select, promote, and excommunicate), I propose that sergeants might encourage the recruitment and promotion of officers who exhibit behaviours that accord to the Regulated Interactions Policy rather than selecting officers who simply "fit in" to the current culture (p. 195). Furthermore, when officers are promoted to sergeants, it should not be the case that administrators "merely add stripes" to their uniform, as observed by Kappeler et al. (1994, p. 75). New sergeants may receive the appropriate training and possess values and cognitive scripts that are congruent with the given policy.

In summary, while some literature suggests that elements of police culture serve to hinder a sergeant's ability to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions,

there is also a demonstrable amount of scholarship, in particular the conceptualizations of Schein (2017), which suggest that elements of police culture may positively influence the capacity of sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. Where the literature hesitates is its ability to explain why elements of a police culture that hinder the capacity of a sergeant to achieve policy conformance still persist even today in modern police organizations. This research aims to contribute to this gap in knowledge by eliciting rich perceptions from sergeants that further our understanding of any elements of a police culture that may impact policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, and how such elements continue to exist despite public recognition of the jeopardy they may present.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature related to policy implementation and the approaches to policy implementation, including the top-down and bottom-up approach. It has also reviewed the literature related to frontline supervision in the public sector as it relates to policy implementation and the capacity of sergeants to influence policy implementation in a police organization. Lastly, this chapter has reviewed the literature related to police culture as it pertains to policy implementation and the potential influence that police culture has on the capacity of sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy. This literature review has exposed the gaps in the extant literature that relate to each of the above review sections and has clarified how this research will aim to fill these areas of knowledge, furthering our knowledge of this policy issue and in doing so, our understanding of the inner workings of the police organization. In particular, this review of the literature has demonstrated that the top-down, bottom-up, and mixed approaches to policy implementation, while rational in explication, suffer from an absence

of understanding the institutional environment within which officers operate and how it may influence policy implementation. This research plans to address this weakness, by examining policy implementation through a sociological institutionalist perspective, advantaging what this conceptual framework may reveal in terms of policy implementation in a police organization. In the next chapter, this conceptual framework is introduced and the methodology is presented.

Chapter Three – Conceptual Framework and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine and discuss sociological institutionalism; in particular, its theoretical propositions that improve our understanding of the relationship between institutions and individuals. I draw on the assumptions of sociological institutionalism to increase our knowledge of police organizations and the conformance choices of police officers. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that police organizations are 'institutions' and are therefore subject to the mechanisms and logic that can be attributed to the institutional environment and its actors. Understanding how this environment operates helps us unpack the contextual factors that may be operating in a police organization that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. Conceptual insight into institutions also assists the researcher in explaining any collective resistance that may exist toward policy decisions and why and how these behaviours might manifest among police officers. I begin by providing an overview of 'new institutionalism' – the conceptual root of sociological institutionalism. During the course of this overview, I differentiate new institutionalism from 'old institutionalism'. Once this overview is complete, I discuss how police organizations are institutions. I then justify my selection of sociological institutionalism as the perspective adopted in this research to conceive the inner workings of police organizations. To accomplish this, I differentiate the three branches of new institutionalism (historical, rational, and sociological) and provide a detailed reasoning for the selected approach. This is followed by an examination of institutional change from a sociological institutionalism perspective, in which I examine the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change (normative, mimetic, and coercive), continuous or discontinuous patterns of institutional change, and the three dimensions or pillars

of institutions: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. Next, I discuss institutional modes of constraint and power from a sociological institutionalism perspective as it pertains to this research. This is followed by a conceptual application of sociological institutionalism to the policy issue that is under investigation. Finally, I discuss the research methodology, including the research questions, research design, and sample descriptives.

3.2 Institutions and New Institutionalism: Framing the Sociological Perspective

Institutions are the foundation of social life (Campbell, 2004, p. 1). They are characterized by "formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which individuals, corporations…and other organizations [including police organizations] operate and interact with each other" (Campbell, p. 1). Institutions provide an incentive for, or constrain the action of individuals in collective orientations (Peters & Pierre, 2007, p. 1). An institutional approach prefers that actors be immersed in environments, which "shape actors' orientations and interests as well as the opportunity structures for the actor constellations" (Ebbinghaus, 2006, p. 16).

Under new institutionalism, the term "institution" can be applied to events, processes, structures, entities, and activities, or as Goodin (1996, p. 21) suggests, everything that yields "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior". Alternatively, March and Olsen describe an institution as follows:

> A relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances. (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 3)

In past scholarship, there have been two dominant approaches to institutional theory: Old Institutionalism and new institutionalism. Old institutionalism reflects institutional theory popularized prior to the "behavioural revolution" (Peters & Pierre, 2007, p. 1). This initial "formalistic, legalistic, and holistic" approach to understanding institutions relies on the assumption that in political contexts (government and organization), formal rules are predictive of individual behaviour (p. 1). This school of thought conceptualizes institutions as concrete administrative structures that are rationalized and official and excludes sociology from governance and politics from administration (Thoenig, 2007, pp. 194-195). Institutional structures operate in a state of equilibrium and its rules are accepted both as righteous and legitimate (p. 195). As noted by Veblen:

> Having once been accepted and assimilated as real, though perhaps not as actual, it becomes an effective constituent in the inquirer's habits of thought, and goes to shape his knowledge of facts. It comes to serve as a norm of substantiality or legitimacy…the "tendency" of things. (Veblen, 1899, p. 422)

On the other hand, new institutionalism – often considered the recent resurgence of institutional theory in political science - prefers more "actor-oriented" ways of explaining human behaviour (Peters & Pierre, 2007, p. 2). It focuses on "legitimation" as a "sustained driving force" in shaping organizational practices (Selznick, 1996, p. 273). Understanding the differences between old and new institutionalism promotes our understanding of the latter approach and assists with further discussions relating to the assumptions of sociological institutionalism – a branch of new institutionalism, which is important to this research.

DiMaggio and Powell (1991, pp. 11-15) compare and contrast new (neo) and old institutionalism. They suggest that both approaches share the following principles: (1) a

scepticism toward rational-actor models of organization; (2) a belief that organizations are state-dependent in process and limited in the options that can be pursued; (3) an emphasis on the relationship between organizations and their environments; (4) an assumption that operating realities are inconsistent with formal accounts; (5) and an accentuation of the role that culture plays in shaping institutional actuality. Notwithstanding, old institutionalism differs from new institutionalism in a number of ways. First, old institutionalism views both internal and external conflict as political. In contrast, new institutionalism tends to downplay the role of individual interest in episodes of conflict, focusing instead on the other aspects of institutions that prevent actors from recognizing and acting upon their interests. Second, while both old and new approaches acknowledge the premise of organizational rationality, old institutionalism associates internal constraint processes with the influence of actor interests (political and alliance-forming); whereas new institutionalism attributes organizational constraint to the "relationship between stability and legitimacy" (p. 12) and common conceptions among actors ("bounded rationality", see H. A. Simon, 1972). Third, old institutionalism highlights informal interactions within organizations – "influence patterns, coalition and cliques, particularistic elements in recruitment or promotion" (p. 13) – and how they are instrumental in achieving the organization's rational mission. However, new institutionalism critiques the organizational structure itself, crediting the diffusion of practice or procedure to the "persuasiveness of cultural accounts" (p. 13) and institutional conformity. Lastly, old institutionalism perceives the existence of organizations at a local level, joined together with other organizations by interorganizational treaties and face-to-face interaction (co-optation). On the other hand, new institutionalism views organizations as nonlocal sectors or fields: environments that "penetrate the organization, creating the lenses through which actors view the world and the very categories of structure, action, and thought" (p.

13). In terms of scholars, old institutionalism relates to the early writings of Weber and Durkheim but is primarily associated with the works of Selznick (1949, 1957) and colleagues (see Blau, 1955; Gouldner, 1954; Lipset, Trow, & Coleman, 1956). These scholars successfully established a separate area of academia dedicated to the study of organizations (see Scott, 1998). New institutionalism stems from the original works of Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), and DiMaggio and Powell (1983).

It has been suggested that the new institutionalism has vacated its view of organizations as "organic wholes" preferring a more contemporary representation of "loosely coupled arrays of standardized elements" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 14). Moreover, new institutionalism has disassociated itself from the idea that "values, norms, and attitudes" shape actors belief systems ("a moral frame of reference" under old institutionalism) and instead conceptualizes the essence of the institutional environment as the product of "taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications" – a "cognitive evolution" (pp. 14-15). Consequently, institutionalists emphasize the normative obligations that merge into an actor's social world which are interpreted as facts (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341). This phenomenon is referred to as "institutionalization": the mechanism by which "social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike status in social thought and action" (p. 341). Institutionalists have shifted their focus to "entire fields or populations of organizations" within an institutional environment, including "informal cultural frameworks, symbolism, …taken-for-granted cognitive schema [and] formal rule systems" (Campbell, 2004, p. 19).

A core premise embodying institutions is that they create aspects of "order and predictability" (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 4). By inducing a "logic of appropriate action", institutions regulate political actors, administer identities and roles, and mark a collective

character, vision, and history (p. 4). This logic of appropriateness relies on the assumption that institutions "shape the definitions of alternatives and influence the perception and the reality within which action takes place" (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 30).

In recent decades, institutional theory under new institutionalism has evolved into a major research paradigm in organizational sociology (Lounsbury, 1997, p. 465) and political science (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The conceptual framework is experiencing a renaissance right across the social sciences as it is applied to a contemporary world order in which "social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life" (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 734). In organizational theory and sociology, this approach depicts institutions as an independent variable, embraces cognitive and cultural explanations, and repudiates models of the rational-actor (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 8). In doing so, institutionalism probes certain institutional traits: the "supraindividual units of analysis, which cannot be reduced to the aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' attributes or motives" (p. 8). Its distinctly sociological flavour emphasizes the "powerful myths" located within institutions that are adopted ceremonially in the form of policies, programs, services, techniques, and products (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 340). Notwithstanding, Meyer and Rowan (pp. 341-343) also suggest that formal organizations tend to be "loosely coupled"; meaning structural elements may only be superficially connected to its activities, policies are often contravened or fail to be implemented, or if implemented are done so ineffectively, and subsequent evaluations of implementations are presented with ambiguous conclusions.

In terms of decision-making, institutional theory from a sociological lens rejects full rationality and autonomy. Instead, the assumptions of "bounded rationality" (H. A. Simon,

1972, pp. 162-163) are referenced copiously in the literature. The assumption of bounded rationality is that institutional actors are unable to make decisions with full rationality as these decisions are subject to individual limitations and the conditions and constraints that exist in the environment. March and Olsen (2006, p. 4) discount institutions as simply "equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual actors or arenas for contending social forces", instead framing them as "collections of structures, rules, and standard operating procedures…partly autonomous…in political life". Below I discuss how it is appropriate to conceive police organizations as institutions and how institutional theory helps us understand the inner workings of police organizations.

3.3 Conceptualizing Police Organizations as Institutions

How are police organizations institutions? To answer this question, I borrow from Peters (2012, pp. 19-20) who proposes that there are elements of institutions that are "common corpus. First, institutions must exist in such fashion as to represent a structural feature of society and polity. The structure may be formal or informal. From a structured environment, institutions "transcend" (p. 19) to involve groups of actors who invoke a degree of patterned behaviours that are predictable and relationship-dependent. Consistent with these propositions, I submit that the formal structure of a police organization includes its bureaucratic and visible presence and its function and representation as an integral public sector organization in government. In terms of its informal structure, police organizations have adopted conceptualizations such as the 'thin blue line of law enforcement' or the 'us versus them mentality' which manifest as a structural separation between police and the public. Second, institutions exhibit stability over time, which functions to establish predictable behaviour among institutional actors. Here I suggest that police organizations are stable while the behaviour of officers is regulated. For instance, uniform

officers work a regular schedule, generally perform identical assignments each day, and work in the same locality (division) for extended periods of time. Third, institutions influence the behaviour of actors. In the case of a police organization, institutional effects include regularly imputing importance to certain behaviours (stopping and questioning suspects, for instance) while simultaneously constraining other behaviours formally (policy and procedure) or informally (myths and customs such as initiation rituals). Fourth, institutions expose a system of shared values and meaning among actors. For police organizations, this may include themes such as 'the war on drugs' or a propensity to associate racialized persons with acts of criminal behaviour. Therefore, I suggest that police organizations exhibit elements of institutions. Next, I discuss how conformance to policy in police organizations meets the assumptions of new institutionalism.

Krasner (1984, p. 240) and Pierson and Skocpol (2000, p. 6) discuss institutional policies in the sense that they are "path dependent": once put in motion, stable policies generally persist, requiring a critical perturbation (deviation) to destabilize their path. These ideas complement those of March and Olsen (2006, pp. 4-7) who suggest that institutions establish elements of "order and predictability". In doing so, institutions are able to formulate policy and enable or constrain actors by endorsing a 'logic of appropriate action'. This process equates to "rule following": "prescriptions based on a logic of appropriateness and a sense of rights and obligations derived from an identity and membership in a political community and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions" (p. 7). Internal policies are adhered to because they are seen as "natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate" (p. 7). Members of institutions are expected to "obey, and be the guardians of, its constitutive principles and standards" (p. 7). This brand of stability leads Krasner (p. 235) to conclude that institutions tend to "act in the future as

they have acted in the past" – a popularized public sentiment often shared toward the operations of local police organizations and the actions of police officers.

To further our understanding of how internal policy is conformed to in an institution such as a police organization, it is helpful to apply the "normative" writings of March and Olsen. For instance, when referencing 'rules' and 'routines', March and Olsen (1989, pp. 21-26) discuss how they function to define what is the most applicable action for actors in a given situation. This assumption is particularly important for this research because I am seeking to understand the behaviours of police officers as governed by internal policy (the Regulated Interactions Policy). March and Olsen (pp. 22-23) discuss the repository of policies and procedures held by institutions that regulate its actors. This repository is accepted as inherently legitimate, enabling institutions to commit actors to perform in ways that may even breach their own self-interest (pp. 22-23). This conceptualization helps us understand why it is that police officers, in attempt to conform to internal policy, adopt practices that are attuned to institutional values (such as the practices of "street checks" and carding") but fall outside of societal expectations or the regulatory aspects of the external legislation.

Elaborating on the above, Peters (2012, p. 31) suggests that even in the most developed institutions which are characterized by conspicuous values and routines, some areas of behaviour will remain open to interpretation by actors and subject to some personal choice. Peters (p. 31) goes on to suggest that as a consequence of this effect, institutions necessitate a means of monitoring the behaviours of actors; "reinforcing the dominant views about appropriateness". He also refers to the inevitable cases of deviance that occur in institutions and the subsequent "enforcement mechanisms" (p. 31) that are fundamental to detecting and sanctioning this behaviour. In summary, I propose that the act of conforming to policy in a police organization

by police officers meets the assumptions of institutional theory as summarized above. I further submit that in police organizations, sergeants are essential to carrying out the mandate of "monitoring deviance" described by Peters (p. 31); establishing and stabilizing what constitutes "boundaries of acceptable behaviour".

Lastly, a total of 21 articles, books, and monographs have been identified that employ components of institutional theory within the field of criminal justice (Crank, 2003, p. 191). From within this literature, it is proposed that police organizations "typify the institution" (Crank, 1994, p. 326, 2003, p. 187; Crank & Langworthy, 1992, p. 338). For instance, Engel, Calnon, and Bernard (2002, p. 266) have examined racial profiling attributed to police officers, suggesting that the assumptions of institutionalism can explain policies that condone racial profiling within police services. Furthermore, Crank's (2003, p. 201) research suggests that institutional factors compose an underlying web of meaning through which 'police officers', when interacting with racialized persons, initiate investigations, judge culpability, and decide whether or not to invoke the criminal justice system. In the next section, I briefly differentiate the three branches of new institutionalism. This is followed by a detailed overview and conceptual application of sociological institutionalism - which I suggest is the perspective that offers more explanatory power in relation to this research.

3.4 Sociological Institutionalism: Suitability and Overview

It is customary in new institutionalism to distinguish among three unique analytical perspectives: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. Each perspective offers a means to decipher the role that institutions play in the social and political outcomes of institutional actors. Despite some overlap, each perspective views the political world through an exclusive conceptual scope. Furthermore, each perspective

offers unique theoretical means to explain institutional change and the relationship between institutions and individuals; more specifically, how institutions impact on human behaviour, preferences, decisions, and attitudes. Notwithstanding, one of the critiques of the institutional approach is that its scholarship could benefit from an increase of exchange among these analytical perspectives (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 957; Immergut, 1998, p. 28; Peters, 2012, p. 2).

It is not my intention in this section to provide a detailed overview or compare and contrast each of the analytical perspectives named above. The comprehensive works of Hall and Taylor (1996), Scott (2001, chap. 2), Campbell (2004, chap. 1), and Peters (2012, chap. 3, 4, 7) have already accomplished this feat. Instead, I will briefly introduce rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism so that the reader may separate them conceptually from sociological institutionalism and then demonstrate in the sections that follow, why sociological institutionalism provides greater explanatory power for understanding the institutional environment of this research. In other words, discussing how it is that the assumptions of sociological institutionalism can improve our conceptual understanding of police organizational operations and how institutional elements from a sociological perspective, influence the behaviour of officers. It is my intention to utilize the conceptual framework of sociological institutionalism in this research so that I may make a unique contribution to this perspective.

In brief, historical institutionalism emphasizes the political influence of the state within public administration and the outcomes of public policies (Thoenig, 2007, p. 196). It infers that previous policy choices inform current ones and future actions of institutions are reflections of current and past experiences – unquestioned social conventions (p. 196). In other words, institutional rules and constraints along with current and future policy-making are structured over

the long-term and situated in a historical and comparative context (Steinmo, 2008, p. 151). For instance, a historical institutionalist would examine historical records to make sense of political outcomes (p. 163). This is referenced in the literature as "path dependency"; meaning policies possess their own inertia and policy choices are heavily influenced by the past and are likely to persist (Peters, 2012, p. 70). Historical institutionalists tend to reject the notion that the social, psychological, and cultural traits of actors impel institutional operations (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 937). Instead, collective behaviour is heavily influenced by political influence stemming from competing interests (p. 938). Historical institutionalists define institutions in terms of embedded formal or informal policies, procedures, norms, and conventions (p. 938). Historical institutionalism is weak in its ability to diagnose the need for change or explain changes in an institution (Peters, pp. 82-83). It fails to explain with precision the decisions made at the actor-level (p. 84). These proclivities are problematic when considering whether or not to adopt this perspective to explain police organizations as institutions. For instance, this perspective may fail to explain how actors (police officers) have adapted to recent changes to organizational policy (the Regulated Interactions Policy) and the current decisions these actors make related to conformance and other factors that may exist in the police organization.

Rational choice institutionalism underscores the behaviours of actors that seek maximum gain from the smallest transaction costs (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 944-945). These behaviours are instrumental, highly strategic, and based on the actor's expectations (pp. 944-945). This perspective tends to explain how institutions operate by examining how such operations influence its actors – how they benefit personally and in cooperation with others (p. 945). Correspondingly, the decisions of actors are inferred to be autonomous and individualistic, seeking to maximize personal utility (Peters, 2012, p. 47). As such, institutions under rational

institutionalism are conceptualized as an amalgamation of policies and enticements that channel individual behaviour in ways that are motivated by personal goals, attainable more easily in an institutional context via cooperation (pp. 48-49). One of the most significant criticisms of rational choice institutionalism is that its assumptions are too exacting and impractical to apply to real-life situations (Kato, 2007, p. 226). This criticism further exposes this perspective's inability to fit, and account for the complexities of the broader institutional environment; meaning all environmental incentives that may influence the behaviour of actors (p. 226). This criticism presents concerns when considering whether or not to adopt this perspective in the context of this research. This is primarily because this perspective may fail to accurately account for all the factors in a decision-making situation that an actor (police officer) may experience in the organizational environment. In this research, establishing a realistic and complex understanding of the police institutional environment and the factors that may exist inside it is crucial for formulating working theories in response to the research questions. Below, the sociological institutionalism perspective is detailed and its superior exploratory power is reasoned.

There is a substantial body of sociological research that is relevant to our understanding of political institutions. The sociological institutionalism movement arose from the subfield of organization theory in the late 1970s (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 946) and has been influenced by developments in cognitive and cultural theory and the neighbouring disciplines of social psychology, anthropology, and ethnomethodology (Scott, 2001, p. 37). Institutionalists with a sociological background began to question whether the internal policies and processes adhered to by contemporary organizations were adopted solely in concern for their rational efficiencies

(Hall & Taylor, p. 946). Sociological arguments surfaced positing that organizational structure and processes could be interpreted as "culturally-specific practices" (p. 946):

> [Institutional processes are] akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally…[arguing] even the most seemingly bureaucratic practices have to be explained in cultural terms. (Hall & Taylor, pp. 946-947)

Therefore, institutions are akin to "social structures" (Scott, p. 58). Structures which consist of "cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour" (p. 58). The sociological literature emphasizes "values and cognitive frames" characteristic of organizations and their capacity to influence institutional operations and the behaviour of its actors (Peters, 2012, p. 137). In lieu of employing normative frameworks, sociological institutionalists adopt cognitive models to explore institutions and the cultural belief systems which occur within their borders, while deemphasizing the value of rational intra-organizational processes (Scott, p. 44). For instance, Jepperson (1991, p. 149) represents institutions as "socially constructed, routine-reproduced…rule systems…accompanied by taken-for-granted accounts". Similarly, Campbell (2004, p. 18) submits that organizations adopt practices considered 'appropriate' in the institutional environment regardless of whether the practice results in a reduction in costs relative to benefits. This phenomenon describes an actor's tendency to adopt a "logic of appropriateness" rather than a "logic of instrumentality" – especially in times of uncertainty and information scarcity (pp. 18-19). Consequently, actors under sociological institutionalism behave according to "taken-for-granted cognitive structures" found in "scripts, schema, habits, and routines that they possess and through which they interpret

the world" (p. 19). Zucker suggests (1977, p. 726) cognitive beliefs anchor the behaviour of organizational actors, which leads to "social knowledge, once institutionalized, exists as a fact as part of objective reality, and can be transmitted directly on that basis". From this perspective, decisions within institutions cannot be understood as "macro-aggregations of individual preferences" but instead a result of cognitive structures which can either constrain or enable action depending on the accepted model of appropriateness (Clemens & Cook, 1999, p. 445; Immergut, 1998, p. 16). Therefore the central concern of sociological institutionalism is the "embeddedness of social structures and social actors in broadscale contexts of meaning…the consequences …of world culture for social organization…" (Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1987, p. 31).

Hall and Taylor (1996, pp. 947-950) discuss three qualities of sociological institutionalism that distinguish it from rational and historical institutionalism. First, under sociological institutionalism, institutions are more broadly defined, not only including the formal procedures and norms, but also the cognitive scripts, moral templates, symbol systems and other "frames of meaning" that constrain human behaviour (p. 947). Defining institutions in this way blur the separation between "institutional explanations" (structure and rational efficiencies) and "cultural explanations" (shared attitudes and values) (p. 947). Under the sociological approach, an institution can be recognized as "culture itself" (p. 948). Therefore, a cognitive interpretation of culture acts as a template that regulates actor behaviour through a "network of routines, symbols or scripts" (p. 948). Second, sociological institutionalism emphasizes the "cognitive dimension" of institutional influence - cognitive scripts and models that interpret the behaviour of actors - conditioning the range of responses that an actor might select from in a given context (p. 948). On this account, sociological institutionalism shares assumptions of social

constructivism – that institutions assign meaning to the social lives, identities, and actions of actors (p. 948). In other words, what an actor perceives as "rational action" is itself "socially constituted" and "socially appropriate" (p. 949). Third, sociological institutionalism views the emergence of, and change related to institutional practices in unique ways (p. 949). Social institutionalists posit that institutional practices are adopted or altered to extend the social legitimacy of an organization and its actors rather than to increase efficiencies (or prevent dysfunction) (p. 949). Professionalization and responses to regulatory standards are examples of this condition (pp. 949-950). Alternatively, new practices or structural arrangements of organizations are adopted and endorsed organization-wide because they are valued and deemed "socially appropriate" in the cultural purlieu of broader society (p. 949). Lastly, organizations may resist change or act in constrained ways in response to uncertainty or by the manner in which creativity or innovation is expressed (p. 950). In the next section, I continue to discuss the explanatory power of sociological institutionalism by discussing how institutions change or resist change under this perspective.

3.5 Sociological Institutionalism: Institutional Change

In this section, I will examine relevant aspects of the sociological institutionalism perspective that relate to the process of change in institutions, police organizations, and this research. In doing so, I examine the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change (normative, mimetic, and coercive). I also examine an alternative model of institutional change and discuss its relevancy. This alternative model assumes either continuous (incremental or evolutionary) or discontinuous (punctuated equilibrium and punctuated evolution) patterns of institutional change. Lastly, to gain additional insight, I examine three dimensions or pillars of institutions: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive.

Recognizing and understanding the change in institutions is important. It can assist implementers to hypothesize whether a planned change (a policy implementation, for instance) in an organization will succeed and the conditions under which success is more likely (Campbell, 2004, p. 31). Institutionalists tend to be much better at explaining "stability" rather than "change" (Hay, 2002, p. 15). However, it is the sociological institutionalism perspective that assumes that change may not be the direct result of seeking greater efficiency or rationality in an organization (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 946). Instead, institutional change can result from processes aligned with the transmission of cultural practices and socially legitimized activities (Hall & Taylor, p. 946; Thoenig, 2007, p. 198). Change from a sociological institutionalism perspective argues that new institutional practices are adopted because the social legitimacy of an organization or its actors is enhanced (Hall & Taylor, p. 949). These changes are valued in the broader cultural environment despite any correlation with means-end efficiencies (p. 949).

The process that describes the homogenization of institutions is best understood as "isomorphism". Hawley (1968, pp. 327-328) refers to isomorphism as a "constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions". Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 346) were the first to use the term isomorphism in combination with the institutional theory, suggesting that organizations are "structured by phenomena in their environments and tend to become isomorphic with them." They (pp. 348-349) further argue that isomorphism has crucial consequences for organizations which include: (1) organizations will incorporate elements that are legitimated externally instead of being adopted for efficiency to increase the commitment of internal and external actors; (2) organizations employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria for validation to appear as a subunit of society rather than an independent entity; and (3) organizations rely on external

institutions for stability and to prevent failure. Essentially, their point is that institutional isomorphism advances the success and survival of organizations and contributes to its perceived legitimacy (p. 349). For instance, isomorphism can help explain the formal structure of an organization and its "blueprints of activities" (the existence of departments, positions, programs, and professions) rather than "day-to-day activities" (the types of products sold or what type of service is provided) (pp. 341-342). Consequently, individual organizations differentiate themselves in minute respects but conventionally share broad structural elements (hierarchies, rules, policies, and routines) and modes of coordination, management and exchange (p. 342).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983, pp. 150-154) elaborate upon the concept of institutional isomorphism to further our understanding of political and ceremonial action in institutions. They propose three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs: normative, mimetic, and coercive. Normative isomorphic change (pp. 150-154) occurs in an organization primarily as a consequence of professionalization. Professionalization happens when actors of an organization collectively define the "conditions and methods of their work" - establishing a "cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy" (p. 152). Normative isomorphic change is especially common in organizations that are heavily controlled by the state. Institutional environments that experience normative isomorphic change do so primarily for two reasons. First, organizations align themselves with professionalized values and norms as a consequence of formal education and other certifications, to achieve legitimacy. Second, the process of "diffusion" (p. 152) occurs, by which professional networks rapidly spread institutional models across organizations and industry. Mimetic isomorphic change (pp. 150-154) responds to the uncertainty that surrounds institutions; which in turn incites imitation among organizations. Generally, organizations model themselves on other organizations in three

circumstances: (1) when goals are unclear; (2) when the environment appears to be symbolically uncertain; and (3) when technologies are poorly understood. Mimetic isomorphic change is advantageous for institutions when facing a problem since workable solutions can be located with a minimal organizational expense. Lastly, coercive isomorphic change (pp. 150-154) occurs when formal and informal pressures are exerted on organizations. Pressures originate from organizations upon which there exists a relationship of dependency or from the cultural expectations of society. External pressures - similar to what Scott (2001, p. 187) defines as "exogenic forces" and distinguishes from "endogenous forces" (forces from within) - can be expressed either as force, persuasion, or an invitation to join in collusion. Coercive change can also stem from the pressures of governmental mandates, legislative oversight, or to achieve legitimacy.

In consideration of the above, I submit that the mechanisms attributed to coercive isomorphic change may assist in predicting and explaining certain implementation and change processes in police organizations. For instance, when experiencing coercive isomorphic change imposed by direct authority relationships, it is strongly suggested that police organizations will respond by conforming formally to environmental domains and ritually to myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 360-361). In the context of this research, I propose that the Province and the TPS implementation of an internal policy that conforms to provincial racial profiling legislation is an example of coercive isomorphism. The implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy has been coerced by two entities that hold direct authority relationships: (1) the authority of the Ontario government via provincial legislation (Benzie et al., 2015, par. 1-8) and (2) critics of the practices of "street checks" and "carding" who compose a segment of the public domain and consider current and previous policies of the TPS discriminatory and conflicted with societal

and cultural values (Benzie et al., 2015; Brennan & Ferguson, 2015; Grewal, 2015; Mukherjee, 2015; Perkel, 2015; Winsa, 2015). In my submission, the 'homogenization of organizational models' is achieved as a result of the requisite compliance obtained from all police services in Ontario. This argument is furthered by Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 352) who propose that "organizations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities."

Despite the suitability of coercive isomorphism to explain the above, the mechanisms of normative and mimetic isomorphic change also offer insight into this research agenda. For instance, organizational policies that seek to eliminate all forms of discrimination and harassment have become normative in contemporary institutions as a result of external legislation and public expectations. Furthermore, the assumptions of mimetic isomorphic change can help us understand how these normative policies are being 'diffused' across other law enforcement organizations and subsequently adopted as operational standards.

An alternative model of institutional change is proposed by Campbell (see 2004, pp. 33-35). In his overview, which I summarize below, he distinguishes between three basic patterns of institutional change: (1) incremental or evolutionary; (2) punctuated equilibrium; and (3) punctuated evolution. Incremental or evolutionary change accelerates slowly, making small advances. This type of change is characterized by contemporary institutional arrangements that continue to resemble their predecessors. Campbell refers to the tendency for institutions to make only marginal changes or maintain the status quo as 'institutional stickiness' or being 'inertia-prone. This pattern of change characterizes organizational decision-makers who are bounded rationally – suffering from insufficient information and inadequate methodology to assess policy

effectiveness or efficiencies. Such organizations generally accomplish modest change, more appropriately labeled "fine tuning" (p. 34).

Punctuated equilibrium (see Campbell, 2004, pp. 33-35) chronicles a pattern of institutional change that is profound, rapid, and discontinuous. This pattern is appropriate for describing a dramatic institutional change. Krasner (1984, p. 239), who was first to apply this pattern of change (from evolutionary biology) to institutions, makes reference to external and internal pressures faced by organizations, which lead to rapid change during periods of crisis followed by "consolidation and stasis". Krasner (p. 239) adds that in these situations, external pressures are generally more preconditioned for powerful change than internal ones.

Lastly, Campbell (see 2004, pp. 33-35) discusses the pattern of institutional change referred to in the new institutional literature as punctuated evolution. This pattern accommodates both concepts of evolutionary and punctuated change by characterizing the periods of equilibrium between punctuations as "evolutionary" instead of "static" (p. 34). Evolutionary periods are characterized by "social learning" under a constrained regiment, guided by "institutional practices, rules, routines, and cognitive schema" (p. 34). Periodically, these periods of evolution are punctuated by crises, dismantling the "institutional status quo" (p. 34) and subsequently inciting profound transformation of institutional components.

In terms of this research, I suggest that of the three patterns of change proposed by Campbell, punctuated evolution most accurately describes and explains the policy issue under investigation. Despite recent intervention from the Ontario government through the implementation of racial profiling legislation, the TPS has continuously conducted reviews of its internal policies (social learning) related to the practices of "street checks" and "carding". These practices have been altered incrementally (evolution) in an attempt to satisfy both legislative and

public mandate (Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. iii). However, it was not until a "public crisis" was reached that the TPS abandoned any further modifications to existing policies (Winsa & Rankin, 2015, pp., par. 1-2) and succumbed to dramatic regulatory changes (the suspension of the practices of "street checks" and "carding" and the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy) (Benzie et al., 2015, par. 1-8), representing a punctuated shift in institutional (cognitive schema) and frontline practices.

Finally, to improve our understanding of change in institutions from a sociological institutionalism perspective, it is advantageous to consider Scott's (2001, pp. 51-68) overview of institutional dimensions or pillars which I summarize below. Scott submits that sociological institutionalists recognize three basic dimensions or pillars of institutions: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar consists of the regulative aspects of institutions that constrain behaviour. This includes all regulatory processes that monitor and sanction institutional activities, including policies, procedures, and practices. The regulative pillar also includes reward and punishment systems necessary to manipulate actors into conforming to rules. The normative pillar (pp. 51-68) emphasizes normative rules and values that advance a prescriptive dimension to social life - how things should be done and how goals should be appropriately or legitimately pursued. Under the normative pillar, norms and appropriate expectations of behaviour are defined. The roles of actors are internalized, constraining social behaviour and empowering social action (duties, responsibilities, and mandates). The cultural-cognitive pillar (pp. 51-68) emphasizes the "centrality of cultural-cognitive elements of institutions" (p. 57). Under this pillar, institutionalists affirm the cognitive dimensions of social reality. This includes shared conceptions and frames of reference that interpret the world in which actors live. Under the cultural-cognitive pillar, compliance from actors is achieved

because other behaviours are deemed "inconceivable" (p. 57) and routines and taken-for-granted scripts are adopted as righteous.

I propose that each of the above three institutional dimensions or pillars provides a unique insight into the policy issue under investigation in this research. In relation to the Regulated Interactions Policy, I posit that the regulatory pillar accounts for the regulatory factors that have been implemented to constrain officer behaviour. Next, I suggest that the normative pillar explains the routine activities and behaviours of a police officer in relation to their conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. Lastly, I postulate that the cultural-cognitive pillar can assist to explain cultural frames of reference in which police officers understand their role, interact with society, and contemplate the meaning of their work in relation to the purpose, and importance of the Regulated Interactions Policy.

In summary, this section has examined a number of models of institutional change from a sociological institutionalism perspective that may help to understand the process of change in institutions and in particular, police organizations. I have demonstrated how the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change (normative, mimetic, and coercive), continuous or discontinuous patterns of institutional change, and the three dimensions or pillars of institutions: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive, provide a conceptual way of understanding how change might occur in police organizations, specifically in reference to the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy by the TPS. In the next section, I discuss institutional modes of constraint and power from a sociological institutionalism perspective as it pertains to this research.

3.6 Sociological Institutionalism: Modes of Constraint and Power

In this section, I discuss two constructs that offer conceptual insights to explain the behaviour of actors in an institutional environment from a sociological institutionalism

perspective: First, 'modes of constraint' and second, 'power'. When conducting research in political institutions, Lowndes and Roberts (2013, chap. 3) emphasize the theoretical and methodological importance of separating out three modes of institutional constraint: rules, practices, and narratives. They go on to theorize how these three modes of constraint, alone or in combination "shape actors' behaviour and the ways in which compliance is sought" (p. 69). Below, I briefly define each of the three modes of constraint and discuss their connectedness to the conceptual framework that I have employed in this research.

Inside institutions, rules are formalized, written down, and function to constrain and enable the behaviour of actors (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 53). Rules include laws, standards, regulations, and internal policies. For example, the Regulated Interactions Policy of the TPS represents a prescribed organizational rule. Distinct from rules, practices are not officially endorsed or formally recorded in institutions. Instead, practices are adopted when actors observe the "routinized actions" of others and then recreate them as "appropriate" behaviours (p. 57). To illustrate this point, I propose that both the practices of "street checks" and "carding" are 'institutionalized practices' of Toronto Police Officers - representing a "binding expectation" (p. 60) sanctioned by law enforcement. Lastly, narratives act to constrain and empower actors in institutions through resonant stories, transmitted by spoken word or symbolic means (p. 63). They can be described as a "sequence of events, experiences, or actions with a plot that ties together different parts into a meaningful whole" (Feldman, Skoldberg, Brown, & Horner, 2004, p. 148). Unlike rules and practices, narratives emerge and persist as more subtle processes within institutions, responsible for persuading actors and explaining actor behaviour (Lowndes & Roberts, p. 63). For instance, a narrative designed to legitimate the practices of "street checks" and "carding" among Ontario's law enforcement community might be; "if it's done right, it

protects people" (Gee, 2015, par. 5). In summary, rules, practices, and narratives offer meaningful ways, alone or in combination, to explain how the behaviour of actors is constrained in an institution, and more specifically, in a police organization.

When researching institutions, it is also meaningful to examine the distribution of 'power' and by what means its actors "exercise agency" (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 77). Dahl (1957, pp. 202-203) suggests that the ability to exploit power in an institution refers to the ability of actor 'A' to get actor 'B' to do something that actor 'B' would not otherwise do. Actor 'A' may be an individual, or represent a collective imposing their will on Actor 'B' (Lowndes & Roberts, p. 78). Notwithstanding, in the above configuration, actor 'B' must retain the ability to act in his or her own right, despite any institutional constraints that may influence his or her behaviour (pp. 78-79). Therefore, the distribution of power in an institution refers to "the ability of actors to 'have an effect' upon the context which defines the range of possibilities of others" (Hay, 1997, p. 50). The willfulness of an actor to exercise power speaks to his or her agency: "the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to attempt to realize his or her intentions" (Hay, 2002, p. 94). From an institutional perspective, Lukes (2005, pp. 29-30) suggests that power has an "evaluative character" that adheres to a distinct moral and political perspective. This perspective is "value-dependent", tied to a given set of assumptions that are legitimized by the operating collective (p. 31). Citing Parson's (1967, p. 331) work, Lukes (p. 31) discusses how power relies on the "institutionalization of authority" and is "conceived as a generalized medium of mobilizing commitments or obligation for effective collective action". This draws attention to the role of ideas and ideology in how actor 'A' can have actor 'B' do things that may be contrary to the interests of actor 'B'. Lukes (pp. 56-57) posits that the complex interrelations involving power in institutions are less likely attributable to individual

motivations and more likely a product of structural determinism. In summary, power in institutions can be conceptualized as a social force that operates within structurally determined limits. Even in the absence of any conflict or without the need to make a decision, power influences institutional practices – a pertinent conceptualization to consider when attempting to explore and identify the internal machinery that compels the practices of "street checks" and "carding".

Lowndes & Roberts (2013, pp. 90-104) discuss how power and agency interact with the three modes of institutional constraint discussed above (rules, practices, and narratives) to shape the behaviour of actors. Rules have the inherent and formal responsibility of distributing power in an institution. For instance, rules identify which actors have the authority to enforce rules and denote sanctions relating to nonconformity. Rules legitimate the actors or collectives who have power over others and affirm an organizational hierarchy. Complementary to rules, practices embody means to shape the behaviour of actors. Institutional practices are explicitly linked to power because they are legitimized and accompanied with incentives or sanctions depending on an actor's degree of conformity to such practices. Practices also influence how rules are conceptualized and adopted by actors. Practices can become rules over time, possessing the added ability to confer power by shaping policy. Lastly, narratives induce collective understandings of "social and political relations" in institutions (Feldman et al., 2004, p. 148). Narratives lay down power relationships - expectations of who is in charge and how actors are expected to behave and relate to each other (Schmidt, 2009, p. 533). In summary, inside institutions, the distribution of power is rooted in rules, practices, and narratives. Power is conceptually important to this research because it has an effect on the behaviour of actors.

Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 13) discuss the existence of "rule makers" and "rule takers" in institutions. Rule makers are actors or collectives that set and modify rules. Rule takers are those that are expected to comply with the rules. For example, in relation to the Regulated Interactions Policy, I submit that the rule makers are representatives of the Ontario government, the Toronto Police Services Board, and the Chief of Police. Correspondingly, I suggest that the rule takers are the police officers at the frontlines – those responsible for conforming to the rules. Streeck and Thelen (p. 14) posit that rules are rarely adopted in an ideal manner and that a gap always exists between the "ideal pattern" of a rule and the "real pattern of life under it". To illustrate this phenomenon, Streeck and Thelen (pp. 14-16) confer four points which I summarize here. First, the meaning of rules is always subject to interpretation and never self-evident. A shared understanding among actors is necessary to establish a normative order. Second, rule makers possess cognitive limits, resulting in unanticipated consequences that may differ from what was initially intended. Third, rule takers do not just adhere to rules, but will also attempt to modify or circumvent them especially when they are uncomfortable or costly. Rule takers may also look for opportunities to evade or subvert rules to their advantage. Fourth, rule makers possess a limited capacity to ensure rules are adopted and conformed to as intended. This includes a recognized inability to prevent unintentional deviation from the rules and willful non-conformance (deviant behaviour). Streeck and Thelen (p. 16) conclude that institutions are characterized by power relationships that exist between rule makers and rule takers. They surmise, that upon its formation, a rule will be "discovered, invented, suggested, rejected, or for the time being, adopted" (p. 16). These actions may lead to "imperfect enactment on the ground" and "unanticipated consequences" (p. 16).

In a police organization, the existence of, and interrelationships among rule makers and rule takers is important to policy and decision-makers who must ensure that frontline officers conform to policy in the way that it was intended. Consequently, the above propositions are useful for understanding how policy is implemented in police organizations – that is who controls the implementation and what contextual factors may impact the policy implementation process. In the next section, I employ Hall and Taylor's three qualities of sociological institutionalism to affirm the effectiveness of its conceptual insights to explain the policy issue under investigation in this research.

3.7 Sociological Institutionalism and the Policy Issue

Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014, p. 20) define 'conceptual framework' as "the current version of the researcher's map of the territory being investigated". The aim of the conceptual framework is to recognize, understand, and predict patterns of "collective human behaviour" (Frederickson et al., 2012, p. 6). In this section, guided by Hall and Taylor's (1996, pp. 947-950) three qualities of sociological institutionalism, I discuss how this approach is an appropriate conceptual application in terms of the policy issue I am investigating in this research. First, the Regulated Interactions Policy represents a formal policy – only one component of an institution as defined under sociological institutionalism. I propose that the practices of "street checks" and "carding" (the practices associated with the above policy) are the symbolic means by which police officers effectuate this policy, representing the actual shared attitudes and values of the TPS. Moral templates reinforce the manner in which officers 'investigate' and 'card' members of the public. These templates guide and legitimize what is considered 'appropriate behaviour' for law enforcement. Stopping and interrogating members of the public, including those who are racialized may be construed as the 'police culture itself' – a scripted disposition of

police work considered righteous by the organization and administrators who legitimate the behaviour - and professionalized among other organizations who share the Anglo-American policing model. Therefore, the practices of "street checks" and "carding", quoting Peters (2012, p. 131), can be viewed in a cognitive sense "analogous to the logic of appropriateness being more or less infused into the members of the institution". Second, I propose that the rational way that police officers understand and conform to the Regulated Interactions Policy is itself socially constructed and constrained by interpretive scripts and models endorsed and maintained within the 'institution' of policing. Institutional meaning is assigned to the effectuation of "street checks" and "carding" by officers. An endorsement of what is institutionally "appropriate" is recognized through reward systems and the reinforcement of "expressed preferences" (Immergut, 1998, p. 7). The rationalized belief that the practices of "street checks" and "carding" reduce crime while protecting the public, enables officers to cognitively identify with their professionalized role and the taken-for-granted need to adopt this practice on behalf of society. Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 340) remind us that "organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work…independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures". Correspondingly, I suggest that the practices of "street checks" and "carding" are "institutionalized" practices (Zucker, 1983, p. 25) – a fundamentally "cognitive process" that is rationalized and impersonally prescribed by officers as a "social purpose" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 343). Third, under this approach, we may conceive the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy as an attempt by the TPS to seek legitimacy from both elite regulators and society rather than as a rational means to reduce crime. This may have a detrimental effect on the "social meaning" officers give to this policy. For instance, I submit that while regulatory

attempts within the police organization have endorsed the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy as "social fact", the policy itself may diverge from preconditioned cognitive beliefs of officers - those that can be attributed to the institutional environment. Preconditioned cognitive beliefs stem from the sociological premise that "…knowledge, once institutionalized exists as a fact, as part of objective reality, and can be transmitted directly on that basis" (Zucker, 1977, p. 726). Consequently, the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy may be resisted if officers interpret the policy as illegitimate, culturally inappropriate, or contrary to preconditioned beliefs. Rejection may occur despite the presence of coercive forces (monitoring and sanction) that exist within the organization to constrain officer behaviour. In summary, I propose that the assumptions of sociological institutionalism that have been discussed in this chapter so far, including the application of the sociological institutionalism perspective presented in this section, provide sufficient support for its explanatory power as a conceptual framework to further our understanding of: (1) the behaviour of police officers and (2) other factors that may exist in a police organization that may influence conformance to policy decisions. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the research methodology.

3.8 Methodology

3.8.1 Research Questions

This research explores police organizations, supervision, and policy implementation in new ways, seeking to confirm theorizations that have emerged from the gaps in the extant literature. The research questions explored in this study include:

1a) What are the factors that facilitate or hinder policy conformance in a police organization?

1b) Do sergeants have the capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers?

1c) Are there contextual factors operating in a police organization, influencing a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers?

1d) Do those contextual factors vary across a police organization?

Based on a review of the literature, this research hypothesizes that the factors that may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers vary across a police organization (from one division to another). The reason for this hypothesis is dependent on the literature that confirms the variability of the environments in which a frontline police officer operates (Chan, 1996, p. 112; Mastrofski, 2004, p. 102; Paoline, 2003, pp. 200-201; Reiner, 2010, p. 116; Reuss-Ianni, 1983, pp. 6-7) and the various styles and strategies of supervision that may also influence an officer's working conditions (Engel, 2001, pp. 341-344; Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 55; Sparrow et al., 1990, pp. 213-214). This research also hypothesizes that sergeants positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. The reason for this hypothesis is dependent on the policing literature that suggests that frontline supervisors are relied upon to achieve operational success, representing the most powerful bureaucratic pressure in a police organization (Engel, 2001; Engel & Worden, 2003; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). The research questions aid to establish from sergeants the "lay of the land" as it pertains to their capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization.

3.8.2 Research Design

The literature suggests that the sociological institutionalism perspective is often employed when undertaking research involving specialized organizational "fields" in the public sector (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, p. 33). This approach has been further credited for producing a "detailed history of the institutionalization of specific ideas or norms in organizational settings" and "thick descriptions of subtle and dynamic processes, which are not usually easily

apprehended by their subjects" (p. 33). The research design draws from the conceptual insights of sociological institutionalism to frame my examination of the factors that may facilitate or hinder policy conformance in a police organization with an emphasis on a given policy (the Regulated Interactions Policy) and the role of sergeants.

The research design represents a qualitative undertaking. Notably, qualitative research methodology creates a variety of opportunities for "real life" experiences to inform policy-making and policy decisions (Graham & McDermott, 2006, p. 22). It embodies a research approach capable of analyzing and interpreting the meaning participants or groups impute to social issues and human problems (Creswell, 2014, p. 4). For instance, Berg (2012, p. 8) suggests that qualitative researchers are "most interested in how human beings arrange themselves and their settings, and how inhabitants of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles, and so forth". Moreover, Repko (2012, p. 129) emphasizes that qualitative research is often focused on evidence that is difficult to quantify, such as cultural behaviours and human perceptions.

Using a qualitative approach, this research will examine the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization with an emphasis on a given policy (the Regulated Interactions Policy) and the role of sergeants. To do so, 17 sergeants, each representing a different division of the TPS, were interviewed (semi-structured and face-to-face). Interviews ranged in length from approximately 45 minutes to two hours. It was anticipated that interviews across divisions would capture varying factors that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance and any differing degrees of resistance or conformity from frontline officers to the given policy.

A survey questionnaire (Appendix 9.4) was also administered to sergeants after their interview to supplement the data collected from their interviews. The intent of the questionnaire was to collect additional data from individual sergeants including demographic data, work experience, leadership style, communication style, policy knowledge, and other self-reported beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. The use of this questionnaire is supported by Neuman and Robson (2012, p. 154) who suggest that measurement and analysis of additional variables allow for additional testing of hypotheses, the inference of any temporal order, and the confirmation or denial of data collected during interviews with participants. In this research, an additional advantage of the questionnaire was its simplicity to execute.

3.8.3 Research Participants

Sergeants directly control what police officers do on the street on a day-to-day basis (Engel & Worden, 2003, pp. 262-263; Skogan, 2008, p. 25). This includes briefing and overseeing police officers in relation to conformance with a new policy (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 226). The literature distinguishes patrol sergeants termed "street sergeants" from administrative sergeants termed "station house sergeants" (Van Maanen, 1983, pp. 298-299). Patrol sergeants spend their time in uniform in the field directly monitoring police officers. Administrative sergeants are more likely to remain inside a police building and engage in administrative tasks that do not include direct and regular monitoring of police officers in the field. In order to ensure that all interviewees have experienced the process under investigation and are able to contribute towards theory-construction, the selection of participants - in this case, sergeants, is "homogenous" (Creswell, 2013, p. 154). Accordingly, this research sampled patrol sergeants only – a method of data collection referred to as "theoretical sampling" (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 143) or "purposive sampling" (Miles et al., 2014, p. 31). One sergeant was

selected from each of the 17 police divisions spread across the city. The divisional cross-representation of sergeants ensured that interviews across divisions got a sense of the varying factors that may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance and any differing degrees of resistance or conformity from frontline officers to the given policy under examination.

The number of sergeants interviewed in this research is supported in the literature. On the higher side, Creswell (2013, p. 86) suggests that a "well-saturated theory" can be achieved after 20 to 30 interviews amid several visits to the field. On the lower side, Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006, pp. 74-77) suggest thematic saturation may be reached in as few as 12 interviews when the data is rich, in-depth, homogeneous, and accurate. These sample sizes are supported by consensus theory which postulates that small samples are sufficient to provide suitable information within a specific cultural context if participants possess some expertise related to the area of inquiry (see Reflexivity and Positionality section) (Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986, p. 326). Consequently, 17 sergeants of the TPS were recruited for participation in this study. To meet eligibility requirements sergeants were required to have spent a minimum of 6 continuous months assigned to a police division in the position of patrol sergeant and tasked with directly supervising police officers who work in a uniform position at the frontlines. I submit that six months experience allows for sufficient opportunity for sergeants to perceive factors that facilitate or hinder policy conformance in a police organization and the contextual factors that may be operating that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. Frontline officers are defined in this research as officers in a uniform patrol position experiencing regular interaction with members of the public as a result of patrol, requests-for-service, or self-initiated investigations.

3.8.4 Recruitment of Participants

For professional reasons, I have unique access to employees of the TPS. I received support and written permission from the Chief of Police prior to recruiting participants. Support from the Chief of Police is intended to promote the effect of "champions" - increasing acceptance and the likelihood to recruit (Michael Moore & Smith, 2007, p. 145). This effect is significant as the literature suggests that police officers are reluctant to share "in-house" knowledge with researchers, particularly during times of organizational change or in situations where confidentiality cannot be guaranteed (Marks, 2004, pp. 871, 875). Police management assisted in the recruitment process. A recruiting email was sent to all Unit Commanders (Senior Officers) of the 17 divisions of the TPS explaining the study and asking for volunteers. The recruiting email was then forwarded down the chain-of-command to the sergeant level at the division. Sergeants who were interesting in volunteering in this study contacted me directly by email. While it is possible that sergeants were positively influenced to participate in this study because the request came through police management, not one participant indicated to me that they were told, ordered, or forced to participate in the study. Notwithstanding, I cannot ignore the possibility that one or more sergeants in my sample who chose to participate in the study may be more supportive of police management or the police in general. Once sergeants responded with interest, it was determined whether they met the eligibility requirements discussed above. If so, the sergeant was invited to participate. Once a sergeant confirmed their participation in the study, no other sergeant was sought from the same division. Throughout this research, the identities of participants were kept confidential.

3.8.5 Study Participants: Sample Descriptives

As outlined in the research design, 17 sergeants, each representing a different division of the TPS, were interviewed (semi-structured and face-to-face). A survey questionnaire was also administered to sergeants after their interview to supplement the data collected from their interviews. The intent of the questionnaire was to collect additional data from individual sergeants, including demographic data. This data was collected and analyzed using SPSS. Below, the results of the demographic analysis are presented.

Of the total number of participants interviewed, 88.2% were male and 11.8% were female (see Table 1). In terms of their age, the majority of the study participants were 35 to 44 (47.1%) years of age and 45 to 54 years of age (41.2%), which is also to be expected, given that promotion to the rank of sergeant generally occurs after officers have been on the job for a decade or more (see Table 2). Participants also reported relatively high education levels, with 35.3% reporting completing some university and 54.3% reporting holding a university degree or college diploma (see Table 3). This is also expected given that completed post-secondary education is considered an important attribute of officers should they wish to apply for promotion to the rank of sergeant.

The self-reported ethnicity of the participants was South Asian and Caucasian (see Table 4). Some participants preferred not to answer questions about their ethnicity or age. This may have led to the underreporting of the true number of racialized sergeants that participated in this study. Consequently, my sample of sergeants may have been more or less ethnically diverse than this analysis indicates. The majority of participants had between 16 and 20 years (52.9%) of policing experience (see Figure 2) and 1 to 5 years (64.7%) of supervisory experience. Only four participants (23.5%) had 11 or more years of supervisory experience (see Figure 3). Lower

levels of supervisory experience are expected as many officers over the past few years have been newly promoted to sergeant, likely replacing the retiring baby boomer generation. Below, the specified frequency tables and figures are presented to illustrate the above.

Table 1. Number and Gender of Participants

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	15	88.2	88.2	88.2
Female	2	11.8	11.8	100.0
Total	17	100.0	100.0	

Table 2. Age of Participants

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
35-44 years	8	47.1	47.1	47.1
45-54 years	7	41.2	41.2	88.3
55-64 years	1	5.9	5.9	94.2
Prefer not to answer	1	5.9	5.9	100.0
Total	17	100.0	100.0	

Table 3. Highest Level of Education completed by Participants

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
High School	1	5.9	5.9	5.9
College Diploma	5	29.4	29.4	35.3
Some University	6	35.3	35.3	70.6
University Degree	5	29.4	29.4	100.0
Total	17	100.0	100.0	

Table 4. Ethnicity of Participants

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Caucasian	11	64.7	64.7	64.7
South Asian	2	11.8	11.8	76.5
Prefer not to answer	4	23.5	23.5	100.0
Total	17	100.0	100.0	

Table 5. Participant's Years of Policing Experience

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
11-15 Years	3	17.6	17.6	17.6
16-20 Years	9	52.9	52.9	70.6
21-25 Years	1	5.9	5.9	76.5
26-30 Years	3	17.6	17.6	94.1
31-25 Years	1	5.9	5.9	100.0
Total	17	100.0	100.0	

Table 6. Participant's Years of Supervisory Experience

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1-5 Years	11	64.7	64.7	64.7
6-10 Years	2	11.8	11.8	76.5
11-15 Years	4	23.5	23.5	100.0
Total	17	100.0	100.0	

3.8.6 Interviews

Marks (2004, p. 871) suggests that the best way to understand the experiences and issues of police officers is through direct interaction with them. Data collection in this study consisted of 17 semi-structured interviews conducted face-to-face with sergeants. Advantages of face-to-face interviews include "high response rates and the longest questionnaires" (Neuman & Robson, 2012, p. 176) and richer and more detailed qualitative data (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 173). The

interview guide (Appendix 9.5) consisted of several sections of questions, each section associated with a "prefigured category" or measure (Crabtree & Miller, 1992, p. 151). Interviews were initially expected to last approximately one hour. "Subquestions" (semi-structured questioning) were permitted if the participant's responses to the initial questions did not cover the topics of interest. The data recording procedures and the interview and observational protocols included note-taking, audio-recording, full transcription, and coding using QSR International's NVivo (2017) 11.4.3 Software (trademarked). Follow-up opportunities were permitted with participants if additional clarification or information was necessary.

3.8.7 Data Analysis

The analysis benefits from the coding process to facilitate the conceptual abstraction of data and its reintegration as theory (Holton, 2010, p. 21). During the coding process concepts were extracted from the raw data during interviews and developed in terms of their "properties and dimensions" (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 159). This process represents the "pivotal link" between data collection and the advancement of emerging explanation and meaning (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 45-46).

In this analysis two types of coding were incorporated; "substantive coding", which includes the practices of both "open" and "selective coding", and "theoretical coding'" (see Holton, 2010, pp. 21-38). Coding will lead to "theoretical saturation", meaning there are no new emergent properties or dimensions pertaining to the core category or concept (Holton, 2010, p. 32) and additional data collection no longer yields new theoretical insight (Charmaz, 2006, p. 113). Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 10) refer to this type of analysis as "thematic analysis", relying on both the "prevalence" and "keyness" of a theme for inclusion in the findings.

During coding, special consideration was given to "in vivo" codes, which act as symbolic markers of speech and meaning (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 50-55; Creswell, 2013, p. 185). Additionally, concurrent "memoing" during the coding process prompted continuous conceptual development (Charmaz, 2006, p. 72) and "ideation" of the emerging theory (Holton, 2010, p. 21). The coding process culminates once theoretical (thematic) saturation is achieved. Accordingly, this analysis will serve to substantiate or disconfirm the research hypotheses detailed above.

3.8.8 Reflexivity and Positionality

My interest in this research stems from my experience as a PhD and Masters student in the fields of policy, leadership, and management, and from over a decade-and-a-half of employment as a Police Constable, Sergeant, Detective, Staff Sergeant, and currently Detective Sergeant with the TPS. Reflexivity allows me to recognize and reflect upon how my background, biases, values, professional and cultural experiences inform my interpretation of the data (Creswell, 2013, p. 47, 2014, p. 187). It allows me to critically engage my "underlying assumptions" and explore my personal position, influence, knowledge, and identity as they relate to the emerging themes (Hand, 2003, p. 18). Reflexivity recognizes the impossibility of researcher-neutrality (Hand, 2003, pp. 18-19) and requires me to address the power imbalances that exist between me and the participant prior to data collection and interviewing (Creswell, 2014, p. 98).

Strong scholarly support can be found for the continuous use of reflexivity by the researcher. Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 208) suggest that "tacit knowledge not only widens the investigator's ability to apprehend and adjust to phenomenon in context, it also enables the emergence of theory that could not otherwise have been articulated". Similarly, Turner (1981, p. 242) suggests effective research cannot emerge "in a vacuum", but rather relies on the ability to

ask the correct questions - ones that are theoretically relevant and "understandable in and crucial to the substantive area under investigation". Lastly, Cutliffe (2000, p. 1480) posits that to deny a researcher access to their own influence, specifically self-knowledge or creativity has the potential to restrict the "depth of understanding of the phenomenon" being investigated and impose a wanton rigid structure to the inquiry.

Positionality describes where the researcher stands in relation to the participant (Merriam et al., 2001, p. 411). Positionality requires me to disclose my "insider status", meaning my familiarity with, and intimate knowledge of the subject matter (Turner, 1981, p. 243). In literature, insider status has been associated with the exclusive ability of a researcher to gain access to participants, ask more meaningful questions, understand non-verbal cues, and derive a more realistic impression of a participant's reality (Merriam et al., 2001, p. 411). I suggest that my background, which consists of more than a decade-and-a-half of policing, grants me insider status. I possess the rare and fortunate experience of having been "immersed" beforehand in the "host society" (as an employee of the TPS) (R. Walker, 1985, p. 6) and a greater understanding of what has been referred to as the "world of others" (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p. 34). Consequently, in this research, positionality enhances my ability to procure a more realistic model of the phenomenon under investigation and the viewpoint of participants (Aguilar, 1991, p. 25).

My positionality also presents some drawbacks. I am aware that the "external meta-categories" (Moser, 2008, p. 383) to which I belong (male, white, Canadian, police officer, supervisor, middle-class, academically-oriented) may impact the degree to which participants may open up and tell the truth. It is also possible that participants may regard my intentions as suspicious or accompanied with ulterior motives such as the intent to expose, discipline, or self-

promote. In addition, I bring with me my personal history, experiences, culture, a particular and personal location (Merriam et al., 2001, p. 416), and power structures (Moser, 2008, p. 385). Consequently, it is important as a researcher to be aware of my positionality and how it may affect the production and representation of knowledge and theory-building.

3.8.9 Reliability and Validity

Reliability is defined as the "degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions" (Hammersley, 1992, p. 67). To achieve a high degree of reliability in this research, this data analysis incorporates the pre-testing of semi-structured interviews and an intercoder agreement process (Creswell, 2013, pp. 254-255; Silverman, 2001, p. 229). Pre-testing of semi-structured interviews was conducted with police officers of the TPS on a voluntary basis, who did not meet the criteria to participate in this research due to their current assignment. For example, in one case, the pre-test participant was a detective who used to be a sergeant and would have qualified for the study one year earlier. To ensure the reliability of the data, a qualitative methodology developed by Hesse-Biber (2017, pp. 326-329) was used. This meant that findings and interpretations were examined for process integrity, discussed with "legitimate knowers", and investigated in the context of how they may impact participants specifically and the broader social context in which the research transpired (pp. 326-327). Further, to ensure high agreement between codes and the intended meanings of participants, it was necessary to practice reflexivity through "memoing" of core categories and engage in dialogue and "member-checking" with participants, insiders, and researchers throughout the coding process (p. 327). The reliability of this analysis was bolstered by making detailed and standardized field notes, recording all face-to-face interviews, producing a good quality recording, carefully transcribing to prepare for

analysis, and presenting long extracts of data in the write-up, as suggested by Silverman (2001, pp. 229-231).

Validity refers to the "truth", meaning the extent to which the interpretation of data accurately reflects the social behavior under investigation (Hammersley, 1992, p. 57). Creswell (2013, pp. 250-253) emphasizes the necessity for the researcher to document "validation strategies" which also include member-checking (a form of participant-validation), prolonged engagement (building trust and learning the culture), triangulation, peer review or debriefing, negative case analysis, clarifying researcher bias, rich and thick descriptive writings, and external audits. Incorporating these validation strategies throughout this analysis at both the interview and survey stages ensured that validity was continuously assessed.

3.8.10 Ethical Considerations

Ethics are concerned with the conception of "right and proper conduct" (Israel & Hay, 2006, p. 12). What is ethical and unethical is fundamentally a community decision – one that concedes what actions and beliefs are "right and wrong" (Babbie & Benaquisto, 2014, p. 79). Anticipating and addressing ethical issues is an important consideration for any qualitative research design (Babbie & Benaquisto, p. 64; Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 61; Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, & Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2014, p. 6; Creswell, 2013, p. 56; Fisher, 2002, p. 160; Hesse-Biber, 2017, p. 67; King, Henderson, & Stein, 1999, p. 213; Miles et al., 2014, p. 56; Palys & Atchison, 2014, p. 74; Punch, 2005, p. 276; Sieber, 2009, p. 107). A helpful approach to strategize ethical considerations during qualitative research is advocated by Creswell, who prefers to think about ethical issues as they apply to the different phases of the research process (2013, pp. 56-60, 2014, pp. 95-101).

Prior to beginning a study, it was important to consult the code of ethics and other guidelines of the affiliated institution and apply to the institutional review board (IRB) (Creswell, 2014, p. 95); in this case, the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board (REB). To fulfill this objective, I conferred with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Canadian Institutes of Health Research et al., 2014) and completed the online tutorial mandated for graduate research. I have received approval from Ryerson University's REB. In addition, prior to commencing this research, I considered five important ethical issues: consent, privacy/confidentiality, risk/benefit, power imbalances, and conflicts of interest (Creswell, 2014, pp. 96, 98; Israel & Hay, 2006, pp. 120-123; Sieber, 2009, p. 110). Informed consent refers to two related components. First, participants must understand (Israel & Hay, p. 61). Second, participants must agree voluntarily to the nature of the research and their participation in it (p. 61). Consent is intended to protect human rights (Creswell, p. 96). To establish informed consent prior to completing this research, necessary permissions (written) were obtained from both the organization (Chief of Police of the TPS) and participants - reinforcing the voluntary nature of participation. Written forms were consistent with REB standards made available by Ryerson University.

Privacy and confidentiality are ethical principles which ensure that information obtained from participants, including their identities, is protected, and any threat to confidentiality is contemplated (Palys & Atchison, 2014, pp. 71-72). In establishing privacy and confidentiality it is important that the specifications and limitations of any protections are explained to participants prior to beginning the research and observed during and after the completion of the research process (Giordano, O'Reilly, Taylor, & Dogra, 2007, p. 264). In this research, privacy and confidentiality have been considered by anonymising the participants and data sets, while

using data storage techniques that ensure information is secured effectively, accessed solely by the researcher, and destroyed when appropriate.

The risks and benefits associated with qualitative research must be carefully considered to protect participants from harm (disclosure of personal information; physical harm; psychological damage; social embarrassment; discomfort; economic; legal) and provide reciprocity (maximum benefits to individual or collectives, researcher, study organization, communities and society) (Giordano et al., 2007, p. 269; Israel & Hay, 2006, p. 95; Sieber, 2009, pp. 128, 130). One way a researcher can offer benefit to participants (and their organizations) is by sharing findings in practical and meaningful ways in easy-to-understand language (Creswell, 2013, p. 60; Sieber, p. 130). In this research, to mitigate the risk to participants, I have employed detailed informed consent forms, considered the protection of the privacy and confidentiality of participants, and have adhered to REB-approved data storage protocols. In terms of research benefits, participants may find it rewarding to discuss their perceptions of the policy issue under investigation. Additionally, the results of this research are intended to improve society's understanding of the inner-workings of police organizations and methods to improve conformance to policies via frontline supervision. The findings of this research will be communicated to employees of the TPS in ways that meet specific operational needs.

In conducting research, it is important to respect potential power imbalances between interviewers and participants (Creswell, 2014, p. 98). Qualitative researchers have become more reflective of "power imbalances" and "issues of authority and representation" concerning relationships and the analysis and interpretation of data (Hesse-Biber, 2017, p. 357). As a result, qualitative researchers have embraced interpretive styles of writing - those that recognize the multiple realities that are experienced by participants (p. 357). Beginning with the presumption

that power imbalances do exist, researchers are able to build trust with participants, consider multiple perspectives, and accede the potential influence that hierarchical relationships have on data collection and interpretation (Creswell, 2013, p. 60, 2014, p. 98). This research considers potential power imbalances by recognizing the possibility of any already-existing relationships that I may have with participants and any influence that my positional authority may have during the data collection and interpretation phase. To avoid feelings of obligation or undue influence, informed consent and voluntariness were stressed upon participants from the outset of this research to its completion.

Lastly, it is important to consider the potential for conflicts of interest during this research. Conflicts of interest may occur when any number of "personal, financial, political, and academic concerns coexist and the potential exists for one interest to be illegitimately favoured over another..." (Israel & Hay, 2006, p. 120). Often conflicts of interest arise from the situation itself rather than any particular research misconduct (p. 120). Being associated with conflicts of interest may lead to community perceptions of negligence, deception, incompetence and a tendency toward biased research (M. Davis, 2001, pp. 11-12). To address conflicts of interest; first, I have emphasized voluntariness and the rights of participants to withdraw their participation at any time. Second, I have acknowledged my dual identity as a researcher and police officer and any potential impacts this may have on the perceived legitimacy of this research (see section above discussing reflexivity and positionality). I propose that my relationship with the TPS has enhanced the quality of this research and the legitimacy of the findings presented.

While it is unrealistic to anticipate all elements of ethical risk when planning research, it is evident from the literature that ethical considerations pertain to all stages of the research process.

Acknowledging ethical considerations in writing, in both dissertation and REB submission is important when attempting to justify the social and academic benefits of this research (see Creswell, 2014, p. 92) and for developing solutions to ethical problems (see Israel & Hay, 2006, p. 1). Rather than adhering to strict rules, I rely on the approach adopted by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014, p. 68): that "heightened awareness, negotiation, and making trade-offs" all through the completion of the research process is integral in establishing ethical and humane outcomes.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined and discussed the theoretical assumptions of sociological institutionalism. In doing so, I have attempted to highlight how the various assumptions of sociological institutionalism, specifically those associated with taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications, can shape the social world of individual actors through powerful myths and cognitive schema. I have also attempted to demonstrate that sociological institutionalism offers theoretical insights to explain the conformance choices of police officers, particularly in relation to the given policy under investigation. To support these suppositions, I have also examined institutional change, modes of constraint, and the power relationships that exist in institutions from a sociological institutional perspective. Following the above, I have advocated for a sociological institutional approach to this research. In doing so, I have attempted to demonstrate how sociological institutionalism provides an appropriate conceptual framework to explain the behaviour of officers as it relates to the prescription of legitimate institutional practices. I have also postulated how the assumptions of sociological institutionalism may assist in explaining the contextual factors that operate inside the institutional environment of a police organization. Lastly, I have discussed the research methodology. In the next chapter, I explore how structural

and cultural elements of the TPS aid to inform our understanding of the inner workings (internal factors) of the police organization, and in particular, our understanding of the policy issue under investigation.

Chapter Four – Inside the Toronto Police Service

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the TPS and explore how structural and cultural elements of this organization aid to inform our understanding of (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. First, I account for the structural elements of the TPS. They include command and composition, professionalization, and centralization. Second, I examine the policy process of the TPS. Lastly, I examine the cultural elements of the TPS. Throughout this chapter, I will support my positions with relevant empirical evidence, including archived literature[9]. Key findings of this chapter include: (1) the three structural elements discussed above, function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions; (2) cultural factors may facilitate or hinder policy conformance in important ways; and (3) both structural and cultural factors of a police organization shape the organizational reality of police officers, strengthen the relationship between police and state, but in doing so, function to disunite the police and the public – diminishing the trust and confidence that the police and the public have for each other.

4.2 Structural Elements of the Toronto Police Service

Structural elements have much to offer when conceptualizing the workings of police organizations. For instance, Forcese (1992, p. 91) suggests that the structural elements associated with police organizations can "shape the conception that police have of themselves,

[9] Much of the archived literature is held at the City of Toronto Archives.

and affect the nature and quality of police relations". An organization's structure is largely dependent on an internal division of labour and coordination – paying no mind to extra-organizational influence. In police organizations, however, the organizational structure is also reliant on relationships with the larger external environment – ones that are "demographic, social, legal, [and] political" (Redlinger, 1994, p. 37). Consequently, the police "institutional entity" is far from monolithic, and but one example of an "amalgam of sub-state institutions" (Casamayor, S., as cited in Berkley, 1969, p. 197; Sheptycki, 1999, p. 2). In other words, the relationship between the police organization and society can be considered rather "complex and multi-dimensional", presenting a multitude of "cultural meanings" (p. 2). Structural elements of police organizations may also be identified and explained in terms of their "fit" with the extrinsic environment to be properly evaluated (Redlinger, p. 37).

In a critique of the above, Manning (1997, p. 11) proposes that police organizations are only "loosely coupled" with the environment and more closely linked with the needs of the state [emphasis added] and the political decisions of a state authority. Manning defends his position in two ways. First, Manning (pp. 30-31) discusses the example of police organizations who "manage their appearance" by controlling information available to the public. He suggests that this behaviour is representative of a self-serving allegiance and a demonstration of support for state-endorsed legal mandates rather than an act of public service. Second, Manning (p. 106) acknowledges that police officers are selective of which segments of society they enforce the law against. This habitude is more suggestive of an organization that "controls the law" on behalf of the state rather than one which operates principally as a "servant" to its public (p. 106).

4.2.1 Command and Composition of the Toronto Police Service

In this section, I will discuss the command and composition of the TPS. In doing so, I will attempt to demonstrate that the command and composition of the organization promote conformance choices of officers that satisfy a hierarchy-of-command rather than an individualistic and co-productive effort with members of the public (the extrinsic environment). The current command model of the Toronto Police originates from military design - a conventional structure that can be attributed to the overwhelming majority of police services throughout the world[10] (Forcese, 1992, p. 100). The command model relies on "unquestioning obedience" to the directives of superior officers and "unquestioning loyalty" to the mission-at-hand (pp. 100-101).

Today the TPS continues to display overt paramilitary characteristics (symbolic or not) inside a clear and well-conceived bureaucratic structuration. For instance, as noted in an archived internal report of the Metropolitan Toronto Police, entitled, Beyond 2000: Metropolitan Toronto Police Restructuring Task Force (1991) under the heading "current status":

> Rank and management structure is of traditional importance to police organizations because it symbolizes authority, discipline, rules, procedures and operational decision-making. It is important also because it currently represents the only opportunities for achievement to higher levels of responsibility. Finally, it is important because it is the basis for the compensation system. (The Metropolitan Police Service, 1991, p. 156)

This suggests the present-day command and composition of the TPS remains anatomically paramilitary and operates in line with the principles of a modern bureaucracy enumerated by Weber (see 1946, pp. 196-197). .

[10] For a detailed examination of the composition and sociability of early 20th century Toronto police officers, see Marquis (1987).

The current organizational configuration of the TPS exhibits a complex and elaborate hierarchy controlled through a militaristic chain of command also referred to as "unity of command" (Iannone et al., 2009, p. 19; McKenna, 1998, p. 117). This means that an officer receives orders directly from a supervisor and in turn, reports their activities and results back to that same supervisor – a "one-to-one relationship" conventional of police administrative operations (McKenna, p. 117). The officer of higher rank accepts responsibility for the actions of their subordinates (Manning, 1997, p. 184). Souryal suggests that unity of command relies on four principles that are essential for the workings of a contemporary police organization:

1. It reinforces the influence of authority and command and control inside the organization.
2. It eases the determination of which officer is responsible for a specific action which can be particularly useful when mistakes are made.
3. It facilitates communication and reduces internal conflict by omitting contradictory orders
4. It increases the effectiveness of the supervision of members. (Souryal, 1985, p. 19)

The current[11] organizational structure of the TPS (2016b) is illustrated below in Figure 1.

[11] This section relies on the organizational information of the TPS that was current at the time of authoring this chapter.

Figure 1. Toronto Police Service Organizational Chart



I suggest that this organizational structure characterizes what Maguire (1997, p. 547) refers to as "common" for large bureaucratic "precinct-based" police organizations: highly centralized, specialized, formal, exhibiting tall hierarchies of control and large administrative units. The Chief of Police is positioned at the top of the hierarchy – in line with the concept of "rational police administration" (Manning, p. 134) or a line organization (Iannone et al., 2009, p. 15). Under the Chief of Police, a military rank structure propagates a commanding bureaucracy in a downward direction. This rank structure is common among all Canadian police services and defined in the relevant "Police Services Act" that governs the locality (Forcese, 1992, p. 102).

Field operations represent the "core of the policing operation" (Forcese, 1992, p. 106). In the TPS, field operations fall under a vertical pillar known as "Community Safety Command". This pillar houses 4000 of the police service's complement of 5,457 officers and represents the "frontlines" of the Service (Toronto Police Service, 2013c, p. 3; 2017a, "Community Safety Command"). It is composed of 17 police divisions located throughout the City of Toronto which is where the clear majority of uniform patrol officers and general investigators are assigned (2013c, p. 5; 2017a, "Community Safety Command"). Community Safety Command also provides a home to the Divisional Policing Support Unit: a centralized support unit that is primarily designed to maintain and improve community relations (2017b, "Divisional Policing Support Unit"). It is in this pillar that the uniform patrol officer carries out generalist duties (emergency and community response) (2013c, p. 5). Consequently, it is in this area of the organization where the majority of documented police-citizen interaction occurs. I propose that in terms of the research objectives, the category referred to as field operations is the most relevant area for discerning a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers

to policy decisions, particularly those related to Regulated Interactions Policy. Accordingly, the category of field operations is the area where I will conduct the qualitative interviews.

The command and composition of the TPS is consistent with, and continues to operate in ways common to the Anglo-American policing model[12], originating from British and Irish

[12] The Anglo-American policing model emerged from the Anglo-Saxon policing traditions of nineteenth-century England. This policing model was eventually adopted by Canada (directly) and the United States (indirectly) and is considered by orthodox scholars to be the "modern" policing system of industrialized and urban society (Mawby, 1999, pp. 28, 32). The Anglo-American policing model adheres to a presumption that the role of the police is to safeguard democracy – the carrying out of duties dispassionately and for the collective good (Manning, 2008, p. 285). Bayley (1985, p. 11) characterizes the Anglo-American policing model as public, specialized, and professionally organized. At the core of our understanding of this policing model are Peel's nine principles (Loader, 2016, p. 427). This model purports to be guided by law and aims to protect the citizenry from harm (Manning, 2005, pp. 23-24). It operates contrary to other competing models that endorse vigilantism, voluntary associations, and high or political policing (Liang, 1992, p. 2). The legitimacy of the Anglo-American policing model is derived from law and public consent (Mawby, 1999, p. 42). Tyler (2004, p. 91) proposes that the legitimacy attributed to the Anglo-American policing model is less likely based on perceived or experienced views of actual police practices; rather whether those practices are understood to be procedurally fair.

In deconstructing the legitimacy of the modern Anglo-American police – that which is present in Canadian society - Reiner (2010, pp. 71-77) identifies eight fundamental components: (1) Bureaucratic organization – a professional hierarchy of full-time officers who were "meritocratic not partisan or nepotistic"; (2) rule of law – the adherence to legal procedures and constraints; (3) minimal force – the use of as little force necessary including armaments; (4) non-partisanship – impartial and insulated from political control; (5) accountability – police action is reviewable by the court and accepted by the citizenry; (6) service role – providing friendly and reliable service in non-coercive situations; (7) preventive policing – a focus on preventing crime in a uniform capacity on patrol (in contrast to the undercover government spy); and (8) police effectiveness – the successful reduction of crime and the preservation of order. Expectedly, in a democratic society such as Canada, the legitimacy of the Anglo-American policing model is reliant on institutional accountability, either directly to the citizenry, or indirectly to elected local and federal politicians (Mawby, 1999, p. 42; Reiss, 1992, p. 75).

The structure of the Anglo-American policing model in Canada can be understood by examining the balance between local and central control of its policing system and the organization of its police services. The three-tiered system of policing that exists in Canada has had several implications relating to this point. While policing at the federal level carries nationwide responsibilities, policing within each province is a matter for local government to control and coordinate (Mawby, 1999, p. 45). Therefore, in some respects, the federal policing structure of Canada (RCMP) is similar to that of the United Kingdom; it is of paramilitary design, loyal to a centralized government and resistant to localized accountability or influence.

colonial police forces[13]. Its organizational structure exemplifies a hierarchy-of-command, the segregation of duties, and occupational specialization that idealizes what Manning (1997, p. 121)

In other respects, Canada's provincial and municipal policing structure is similarly fashioned to that of the United States; decentralized, and accountable to local government.

Function is the third element that completes this analysis of the Anglo-American policing model. Research by Bayley (1985, 1994), Ericson (1982), and Shearing (1984) criticize the prominent view that the main function of the Anglo-American policing model is crime-fighting and crime deterrence. This is confirmed by a body of critical research that suggests that Anglo-American police officers may represent a less effective tool for crime-fighting than has been previously conceded by criminologists (Hough, 1987, p. 70). Notwithstanding, much of the policing research that attempts to assess the function of Anglo-American police services continue to focus on the work done by patrol officers in relation to their impact on reducing crime. Moreover, Reiner (pp. 23-24) suggests that patrol work has been injected with performance measurement tactics that have been undoubtedly borrowed from the private sector under the guise of professionalism, neo-liberal governance, and New Public Management. Of consequence, government services provided by the police are wide-ranging – responding to the needs of Canadian society by providing a multitude of public services to sustain a massive government (Mawby, 1999, p. 32).

[13] The evolution of the role of the police in Canada is linked to the development of the country as a whole (McKenna, 1998, p. 1). The social forces that have contributed to Canada's history have also influenced the evolution of its police institution. Therefore, this section pays particular attention to the impacts that these social forces "posed for the police and the manner in which the police reacted to them" (Juliani et al., 1984, p. 8). Before I continue, it is important to acknowledge that over 100 centuries ago Indigenous Peoples arrived at the continent of North America from Asia and migrated across lands we now refer to as Canada (McKenna, 1998, p. 1). Groups of Indigenous Peoples formed nations to ensure support and protection, ultimately establishing a "confederacy" prior to the arrival of European explorers and any resemblance of a presence of professional police services (p. 1).

Britain was the greatest source of "institutional inspiration" for nineteenth-century British North America (Marquis, 1993, p. 18). At this time, policing traditions were guided for the most part by British customary traditions and practices (McKenna, 1998, p. 2). British officials stationed in British North America had served in the British military and were familiar with British policing models (Marquis, p. 18). The Irish policing model (the Royal Irish Constabulary) also had some influence on various British North American colonies, including Lower Canada, British Columbia, and Newfoundland (pp. 18-19). Notwithstanding, the greatest influence on the origins of professional policing in Canada was that of the Metropolitan Police of London and the relevant reforms administered by Peel (p. 22).

Literature suggests that the evolution of the role of local policing in Canada was not always related to increases in crime or disorder as one might expect (Juliani et al., 1984, p. 20). Rather, constituents of municipalities were often satisfied with militia or other surrounding police services stepping in to subdue any mass uprising or other matter (p. 19). In Canada, it is more apparent that the evolution of the role of municipal police services was more often in

refers to as a "rational, efficient, scientifically organized, technologically sophisticated bureaucracy". This dominant format is perceived by police administrators as the most efficient means to deal with public demands and is therefore, one of the most powerful ways a police organization finds legitimacy in society (1997, pp. 121-122). However, I also argue that the same command and composition acts to constrain and control the behaviour of police officers, thereby limiting their individual autonomy and relationships with the public. In fact, critics of the bureaucratic structuration of the police organization have pushed for a variety of police reforms that include: delayering, deformalizing, and flattening of the hierarchy (Maguire, 1997, p. 547). Reformers theorize that a more flexible organization may be more responsive to the public (p. 547). In the next two sections, I consider the structural elements professionalization and centralization, both of which are common to large Anglo-American police organizations and the TPS.

4.2.2 Professionalization of the Toronto Police Service

In this section I discuss the professionalization of the TPS, incorporating empirical evidence to support my suppositions. The organizational structures of large urban police organizations have transformed significantly over the past century and well into this one (Ater,

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response to the diverse and specific needs of local communities. Notwithstanding, the government at all three levels had hand in shaping and controlling local police services to ensure local objectives were compatible with national ones. For instance, Juliani et al. (pp. 15-16) suggest that the evolution of the role of municipal police services in Canada coincides with the economic development of the nation, determined largely by a demand for raw materials in Britain, necessitating new infrastructure for industrialization and geographical expansion. In addition, historians claim that the evolution of the role of municipal police services in Canada addressed three pending societal issues: (1) minimizing conflict between ethnic groups and between labour groups and industry; (2) upholding moral order by enforcing "puritanical" laws; and (3) apprehending those involved in the criminal sphere (Griffiths & Cunningham, 2003, p. 58). These issues are consistent with the Post-Revisionist Approach that I have adopted in this dissertation.

Givati, & Rigbi, 2014, p. 63; Reiss, 1992, p. 51). Many of these transformations directly impact the emergence, growth, and sustainment of the police occupation – a movement referred to in organizational theory as "professionalization" (Curnow & McGonigle, 2006, p. 285). Professionalization can be defined as:

> A process by which an organized occupation, usually but not always by virtue of making a claim to special esoteric competence and to concern for the quality of its work and its benefits to society, obtains the exclusive right to perform a particular kind of work, control training for and access to it, and control of the right of determining and evaluating the way work is performed. (Freidson, 1973, p. 22)

It is theorized that professionalization leads to structural configurations that "maximize access to and control over resources in a given sector of knowledge and practice" (Jackson, 1970, p. 10). This privilege then facilitates "a monopoly control over the use of its knowledge base, the right to considerable autonomy in practice, and the privilege of self-regulation (Cruess, Johnston, & Cruess, 2004, p. 74). Moreover, Manning (1997, p. 121) proposes that the move toward professionalization, is above all, an occupational grab to gain more power, authority, and legitimacy. Further, it is suggested that professionalization serves as an ideology, functioning as a precursor to the formation of a professional culture (Greenwood, 1957, p. 45).

These theorizations are consistent with police scholars who tend to associate the professionalization of the police organization with its "bureaucratization" (Regoli, Culbertson, Crank, & Poole, 1988, p. 90; Reiss, 1992, p. 90). In other words, professionalization characterizes the police occupation's continued adoption of rational, scientific, and technological efficiencies (Manning, 1997, p. 121). As noted by Monkkonen (1981, p. 53), "in twentieth-

century cities, where professionals, experts, and managers administered services…the police officers themselves had to be upgraded".

The professionalization of the police organization has led to a "preoccupation with management, internal procedures, and efficiency" (Reiss, 1992, p. 92). Inside the police organization, the structure is "formal" and "specialized": characterized by tall hierarchies, large administrative units, and a high degree of centralization (Maguire, 1997, p. 547; Regoli et al., 1988, p. 90). Bureaucratic and technocratic influence on the police occupation has led to the adoption of technological inventions (patrol cars, radios, computers, scientific methods), the specialization of assignments (vice detectives, SWAT teams), and the use of highly formal and complex information systems (intelligence databases), the modernization of recruiting and promoting practices (equal opportunity), and the increased employment of technical civilian specialists (Reiss, 1992, pp. 58-71). For instance, an archived internal report of the TPS, entitled, *Chief's Investigative Review*, confirms the creation of a Detective Services Branch that features an exhaustive list of specialized units (2000, p. 9). The Central Drug Squad alone is comprised of a Central Drug Investigation Unit, a High, Mid & Street Level Enforcement Unit, a Clandestine Lab Unit, a Combined Forces Airport Squad, a Surveillance Unit, and a Combined Forces Drug Enforcement Unit (p. 9). Also in support of the above, is the TPS' contemporary pursuit of police-related technologies. Recommendations concerning the above are contained in an archived internal report, entitled, *Planning for the Future…Scanning the Toronto Environment* (2011). In this report, it is recommended that the TPS become more familiar with cyber and technology-facilitated crime and social media, establish programs related to cyber-vetting, and upgrade its current record and radio systems to increase efficiencies despite fiscal constraint (p. 192).

Found also in the literature and attributed to the professionalization of the police organization, is an attempt to establish the perception of political neutrality among rank and file (Bordua & Reiss, 1966, p. 68). Deviating from the influence of the political elite, the professionalized police promote the idea that they have become entirely loyal to their commanders and the occupation (Reiss, 1992, p. 70). Below, I attempt to demonstrate empirical support for the professionalization of the modern police organization using national statistics and the TPS as case studies. I accomplish this by employing relevant data that depicts trends in the recruiting and promotion practices of the TPS that are consistent with the scholarship outlined above, in particular, Reiss (pp. 58-71).

Statistics Canada (2017e) shows that the number of female police officers from all ranks (Constables, Non-commissioned Officers[14], and Senior Officers)[15] of the TPS has increased from 635, representing 12.5% of all officers in 2000, to 1,018, representing 19% of all officers in 2016. Archived internal reports of the TPS confirm the above. A 2013 report by the TPS entitled, *Planning for the Future…Scanning the Toronto Environment*, reports that the number of female police officers has increased 33%; from 774 in 2003 to 1,033 in 2012 (p. 120). The increased recruiting of female police officers by the TPS follows a national trend in Canada that has been evident since the 1960s (Burczycka, 2013, p. 13). For instance, Statistics Canada (2017d) reports that as of May 15, 2016, there were 14,545 female police officers in Canada, representing 21.1% of all Canadian police officers, compared to 1,994 female police officers as of September 30, 1986, representing just 3.9% of all Canadian police officers. In summary, this data supports a recent increase in the recruiting of female officers by Canadian police services,

[14] Non-Commissioned Officers are police officers between the ranks of Constable and Senior Officer referred to as 'supervisors' by the TPS.
[15] Constables combined with Non-Commissioned Officers represent Under Officers or Non-Senior officers in the TPS.

including the TPS, characteristic of the modernization of recruiting practices associated with the professionalization of the police organization.

There is currently no published data by Statistics Canada that demonstrates trends related to the hiring of racialized persons by the TPS or other police organizations across Canada (Greenland & Alam, 2017, p. 15). However, internal reports[16] of the TPS shed some light on this subject. For instance, a 2011 internal report entitled, *Planning for the Future…Scanning the Toronto Environment* shows that in 2010, Indigenous and "visible minorities" accounted for 1% and 20% respectively of Toronto's police officers (p. 206). These percentages are higher than those reported to exist in 2001, which were 0.8% for Indigenous and 11% for "visible minorities" (p. 206). A published 2013 update by the TPS to this internal report, shows that the number of Indigenous and "visible minority" police officers increased 69% (from 42 to 71) and 89% (from 630 to 1,192) respectively from 2003 to 2012 (pp. 110, 120). In summary, this data demonstrates a recent increase in the recruiting of racialized police officers by the TPS characteristic of the modernization of recruiting practices associated with the professionalization of the police organization.

Survey data shows increased rates of advancement by female police officers to the Senior Officer ranks. Statistics Canada (2016) reports that in 2016, 15.2% of the Senior Officers of the TPS were females, compared to 8.3% in 2000. This pattern is also observed nationally, showing that in 2016, 13.3% of Senior Officers were female across Canada, compared with 3.1% in 2000, and less than 0.2% in 1986 (Statistics Canada, 2017d). A 2011 internal report of the TPS entitled, *Planning for the Future…Scanning the Toronto Environment* shows that the proportion of female officers that are Senior Officers has increased from 8% to 14% from 2001 to 2010

[16] All internal reports referred to in this chapter are available to the public.

(Toronto Police Service, 2011, p. 207). Moreover, this reports shows that the proportion of female officers that are Non-Commissioned Officers (supervisors) has increased from 9% to 17% from 2001 to 2010 (p. 207). Similarly, a published 2013 update by the TPS to this internal report, shows that the proportion of female officers that are Senior Officers has increased from 8% to 15% from 2003 to 2012 (p. 121). Lastly, this updated internal report shows that the proportion of female officers that are Non-Commissioned Officers (supervisors) has also increased from 10% to 18% from 2003 to 2012 (p. 121). In summary, this data demonstrates a recent increase in the promotion of female police officers by Canadian police services, including the TPS, characteristic of the modernization of promoting practices associated with the professionalization of the police organization.

There is currently no published data by Statistics Canada that demonstrates trends related to the promotion of racialized persons by the TPS or other police organizations across Canada (Greenland & Alam, 2017, p. 15). However, internal reports of the TPS inform this issue. For instance, a 2011 internal report entitled, *Planning for the Future…Scanning the Toronto Environment shows that in 2010*, 12% of the Senior Officers of the TPS were "visible minorities", compared to 5% in 2001 (p. 207). Moreover, this internal report shows that the proportion of Indigenous and "visible minority" officers that are Non-Commissioned Officers (supervisors) has increased from 0.2% to 0.6% and from 5% to 12% respectively from 2001 to 2010 (p. 207). Similarly, a published 2013 update by the TPS to this internal report, shows that the proportion of "visible minority" officers that are Senior Officers has increased from 7% to 15% from 2003 to 2012 (Toronto Police Service, 2013a, p. 121). Lastly, this updated internal report shows that the proportion of Indigenous officers and "visible minority" officers that are Non-Commissioned Officers (supervisors) has increased from 0.4% to 0.8% and from 6% to

14% respectively from 2003 to 2012 (p. 121). In summary, this data demonstrates a recent increase in the promotion of racialized police officers by the TPS characteristic of the modernization of promoting practices associated with the professionalization of the police organization.

Statistics Canada (2017c) shows that in 2016, the TPS employed 2,685 civilian personnel[17] (technical civilian specialists), compared to 2,472 in 2000. This represents a 7.9% increase in the number of civilian personnel over 16 years. A 2013 internal report of the TPS entitled, *Planning for the Future…Scanning the Toronto Environment* corroborates this trend. This internal report shows that the number of civilian personnel increased by 9% from 1,729 in 2003 to 1,876 in 2012 (Toronto Police Service, 2013a, p. 111). Predictably, the increase observed of the number of civilian personnel employed by the TPS follows a longstanding national trend. Statistics Canada (2017b) reports that as of May 15, 2016, there were 28,422 civilian personnel[18] employed in Canada, compared to 19,907 in 2000, and 18,273 in 1986. Consequently, I suggest that this data demonstrates a strong intention of Canadian Police Services, including the TPS, to recruit civilian technical specialists, in particular, over the past 16 years. I further submit that growth in the category of civilian technical specialists evidences the growing trend of specialization and functional differentiation characteristic of modern police organizations as discussed by Reiss (1992, pp. 58-71). Importantly, across all Canadian police services, "management and professional staff" compose the category of civilian personnel that

[17] For the TPS, civilian personnel include all permanent, full-time civilian members with the exception of cadets-in-training and parking enforcement personnel (Toronto Police Service, 2013a, p. 109)

[18] For Statistics Canada, civilian personnel include: (1) clerical staff; (2) management and professional staff; (3) communications and dispatch staff; and (4) other civilian staff, which include security officers, cadets, special constables, and school crossing guards (Greenland & Alam, 2017, p. 6)

has seen the most growth, representing 10% of the entire police organization in 2016, compared to just 4% in 1996 (Greenland & Alam, 2017, p. 6). The category of management and professional staff is composed of managers, administrators, scientists, systems/computer analysts, and other experienced civilians (p. 6). In summary, this data demonstrates a recent increase in the promotion of technical civilian specialists by Canadian Police Services, including the TPS, characteristic of the modernization of promoting practices associated with the professionalization of the police organization.

It has also been suggested that the professionalization of the police organization has resulted in several unanticipated consequences which have advanced the "separation of the working police from the communities" (Reiss, 1992, p. 52). For instance, the research of Regoli, Crank, Culberston, & Poole (1988, pp. 90-91) related to the professionalism of police organizations surmises five outcomes that are supportive of this position. First, the reduction of political and outside influence on organizational decision-making has arguably reduced the sensitivity and responsiveness of police officers to the community. Second, inflexible recruiting standards have made it difficult for members of racialized communities to pursue a policing career (despite a professional consensus that police services should be representative of their community and that progress in this area has been made as indicated in the above case studies). Third, the lateral entry of officers from other police organizations has decreased the number of employment opportunities for local community members. Fourth, the development of "internal codes of ethics" is often perceived as a rejection of local values and affairs. Fifth, professionalization has fostered police organizations and administrators that are slow to adapt to change. Scholars also point out an important contradiction between a critical principle of professionalization in policing - autonomy in decision-making - and the influence of the current

bureaucratic structure, which serves to reduce this prerogative among frontline officers (Bordua & Reiss, 1966, p. 69; Regoli et al., p. 91).

It is safe to conclude that the impact of professionalization on the TPS has served to reinforce its bureaucratic structuration. In terms of a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions, the principles of professionalization may serve well. For instance, the adherence to rules and regulations and a reduction in autonomy are distinguished consequences of a professionalized and rationale bureaucratic chain-of-command. However, outside of the police organization, it seems that professionalization has done little to enhance community relationships, leading scholars to posit that the police have intentionally withdrawn from traditional partnerships with local communities to police said communities more efficiently. This supposition has implications, discussed above, for our understanding of the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. In the next section, I will show that the centralization of the police bureaucratic structure – an outcome of the professionalization movement - has led to similar consequences; first, as it relates to the capacity of sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions; and second, as it describes local police-community relations.

4.2.3 Centralization of the Toronto Police Service

As a consequence of professionalization, the organizational structures of contemporary Anglo-American police services have become highly centralized (Maguire, 1997, p. 547). Centralization can be defined as "the extent to which the decision-making capacity within an organization is concentrated in a single individual or small select group" (Maguire et al., 2003, p. 254). Manning suggests:

> Police organizations are to a considerable degree patrimonial bureaucracies – they operate along the lines of particularistic favouritism, are dominated by the style and preferences of the head of a particular division, subdivision, or station, and are characterized by attempts by subordinates to gain favour from their superordinates. (P. K. Manning, 1997, p. 138)

Typically, centralized police organizations have tall hierarchies, exhibiting more ranks to strengthen authority – a formalization of command and control (Hassell & Maguire, 2003, p. 233). In Wilson's (1968, p. 183) depiction of a "legalistic" police organization[19], he notes that top administrators tend to establish themselves over rank-and-file by centralizing control, formalizing authority, and mandating written accounts of all organizational activities. Accordingly, centralization achieves rationale bureaucratic attributes within the organization: "…a firmly ordered system of super-and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones…in a definitely regulated manner" (Weber, 1946, p. 197). In centralized organizations, administrative rules proliferate – many designed to discipline employees and few to reward innovation or the identification of organizational problems (Redlinger, 1994, pp. 41, 50). This design can be evidenced in archived literature belonging to the prevenient 'Toronto Police Force'. For instance, as early as 1878, the Toronto Police Force already entertained a published policy manual, entitled, *General Orders and Regulations* (1878) consisting of about 100 pages of rules and regulations for its officers to adhere to. Correspondingly, as a police organization becomes more centralized, so does the amount of

[19] Legalistic police organizations emphasize law enforcement over order maintenance, a single standard of conduct for all communities (an institutional view), and a pressure to produce (high arrest and ticket rates) (Wilson, 1968, see chap. 6). The "legalistic style" is one of three influential police styles identified by Wilson (see chap. 5-7). The other two styles are the "watchman style" and the "service style".

decision-making from within (Hassell & Maguire, p. 233; Maguire, p. 441). As noted by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux:

> [The] power to make decisions concerning how the police will operate resides in the centralized authority of the police command. They tell the community what the police agenda will be, and they issue orders to underlings in the department concerning how policy will be implemented" (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, p. 26).

In response to the increasing complexities of today's policing environment, the centralization of the police organization has been the impetus for an expansion of "formal rules, policies, procedures, and standards" (Maguire, 1997, p. 552). Furthermore, under the centralized model, all forms of governance are strictly enforced to ensure frontline officers exhibit appropriate conduct (Hassell & Maguire, 2003, p. 233). As powerfully noted by Niederhoffer:

> Large urban police departments are bureaucracies. Members of the force sometimes lose their bearings in the labyrinth of hierarchy, specialization, competitive examinations, red tape, promotion based on seniority, impersonality, rationality, rules and regulations, channels of communication, and massive files. (Niederhoffer, 1967, p. 11)

Perhaps an unintended consequence of centralization, but nonetheless evident in the literature, is its suggested impact on police relations. There is a tendency for centralized police organizations to become isolated and insensitive to local communities (Berkley, 1970, p. 309; Bordua & Reiss, 1966, p. 68; Regoli et al., 1988, p. 90). For instance, Cain (1973, p. 246) notes of the modern police: "Community power is decreasing; both central power and autonomous police power to define the role are increasing". In support of the above, I refer to the archived internal report, entitled, *Beyond 2000: The Strategic Plan of the Metropolitan Toronto Police* (1991), which discusses the need for the Metropolitan Toronto Police to develop strategies that

"decentralize appropriate functions currently performed at the district and corporate levels…[to achieve] a community focus" (p. 10). One challenge, as noted later in this report, was to develop strategies to be more "adaptive to on-going changes in the external environment" - an outcome of a "centralized" and "autonomous" police environment (pp. 10-11). As noted: "While the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force has begun to move away from the traditional model, fundamental organizational and cultural change is still necessary if Neighbourhood Policing is to succeed" (p. 25). Such local empowerment requires "organizational decentralization, closer contact between the police and the public, receipt and interpretation of public demand for service by individual front-line officers, and development of service delivery methods by patrol officers at the neighbourhood level" (p. 26).

Reiss (1992, p. 51) discusses the various drivers that have led to the centralized arrangements of modern police organizations, which I summarize here and complement with empirical data. First, Reiss (p. 52) suggests that recent technological inventions have solidified the "bureaucratic centralization of command and control", effectively withdrawing the presence of police officers in their local communities. For instance, the central communications and dispatch center which facilitates a "reactive call-for-service model" has replaced decentralized "beat officers" and "community station houses" (p. 52). An archived report by Hickling-Johnston, entitled, *The 911 Emergency Call Service and Related Systems* (1981) confirms this transition. In this report, it indicates that while the 911 system used by the Metropolitan Toronto Police had been under intensive review since 1979, the Force planned on implementing a centralized Automated Complaint/Dispatch System (CAD) by March of 1982. This system was to be housed at the Metropolitan Toronto Police's Communications Bureau (p. 5).

Reiss (1992, p. 52) also suggests that contemporary uniform officers have evolved to work out of "area commands" and are mobilized upon request. Furthermore, detention facilities and specialized tactical and investigative units have been centralized and officers belonging to these units travel to locations only when needed (p. 52). Second, Reiss (p. 60) refers to the contributing impact of the specialization and functional differentiation of responsibilities within the contemporary police organization. Whereas traditional policing models employed officers who completed the majority of tasks themselves, large modern urban police services tend to engage centralized specialists (for instance, detectives who specialize in vice, tactical and hostage-negotiating teams, or forensic examiners) (p. 60). To exacerbate the issue, specialized officers are only assigned to cases when it is essential (p. 60). These officers generally lack any pre-existing relationship with the local community (p. 60). Third, Reiss proposes that professionalization and its tendency to centralize organizational processes have influenced the recruiting patterns of police organizations (p. 61). For instance, the civilianization of a number of more technical and clerical tasks has created a number of specialists that are employed at central locations such as headquarters or intelligence units. Fourth, the storage and operation of information databases have also been centralized, removing the need to maintain localized databases across an organization (p. 60). For example, an archived internal document of the Metropolitan Toronto Police authored in 1991, entitled, *Review of Technology and Development*, refers to the centralized technocratic strategy employed by the organization in the 1980s. It notes: "Throughout the 1980's, the Force has confined its computer systems strategy to the development and implementation of large centralized/mainframe systems..." (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1991b, "Appendix 1, pp. 1"). Additional evidence of this trend is detailed in an archived internal report also authored in 1991, entitled, *Metropolis: The Metropolitan Toronto*

Police Information System. The report looks ahead and identifies the need to develop a "Force-wide Information System" (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1991a, p. 3). It states:

> MTP's growing need for complete, accurate and timely force-wide information cannot be serviced with its existing, inadequate information systems. The Force must undertake a global, strategic approach for satisfying these needs and simultaneously laying the foundation for a solution that will serve its needs well into the next decade. The central thrust of this strategy is the establishment of a Force-wide Information System…Officers on the beat will require efficient and reliable access to information in order to avoid delays and increase safety…management will require a reliable and efficient information gathering mechanism that will help them make the appropriate operational, tactical and strategic decisions. (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1991a, pp. 3-4).

More recently, an archived internal document, entitled, *TPS Information Technology Plan: 1998-2000*, explains the reason for the continuation of the development of centralized information databases into the millennium. It reads:

> The intent of this strategy was to modernize TPS' computing services and to leverage the technology to provide better service at reduced costs…it is essential that TPS not fall into a period of retrenchment…[recognizing] the absence of investments in technology as a clear signal of a weakening organization. (Toronto Police Service, 1998, p. 16)

To support the above, the report enlists a quote from the Chief of Police at the time, David Boothby: "In the '1990s' Information Technology was used to count crimes; in the new millennium it will be used to enhance public safety – and anything that enhances public safety has strategic value!" (Toronto Police Service, 1998, "cover")

Fifth, Reiss suggests that centralization has been a means to ensure political neutrality (p. 70). Under a centralized hierarchy, police officers demonstrate allegiance only to their chief, separating themselves from external influences (p. 70). Six, the centralization of authority, specifically, the universal application of rules and regulations, acts to constrain the behaviours of frontline officers whose actions and discretionary decisions commonly go unsupervised and without review (pp. 73-74). Lastly, Reiss suggests that the centralization of police organizations has been observed to reduce corruption. This outcome mainly relies on the premise that a decrease in exposure of officers means that they are less vulnerable to corruptible aspects of the local environment (p. 81). Later, Reiss makes these compelling criticisms:

> Although the centralization of command was accomplished with the goal of a more efficient delivery of police services...they often appeared only to alienate those who were served…Citizens experienced impersonality in their contacts with the police and abandonment of their local community and its problems. (Reiss, 1992, p. 92)

To support this point, I refer to the field operations of the Metropolitan Toronto in 1979, which consisted of 18 police divisions located in communities across the city (Metropolitan Police Service, 1979, p. 66). Today, only 17 divisions remain (Toronto Police Service, 2017a, par. 1) and plans exist to reduce these numbers further (Toronto Police Service, 2016a, pp. 52-53, "recommendation 16").

One area that Reiss (1992) does not discuss is the cost savings that may accompany the centralization of police organizations. For instance, Reiss neglects to acknowledge the popular topic of New Public Management; “one of the most striking international trends in public administration” (Hood, 1991, p. 3). Whether one attributes the trend of centralization to neo-liberal policy, the private sector, or market models, efforts to devolve responsibility from local

levels of service to achieve "best financial value" remains a common theme in government (Reiner, 2010, p. 24). Policing represents a significant public expenditure and much like any public sector organization, administrators are constantly seeking ways to cut overhead via "cost-effective planning" (Leishman, Cope, & Starie, 1995, p. 32). The centralization of service delivery is seen as one means to accomplish this goal. Below, I attempt to demonstrate empirical support for the cost-saving mechanisms of centralization using national data and the TPS as a case study.

The total operating expenditures for all police services across Canada in 2015/2016 was $14.2 billion dollars at a per capita cost of $396 dollars (Statistics Canada, 2017a). A recent and dramatic increase in total national operating expenditures can be observed when the above 2015/2016 values are compared to much lower values of $6.8 billion dollars at a per capita cost of $222 for 2000/2001 and $3.8 billion dollars at a per capita cost of $144 for 1986/1987 (Statistics Canada, 2017a). Similarly, the annual budget of the TPS has also grown exponentially in recent years. For instance, in 2017 the budget reached $1.005 billion dollars (Toronto Police Service, 2017d). This value is considerably higher than the annual budget of the TPS in 2007, which was $786.2 million dollars (2017d) and in 1997, which was $522.1 million dollars (Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, 1997, p. 1). These values demonstrate that the annual budget of the TPS has virtually doubled over the past two decades. Therefore, this data provides empirical support for the acute and rising costs associated with operating a modern, specialized, and sizably staffed Anglo-American police organization and the accompanying challenges for local and national governments in Canada. This empirical data is also supportive of the centralization of Canadian police organizations, including the TPS. As explicated by

Reiner (2010, p. 229): "the cutting edge of the thrust to greater centralization has been the government's tightening control of the police purse-strings".

Many police reformers remain opposed to the centralization of contemporary police organizations. Advocates of 'community policing' – policing that is environmentally consistent with the local community – argue that policing in its current centralized and rationale bureaucratic form is not effective (Redlinger, 1994, pp. 37-38). In concert with this opinion are advocates who further claim that the police have overemphasized themselves as "crime fighters" while failing to address non-crime related services that local communities actually need (G. L. Kelling & Moore, 1988, p. 7). Critiques of the "Tayloristic" regime assert that centralized control has extended bureaucratic authority to the frontlines of policing, leading to the dehumanization and routinization of police work (p. 6). As a result, officers feel as if they are treated like robots not professionals – as "interchangeable cogs in a wheel" (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990, p. 31) or "automatons" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 27). Simultaneously, administrative officers have "turned inward" and have established "command-and-control cultures" (Redlinger, p. 43). In doing so, officers have lost touch with their communities and have become preoccupied with "management, internal procedure, means over ends, and efficiency over effectiveness in dealing with substantive problems" (p. 43). As reiterated by Goldstein (p. 16), the delivery of community-driven police services has acquiesced to the importance of organizational matters. Unsurprisingly, community policing reformers submit that police organizations must adjust their structure to become more effective and responsive to community needs; by delayering, deformalizing, despecializing, and most importantly, decentralizing (Maguire, 1997, p. 547). For instance and consistent with the above, an archived internal report produced in 1989 by the "Strategic Planning Unit of the Metropolitan Toronto

Police", entitled, *Environmental Assessment and Force Objectives for 1990*, recommended the following as a means to succeed in the area of "police service delivery" and in particular, "community-police relations":

> To be successful it requires more frequent police/public contact in non-threatening situations for constructive dialogue. This has required resources to support a number of strategies designed to accelerate this goal. Mini-stations [;] area foot patrols [;] regular meetings with schools, business and community groups, etc. [; and a] generalist constable concept. Each of the above either requires dedicated assignment of officers or more time from within the normal workday of the officer. (Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, 1989, p. 55)

Most notably, this former recommendation opposes the general trend to centralize the operations of the TPS. Notwithstanding, I submit that the structure and operations of the Metropolitan Toronto Police[20] (referred to as the Toronto Police Service after 1998) have become more centralized (to be discussed explicitly in the next section).

In summary, the above analysis suggests that the TPS is a highly centralized organization characterized by formalized and tall hierarchies, specialized units, and sizable administrative staffing. It has been suggested that an unintended consequence of centralization is a deterioration of police relations and a more isolated police organization. Therefore, centralization has implications, which have been discussed in this section, for understanding the factors that may facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. Next, I discuss historical and additional empirical literature related to the

[20] The literature refers to the titles "Metropolitan Toronto Police" and the "Metropolitan Toronto Police Force" interchangeably and without consistency.

professionalization and centralization of the TPS, highlighting implications for our understanding of the policy issue under investigation.

4.3 Empirical Support of a Professionalized and Centralized Toronto Police Service

In this section, historical and empirical literature is presented, accounting for the professionalized and centralized character of the TPS. This section presents a number of implications for our understanding of the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. In a legalistic style, police organization decisions are centralized and subordinates are controlled via formalistic policy administered in a downward direction (Wilson, 1968, pp. 183-184). The fundamental reason for administering a police organization in such a bureaucratic manner is to reduce the autonomy and discretion of frontline officers (Hassell & Maguire, 2003, p. 233). As noted by Wilson (p. 181), "discretion, except under carefully defined circumstances, creates opportunities for officers to use that discretion out of improper or corrupt motives…" The legalistic style also emphasizes "efficiencies" - accomplishing law enforcement objectives and producing output (high arrests and ticketing rates) at minimum cost (p. 185).

The TPS operates under a legalistic management style characterized in part by its trend toward professionalization and centralization. The encompassment of professionalization by the previously named Metropolitan Toronto Police is evidenced in an archived memorandum written March 12th, 1979, by then Chairman and His Honour Judge Philip G. Givens. In this memorandum he writes:

> It gives me great pleasure to commend the members of our Force, who have gone before, and those serving now, for their devotion to duty and the contribution they have made to

> the lifestyle enjoyed by us all. The career of a police officer on our Force has, indeed, been elevated to the status of a profession, and not just that of an occupation. (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1979, p. 5)

However, references to professionalization and centralization have a much earlier association with the TPS. As of the late 19th century, the Toronto Police Force underwent a state of bureaucratization in conjunction with a proliferation of rules and regulations. Illustrating these qualities of centralization and professionalization is an archived yearbook of the Metropolitan Police Service (1979, p. 24) which notes that in 1876, there were major changes in divisional policing boundaries, such that:

> These changes were made necessary by the city's rapid growth, and in fact, increased the Chief Constable's duties to the point that the Board of Commissioner appointed Sergeant Major McPherson to the new rank of Deputy Chief Constable…A thorough examination into the systems used by the London Metropolitan Police Force [resulted in] "Orders and Regulations of the Toronto Police Force". (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1979, p. 24)

Moreover, an early proliferation of rules and regulations is evinced in an archived policy manual of the Toronto Police Force produced in 1878. Entitled, *General Orders and Regulations*, this policy manual consists of about 100 pages of rules and regulations, governing all forms of conduct, including; directions on how to investigate assaults, prohibitions on consuming alcohol, and rules on how to cut hair and trim beards (Toronto Police Force, 1878, pp. 10, 39, 49). The manual's preface emphasizes that "the Police must be directed…" (Toronto Police Force, 1878, "Preface") and is followed by an explanation of why "Police Regulations" are necessary:

> 1st. For the government of the Force.
>
> 2nd. For preventing neglect and abuse – and

3rd. For rendering the Force efficient in the discharge of all its duties. (Toronto Police Force, 1878, p. 5)

As early as 1938, the Globe and Mail reports the centralizing of administrative services and other characteristics of professionalization inside the Toronto Police Force, demonstrating a further insertion of specialization and functional differentiation. The news article notes:

> Centralization of the Toronto police licensing and summons department has resulted in an increase in revenue from licenses of more than $1000,000, while administration costs were being pared nearly $7,000, the police Commission was informed yesterday…All clerical work, formerly done by full-fledged policemen, is now done by civilian stenographers. The uniformed men are thus released for service in regular police patrol work. (Globe and Mail, 1938, p. 4)

I propose that one of the most conspicuous examples of the centralization of policing services in Toronto, occurred on January 1st, 1957, when thirteen municipalities and their individual police services (including the "Toronto City Police") amalgamated to form the "Metropolitan Toronto Police" – many decades later renamed the "Toronto Police Service" in 1998 (Sale, 2007, p. 9). Reasons for the amalgamation, which I suggest are references to professionalization and centralization, were stated in the Globe and Mail the night before the event:

> Traffic congestion has grown every year…This was a main consideration in the amalgamation of city and suburban police…from midnight tonight all traffic regulation will be under one command…The overlapping of criminal investigation is another main factor. Often three and four teams of detectives, from separate forces were investigating the same crime…Now special squads from Metro police headquarters…will handle all criminal investigation in the Metro area. (Globe and Mail, 1956, p. 3)

In 1982, the Metropolitan Toronto Police commissioned a management study by "Hickling-Johnston" entitled, *A New Organization Design for the Metropolitan Toronto Police – Organizing to Meet the Challenges of the 1980's.* A number of references to the professionalized and centralized character of the Metropolitan Toronto Police are contained in this study - three of which are discussed here. First, the command and control system of the Metropolitan Toronto Police was portrayed as exhibiting "a large span of control, highly centralized decision-making processes and voluminous information reporting requirements" (p. 7). Second, but related to the above, the delivery of police services was quoted as being far from adequate:

> The current organization of the Force, with its highly centralized decision-making processes, limited accountability at the field command level, and uniform application of solutions and programs across geographical areas is, for the most part, inconsistent with the fundamental requirement to give increased focus to the needs of local communities. (Hickling-Johnston, 1982, p. 17)

Third, difficulties in providing adequate policing services led the authors of this management study to reaffirm the Service's inclination toward professionalized solutions including functional differentiation combined with the employment of specialists:

> As the Force moves into the 1980s, however, the need to mesh this police experience and know-how with non-police functional and professional expertise is most apparent…Organizationally, the increasing requirement for interjection of professional expertise reflects a need to think of the Force as a mix of police and non-police type work. (Hickling-Johnston, 1982, pp. 19-20)

This management study recommended the centralization of field operations under one command to ensure "expertise, specialized support and, as necessary, functional direction" for all frontline operations across the city (Hickling-Johnston, 1982, p. 56). This included a recommendation to centralize the oversight of investigative services, community/public education programs, community relations, traffic planning, operational plans, and budgeting (p. 56). The recommendations from this management study were adopted in a subsequent reorganization of the Metropolitan Toronto Police (Sale, 2007, p. 9; Toronto Police Service, 2017c, "1982").

Authored in 1986, an archived internal document of the Metropolitan Toronto Police entitled, *First Employment Equity Report*, demonstrates firsthand the Service's continued adoption of professionalized values. For instance, the document discusses the modernization of hiring practices by removing "artificial barriers" in a need to comply with legislation (p. 2). An excerpt of the "Executive Summary" states:

> The purpose of this Report is to convey the commitment of the Metropolitan Toronto Police to equal opportunity employment and to establish an Employment Equity Program for women and visible minorities in its uniform and civilian ranks…The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force has recognized the importance of this issue for some time…It is acknowledged that this process must be managed and not merely left to happen. (Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, 1986, pp. 2-4)

Four years later, an internal report produced by the "Strategic Planning Unit of the Metropolitan Toronto Police", entitled, *Environmental Assessment and Force Objectives for 1990,* makes the following declaration related to the ongoing professionalization and centralization that was occurring inside the organization, in particular, concerning areas of specialization:

> In order to deal effectively with changing conditions within the community, new specialized units are being created. Recent examples would include the Major Crime Units, the Youth-Gangs Unit and the Sexual Assault Unit. Each, of course, requires dedicated, experienced officers. (Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, 1989, p. 57)

Likewise, in 1991, an archived internal document of the 'Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police', entitled, *Looking Ahead: Policing in Metropolitan Toronto in 1991*, continues to discuss a number of professionalized hiring strategies that were to be engaged by the Toronto Police Force to satisfy motifs of "Employment Equity, Recruitment, and Race Relations":

> To make the Force more representative of the community it serves…recently, the Board approved funding of 1.4 million dollars to implement a specialized Recruitment Team to further advance this program. This Team not only reaches out to visible minorities, women and native people to increase their representation on the Force, but in particular seeks those individuals who can sensitively handle the complex job of being a police officer… (Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police, 1990, p. 9)

More recently, it was made clear to the public (in unintentional ways described below) that a feature of professionalization – an emphasis on "producing" to demonstrate organizational "efficiency" – was common practice among officers of the TPS. In 2006, Toronto Sun reporter Alan Cairns wrote about a practice that encouraged Toronto Police officers to issue 25 tickets in exchange for going home early (Warmington, 2012, par. 12). Similarly, in 2012, an internal email was leaked to the Toronto Sun, originally written by a Toronto Police sergeant, which demanded that officers issue tickets more regularly if they were concerned about their careers ("A memo"). In this leaked email, the sergeant wrote: "two or no tickets an entire shift - that is

not acceptable…" ("A memo"). Moreover, in 2013, an email was obtained by the Toronto Sun, originally written by a highly ranked inspector of the TPS, which outlined an expectation that officers achieve at minimum "2 provincial offence tickets and 3 field information reports [the practices of "street checks" and "carding"] per day" (Warmington, 2013, par. 3-4). These news articles illustrate the TPS' commitment to the practice of "producing" by enforcement (high ticketing rates) to adhere to the principles of organizational efficiency – a characteristic of professionalization.

In 2013, the TPS made public an organizational review entitled, *Toronto Police Service Organizational Structure Review*. Many aspects of this review epitomize the degree to which the TPS advocates for professionalized and centralized outcomes. The mandate reads: "The purpose [of the review]…is to examine how the TPS [Toronto Police Service] conducts its business, and determine how to do it more effectively and more economically" (Toronto Police Service, 2013d, p. 4). The scope of this review includes categories such as: delayering of the organizational structure; opportunities for civilianization; the effectiveness of the number of hierarchical levels and spans of control; and organizational alignment (p. 5). Moreover, the recommendations that stem from this review illustrate the professionalized and centralized outlook of the TPS. For instance, the review recommends the consolidation of administrative, planning, and investigative sections under a "shared services" model to "make more efficient use of assets" (p. 34). The review further endorses the civilianization of the organization at mass scale, citing "The International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy on Civilianization" for authority: "the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies is enhanced when sworn and non-sworn personnel are appropriately used to perform those functions that are best suited to their special knowledge, skill and abilities" (as cited in Toronto Police Service, 2013d,

p. 61). The review concludes that "potential economic value" can be achieved by increasing spans of control, changing the workforce mix, and reducing layers of management (p. 98) – an acknowledgement of the outcomes of centralization (that tall bureaucratic hierarchies may not be the most effective means of achieving organizational goals) and a reiteration of the organization's commitment to professionalization.

Following the TPS Organizational Structure Review (and despite some of its recommendations), the TPS released its *2014-2016 Business Plan*. The plan iterates centralized aspects of the command structure and the crowning power of the police chief, particularly, in relation to organizational decision-making and the control of information flow. As noted:

> In addition to the four Command Areas [Corporate, Operational, Community Safety, and Specialized Operations Command], the Executive Officer, Corporate Communications, the Disciplinary Hearings Office, and Strategic Management (including Customer Service Excellence and Strategic Planning & Corporate Projects) report directly to the Chief of Police. (Toronto Police Service, 2013c, p. 4)

What is more, two out of three "Service Priorities" noted in this business plan identify with professionalized discourse: (1) High Quality, Professional Service to the Community; and (2) Economic Sustainability & Operational Excellence (p. 15)

More recently, in 2016, sparked by an unsustainable billion-dollar budget, the TPS appointed a "Transformational Task Force" to modernize the organization (Pagliaro, 2016, par. 1-3). In early 2017, this task force released a final report entitled, *Action Plan: The Way Forward* (2016a), which details internal strategies of the TPS to achieve a modernized policing model. In this report, themes of professionalization and centralization are prominent, emerging as recommendations underlying a general discourse of "providing value, always seeking to

control costs, and making the most of every dollar" (Toronto Police Service, 2016a, p. 10). These themes include: sustainability and affordability; prioritization of service-delivery; embracing modern technology; cost-cutting measures, for instance, freezes of hiring and promotions, shared services, fewer police divisions, and downsizing of infrastructure; academic partnerships including research support; incorporating private sector expertise and models; centralization of public safety units; and downsizing of infrastructure (pp. 10-33)

Notably, this report also makes reference to "cultural" factors that are in need of transformation and strategies to improve engagement with local communities (Toronto Police Service, 2016a, pp. 12, 33-41). These two themes, discussed in the "Culture of the Toronto Police Service and Policy Implementation" section below, represent marked departures from the professionalized and centralized discourse of past Service reports and may show recognition that the internal objectives of professionalization and centralization are more concerned with maintaining "structural arrangements"[21] and law enforcement objectives than satisfying their local constituencies.

In summary, in this section, I have attempted to demonstrate that the TPS operates under a legalistic management style characterized in part by its trend toward professionalization and centralization. I have attempted to show this by presenting historical and empirical literature related to the professionalization and centralization of the TPS. I further submit that the empirical data and recent literature that I have referred to in this section support a continued climate of professionalization and centralization inside the TPS. This section has discussed several implications for our understanding of the factors that may facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and the perspective held by

[21] Structural arrangements refer to organizational frameworks which are adopted to meet objectives, including formal organizational structure (Hassell & Maguire, 2003, p. 236).

police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. In the next section, I discuss the formalized process of policy implementation in the TPS and how the structural elements already discussed in this chapter (command and composition; professionalization; and centralization) contribute to this stage of the policy process.

4.4 Policy Implementation and the Capacity of Sergeants in the Toronto Police Service

In this section, I briefly discuss the policy implementation process adopted by the TPS that exemplifies the traditional top-down approach and that is conducive to the structural elements of the organization as discussed above. In doing so, I make reference to a previous policy initiative of the TPS. In addition, I discuss the capacity of sergeants to achieve policy conformance, which is linked to the structural elements presented in this chapter and additional empirical evidence. This section has implications for our understanding of the factors that may facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance.

The Ontario Police Services Act governs the responsibilities for all police services in Ontario (Police Services Act, 1990, s. 1). This Act legislates the requirement for the establishment of a "municipal police services board" to ensure police services remain compliant (Police Services Act, s. 31). The "Toronto Police Services Board" is responsible for administering the TPS (Toronto Police Services Board, 2017a, par. 3). This includes establishing and overseeing the service's objectives, priorities, and policies (Toronto Police Services Board, par. 3).

The Toronto Police Services Board is charged with developing policies for the effective management of the Service while directing the Chief of Police to implement them (Police Services Act, s. 31). The Toronto Police Services Board cannot interfere in actual police

operations, but instead establishes policies that govern the environment in which those operations take place (Toronto Police Services Board, par. 4). This governing dichotomy mirrors one of politics-administration; establishing an accountability hierarchy that ensures day-to-day operational matters remains free from political meddling and under the purview of the Chief of Police.

To illustrate the above process, I point to Clarke (2003), who examined the implementation of two reform initiatives by the TPS: a robbery reduction initiative and a crime management initiative. Both initiatives were part of a broader restructuring effort of both provincial and municipal governments who were seeking further efficiencies from the Toronto Police Services Board (pp. 475-476). In both initiatives, implementations began at the "Command" level of the TPS (pp. 478, 483). Next, senior managers effectuated structural and functional changes to achieve desired outcomes through the formation of internal committees and working groups (pp. 478, 484). The committees and working groups operationalized the policies for frontline supervisors (sergeants) and frontline officers to deliver – an outcome that Clarke refers to as "frontline ownership" (p. 487). Consequently, the policy implementation process of the TPS epitomizes a top-down approach to policy implementation. It demonstrates how the command and composition of the TPS combined with its professionalized and centralized character regiments implementation at the frontlines of the organization.

In a legalistic police organization such as the TPS, a central command sets out general policy and principles to guide the actions of officers. However, unlike other professions, the institutionalized and legalistic role of a police organization, rooted in its structural elements, denies its frontline employees autonomy in their choice of action and decision-making (Bordua & Reiss, 1966, p. 72). In a professionalized and centralized police organization, "rank structure"

and “rules and regulations” represent the dominant mechanisms to control the behaviour of police officers (Crank & Langworthy, 1996, p. 225). Administrative rules proliferate the organization and are designed to punish offenders should employees select a path of deviance (Redlinger, 1994, p. 41).

In police organizations, including the TPS, rules appear as internal policies and function as “elaborate control mechanisms” that extend administrative regulation all the way to the frontlines (Redlinger, 1994, p. 41). Combined with other bureaucratic means – namely, “supervision, limited span of control, flow of instructions downward and information upward…” - centralized administrations are able to constrain the behaviour of frontline officers from the top of the organization (G. L. Kelling & Moore, 1988, p. 6). To illustrate the above, I refer to an archived rules and regulations manual of the Metropolitan Toronto Police. Under the heading, *Member’s General Responsibilities*, it reads: “Members shall familiarize themselves with all regulations; orders; procedures; posted notifications, telex and C.P.I.C. messages; [and] written communications; that may affect their official duties” (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1987, "3.0.1").

Westley (1970, p. 24) notes the amount of power in a police organization that can be achieved by police chiefs via the downward adoption of internal rules and regulations. However, he surmises that many of these rules and regulations are both “manifold and picayune”; that “no man [or woman] in the police department obeys even a good portion of these rules all the time” (pp. 24-26). Similarly, Manning (1997) reflects upon a colourful interview with a sergeant who relays the difficulty officers experience when attempting to comply with the “general orders” of a police organization. The sergeant explains that general orders contain:

> 140 years of fuckups. Every time something goes wrong, they make a rule about it. All the directions in the force flow from someone's mistake. You can't go eight hours on the job without breaking the disciplinary code…The job goes wild on trivialities. (P. K. Manning, 1997, p. 149)

To address the lack of conformance to rules, police organizations draw on the power of accountability by the agency of its "chain-of-command rank structure" (Crank & Langworthy, 1996, p. 225). Sergeants are employed at the frontlines of police organizations, representing the formal authority of a centralized command (where administrators cannot physically be) and are tasked with identifying the lack of conformance of officers to policy (Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 245). As noted by Reiss (1971, p. 167), "supervision has a particular strong effect…rule infraction is lowest when command is most centralized and where supervision is exercised…in the field".

Since enhanced authority characterizes a legalistic police organization, administrators are able to leverage the power of rules to establish order and constrain the behaviour of officers (Kappeler et al., 1994, pp. 252-253). Manning (1997, p. 150) suggests that rules have this effect since they act to frame the organizational reality of police officers. Accordingly, administrators communicate to sergeants how they are supposed to interpret and enforce rules and regulations (p. 150). Sergeants, in turn, ensure that officers are aware of the organizational mission, rules, and regulations and that officers exhibit conformance on a day-to-day basis (Kappeler et al., p. 245). Furthermore, sergeants act as administrative interpreters for frontline officers – translating policy into action (Skogan, 2008, p. 25).

For the chain-of-command to be effective, a sergeant's first loyalty must be to the administration (p. 245). There must be an understanding between administrators and sergeants

that ineffective supervision or failure to take disciplinary action against subordinates condones non-conformance, and alternatively, can lead to accountability measures being taken against a sergeant (pp. 246-248). To illustrate a sergeant's responsibilities, I refer to regulations governing the conduct of sergeants that have been instilled in Toronto as early as 1878. In an archived internal manual, entitled, *Toronto Police Force General Orders and Regulations*, sergeants were charged with 21 responsibilities (pp. 78-80) including:

> When in charge of a Section or Division, and on street duty, he is held responsible for the general conduct and good order of the Constables under his charge.
>
> He is to report every case of misconduct on the part of Constables to the Officer on Division Duty and the Chief Constable, at the earliest opportunity.
>
> He is not to make himself too familiar with Constables, but he is to instruct them in the duties they have to perform, and so conduct himself as to secure the respect of those over whom he is placed in command. (Toronto Police Force, 1878, p. 79)

Decades later, "Chapter Three" of a 1987 archived policy manual of the Metropolitan Toronto Police, provides more current details related to the role of "Sergeants":

> Sergeants shall be responsible for the appearance, good conduct, discipline and efficient performance of duty by subordinates and shall advise, assist and direct them in a constructive and helpful manner. Sergeants shall, upon becoming aware of a member who has committed or apparently committed a breach of any provision of this By-Law, Administrative Procedures, Routine Orders, Standing Orders or the Code of Offences in Ontario Regulation 791 under The Police Act (1980), report such breach forthwith to the Officer in Charge. (Metropolitan Toronto Police, 1987, "3.10.0").

To constrain the behaviour and reduce the autonomy of frontline officers, a legalistic, professionalized, and centralized police organization relies for the most part on two internal accountability mechanisms: (1) Bureaucratic rules and regulations; and (2) accountability and punitive mechanisms through a chain-of-command rank structure (Bahn, 1984, pp. 390-391; Crank & Langworthy, 1996, p. 225; Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 247). It is therefore, safe to conclude that the three structural elements discussed in this chapter (command and composition; professionalization; and centralization) function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. It also seems accurate to suppose that the main reasons for this correlation stem from a sergeant's primary responsibility to initiate disciplinary action when there is a lack of conformance to rules and regulations and the serious punitive consequences for frontline officers that may result when this occurs. As a result, it may seem logical to agree with the assertion of Lurigio and Skogan (1994, p. 316), that "in reality, [police] agencies are managed mostly by the threat and fear of punishment from supervisors. These conclusions represent implications for our understanding of the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization and the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance. In the next section, I further our understanding of these implications by considering the police culture of the TPS and policy implementation.

4.5 Culture of the Toronto Police Service and Policy Implementation

In this section, I consider cultural elements of the TPS to further our understanding of (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. The two cultural

elements discussed in this section are the inflexible command and control impacting the rank of sergeant and the presence of racist attitudes or beliefs. In this chapter, I support suppositions with relevant empirical evidence. This section also builds on the previous section, by establishing the significance of the impact of police culture on policy implementation.

As previously discussed, the literature suggests that subcultures may vary between ranks (Paoline, 2003). Reuss-Ianni (1983, pp. 6-7) describes this variation as the existence of two cultures: "street cop culture and management cop culture". Similarly, Manning (1993, as cited in Chan, 1996, p. 111) recognizes three subcultures when correlated with rank: "command, middle management and lower participants". It can be surmised from the literature and the preceding section of this dissertation, that a sergeant subscribes to a subculture dominated by mechanisms of enhanced authority via rank structure and the promotion of rules and regulations. This can be explained by a sergeant's unquestioning loyalty to the Chief and administration (Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 245) and from a sergeant's ability to translate administrative policy into action at the frontlines (Skogan, 2008, p. 25). Recognition of a subculture that resides at the supervisory level of a police organization, in particular in the TPS, is important when examining implementations, especially when the policy is controversial - as is the case of the Regulated Interactions Policy.

To explore the authority of a sergeant as embedded in the culture of the TPS further, and how it may influence policy implementation, I make reference to an internal report of the TPS entitled, *Action Plan: The Way Forward* (2016a). This report, which serves to offer empirical confirmation of the above, details a number of internal strategies that involve changing the culture of the organization (Pagliaro, 2016, par. 1-3). References to culture in this report acknowledge a "strong emphasis on following procedures and rules…top-down, command-and-control, restrictive, inflexible…military or paramilitary" and the ability of culture to act as a

barrier to "flexibility, empowerment, and innovation" (Toronto Police Service, pp. 34-35). This report, however, also speaks to the second cultural element that is discussed in this section, referencing issues surrounding police culture that pertain to the state of police relations; for instance, "the need for culture change and more consistent actions and behaviours from officers, particularly when dealing with youth, including racialized youth, and marginalized communities (p. 12). This particular cultural element is important to consider when implementing policies that relate to police relations, as discussed below.

Relevant empirical evidence promotes our understanding of the cultural assumptions, beliefs, and values that may exist in the TPS toward racialized segments of the public and the given policy implementation under examination. For instance, the literature demonstrates allegations of an organizational culture afflicted by racism. In October of 2003, at the request of then Police Chief Julian Fantino, a meeting occurred that was coordinated by the TPS' highest-ranking Black officers to discuss racism inside the Service (Mascoll & Rankin, 2005, p. 1). The meeting consisted of 38 Black officers who in their discussions confirmed that Toronto Police officers do stereotype Black drivers in expensive cars and do pay more attention to neighbourhoods that are characterized as racialized (p. 1). Furthermore, Black officers at this meeting recounted to each other personal experiences of being stopped by Toronto Police officers and racially profiled. One officer articulated that his Toronto Police colleague regularly referred to racialized persons riding bicycles as "chimps on bikes" (p. 1). What was reported back to the Chief from this session was that racial profiling and racism inside the TPS was "serious, and nothing would change until the matters were dealt with internally" (p. 1). Furthermore, during a subsequent presentation of this meeting's findings to Ontario's most

senior police officers, it was made clear that "racial profiling exists" and "racial profiling is a product of racism and organizational culture" (pp. 2-3).

In addition to the Canadian scholarship discussed in Chapter One (Racial Profiling in Toronto), other scholars have shown support for the existence of racist components of the TPS culture and the systemic racism that exists in Toronto's justice community. For instance, Tanovich (2006, pp. 87-104) provides an account of how Toronto police officers "racialized" the identification of drug dealers and street gang members and their affiliates through a process of embedded stereotypes, myths, and cultural assumptions. Henry and Tator (2006, p. 110) discuss the resistance of the TPS to engage in core issues involving "institutional culture, racialized ideology, and racialized norms and practices" – elements that are protected by powerful cultural constraints that exist in the organization. For instance, Henry and Tator (p. 109) refer to the TPS' hesitation to modernize its recruitment policies, training in race relations and cultural sensitivity, the establishment of community advisory committees, and greater independent civilian oversight mechanisms. This hesitation exists despite reports that indicate that these are the areas that strain relations between the police and the Black community (p. 109).

In summary, this section has highlighted cultural elements of the TPS related to inflexible command and control impacting the rank of sergeant and the presence of racist attitudes or beliefs. This section has considered the implications that relate to the implementation of the given policy and has furthered our understanding of (1) the factors that may facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. This section has demonstrated that it is imperative that we understand how sergeants "see the social world and their role in it" (Reiner, 2010, p. 115).

Comprehending elements of police culture and their potential influence on policy implementations, in particular, the Regulated Interactions Policy, serves to avoid 'policy failure' or even worse, exacerbate tensions between police officers and Toronto's racialized communities. Importantly, this section demonstrates that police culture is contextual - sergeants are unable to communicate policy or oversee its implementation in a vacuum.

Conclusion:

This chapter demonstrates that the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. This is because these elements support the bureaucratization of the police organization – enabling top-down command to assert control on the conformance choices of police officers and the implementation of policy at the street level. This chapter also demonstrates that cultural factors may also facilitate or hinder policy conformance in important ways: most importantly, that sergeants may leverage occupational culture to achieve a police service's policy objectives. This is due to the cultural aspects of the police institution that reinforce a respect for militaristic rank and perforation of legalistic mechanisms that act to frame the organizational reality of police. These propositions are grounded in the idea that both the structural and cultural elements that exist inside the TPS, shape the view of its police officers, influencing their sociological perspective and their conformance choices. This chapter also shows support for a police organization that is imbued with structural and cultural elements that serve to protect the organization and its officers. One of the cultural elements discussed in this chapter is the existence of racist beliefs among Toronto police officers. Accordingly, this chapter suggests that certain structural and cultural elements might serve to divorce the police from the public – diminishing the trust and confidence that the

police and the public have for each other. In the next chapter, the findings of this research are presented.

Chapter Five – Findings Part One: Factors that Achieve Conformance

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the dynamics of the police institution – the structural and cultural elements - impact the typology and attributes of a police organization and that over time, and particularly in the case of the Anglo-American policing model, have instilled a divide between police officers and the communities they serve, potentially manifesting as reactive police-citizen interaction. Further, by focusing on the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization, I have demonstrated that these elements, under the umbrella of bureaucratization, function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. I have also emphasized that the cultural factors that may exist in a police organization, namely; its respect for militaristic rank and its ubiquitous rules and policies, shape the organizational reality of police officers. The above acts to reinforce the mechanisms available to sergeants to achieve policy implementation at the street level and policy objectives via the conformance choices of frontline officers.

The findings presented in the next two chapters provide support for these presumptions. Through the comments of the participants, I will uncover how the sergeants in my sample (respondents) experience the police organizational environment and what meanings they attach to this experience (Comack & Brickey, 2007, p. 1). In unpacking the above, these findings identify key and prevalent contextual factors, or the factors pertaining to the institutional environment, that may be operating that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. While this dissertation did not initially intend to seek out the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction, this data did emerge during the interviews -

primarily the result of the policy issue being investigated – and could not be ignored due to its importance in furthering our understanding of the contextual factors that exist inside a police organization. By identifying and documenting these factors, I am able to further explain how sergeants perceive (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. To restate, the findings of the next two chapters build on the findings of the previous chapter, presenting further evidence from sergeants in relation to the above. This chapter presents the findings related to a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization in general (police organization), and to Regulated Interactions Policy in particular (the policy).

5.2 Outline of Key Findings

The interview data are presented below. Relevant data collected from the supplemental questionnaire are included in the findings below to corroborate the interview data. Using NVivo, theoretical codes emerged from the interview data during the coding process. This type of qualitative analysis, which Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 10) refer to as "thematic analysis", relies on both the "prevalence" and "keyness" of a theme for inclusion in the findings. By using this form of qualitative analysis there are no "hard-and-fast answers" and the greater prevalence of a theme does not automatically mean it is more "crucial". Instead, these findings are the product of a detailed, rich, and descriptive account of a group of themes from within the data that pertain to the research questions under investigation. It is also important to acknowledge that thematic saturation was experienced as the interviews progressed; meaning at a certain point, new data no longer sparked new themes, insights or new properties for the themes that had already emerged

(Holton, 2010, p. 167). Thematic saturation was detected as early as the thirteenth qualitative interview with participants.

The findings that emerged represent the outcomes of the thematic analysis. In Section 6.3, below, the findings related to the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization in general (police organization), are presented. In Section 6.4, below, the findings related to the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy), are presented. A discussion of these findings occurs in Chapter Seven.

5.3 The Factors that Facilitate or Hinder a Sergeant's Capacity to Achieve Conformance in a Police Organization

In this section, the findings related to the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization in general (police organization), are presented. The interview and survey questionnaire data show empirical support for a number of factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. These factors can be considered either external factors or internal factors. As will be discussed below, the external factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) Media portrayals of the police; (2) civilian oversight; (3) perceived levels of respect from citizens; (4) relationship between the police and citizens; and (5) number of public complaints. The internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) supervision; (2) internal discipline; (3) policy and procedure; (4) top-down command; and (5) parade. The external factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) the Toronto Police Association (Association) and (2) Media portrayals of the police. The

internal factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) staffing shortage; (2) morale; and (3) decisions of internal management. The findings show that one factor (media portrayals of the police) has the ability to facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. Below, I present the key findings in an attempt to unpack the meanings these factors have for the respondents. Each thematic category of findings contains a brief summary of the empirical support for each identified factor.

Media portrayals of the Police

"Nobody would want their name in the paper" (Sergeant #8)

To help unpack this factor, it is necessary to acknowledge that the respondents strongly perceive that the media is biased against the police. It is further perceived that the media has adopted an anti-police stance; siding with special interest groups and other anti-police groups. This is consistent with the classic police cultural literature that suggests that police officers identify with characteristics of suspicion, solidarity, isolation - the 'thin blue line of law enforcement' or the 'us versus them mentality' that manifests as a structural separation between police and the public (Banton, 1964; Cain, 1973; Reiner, 2010; Rubinstein, 1973; Skolnick, 1966; Westley, 1970).

Media portrayals of the police is a unique external factor because it is perceived by respondents to have the ability to facilitate (94.1%) or hinder (41.2%) their capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 82.4% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that media portrayals of the police is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community (the catchment that the respondent's division services). The message conveyed by respondents is

that media portrayals of the police is a factor that has the ability to influence officers to deviate from policy decisions or to avoid engaging in policy decisions altogether. This is particularly prevalent in situations that expose officers to any type of risk as discussed below.

Respondents perceive that the media only report negative events and issues about the police and refrain from commenting on any of the good work that the police accomplish in the community. For instance, sergeant #2 explains that the media continuously creates and sustains a negative perception of the police for the average citizen/viewer because the stories are profitable. This sergeant also speaks to the resulting implications for officers:

> The media [has] a dislike for the police…highlighting police misconduct helps to sell papers…[officers are] straight up afraid to make a mistake and be on the six o'clock news…its going to affect their family, their marriage, their job prospects…[officers] are afraid of um, crossing them [media] and being on their hit list.

Respondents also grouped the influence of media and social media together claiming that both forms of media adopt an anti-police stance – one that only represents the side of special interest groups. These sergeants shared their frustration toward the media and blame them for facilitating the agendas of anti-police groups and special interest groups, which they perceive often results in the cancellation of "good" police programs or masks the good work that police officers do in the community. As sergeant #17 explains:

> I know that officers are very frustrated with social media…we're all on Facebook, we're on twitter…we're not allowed in gay pride anymore…that's a lot of like Desmond Cole type stuff…School resource officers are out of schools now. It's just so frustrating because they do such good work but because for some reason these few select media people are able to have policymakers change their mind…We are a target, we have been a target for several years now and unfortunately with social media it's cool to hate the police.

The above quotes further emphasize what many of the respondents suggest; that officers feel that they cannot make any mistake without the media publicizing it instantly for all to see. Because of the media's penchant to instantly report on the negative actions of police officers, respondents

feel that the media presents a serious jeopardy toward their career prospects and their professional and personal reputations. They further perceive that the media's role to expose their mistakes has the potential to negatively impact their personal lives, causing embarrassment in front of peers, friends, and family, which translates into problems with marital relations and financial hardships. Respondents perceive that when officers choose to conform to policy in a police organization, they are more likely to avoid public embarrassment and public shaming by the media. This is the mechanism by which media portrayals of the police influences officers to conform to policy. As sergeant #4 states:

> When the media is out there, you're doing everything exactly how you're supposed to because it's being recorded and you can't, there's no wipe over right, people can't…it's captured so I think it actually puts people [officers] in a position where you're more or less likely to do what you're supposed to do because the community is watching, because the media is watching, the government's watching whatever it might be.

The findings also show that media portrayals of the police is an external factor that hinders a sergeant's ability to achieve conformance in a police organization. Respondents report that the media provides a good reason for a police officer to avoid law enforcement related duties so that any mistakes that are made are not broadcast publically and perpetually. This may translate into officers not conforming to, or engaging in policy decisions. For instance, sergeant #9 explains why an officer may choose to break the rules because of media portrayals of police:

> If the media takes a position on something and I mean the media is great at influencing not just us, but influencing anybody, they could direct stories the way they want them to go. I mean, yea the media, if the media is pushing for something or against something, then that officer is like, if all they're reading or hearing on the radio, the TV, reading a newspaper, it's got a point of view and soon enough maybe the officers might be taking that, that point of view.

From a different point of view, sergeant #13 clarifies how media portrayals of the police may cause officers to avoid engaging in their duties rather than not conforming to them:

> [It is the] fear of [being] publicly humiliated by the media, even though behaving lawfully and doing your job…not get involved to begin with – avoidance. So not so much non-compliance, but avoidance.

Similarly, sergeant #15 explains how media portrayals may lead to officers disengaging from proactive responsibilities within the community:

> They [officers] sometimes feel that their actions are judged by the media in a space of a few minutes, or a few hours, or a few days and it isn't always judged fairly, and it isn't always judged with all of the information. And by the time all that information comes out a year from now, the media isn't always there to say hey wait a second that officer actually went out and did the right thing. Instantly um, that officer sometimes feel that they're judged by the media or by members of the public when they don't have all of the necessary information about what's going on…So as a result I think it, it causes some officers to second guess how they put themselves out there and how much they expose themselves in terms of how they're doing their job….So I think it sometimes limits the amount of proactive policing that officers go out and do today compared to the amount of, um, proactive policing that officers would have perhaps done in the past.

Sergeant #3 conveys that due to the negative consequences for officers that may result from media portrayals of the police, "FIDO" is now subscribed to by officers, which is explained in the following quote:

> The media has a huge impact on the psyche and feelings of the police…media today doesn't like the good loving warm fuzzy stories…No officer wants to lose their house, wants to lose their family, or wants to get labeled…There's an acronym used in policing and it was used for years and years; it's called FIDO and the acronym stands for fuck it drive on. Why am I gonna get involved…its just gonna be me named in a complaint…I'll drive on…Whenever we're hearing about ourselves in the media, for the most part it's bad.

<u>Civilian Oversight</u>

"I think officers have pulled back" (Sergeant #14)

As the occupation of policing has itself become more professionalized, officer behavior and their decision-making processes have received increased scrutiny from government oversight, the media, and the public (Campeau, 2015, pp. 674-675; Chan, 1996, p. 232). In Ontario, the Special Investigation's Unit (SIU) and the Ontario Independent Police Review

Director (OIPRD) – the Province's two main police oversight bodies – have become more prominent and have taken on more and more cases over the past few years (Campeau, p. 674). Respondents suggest that this trend has had an impact on how police officers conduct themselves and conform to policy. The overall sentiment of the respondents is that police officers are more likely to conform to policy to avoid public complaints that are investigated by the SIU and OIPRD. The interview data show that 70.6 % of the respondents perceive that civilian oversight is an external factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 58.8 % of the respondents strongly agree or agree that the number of public complaints (investigated by civilian oversight bodies) is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community. Civilian oversight was understood by the respondents to be comprised of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), the Ontario Independent Police Review (OIPRD), and the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS).

Respondents suggest that officers avoid engaging in certain law enforcement obligations to reduce the likelihood of being subjected to civilian oversight investigations. For instance, sergeant #14 describes how police officers prefer to avoid civilian oversight investigations at all costs as they may negatively impact their careers, their personal lives, their financial status, and may lead to jail time. While this sergeant suggests that civilian oversight has its positive aspects, for instance, it does make officers follow the rules, this sergeant also feels that such oversight has gone too far, for instance, causing officers to refrain from using legally justified force. This sergeant adds that when officers omit their responsibilities out of fear of being investigated, it jeopardizes the safety of other officers:

> We all have families, we all have homes, we have cars, we have debts. I think when an officer contemplates breaking a rule that could put them in the gun sights of these

> oversight bodies or it could lead to a criminal charge, or, uh, formal discipline…I think a lot of them are starting to realize, "hey, you know what, there is no cowboy mentality anymore." There is no, "I will take a huge risk in this situation." Sometimes it's a good thing. Sometimes it's a bad thing. When officers should use a level of force and they don't and they become injured and somebody else does, then its uh, its gone too far.

Sergeant # 14 also expresses how intrusive civilian oversight investigations can be for officers. This sergeant explains that this lone characteristic of civilian oversight mechanisms causes officers to avoid engaging in duties that may put themselves at risk to be investigated:

> We work for the public…they have the right to know what we're doing…but when it becomes intrusive to the point that it affects performance then I have a problem. When it comes to the point of where officers…become gun shy into doing certain things because of oversight or they don't want to be interviewed by the SIU, and they're reserving certain levels of force when they are legally and morally justified then we've lost. The tipping point has been tipped.

However, it is not just the intrusiveness or the consequences of a civilian oversight investigation that influences officers to conform to policy. Respondents also perceive that the investigators belonging to these agencies are incompetent. The perception is that this leads to a lengthy amount of time - months, even years - for civilian oversight investigations to be completed and officers vindicated. For instance, sergeant #3 states:

> What influences them [officers] from the civilian oversight is the lack of competence in some of their investigative skills, in being fair in their time management...the lack of the investigation being completed in a timely fashion.

Finally, an important narrative that is conveyed by the respondents is that civilian oversight investigations are biased from the start to their conclusion. They perceive that media portrayals of the police and negative public sentiment have an impact on civilian oversight investigations, contributing to a "trial by media" sentiment held by officers. Sergeant #2 explains:

> The SIU and OIPRD are still largely, their response is largely informed by the sentiment of public opinion which is largely informed by the media…If public sentiment was more pro-police…I wouldn't be as afraid because I know they're going to treat me fairly…I think the thing now is, that it's not fair, the scales have turned against the police.

Perceived Levels of Respect from Citizens

"The public only get one side" (Sergeant #2)

The Anglo-American policing model emphasizes a reciprocal and trusting relationship between the police and the public (Frank et al., 2005, p. 207; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998, p. 547). This includes the notion that a positive relationship must exist between the police and citizenry to achieve a satisfactory level of service (Worrall, 1999, p. 47). To improve police policies, practices and accountability measures, officers should understand the value of public opinion and the state of police relations (B. Brown & Benedict, p. 546; O'Connor, 2008, p. 578). Consistent with the above, respondents indicate that police officers conform to policies because they are deeply concerned about how the public views them. These sergeants understand that in order to do their jobs as police officers they must maintain what they perceive as high levels of respect from citizens. This understanding is coupled with the belief that conforming to policies will likely lead to a greater respect for the police and their actions. The interview data demonstrate that 52.9% of the respondents convey that perceived levels of respect from citizens is an external factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 82.4% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that perceived levels of respect from citizens is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Respondents communicate that low perceived levels of respect from citizens might lead to professional and personal embarrassment for a police officer. Sergeant #6 explains:

> Nobody wants to have problems with the community. You don't want the community to say you're a racist or sexist or insensitive towards transgendered…Nobody wants to get labeled anything [or told] you didn't do your job because I'm Black or because she's transgendered or she's a lesbian.

Similarly, sergeant #11 describes the long-lasting effect of losing the public's respect when officers are observed to deviate from policy directives in unacceptable ways:

> Nobody really wants to have their name associated with something negative in the first place. Now everybody knows…People see your face and name and recognize you. Months down the line…you're that officer that did this and this…you've lost that respect now from that person.

Respondents perceive that when respect from citizens is low, the work that police officers do can be underappreciated – which may result in a total abolishment of a positive program in the community. Many of these sergeants link this trend with the actions of the media who misinform citizens regularly, leading to low levels of respect for officers. As sergeant #2 explains:

> So what you have is this group of people [officers] who are being criticized and don't feel that they can respond to the criticism and so they don't. And then the public only hears one side and, uh, that contributes to continued negative perception of the police.

Many of the respondents suggest that to increase the level of respect from citizens, the police organization could increase the number of public communications that explain the actions of officers in critical situations. Sergeant # 14 explains:

> I think public perception is enormous. I think we do a horrible job of explaining ourselves.

<u>Relationship between the Police and Citizens</u>

"I wanted to help people" (Sergeant #4)

A public that distrusts the police may have a negative impact on the police's ability to control crime, contributing to ongoing police-public tension and increased suspicion towards the actions of law enforcement (B. Brown & Benedict, 2002, p. 545). The loss of legitimacy of any aspect of the criminal justice system, including the police, can have many disastrous consequences for the working relationship between officers and communities (M. Moore, 1997,

p. 27). For example, the authority of police officers may be challenged, leading to a citizenry less likely to abide by the law and defer to policing by consent (Tyler, 2003, p. 286). Respondents perceive that by maintaining a positive relationship with communities, which stems from the perception that policies are adhered to, police officers will enjoy a higher level of professional and personal satisfaction. The interview data demonstrate that 52.9% of the respondents perceive that the relationship between police and citizens is an external factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 88.2% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that the relationship between the police and citizens is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Many of the respondents perceive that police officers want to serve citizens in an honourable fashion, maintaining strong relationships and a positive perception of the police. Respondents also suggest that a damaged reputation leads to job dissatisfaction among police officers, which spreads into their personal lives. Sergeant #4 states:

> I think they [officers] want to do a good job for the public. And I think they want to demonstrate to the public that we are a good organization of good people who want to follow procedures.

While it is acknowledged that a positive relationship between the police and citizens relies heavily on whether the public believes that police officers obey the rules, respondents reveal that the media has damaged the reputation of the police. This, in turn, has caused police officers to feel ashamed and embarrassed when at work, when at home with their families, or in the company of friends. As sergeant #2 explains:

> Doesn't matter how articulate you are in legally and analytically explaining something…if the public opinion is swayed against you, that is what becomes the truth. It's the power of perception…perception is reality. Obviously, it's not true...The power

> of the media to impact the public's perception of the police, is uh, unfortunately impacting what people believe to be true about the police.

Sergeant #5 describes how this negative sentiment may positively impact the conformance behaviours of police officers. This sergeant indicates that officers might choose to conform to policy to avoid worsening an already taxed relationship with the public:

> Seeing how people in the community talk about them [officers] in the media, in the news, in the politics, effects how they interact and basically how their day-to-day move goes. If you see someone in the media bashing them, they come to work and they're pissed off...[it] impacts how they police and how they carry on.

When discussing relationships with the community, sergeant #6 elaborates on how the relationship between the police and citizens is a facilitating factor relating to achieving conformance. In particular, this sergeant discusses how this factor may prevent officers from cutting corners when choosing to conform to policy. This sergeant explains that police officers are constantly afraid of being portrayed in a negative light or being personally labeled as an undesirable character; for instance, racist, sexist, or insensitive. This sergeant breaks it down as follows:

> I think it kind of forces people [officers] to, if you're going to cut corners, these are not the corners to cut, cause this is where it's going to get you, this is where you're going to get in trouble…the community is watching.

<u>Number of Public Complaints</u>

"*People are just complaining about everything"* (Sergeant #16)

Police misconduct is a popular topic in the media and inside police organizations. In the public eye, this form of professional wrongdoing is understood as the administrative outcome of: (1) violating regulations and standards of professional conduct; (2) the abuse of discretionary powers and authority; (3) actions whether criminal or otherwise that may undermine the justice system; (4) and the commission of a specific criminal offence (Griffiths, 2008, p. 155).

However, inside a police organization, police misconduct represents an aspect of a police culture that has led to the trenchant "cop codes" and "maxims" that serve to influence the decisions of officers and how and why they choose to conform to policy (Reuss-Ianni, 1983, pp. 13-16).

Public complaints serve to bring police misconduct to light and often commence the process of investigating police officers for various allegations of misconduct. Therefore, it is unsurprising that respondents suggest that officers are more inclined to follow the rules to avoid a public complaint. The interview data show that 47.1% of the respondents perceive that the number of public complaints is an external factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 58.8% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that the number of public complaints is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Respondents perceive that officers are more likely to conform to policy to avoid receiving a public complaint. This is primarily due to a complaint's negative consequences; which include internal discipline, negative career implications, and public shaming. For instance, sergeant #5 explains how the potential for public complaints influences officers to interact with the public professionally:

> Seeing officers getting in trouble for things, um, discipline things, arrests, etc, that frightens them. That definitely has an impact on how they interact with people…because you know they always think: You know are we on camera? Are people watching? Are we going to be in the media?

Similarly, sergeant #14 conveys to me how officers consider the repercussions of public complaints before choosing their actions:

> I think officers are very much aware maybe more so than ever that their actions could have that butterfly effect into their lives. They could lose their home, they could lose their families, they could lose their car, their savings, everything. So I think never before have officers been aware of how their individual actions could have great consequences personally. I think officers have seen how this is gonna affect me and my family. I have

> a family, and um, I think that if I made a gross error and I put myself in that situation where I could go either to prison or I could lose my job, how would I pay my mortgage exactly? How would I put shoes on my kid's feet? I think those types of equations [are] in their minds.

Respondents perceive that officers are very concerned about the length of time public complaints take to be investigated and how these delays impact their career. As sergeant #17 conveys:

> You can sit at home in your underwear and get online and type in a complaint that is so incredibly frivolous and wrong. Now we're [officers] part of this investigation that may not be concluded for months. We have to do this detailed, long response. Some people don't get promoted until this [complaint] has gone through. Recently I had an SIU investigation where…and a year and a half later they finally cleared me.

Sergeant #7 also expressed how public complaints might hinder an officer's chance of promotion – an important consideration for many officers who wish to move up the corporate ladder. This sergeant explains:

> Complaints, cameras, like everyone has cell phone cameras, CCTV cameras, um, and I guess there's always a backlash. Everyone knows their rights now and there's more access to what our policies and procedures are, so people are more educated…and say, "oh this happened and this is illegal." So they're [officers] worried about that, they're worried about being sued….they don't want any negative files, any documentation…it hinders your chance of promotion.

Respondents also perceive that the public is eager to complain about the actions of police officers. This perception is primarily based on the view that there is an abundance of citizens who choose to record interactions between the police and the public for the sole purpose of shaming officers. Sergeant #10 clearly illustrates the perceived risk faced by frontline officers each day when they interact with the public:

> You have to be totally and completely cognizant of the fact that no matter what you say or do, no matter how bad of a day you're having, no matter how tired you are, no matter how shitty that call was you were at before, you don't just represent yourself you represent all of us [officers]. Social media, Twitter, God I'm sorry I don't know all the ones, Snapchat, it could be out there within seconds of you turning away. It's a push of a button. I says you come off treating this guy in a less than respectful manner or in language that is not appropriate and not professional…there's no retracting

Sergeant #16 summarizes why it is that policies are likely to be followed more closely by officers due to the impact of the number of public complaints the police organization receives. This sergeant explains that citizens are obsessed with making public complaints against the police:

> People are just complaining about everything right, if, like it shouldn't be the public or people complaining making us following the procedures. But chances are if you are following the procedures the way you're supposed to be, they're [the public] not gonna have a leg to stand on. So that's more reason to stick to it [following the procedures].

Supervision

"Make sure they're following all their procedures" (Sergeant #4)

The literature demonstrates that sergeants represent a potent bureaucratic force when attempting to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions (Britz & Payne, 1994; Charles et al., 1992; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; G.L. Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Phillips, 2015; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Sergeants are credited with administering policy to the frontlines and operationalizing new policies in ways that officers understand (Skogan, 2008, pp. 25-26). Many respondents perceive that supervision in a police organization creates the necessary checks and balances; meaning, a system of accountability that ensures that policy is followed by frontline officers. The interview data show that 94.1% of the respondents perceive that supervision is an internal factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 88.2 % of the respondents strongly agree or agree that internal discipline is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

It is perceived by respondents that their presence on the street and at calls for service causes officers to choose to conform to policy to avoid discipline or other negative consequences. In support of the above, sergeant #3 describes the main role of a sergeant:

> Our [a sergeant's] primary function is really to ensure that police constables, they're doing their job, they're doing it in accordance with our rules and regulations and our policies. Also with our core values, to ensure they're addressing the public in a professional manner, um, that is the bulk function of a sergeant.

Another narrative brought forward by respondents is that their position requires them to act as the "enforcer" on the street. For instance, respondents suggest that it is their job to ensure that the rules are not broken. In cases when rules are broken, sergeants from my sample advise that they are the ones to identify which officer(s) commit the misconduct and are then required to initiate the discipline investigation to hold the officer(s) accountable. According to respondents, they are considered by officers to be "punishers" in cases when a policy is not followed. Many respondents conveyed that to avoid having to punish their officers, they spend much of their time ensuring officers follow the rules. It was clear from respondents that they do not take pleasure in disciplining officers. Sergeant #4 explains:

> I lay out the potential consequences of them [officers] not following procedures, um, so that's very clear. So nobody can come back and say I got in trouble because I didn't know.

One interesting perspective conveyed by sergeant #10 is that when working, this sergeant often feels like a parent watching over his children. From this sergeant's perspective, sergeants experience emotions that parents might feel, for instance, this sergeant often feels worried, proud, concerned, and responsible. The sergeant explains:

> I'm the first in the Chain of Command. Obviously whatever transpires during the course of a shift whether it be work related or personal issues, anything like that. [I am] the first guy to go…I assess my officers, their state of mind, their physical condition. [It's like] being a parent…watching your children, listening to your children, correcting behaviour before it becomes a problem, ensuring that you instill values, morals, code of conduct. It's not a term or disrespect, it's a term of ownership and responsibility.

<u>Internal Discipline</u>

"The fear of consequences" (Sergeant #9)

The discipline process that exists in a police organization can lead to the investigation and punishment of frontline officers in unpredictable ways (Paoline, 2003, p. 201). These consequences have the effect of complicating the relationship between sergeants and their subordinates. Officers experience feelings of uncertainty and suspicion toward their sergeants and fear the repercussions that may result from the internal discipline process, which is often commenced by a sergeant (R. R. Johnson, 2015, p. 1161; Paoline, p. 201). Consequently, officers feel constrained in their actions – under the watchful eye of their sergeants (Paoline, p. 201). Respondents perceive that officers are more likely to conform to policy out of fear of or to avoid being disciplined. The interview data show that 88.2% of the respondents perceive that internal discipline is an internal factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates 88.2 % of the respondents strongly agree or agree that internal discipline is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community. Sergeant #4 explains the perception that discipline makes officers follow the rules:

> The bottom line is that officers most often, uh, for lack of a better term don't want to get in crap or don't want to get in trouble. So it's much easier to follow procedures than to go through the challenging process of not following procedures and, um, facing a disciplinary action.

The negative aspects of discipline can be better understood when one appreciates the potential ramifications that exist for officers. These potential ramifications include: loss of respect among peers, loss of pay, suspension from work, loss of job, provincial or criminal charges, lengthy conduct investigations by internal investigators (Professional Standards) or civilian oversight bodies (SIU and OIPRD), personal stress, financial problems, family and marital problems, public shaming, undesirable assignments, denial of time off, denial of specialized courses, and negative job prospects. These sergeants suggest that all of these ramifications negatively impact

either the work life or personal life of officers. Therefore, it is in the best interest of officers to adhere to the rules of the police service to stay out of trouble. Sergeant #3 explains:

> Fear [of internal discipline] is never a good thing in policing and because it's a policy, because it's a procedure, officers know that when you breach policies and procedures there's a document component, there's a discipline component to that which, uh, no officer, officers have families, they have homes, they have mortgages, none of them want to be disciplined, and potentially risk civil lawsuit, discipline process, loss of rank, loss of pay.

Similarly, sergeant #5 highlights how the potential for internal discipline influences officers to "make the right decision":

> You don't want to break the rules, you don't want to be disciplined or punished for it but that is definitely a factor I think in every, when every officer is making a decision they want to make sure they're making the right decision because they don't want to get in trouble. They all have career goals and aspirations and they're good people.

Sergeant #11 conveys a unique perspective regarding the effects of internal discipline. This sergeant suggests that an officer who has a large number of disciplinary actions recorded in their personnel file may have trouble seeking out a position in a high-risk unit. The reason being is that in high-risk units, officers are supervised even less than when they work in uniform patrol, allowing for the potential to break even more rules. Accordingly, this sergeant suggests:

> Discipline could kind of derail your entire career. So if you get something negative on your, on your, we call them files, so like on your personal work folder that could deter other units outside of your local division that you work at from hiring you. So if you want to go to the Drug Squad and you have a number of disciplinary actions on your file, then Drug Squad calls down to look at your file and sees all these disciplinary actions. Drug Squad is a unit where you're gonna get a little more freedom. You're gonna get a little more trust to go and do the right thing. And it shows on your file that you haven't been able to do the right thing when you had a lot of oversight. Then you might not be the right person

<u>Policy and Procedure</u>

"They know that's their job" (Sergeant #4)

Policy and procedure in police organizations contain directives which are designed to achieve predictable outcomes and "nonthinking compliance" from frontline officers (Goldstein, 1990, p. 27; D. Sklansky, 2007, p. 31). This is consistent with the literature that suggests that policies are meant to make behaviours customary and acceptable within an organization (Boba & Crank, 2008, p. 384). Respondents suggest that adhering to policy and procedure is a common job expectation – no different than anywhere else. The interview data show that 82.4% of the respondents perceive that policy and procedure is an internal factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization.

Sergeant #12 explains how the presence of policy and procedure helps to shape officer behaviour:

> Our unit specific policies, our policies and procedures, the fact that we're a semi-military organization, I think all that comes into play in why we do what we do and why officers follow the procedures. I think in any business whether it be the police culture or not, you sign up to be a lawyer you know there's certain expectations that you're required to do as part of your employment. Whether it be your driving a bus or working in a scout car [police car].

However, other respondents perceive that officers follow policy and procedures because they fear being disciplined. Therefore, it may be inferred from these comments that if there were no serious repercussions for breaking the rules, it would be unlikely that officers would regularly conform to any given policy. Sergeant #14 explains this supposition:

> I think that uh when an officer just follows the procedure, does what they're supposed to do, they're almost inoculating themselves against that [discipline]. They're almost…ensuring their survival by following compliance.

Similarly, sergeant #4 reflects on how much easier it is for an officer if they choose to abide by the rules. This sergeant suggests that conforming to policy leads to a much more amicable professional experience than the alternative: the negative repercussions of discipline, as discussed above:

> It's much easier to follow procedures than to go through the challenging process of not following procedures and um facing a disciplinary action. The procedures are for the most part very clear, for the most part they're very understandable and, um, applicable and makes sense for the job that we do.

Sergeant #10 provides an example of how policy and procedure influence his officers to obey the rules. In this sergeant's example, the sergeant recounts the operational value that policy and procedure had for officers when they experienced a summer ridden with gun violence and homicide. In the same example, this sergeant also demonstrates the role that sergeants play in communicating policy and procedures to their officers:

> [It was] summer of the gun. I was the only sergeant on the platoon okay. So my big thing, and I'm gonna use that one as an example, was ensuring that the guys and girls know what the procedures state. We had a tremendous amount of shootings. We had a tremendous amount of homicides over those summer months. And there were nights when I was handling two or three, sad to say, "take a number, when I'm done with this I will get to the other one." But with the guys and gals…they did an exceptional job. I drilled into them what the procedure states, what the investigation aspect was, and then in the absence of me, what I needed them to do.

Top-Down Command

"Do what's required" (Sergeant #17)

The literature suggests that police organizations are traditionally top-down in managerial style - issuing directives and orders in a downward direction through a chain of command (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 45; G. D. Russell, 1997, p. 569). As one might expect, sergeants, through the use of formal rank and military attributes, administer directives to frontline officers (Toch, 2008, p. 62; Witte et al., 1990, p. 2). The acquisition of control over frontline officer discretion is characteristic of the objectives of a top-down administration (D Sklansky, 2007, p. 31). Respondents perceive that police officers are more likely to conform to policy to as a result of the inherent command structure of their police organization, which operates in a top-down hierarchical direction. The interview data demonstrates that 82.4% of the respondents perceive

that top-down command is an internal factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates 82.4% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that the decisions of internal management is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Sergeant #3 speaks to this innate quality of police organizations, emphasizing how early it is in an officer's career that they are taught to respect the rank and the directions given by superiors:

> From day one of hire to training, there is a structure. This is the paramilitaristic end of it, there is a structure, you're, for lack of a better word, a foot soldier, you answer to a sergeant, who answers to a staff sergeant, who answers to a Chain of Command. And when an order is decreed you follow the order…It just comes from an instilled sense of duty that we literally engrain into our officers from the moment they're hired to the moment, uh, they hit the road…uh, sense of rank and sense of order.

Respondents discuss how paramilitary and command and control orientations are innate to police organizations and are embedded in the socialization processes of officers. This perception is consistent with the cultural policing literature that explores the legalistic nature of a police organization (Wilson, 1968, p. 183). From this perspective, administrators are able to leverage the power of rules to establish order and constrain the behaviour of officers (Kappeler et al., 1994, pp. 252-253). For instance, sergeant #1 discusses the cultural pervasiveness of top-down command:

> Officers are provided directions from their supervisors. That's a direction…Either it's coming from that supervisor's supervisor, or Command…this rule has been put in place and it needs to be followed [deep pause] period [emphasis added].

Sergeant #4 describes how top-down command is taken-for-granted among officers, including command officers, from the top of the organization right down to the frontlines. While this sergeant may have difficulty describing why the process of top-down command is so effective, it

is clear that top-down command is perceived to be a prevailing characteristic of the police organization – a part of the cultural awareness that is adopted and operationalized by all officers:

> The Chief has the deputies and the deputies have the staff superintendents, and um, so each one is responsible for the layers so the trickle down is, is that the procedures that are laid out, uh, if I don't follow them I get in trouble…That's how the rank structure works in that everybody is just sort of accountable to the person that they're accountable to, for lack of, I don't really know how to describe it. That's the way it works and everybody is sort of aware that's how it works.

Sergeant #2 brings up a unique point to illustrate how effective top-down command is when attempting to get officers to follow orders. This sergeant discusses "actors" – sergeants who are filling in for staff sergeants on a temporary basis and who have not been formally confirmed in the rank - and conveys that those actors are not perceived to have the same authority or influence by their subordinates. Without the same authority as a regular staff sergeant, this sergeant perceives that acting staff sergeants find it much more difficult to get officers to obey orders or complete assigned tasks. This sergeant provides strong support for the effectiveness of top-down command in making officers conform to regulations. The sergeant explains:

> My shift has an acting staff sergeant. He's not an actual staff sergeant…if you don't have the rank that you need…you're less likely to have it [follow orders] happen. An acting staff sergeant asking an actual sergeant [to do something]…might be faced with some resistance.

In contrast to the above, sergeant #8 conveys skepticism toward the effectiveness of top-down command. This sergeant suggests that nowadays, many officers have lost faith and confidence in the abilities of their commanders and are instead more likely to adhere to the advice of their labour group; the Association:

> Right now we're at the point where, it's um, I don't think there's a lot of trust in upper management. So I think officers are more inclined to listen to stuff that the Association is telling them to do.

Parade

"It derives from the military…having officers stand before you" (Sergeant #3)

Parade is defined by respondents as the initial briefing that police officers receive from their sergeants at the beginning of their shift. During this briefing, sergeants confirm that police officers are properly equipped and fit for duty and deliver the instructions necessary for officers to carry out their duties. Respondents indicate that officers are more likely to conform to policies as a result of attending parade. The interview data show that 70.6% of the respondents perceive that parade is an internal factor that facilitates conformance in a police organization.

Respondents convey that parade provides officers with information and training about new and existing policy and procedure, changes to policy, news of other miscellaneous directives, and a broad spectrum of knowledge needed to carry out duties. Sergeant # 4 explains that parade provides an opportunity for police officers to ask questions and gain a better understanding of organizational policy; for instance, the reasons for the policy, what the policy means, and ways to implement it at the street level:

> We have procedures and if there's procedural changes, we talk to the officers in regards to the procedural changes at that time. Um, you know, if there are issues with procedures that have occurred. If there's instances where officers from other divisions have had issues in following procedures. We review all of that at that time, um, so that officers are at least aware of what the procedures are and what's required of them.

Sergeant #5 suggests that sergeants prepare themselves first before parade so that when sergeants do parade officers, the information officers receive is current. This sergeant sees parade as an opportunity to "relay" information – this includes new and existing policy:

> Anytime there's a change in a procedure when I come in for shift, I always, um, go on the TPS internet and read up on procedures, read up on the routine orders, so I'm up to date with what's going on. I will also read the sergeant's board, where you know, important information is posted. I will make myself aware of it, you know educate myself on it. Then I will go up on parade and as a group discuss it so they're [officers] all aware if anyone has any issues or concerns and just chat about it there. I find that's the best time to relay any information.

Many of the respondents explained that parade is not just about conveying information related to policy. Parade also provides an opportunity for officers to "debrief" an incident or issue with their sergeants and each other. Debriefing sessions provide opportunities for sergeants to correct things that may have gone wrong and reinforce things that went right. As sergeant #4 explains:

> We have parade with officers, which means we, uh, sit down and discuss the assignments for the day, um, if there has been incidents that occurred when we were not in the building or on duty that might affect the day's activities. Stuff like that. During that time we take opportunities to debrief what has been done on previous calls, um, good or bad. We will often debrief the good things so that everybody in the room could benefit from what was done well. Less often we will debrief things that have gone poorly. Um, but we also utilize, at that time, uh, we have procedures and if there's procedural changes, we talk to the officers in regards to the procedural changes at that time.

<u>The Toronto Police Association</u>

"The Association is saying no" (Sergeant #17)

The Toronto Police Association (Association) is a labour group that represents the uniform and civilian members of the TPS excluding Senior Officers. The role of the Association is "promoting and advancing the health, safety and economic well-being of the membership" (Toronto Police Association, 2018, par. 1). Depending on the goal of the Association (for instance, the wellbeing of the officer, collective bargaining, or lobbying for or against a particular legislation), instruction or guidance is often provided to police officers through formal and informal mechanisms. Respondents suggest that the Association promotes whether or not officers should conform to a particular policy or procedure. For instance, at the time of the participant interviews, the TPS was in the process of undergoing a corporate and transformational exercise (see Toronto Police Service, 2016a) that had caused the Association to spearhead a job action.

The interview data show that 41.2% of the respondents perceive that the Association is an external factor that hinders conformance in a police organization. Respondents convey how the

Association influences officers to break the rules or avoid engaging in certain policies. For instance, sergeant #14 describes how the most recent job action represents an Association-sanctioned opportunity for all officers across the police service to break the rules – in this case, rules governing uniforms:

> The Association, when I'm speaking of the Association I mean the Toronto Police Association, um, we recently had a campaign where officers wore baseball caps … that [the Association] could give some credence to a disobeying of certain governance.

Sergeant #12 provides another example of how the Association convinces officers to fail to conform to policy. This sergeant refers to times when Association representatives show up on parade and give direction:

> You have Association stewards on parade addressing the situation. That's what causes the officers to disobey the rules and procedures.

Alternatively, respondents also describe how the Association can influence officers to follow the rules without any flexibility. The respondents suggest that strict adherence to rules has negative implications for police management; often slowing down calls for service resulting in long lists of backed-up calls and a dissatisfied public. Sergeant #11 explains:

> I mean it's hard to say when they want us to do these job actions. Obviously, we're, we're either bending the rules for the job action or they want us to conform strictly to the guidelines.

However, some respondents are not convinced that the Association has that much influence when officers decide whether or not to conform to policy. Sergeant #3 explains that the Association may have some influence on officer decision-making, but not as much as officers would like to think:

> I would say the Association or union has an influence, but not in breaking the rules. The Association tows a very, very fine line with what we do and what we don't do.

Sergeant #3 also questions whether or not the Association actually makes officers break the rules. Rather, this sergeant suggests that the Association is more effective in convincing officers to avoid engaging in certain policies. This sergeant provides an example:

> To breach a procedure – no. To avoid it – yes. Uh the Association for example with the 'street checks', there was never a push to do it wrong, but to avoid getting into the situation and circumstance.

Staffing Shortage

"Trying to make a bad system work" (Sergeant #16)

There has been a recent reduction in officer strength in the TPS due to the recommendations from an organizational action plan, entitled, *The Way Forward*, which plans to reduce the number of police officers significantly by 2019 (Gillis, 2017, "Approved by the police board"). The reasons for the reduction are detailed in this plan and include the adoption of a modernized policing model for the City of Toronto that is more sustainable, innovative, and affordable. However, the Association claims that this plan to modernize is nothing more than cost-cutting measures (Carnegie, 2017, "Stop the Toronto Police Cuts"). Many of the respondents explain that the current shortage of frontline officers causes their officers to cut corners to get tasks completed faster. The interview data show that 70.6% of the respondents perceive that staffing shortage is an internal factor that hinders conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 41.2% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that available internal resources is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Cutting corners equates to officers not adhering to policies because not all the directives are being completed. Sergeant #9 recounts a recent experience, and in doing so, explains how

"cutting corners" due to staffing shortages may have negative implications for an officer's wellbeing and conformance behaviours:

> I was talking to one of the other sergeants the other day when we did the 12 hour shift and he was the only sergeant and he said to me, he goes, "I don't like cutting corners, but", he goes, "we had a subway jumper, a fatality", and he goes, "we had an assist in 22 [division], there was a couple domestics", and it's just like, and I think that's the biggest thing, everyone would like to spend x number of hours on a call or do this or do that but realistically … the thing is that we're expecting the officers to do, still like, to do I guess more with less and that's what it comes down to and I think that's the biggest issue is, is that the officers are burning themselves out and it's, you know… there's no downtime for the cop…But, the guys are also having to cut corners to get the job done and ultimately they cut the corners but someone might end up paying the price right.

Sergeant #4 discusses how staffing shortages can lead to officers ignoring the rules to get a job done under time constraints. This sergeant explains that officers are well-intentioned; however, the outcome still manifests as a deviation from policies:

> It could be, um, officers can uh, if they're going to ignore procedures or rules, um, the major factor I find is time. So it's not that they're trying to defy them because they want to defy them, it's because they wanna be more efficient in the job that they do, and that they could go onto the next thing.

Notwithstanding, sergeant #2 describes how the current staffing shortage may not just be expressed as "cutting corner" behaviour among officers. This sergeant suggests that officers, once stressed and impassioned due to the shortage, may intentionally choose to commit misconduct, including breaking the rules out of sheer frustration:

> If an officer is so upset by the pressure and the distrust and the lack of staffing….officers could be so stressed and annoyed and irritated by those external forces that they could develop the attitude of who cares about the public, "I am just gonna take what's mine and be selfish", and uh, "I'm gonna break the rules" and um, "I'm just gonna make sure I get paid." And then their philosophy and their reason behind policing become jaded and poisoned.

<u>Morale</u>

I'm gonna break the rules" (Sergeant #2)

According to respondents, the recent modernization plan of the TPS has led to low morale among officers. Respondents indicate that low morale negatively impacts their capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a number of ways. It is explained that low morale may cause officers to resent their employer and purposely contravene policy, fail to adhere to all the steps of a policy, or make poor decisions. The interview data show that 64.7% of the respondents perceive that morale is an internal factor that hinders conformance in a police organization.

It is perceived by respondents that low morale is caused by the decisions of internal management, staffing shortages, and in situations where officers feel that career advancement is unlikely. Sergeant #5 discusses how low morale makes officers less inclined to do their job properly because they feel underappreciated:

> I know sometimes just the overall frustration of the negative activity from all the outside factors, um, might make them [officers] less willing to do the job that they're supposed to be doing, because you know what, I mean it affects their morale, because they know they're here doing a good job and they're busting their asses out there, and they're always being shown in a negative light. So I guess sometimes that could affect them doing the job that they're supposed to be doing.

Sergeant #6 discusses how low morale may influence officers to do the minimum amount of work they are required to do. This sergeant believes that low morale has caused officers to have lower career ambitions. This sergeant perceives that with less ambition comes a reduced need to conform to rules and be the best officer one can be:

> In this environment that we're in with policing now, we're coming down to the fact that people are only doing the bare minimum right. And because people are only doing the bare minimum, you have a problem as a supervisor. And what I mean by that is there used to be a time where it was people would climb over each other for …all these spots right and those spots are what kept the ball rolling at a fast pace, kept people motivated, kept people sharp, kept people compliant…When these officers no longer seek anything else ambitious…they end up disgruntled and not motivated. You don't have much of anything to control them.

Sergeant #8 connects 'reaching a point in your career when you are going nowhere' and 'failing to conform to the rules'. This sergeant suggests that once you have attained your maximum potential, meaning, the unlikelihood of advancing to a better position or receiving a promotion, there is no motivation to stay out of trouble or adhere to directives:

> Senior officers, some sergeants, uh, when they've reached a point that they're, uh, not going anywhere else in their career, when in their minds their thought is I can't get anywhere else cause I tried going to these units and they won't take me, I am now a certain age and I got a certain amount of time before retirement, um I'm probably going to be staying in the primary response capacity for the rest of my career, um, they, they lose their motivation to do stuff, so that and they don't care if they get disciplined or not because they're not looking to go to a spot anywhere, um, so, if they get disciplined then...they don't care.

Decisions of Internal Management

"It's upper management issues " (Sergeant #8)

The literature suggests that officers often resent the decisions of police administrators, especially when those officers are not consulted in advance (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, p. 316). Respondents convey this sentiment. They perceive that incompetent, disinterested, and unethical decisions from managers have the effect of demotivating officers to conform to policy. The interview data show that 52.9% of the respondents perceive that decisions of internal management is an internal factor that hinders conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 82.4% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that the decisions of internal management is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Respondents explain that managers who are viewed as unsupportive, disrespectful, and uncaring, influence officers to stop concerning themselves with performing well. When this occurs, officers may become unmotivated to follow policy. Sergeant #5 explains:

> When we have Unit Commanders that are good, P.C.s are like I'm going to go up for an evaluation with him. I have to make sure that you know my numbers are good and everything is good, I got a clean record. When we have Unit Commanders that are, let's just say people that the officers do not like or respect, or that don't treat them well, their attitude changes completely. Morale goes down, um, they don't give a shit, "screw him he's an asshole anyways, why would I want to impress him, screw him, he's just not gonna give me what I want. He's gonna screw me over". And they, a lot changes and we've seen that, you know what I mean, I've seen that happen in here a few times.

Further, if management is not viewed as behaving ethically or competently, officers will deviate from the rules. Sergeant #13 explains this view and the impact of what this sergeant perceives to be poor role modeling by management:

> This is…the total disconnection between the rank and file and Senior Command…. I have two ex-Chiefs and one Deputy involved in what is still a very controversial subject, which is marijuana and its legalization. Not only are you championing for legalization but you stand to make a lot of money in it and to me that's, uh, that message you're sending, it's having an effect on a lot of the police officers and even the junior ones are looking and going first we're in the business of law enforcement with respect to marijuana and now we're going to deal it. It's one thing as a police officer to accept change, it's one thing to understand that society is changing and this may or may not be society's wish, it's not for me to matter, I don't set policy…but when my ex-Chief, a guy whose signed hundreds of hours in overtime for me to go and smash in doors, is now doing it, it tarnishes that whole perception…It starts at the top, if the Chief and his Command Officers and everybody below him do not set an example to be respected and admired, then people aren't going to follow.

Similarly, sergeant #16 suggests that if officers perceive their police administrators to be unfair or disreputable, it is much more difficult for sergeants to achieve conformance:

> If they [officers] feel that you know the Command isn't really ethical or if they lack integrity, of course it's gonna affect how they do their job or what they think of their job right…Yea definitely, guys see it, if they don't have faith in the Command, it's definitely more difficult to do your job.

Summary

The interview data and survey questionnaire data show empirical support for a number of perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. These factors can be considered either external factors or internal

factors. The external factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) Media portrayals of the police; (2) civilian oversight; (3) perceived levels of respect from citizens; (4) relationship between the police and citizens; and (5) number of public complaints. The internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) supervision; (2) internal discipline; (3) policy and procedure; (4) top-down command; and (5) parade. The external factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) the Association and (2) media portrayals of the police. The internal factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) staffing shortage; (2) morale; and (3) decisions of internal management. The findings show that one factor (media portrayals of the police) has the ability to facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. This section has further demonstrated that these factors are contextual and vary across a police organization. The contextual nature of these factors is supported by the variation in the frequency of the respondents who perceived these factors during their interviews or documented them in their survey questionnaires. The above factors, both external and internal, that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization are illustrated in the following mind map labeled Illustration 1.

Illustration 1. Mind Map of the Factors that Facilitate or Hinder a Sergeant's Capacity to Achieve Conformance in a Police Organization



In Section 6.4, below, I present the findings related to the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy).

5.4 The Factors that Facilitate or Hinder a Sergeant's Capacity to Achieve Conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy

In this section, the findings related to the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy), are presented. The interview and survey questionnaire data show empirical support for a number of factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. These factors can also be considered either external factors or internal factors. As will

be discussed below, the external factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) civilian oversight and (2) media portrayals of the police. The internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) policy and procedure; (2) internal discipline; and (3) training. The external factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) Media portrayals of the police and (2) number of public complaints. The internal factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) internal discipline; (2) confusing policy; (3) staffing shortage; and (4) tedious reporting process. The findings show that two factors (media portrayals of the police and internal discipline) have the ability to facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Policy.

Civilian Oversight

"*You might be on the next video"* (Sergeant #2)

The factor, civilian oversight, was discussed in the preceding section. Consistent with that discussion, respondents perceive that officers are more likely to conform to the policy to avoid public complaints that are either investigated by the SIU or OIPRD. The interview data show that 23.5% of the respondents perceive that civilian oversight is an external factor that facilitates their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy.

Sergeants from my sample perceive that officers will conform to the directives laid out in the policy to avoid the outcome of public complaints (also discussed in the preceding section); namely, internal discipline and negative career prospects. For instance, sergeant #7 explains that officers will interact with members of the public in lawful ways to avoid any punitive outcomes stemming from civilian oversight investigations:

> I think uh, 'street checks' and 'carding', well OIPRD for sure, cause that's who they go complain to if somebody felt they weren't dealt with properly…Again I don't think the

> officers want a file open on them. And just uh, again it hinders any promotion or anything that you have going on and that's why they don't want to do 'street checks', because it just opens them up to more investigation, whether it's a legit stop or not legit stop.

However, in some cases, sergeants from my sample suggest that civilian oversight has the ability to deter officers from engaging in the policy altogether. These sergeants subscribe to the logic that if officers avoid interacting with members of the public, they are also likely to avoid public complaints and the negative outcomes that stem from such complaints. For instance, sergeant #2 suggests that officers will counsel themselves out of engaging in the policy for their own self-interest.

> Officers might see somebody who is a visible minority doing something strange or suspicious. Their initial reaction might be to stop and investigate that person. Then they might start slow thinking, reminding themselves of the regulated interaction, all the negative media that we had, the potential complaints that may come if they do stop that person, um, the potential attitude they would get from that person if they stop them and how that's gonna be a challenge to overcome.

Media Portrayals of the Police

"*The media does discipline"* (Sergeant #2)

The factor, media portrayals of the police was discussed in the preceding section. Media portrayals of the police is a unique external factor because it is perceived by respondents to have the ability to facilitate (23.5%) or hinder (35.3%) their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. Congruent with that discussion, the respondents perceive that the media's tendency to report on the negative actions of police officers and the media's affinity to expose their mistakes, influences officers to conform to the policy. Sergeant #8 discusses how officers are concerned that their interactions with members of the public may be publicized by the media, especially if their interactions are perceived as being improper, which may result in discipline. This sergeant

suggests that officers are more likely to adhere to the directives of the policy to avoid such outcomes:

> The media has an influence cause they [officers] want to do it properly because they don't want to be on the news, um, I think officers are fairly confident that if they did something properly, and they get a complaint on it they're not too worried about it because they followed everything from how they're told to do it.

Sergeant #11 suggests that the media represents a source of information for officers; namely, it informs officers of what happens to other officers when the media captures them breaking the rules in relation to the policy. This sergeant explains how an educated officer chooses to conform to the policy because the alternative is unwanted media exposure:

> Well, I think to follow it [the policy], I think they've [officers] gotten the training so they know the rules, they know the consequences if they break the rules, and outside they know what's been in the media and people read the media so they know what people are saying. So I think all those things combined is why officers will follow the rules because they know if they don't they're gonna be in trouble for sure and I think yea basically that's it.

Alternatively, "trial by media" is another concern of the respondents. Many sergeants discuss how officers fear that when they do appear in the media, their behaviour is automatically condemned prior to any proper investigation. Sergeant #2 suggests that to avoid 'appearing guilty' on camera, officers choose to adhere to the policy. This way the media loses their opportunity to publically condemn their actions:

> You have what we call trial by media which is, can be quite unfair oftentimes where people are made to be uh, made to appear guilty without a trial, without evidence, just people's opinions based on how things look on their face. Um, and we see this a lot now in today's day and age of social media with videos and cell phone videos, these videos are easily edited you could just give one little clip that maybe shows things in a certain light from a certain angle with a certain piece of audio but it doesn't show the full picture.

The findings also show that media portrayals of the police is an external factor that hinders a sergeant's ability to achieve conformance to the policy. Respondents suggest that the fear of being criticized in the media for being racist is the dominant explanation for why it is that

officers choose not to engage in regulated interactions with members of the public. For instance, sergeant #5 describes how officers have no desire to be categorized as biased, as an officer who stereotypes, or racist. This sergeant explains that these are the main reasons officers are not engaging with the public:

> The fear of um being criticized. Let's say they [officers] stop someone who is not a white person, you know what I mean…Like I've heard other officer's complaints you know, sort of about the back chatter and stuff, "oh we can't talk to this guy, oh its gonna be in the media", "oh this white officer was talking to this Native guy or this Black guy" whatever, there is that little bit of fear that they're going to be seen as being racist or biased you know what I mean - stereotyping.

Sergeant #16 conveys that officers will choose not to engage in the policy for fear of making a mistake. This sergeant explains that failure to conform to the policy could lead to officers being accused of violating the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the resulting consequences – a risk that most officers are not willing to take when they do not have to:

> Because you don't want to get caught pulling over that person or stopping that person for no reason if you're not actively involved in some kind of investigation because they just twist everything right, and you just, officers just don't want to get caught there or end up on the news as something that's violating people's rights, and this, you know, this procedure.

Sergeant #12 discusses how the media has influenced great officers (officers who at one time made lots of arrests) to stop interacting with the public out of fear of being complained about. This sergeant describes how this factor has caused officers to become passive, meaning their proactive enforcement and investigative activities have declined:

> Being labeled in the media, being labeled by supervisors as the guy who's always in trouble, having an OIPRD complaint put against them. Um, I've seen some very fantastic officers in the past that have done 'street checks' and made some fabulous arrests that in my, again just in my opinion, are holding back now and not being as aggressive. Maybe aggressive isn't the word, but maybe not as a digger so to speak. Someone who could go out and look for that bad guy at two or three in the morning.

Policy and Procedure

"You know the procedure has been defined" (Sergeant #4)

The factor, policy and procedure, was discussed in the preceding section. Consistent with that discussion, respondents suggest that adhering to policy and procedure improves the likelihood that officers will conform to the policy. The interview data show that 35.3% of the respondents perceive that policy and procedure is an internal factor that facilitates their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. The respondents advise that their police service has made a significant effort to ensure that officers are aware of the directives contained in the policy.

Sergeant # 9 is certain that officers know all the rules in relation to engaging in regulated interactions. This sergeant suggests that officers have resources should they be unsure of their obligations surrounding the policy. Therefore, there is an expectation that officers follow policy should they interact with a member of a public. However, this sergeant is not confident that officers will engage in the policy despite heightened policy awareness:

> Um, yea, I mean I think basically it's been laid down [the policy] to them enough that they know they have to follow it. The question is are they actually going to? If they're going to do it, they know they're going to have to follow the rules and they know what the rules are or if they don't, they could get direction, you know there's certain avenues they could go to.

Sergeant #3 comments on how the policy and procedure that is in place, ensures that officers follow the rules. This sergeant perceives that policy and procedure not only function to govern the actions of officers but also puts in place supervisory mechanisms, which help confirm that officers follow the policy. The sergeant explains:

> I will review in-car camera 'street checks' anytime an officer puts over "I'm stopping to investigate one". There are procedures in place that they activate the camera, activate their microphone and do everything they can to make sure the investigation takes place in front of the uh recording system. I'll make mental note of that stop, I will go back a day or two to review if I couldn't attend myself, I will review the video, see how they did, see how their approach was, see what they got out of it, was it within the legislation, was it outside the legislation, was it an investigation or inquiry?

Sergeant #7 describes how policy and procedure; in particular, the one that regulates the submission of documented interactions (the policy), ensures officers carry out their duties properly. This sergeant describes how the directives contained in the policy provide an opportunity for sergeants to correct the behaviour of officers when necessary:

> They [officers] fill out the cards and they come back and we [sergeants] find out they come back rejected [from] where they get sent up to now. They get rejected and they will find out about it and then we will talk to the officer about it.

Internal Discipline

"They think they're going to get a complaint" (Sergeant #8)

The factor, internal discipline was discussed in the preceding section. Internal discipline is also a unique external factor because it is perceived by respondents to have the ability to facilitate (29.4%) or hinder (76.5%) their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. Consistent with that discussion, respondents suggest that the negative outcomes of a disciplinary action associated with failing to conform to the policy, influence officers to obey its directives. Sergeants from my sample convey that officers are aware of the potential consequences of failing to conform to the policy and therefore, find the discipline process a useful tool to ensure lawful interactions with members of the public. Sergeant #4 articulates this perception:

> Um you know the procedure has been defined, the procedure has been um, enacted and if you don't follow that procedure, especially willfully like, if, um, you, you potentially face disciplinary action for that.

The sergeants from my sample emphasize the apprehension that officers have of being disciplined for any allegations related to racism. Sergeant #1 describes the fear that officers may experience despite receiving the proper training and guidance. This sergeant suggests that this fear – the constant worry of being disciplined and the accompanying stress - is what motivates officers to conform to the policy:

> Well they're thinking, they're thinking that whatever they do if it's especially, especially if it's race related, they're gonna look at it as picking on someone and even though they maybe have, they may be able to articulate themselves fully and explain, and we can explain it through our occurrences, they still think they're gonna be subject to some kind of complaint, disciplinary action, or just a complaint, they don't want to be complained on, they find it stressful. And I could see that, they don't wanna be looked at as a person that's getting themselves in trouble which could affect, maybe they're ready, wanna be promoted, maybe they wanna uh, uh, a spot, a different opportunity within a division or within the Service and they don't want to be a person that's being looked at. Oh look this person is subject to complaints or even, maybe it's a racial type complaint and they think that they're that type of person and maybe they may not be. And 99.9% they're not, but they um, I think it's a fear.

As indicated above, the fear of being accused of being racist and the potential to be disciplined is a prominent concern for officers. Sergeant #2 explains how this fear may in some cases influence officers to stop interacting with racialized members of the public even when it is perceived by those officers that these members are engaged in an illegal activity:

> Officers might see somebody who is a visible minority doing something strange or suspicious. Their initial reaction might be to stop and investigate that person, then they might start slow thinking, reminding themselves of the Regulated Interaction, all the negative media that we had, the potential complaints that may come if they do stop that person, um, the potential attitude they would get from that person if they stop them and how that's gonna be a challenge to overcome…I'm speaking maybe as a typical officer, um, it's a lot to think about why you're trying to make a judgement on a dynamic ever-changing scenario, which is a person in front of you that you're observing. So I think a lot of officers feel that they're afraid to make a mistake and that the mistake would be captured on their own audio and video recording device, and then if a complaint was laid it would be automatic discipline for them, which could impact their future career, which impacts their personal life and their family life. So a simple subject stop, even for the right reasons, uh, leaves officers feeling afraid in this current climate with this new regulation where if they make a mistake it's going to have a really negative impact for that person.

The findings also show that internal discipline is an internal factor that hinders a sergeant's ability to achieve conformance to the policy. Many of the respondents convey that fear of internal discipline, discussed in the preceding section, influences officers to not engage in the policy – essentially withdrawing from proactive investigations that may lead to regulated interactions with members of the public. Sergeant #1 perceives that the 'newer generation of

officers' cannot handle the stress of an internal investigation when compared to the older generation of officers. As such, the newer generation is not willing to take a minimal risk – even when officers are certain of their protocols – when considering what policies to engage in at the street level. This sergeant explains:

> I know they [officers] believe they're gonna get themselves in trouble and these people do not want to face disciplinary action for something they even haven't done wrong. There's a feeling out there even if you do everything correct that you will still have to face some type of consequence and, um, some people can handle it, some people can't and I for one, people I worked for years ago probably could handle it, and different type of people we hired, different type of police officer. I don't know if they could handle that type of stress.

Sergeant #5 communicates a similar perception. This sergeant recounts how officers have made up their minds. The sergeant explains that officers are not willing to risk anything to engage in a policy that is heavily weighted in the favour of the public:

> Like I hear officers say all the time, "we're just gonna get questioned and hassled", "they're gonna come after us", and "we're gonna get in shit if we screw one thing up", you know what I mean, so they don't want to take the risk.

One unique perspective comes from sergeant #9. This sergeant suggests that the current lack of "street checks" and "carding" would have been considered a cowardly act at one time by colleagues. This sentiment is consistent with the classic police culture literature; in particular, core characteristics of police officers that emphasize an inflated sense of masculinity (Reiner, 2010, pp. 118-138). The sergeant explains:

> You're telling the guys [police officers] we want you out there doing your job and even guys like me who have time on and that was how, one of the ways they rated your, your work it was arrests and it was, um, POTs and 172s, 208s, whatever you wanna call them, investigative cards and it's, um, and it's like, I think nowadays the guys are like, you know what, and we talked about this, it was 20 years ago what used to be called cowardness or whatever you wanna call it, um, you know, it's now perfectly acceptable. Whereas years ago it was no, you're going to do this, this, and this and now it's like disengaging and not doing anything is perfectly acceptable and it seems to be more, more the norm, and it's like in all honesty, you have to look at these younger guys with their families and everything and, uh, a lot of the younger guys want to come to work and get

> their paycheck, they don't want court, they don't want overtime, they don't want paid duties and it's like why am I gonna turn around and go out there and do a 'street check' on a person where is the only thing that's going to happen is that they're going to put a complaint on me, grief is gonna be caused by this, why even bother - and drive on.

Training

"*It's complex for them to understand"* (Sergeant #3)

Recently, officers of the TPS have received mandatory training in the areas of bias awareness, discrimination, racism, public interactions, and the collection of information from members of the public as it relates to the policy (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016c, Part III). The sergeants from my sample indicate that this training takes the form of mandatory sessions at the 'Toronto Police College', online modules, and additional training as required at local divisions by training staff and sergeants. Respondents perceive that if officers are trained properly to understand the policy and how to apply it on the street, they are more likely to conform to it. The interview data show that 29.4% of the respondents perceive that training is an internal factor that facilitates their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy.

Sergeant #3 explains why training has been such an important factor to ensure conformance from the outset of the implementation of the policy. This sergeant suggests that officers initially interpreted the policy as a reason to stop engaging with members of the public:

> Um, so with that we are constantly updating and educating and reminding officers of what the legislation actually means. When the legislation first came in, officers just felt like, oh I can't stop and talk to anybody, but there was a misunderstanding of what being in the legislation and outside the legislation meant, and that's been addressed now through flow of communication both down and up, and back to the college, and we're continuously training and educating and reminding officers of what the legislation truly means.

Sergeant #1, discusses the mandatory training related to the policy that occurs on day three of annual re-training and questions its overall effectiveness:

> [We are] given scenarios and examples on what would, what would relate to the procedure and what wouldn't…I don't know if that's benefiting people [officers] or confusing people more and more.

Consistent with this perception, sergeant #3 discusses how even after the first wave of mandatory training, officer comprehension and conformance was substandard. This sergeant suggests that it was the sergeants who took these observations back up the chain of command so that the police service could make additional attempts to train its officers in relation to the policy. This sergeant felt that the training unit did not fully understand how complex the policy is and how difficult it was for frontline officers to comprehend.

> It's [the policy] not being understood well and what do we need to do now to ensure that it is understood and, uh, and they [officers] can accept the changes and know how to apply the changes. So one of the things that resulted from that is mass training going out, communication from what we observed back up the chain to Command to let them know we need to do more in relation to this change because it's not being grasped and it's not being accepted well. So a second wave of training and education, uh, was conducted here at this division specifically, which was a little more lament and simplified and is now understood. And that communication has gone back, has gone back to our training branch and now our college adopts the understanding that this is a complex new piece of legislation that the officers are required to, to follow, and it's now become part of our in-service training, which is our yearly requalification, uh, which includes some use of force options and there's also a lot of law components and policy components to that training.

Sergeant #3 also recounts an example of a personal training method and suggests that this is an effective method to facilitate conformance from officers to the policy. This sergeant describes how videos of 'good' regulated interactions are shared with officers to demonstrate best practices and improve overall conformance to the policy:

> I will take video of myself. If I had a good one [a regulated interaction], I will play it on Parade for them [officers] so that they can observe. Other sergeants, when we communicate back and forth with other parades, when they have one of their officers do a really good one, or I observe an officer do a really good one, I'll take a copy of that video and I will play it for them. Um, you know, take observation and then afterward we'll talk about it. I will break down certain points. And I will also take bad ones, and use it a little bit as a this is not to embarrass someone, not to embarrass an officer, but this is a learning, uh, learning curve, what do you, and I will ask it broadly, what did you see where there was issues cause that gives me feedback in an informal setting of whether or

> not they understand. If they can articulate back to me where the errors occurred then I know they know what the errors are, I know they're going to avoid those pitfalls going forward. I think that's the best way. We get some stuff from the college, re-enacted ones that we have access to that we can show, um, uh, but actually showing successful and unsuccessful ones are actually the best way.

Number of Public Complaints

"They're gonna come after us" (Sergeant #5)

The factor, number of public complaints, was discussed in the preceding section. Accordant with that discussion, respondents perceive that police officers are more likely to conform to the policy to avoid receiving a public complaint. To recap, this is primarily due to a complaint's negative consequences, which include internal discipline, the accompanying negative career implications, and public shaming. The interview data show that 29.4% of the respondents perceive that the number of public complaints is an external factor that hinders conformance to their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy.

Sergeant #5 explains that officers are just not willing to risk any negative percussions stemming from interacting with a member of the public. This sergeant further indicates that this sentiment has transformed the frontlines into a reactive force rather than a proactive one:

> We're gonna get shit on, we're gonna get questioned about it, it's too much hassle. They [officers] just can't be bothered so they just drive around.

Many respondents discuss how accessible the complaint system is for citizens should they choose to make a complaint against an officer. This ease of access is perceived by respondents to further justify their officers' hesitation to engage in policing activities with the public – especially those that qualify as regulated interactions. Sergeant #6 explains:

> Number one, it's very easy to complain about an officer, very easy. The system has made it extremely easy, you could do it from your phone right. You complain, you put in a complaint about somebody, and now you've put in a complaint, a frivolous complaint. Maybe you just put in a complaint because you're hot at the moment, maybe it means nothing to you. After you send it off you feel good. The problem is that complaint ties

> up that police officer until it's done right. And the problem further is it ties him up for possibly months, and the other piece is there's people on this job, despite how much of a strong face they put on, they don't do well with stress right. And when you tie all these things together right, and there's no real benefit or reward to doing the 'street check'…People don't engage with these things because it's not worth it, that's the reality of it right.

Sergeant #6 links the number of public complaints to the broad adjournment of proactive policing across the police service. This sergeant suggests that the culture of policing has transformed: the risk of receiving a complaint now outweighs an officer's drive to identify and apprehend criminals. The sergeant reflects on the justification of officers to disengage from related law enforcement duties:

> A 'street check' is based on or for the most part, not really, most part is based on proactive policing. You know those what you would call your 'spidey' senses: seeing things that aren't right, seeing things that don't fit right and using your knowledge and experience to approach a person and address the situation. The problem is, is that can't be measured, that can't be tested, and the only way those things can be engaged is somebody has to initiate it on their own. You can't tell somebody what they saw, you can't tell somebody what they feel, so I think it's hard for a sergeant to tell somebody, "oh you need to go do more 'street checks'. And [police] cultures change, the cultures change, it's really easy to get complaints, people don't want to get complaints anymore. The reality of it is, people are doing, I don't want to get in trouble. So uh you know what this CIICC [Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances] thing. What are our grounds? Do we have grounds? No, we don't have grounds. What if this happens? What if we ask him for his name and then he says no? Are we in and out of the legislation? What if he gets offended and he puts in a complaint? You know what, don't bother yourself. It's not worth it, that's what's happening. And as a result, people are disengaging, right, and so I'm not sure where it goes from there.

<u>Confusing Policy</u>

"Are they allowed to, are they not?" (Sergeant #3)

The literature demonstrates policies may be rejected at the frontline of police services when they are written in ways deemed unacceptable by officers (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, p. 316). Respondents share this sentiment, indicating the policy is complicated, inconsistent, and lengthy, influencing officers to deviate from the rules. The interview data show that 70.6% of

the respondents perceive that confusing policy is an internal factor that hinders conformance to their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy.

Many of the respondents expressed that the policy is written in a complicated, legal style of writing that makes it difficult for officers to understand and implement. Sergeant #3 comments, that for this reason, the policy is far from being adopted at the street level:

> Some of the officers are very frustrated by the new legislation because it is complex for them to understand and it raises constant doubt as to, are they allowed to, are they not allowed to, so when we were bringing forth that new change in legislation we could see as supervisors, the sergeants and staff sergeants, it's not being taken well. It's not being understood well.

Another perception shared by respondents is that officers interpret terms found in the policy, inconsistently. For instance, many of the sergeants conveyed that terms such as 'reasonable suspicion', 'reasonable grounds', and 'arbitrary', vary in meaning among officers. Sergeant #2 explains this complication:

> What I think is confusing is the idea of when does something become arbitrary and when do they have reasonable suspicion, it is so grey and if you had 10 officers faced with the same scenario they would all articulate it in different ways. And so I think again because it's new, it's a new regulation, because there's still a view within the policing culture that the public has become quite skeptical of police, um activity in this regard, officers are just choosing to be cautious and the threshold for reasonable suspicion I think is quite high now, officers don't want to make a mistake so I think it's a long way of saying that officers do understand the core of the regulation but they're still having trouble figuring out where the threshold is for acceptable proactive policing when it comes to articulating reasonable suspicion for a stop, for a subject stop that is not um, brought about from a radio call.

Sergeant #9 questions why the government and policy-writers would formulate such a complicated policy. This sergeant suggests that the policy's complexity is the reason officers are failing to conform to it:

> I just think it all goes back to um, you know, if politicians and people out there want us to do our jobs and you know, it should be a simple format to do it, it shouldn't be all this you know, all this policy and procedure and if you don't do this you could get documented.

Sergeant #2 emphasizes how lengthy the policy is. This sergeant communicates that even after the police service attempted to simplify it in diagram form, there still remains ambiguities that will cause officers to question entering into the policy altogether. The sergeant explains:

> I think people are still confused. I think they understand the gist but it's still a long piece of legislation. I have it printed out here and it's eight pages of small print…They tried to condense it into one page, kinda cheat sheet, Coles notes, which I have here and it's a flow chart with arrows and exceptions and wording that's so similar from one to another. Just for example, it says um, it says an officer would be into the Regulation if they are inquiring into offences that have been or might be committed, but they're not if they're investigating an offence they reasonably suspect has been or will be committed. So you've got inquiring and investigating as two different words. Well it could be argued an inquiry is an investigation, and an investigation is an inquiry, so those to me words are synonymous so those are confusing right off the bat.

Tedious Reporting Process

"*They fill out the cards and they come back rejected"* (Sergeant #7)

The literature demonstrates that officers become frustrated when rules and restrictions prevent them from performing their law enforcement duties (Crank & Caldero, 1991, p. 344). Consistent with this finding, the interview data show that 47.1% of the respondents perceive that a tedious reporting process is an internal factor that hinders conformance to their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. Many sergeants indicate that the process of entering a regulated interaction into the record management system takes far too long. Sergeant #1 claims to have observed only one attempt since the policy was implemented. This sergeant describes the experience:

> I have found that with this new procedure, um, I've seen a mass decrease in stops. Um, I only know since this new procedure came in, one officer on my platoon has done one. And it took them about two hours to do an occurrence and I think after that they just stopped.

Sergeant #9 points out that once the regulated interaction is entered into the record management system, the entry is often rejected for errors, which adds additional administrative time to their

officers' duties because they have to make the necessary corrections and resubmit the documentation. This sergeant explains that officers do not feel that the process of documenting regulated interactions is a valuable use of their time and energy:

> Like I asked the officer that did do this [entered a documented regulated interaction], "oh my God it came back with errors", it did this. I talked to the guy at Versadex and he goes, "oh we hardly ever see any of these" and it's just becomes a hassle and issue and the guys are like, "no it's not worth it".

Sergeant #9 also discusses a time when officers were asked what the process of submitting a documented regulated interaction was like for them? This sergeant recounts one of his officer's responses:

> I said, "who's actually done a 'street check'?" And basically one person [officer] said they did a couple two months ago, and I said, "why did you do them?" They said "I just wanted to see it, I never done one before", cause this is the officer who is actually leaving us, "I just wanted to see" and he goes, "it ended up going through, there's a number of errors on it, I can't link people" um, um, so you're asking me this question but we never had to deal with it because basically everyone is avoiding it and staying away from it and, uh, apparently that's being shown across all the Service in terms of intelligence and etc., that we're not getting information that we need.

To illustrate how tedious the process is currently for officers, sergeant #9 compares the process with the process of completing a general occurrence. A general occurrence is completed for any type of investigation. In the opinion of this sergeant, a regulated interaction should only take a fraction of the time it takes to complete a general occurrence – which it does not. This sergeant credits this complex and tedious process with the reason officers choose not to engage in the policy. The sergeant describes the frustration:

> Basically, it's like doing a general occurrence now and guys have a, enough things to do out there, where it's 20 minutes, half an hour to do, and it sounds like from what I'm hearing for every one you're doing, it's going to be sent back, may be some issue with it and the guys are like it's not worth it. I don't think the guys are lazy, it's just it's like if, I guess it's the same as looking at an impaired driver. If you really want us to go out and do something in regards to arresting impaired drivers you will make it easy and you won't provide us with all these ways of getting out of it. If you're impaired, you're impaired, that's all there is. And the same with this, it should be a simple thing, you

> could put in that will take a minute or two, it shouldn't take a half an hour to do something like this and submit it and have it reviewed by who knows how many people.

Staffing Shortage

"*We're so busy going from call to call"* (Sergeant #13)

The factor, staffing shortage, was discussed in the preceding section. Consonant with that discussion, respondents suggest that a recent reduction in officer strength in the TPS has hindered conformance to the policy. Many respondents perceive that the current staffing shortage prevents officers from proactively investigating members of the public for suspicious or criminal activities. The interview data show that 64.7% of the respondents perceive that staffing shortage is an internal factor that hinders their capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. This is also corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 41.2% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that available internal resources is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

For the respondents, they perceive that the staffing shortage presents a roadblock for officers who are unable to engage in the policy due to time and resource constraints. Sergeant #4 illustrates this point:

> We oftentimes start the shift going from one call and we end the shift going, finishing another call. So during our shift on the PRU [Primary Response Unit] side, we don't often have time unfortunately to do the proactive policing, which we would want to.

Similarly, sergeant #5 suggests that officers will not engage on a regular basis in the policy as long as the demand for emergency response continues to monopolize his officers' proactive time at the street level. This sergeant explains:

> Officers are tied to the radio, and they're responding to calls and I think the whole reason why this 'carding', this is not a whole issue, is because when it all came into place, its sort of when we went on a hiring freeze and our numbers are lower. Like I parade an average of six people a shift. When do you think those six guys have time to stop and

> talk to someone? It doesn't happen…I don't think I've ever had one of the officers come up to me and ask me about 'street checks' or anything because they're just too busy.

Sergeant #9 explains why regulated interactions take on a low priority for officers. This sergeant sees the main responsibility of sergeants as ensuring officers respond to radio calls for service. This sergeant perceives that as long as there are outstanding radio calls, officers are unlikely to engage in the policy. The sergeant conveys why regulated interactions are not practical in a resource-strapped work environment:

> The guys are out there working and I guess that's part of the issue is that it would be a little different if their entire job was 'street checks', that's all they did, you don't have to go to calls, you don't have to do anything else it's just 'street checks'…They got all this other stuff to do and for me to turn around and you know, I know we're backed up 15 calls and I know this and that, but go do some 'street checks'. I know they're going to take you a half an hour or 25 minutes to submit each 'street check'…My responsibility is answering calls for service. So if I got domestics outstanding and everything else, I'm really not too worried about the 'street checks'. Because I wanna get the stuff where there's violent domestics, there's this and robberies or whatever. I wanna get that stuff dealt with…That's why it's hard to turn around and say yea 'street checks' give them a higher priority. There's other issues. If we had tons of manpower and we had lots of stuff it would be different in a perfect world but it's not.

Sergeant #14 also subscribes to this perspective. This sergeant stresses that as long as a high demand for reactive police response continues, combined with the current staffing shortage, officers will be unable to find time to engage in the policy:

> The PRU [Primary Response Unit] is very busy and they don't really have a lot of extra time to dedicate to proactive policing. They've become strictly 911 for the public. There doesn't seem to be a lot of time left over at the end of the day to do a regulated interaction.

Summary

The interview data and survey questionnaire data show empirical support for a number of perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy). These factors can also be considered either external factors or internal factors. The external factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to

achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) civilian oversight and (2) media portrayals of the police. The internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) policy and procedure; (2) internal discipline; and (3) training. The external factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) Media portrayals of the police and (2) number of public complaints. The internal factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) internal discipline; (2) confusing policy; (3) staffing shortage; and (4) tedious reporting process. The findings show that two factors (media portrayals of the police and internal discipline) have the ability to facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy. This section has further demonstrated that these factors are contextual and vary across a police organization. The contextual nature of these factors is supported by the variation in the frequency of the respondents who perceived these factors during their interviews or documented them in their survey questionnaires. The above factors, both external and internal, that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the policy are illustrated in the following mind map labeled Illustration 2.

Illustration 2. Mind Map of the Factors that Facilitate or Hinder Conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy



In the next chapter of findings, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, are presented. Also presented are the findings on officers' perceptions of the state of police-citizen interaction.

Chapter Six – Findings Part Two: Methods Used to Achieve Conformance and Perceptions of Police-Citizen Interaction

6.1 Introduction

Building on the previous two chapters of findings, by identifying additional themes, I will further explain how sergeants perceive (1) the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance; and (2) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. This chapter presents the findings related to the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, and the findings on officers' perceptions of the state of police-citizen interaction.

6.2 Outline of Key Findings

As indicated in the previous chapter, the findings that emerged represent the outcomes of the thematic analysis. In Section 7.3, below, the findings related to the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization in general (police organization), are presented. In Section 7.4, below, the findings related to the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy), are presented. In Section 7.5, below, the findings related to officers' perceptions of the state of police-citizen interaction, are presented. A discussion of these findings occurs in Chapter Seven.

6.3 The Methods Used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance in a Police Organization

In this section, the findings related to the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization in general (police organization), are presented. Interview data show empirical support for a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization. The methods that sergeants use to achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) communication and translation; (2) rewarding; (3) disciplining; (4) being

present; (5) providing guidance; (6) leading by example; and (7) knowing your people. Disciplining was also corroborated by data that was collected from the survey questionnaire. Below, I present the key findings in an attempt to unpack the meanings these factors have for the respondents. Each thematic category of findings contains a brief summary of the empirical support for each identified factor.

Communication and Translation

"Not everything is always Black and white " (Sergeant #9)

The literature suggests that sergeants informally fill in the gaps of information that officers need so that they may better understand why policies should be implemented or operationalized at the street level (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 226). This is supported in the findings of Skogan (2008, p. 25), who suggests that sergeants interpret policies for frontline officers, translating their meanings into action. The respondents perceive that communicating and translating policies in ways that are understood will influence their officers to follow the rules. The interview data show that 100% of the respondents perceive that communication and translation is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization.

Respondents perceive that one role of a sergeant is to communicate to frontline officers any new policy or change to an existing policy. For instance, sergeant #14 comments on how sergeants are responsible for connecting the policy objectives of 'command' with operations at the street level:

> There has to be that transmission of knowledge from a corporate level to the field. And I think that's where sergeants are the best conduits for that information.

Sergeants perceive that it is their responsibility to help officers comprehend the content of a policy by explaining, reminding, answering questions, using examples, through discussion, training, or by debriefing incidents that have occurred. Sergeant #1 suggests that officers vary in

language skills, abilities, and experience and therefore exhibit different comprehension levels when a policy is delivered. This sergeant explains:

> Sometimes I find that some people [police officers] nod and say yes when they don't really understand the terminology you've used. They haven't read between the lines or whatever it is. You sort of have to explain it in a certain way, I mean we have different people, we have different learning skills, we have people now with more and more language barriers, and I think we have to be conscious of that and understand what you want. How I would talk to a 20-year constable who would actually understand it, would be different than a person who you could say, wet behind the ears and new to the job or maybe has been out of the loop cause they've been working somewhere else.

Sergeants from my sample also convey that they are also responsible for communicating impractical policies back up the 'chain of command'. They feel that part of their role is to be critical of policies that do not make sense or may be counterproductive to the policy objectives. Sergeant #7 explains this narrative:

> I think with a lot of policies we have, they don't, they don't put in the practical side of it. It's good on paper, but when you actually apply, they don't think of these things until you actually apply it…So basically we see the downside of certain policies, why they don't work on the road, we adapt it to make sure they do work, and then from our end, we relay the information to our staff sergeant, and then to Command, here's what we're doing to overcome this.

Sergeant #4 discusses a time when a new policy relating to microphone use was passed down to officers. In response, this sergeant identified points of confusion contained in the policy and made significant inquiries from superiors to ensure officers clearly understood the content of the policy and its objectives:

> There was a change to the microphone procedure as to when we have to carry microphones, when the microphones have to be on, how often they have to be on, when they can be turned off, etc. Um and the procedure, uh, for whatever reason whether it was our interpretation or the writing, was a challenge for us to determine what the actual requirements were. So same thing, as I said, I read it, I received a subsequent email because I requested some clarification and even after that there was a phone call to make sure that everything was clarified. And then, even so, one of our training personnel at the station came in and introduced it because it was such an important, um, change that I wanted to make sure there was a 100% clarity because I did not want people to not follow procedure because they don't know.

Sergeant #9 provides an example of how humour and embarrassment are used as a means to communicate policy effectively to officers and ensure conformance is achieved. This sergeant describes how parade is an opportune moment for this type of technique:

> Sometimes you could embarrass guys into doing things or following with the approach, but not in a mean or nasty way. So if you go on parade, and I would just use the term "someone fucked something up", but you want to get it across that they 'fucked it up', but you don't want them to get pissed off, but peer pressure is a great thing I find, so if you could address it, um, you know, and yesterday 'such and such' did this and you could get it across so you're not hurting the person's feelings, but you're getting it across that now everyone's aware of it and maybe there's a better way you could've done it.

Rewarding

"I think it's important that people feel valued" (Sergeant #16)

Previous findings suggest that the rewards given to officers by sergeants is an effective means to get officers to follow directives (Engel & Worden, 2003, pp. 135-136). Respondents perceive their role is to reward police officers when they conform to policy to reinforce the repetition of similar behaviours among others. The interview data show that 100% of the respondents perceive that rewarding is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization.

Respondents confirm that rewarding can be done in formal and informal ways. The formal methods of rewarding include the documentation of the event in an officer's personnel file, which may also result in a time-off award, other corporate awards, and official ceremonies. Sergeant #1 describes an event, after which an officer was rewarded:

> Putting pen to paper and, uh, explaining an incident, uh, where hopefully down the road they would get an award. Recently I did one a few months ago for people performing, uh, first aid on a woman, a drug woman, a woman who used drugs so they put their own health at risk, cause this woman could have, cause we deal with transient style people, contagious diseases. They did CPR on her, they did two-man CPR…they were professional on the air [radio], they kept everything, uh, I would say they didn't panic so I rewarded them, by not only documenting it, but putting a letter forward to St. John's

> Ambulance. So eventually down the road they will be invited to a breakfast, so they would have a nice breakfast, they would get a nice reward, it would be formal, so a nice opportunity. Maybe they want to bring their family. Maybe you want to bring your children. It's kind of a special day and people appreciate that you know.

Respondents indicate that the recognition that goes along with a formal reward can have a significant impact on the behaviour of an officer and his or her colleagues. Sergeant #5 describes what occurred after formally rewarding an officer on the platoon:

> When I first came to the platoon I did a documentation. I think it was like my first month. And then a couple weeks later I brought up a job-well-done. And they're [officers] like "holy shit we're not used to this", and it goes a long way. Just a simple little recognition, it's huge cause when you're shit on all day by the public, by people at calls, that little bit of recognition is huge.

Respondents were also able to discuss how informal rewards motivate officers to conform to policies. Informal methods of rewarding officers include communicating the conforming actions of the officer upwards to the next rank, unofficial sponsorship or recommendation for a position, preferred working partners, the offering of overtime shifts, the approval of time-off, preferred assignments, preferred specialized courses or training, special accommodations related to working hours, recognition in front of peers, a direct compliment, and gifts of coffee or food such as pizza or breakfast. For instance, sergeant #3 conveys the impact that a small informal reward may have on officers:

> A lot of benefit comes from simply having your supervisor walk by you in and amongst your peers and go, "really good job on that, keep up the good work." It's uh 10 second piece of a day that has a ripple effect not only on the officer continuing the work in that ethical, profession, whatever the law, policy, manner but it has a ripple effect on others that are listening to it.

Sergeant #1 discusses a situation where overtime may be offered to an officer who performs better over one who does not:

> Let's say for example, if there's premium pay positions, so overtime offers - so we call these things callbacks. And I could see that there's spots open, they haven't been filled,

> they're vacant, and this officer, I may know X and Y are good workers, so I'm gonna give them a call, just giving you the heads up that this is available.

Sergeant # 3 explains that a well-performing officer may be informally rewarded with a positive recommendation for a workplace opportunity:

> When opportunities become available and officers want to step forward, I would have an informal conversation with the detective or the officer in charge of that unit about my constable, my candidate, and my support for that person and let them know in an informal fashion the type of girl, guy they are, the type of police officer they are.

Sergeant #17 demonstrates how an officer who conforms on a regular basis, including following unpleasant orders, can be informally rewarded with a special accommodation:

> There's an officer today that, um, is here, but he coaches his son's hockey team. He asked to be able to go to…today to get a quick photograph with him, with the team, because they're doing team photos, and I advised him no problem, go up there. When you allow officers to do something like that, there's a definite, hey, I'm doing something to help you out. In turn, if I were to ask him to go to a homicide and sit on a crime scene for 10 hours, no problem, he's gonna say, it's a give and take.

Disciplining

"The way we modify their behaviour" (Sergeant #17)

In many bureaucratic organizations, administrative rules exist to punish employees in cases when they fail to comply with directives (Redlinger, 1994, pp. 41, 50). This finding is no different for police services. Accordingly, respondents perceive that one of their roles is to discipline officers when they do not conform to policy. This has the effect of deterring officers from repeating the undesired behaviour. The interview data show that 94.1% of the respondents perceive that disciplining is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization. This is corroborated by the survey questionnaire, which demonstrates that 88.2% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that internal discipline is a factor that impacts the daily duties of police officers in their divisional community.

Similar to rewarding, respondents indicate that disciplining can be done in formal and informal ways. Formal methods of disciplining include the documentation of the event in an officer's personnel file, which may also result in loss of pay or being sent to the disciplinary tribunal to face charges. The tribunal is reserved for more serious cases of discipline and penalties can include the loss of a greater amount of pay, demotion, or loss of job. Sergeant #1 explains a situation that might warrant formal discipline by a sergeant:

> If somebody's writing fictitious tickets, for example, I would consider that a serious breach of our governance, of our rules, and, um, I had that personally, where a person was charged, plus I seized all…ticket books. And unfortunately, he had to go to a tribunal and face hours. I mean there also, this could also, could, result in a criminal charge. So major consequences. So that I would, you just can't, I would not work on a caution, it's not like being tardy or forgetting to send in your notes for a traffic ticket, or forgetting to go to traffic court.

Sergeant # 1 also explains what happens when an officer is formally disciplined. This sergeant recounts the long and seemingly unpleasant process:

> I would write a, uh, a particular form explaining the allegation and that officer may be provided a synopsis of what happens, and it would then go to a person, a complaint detective, where a detective sergeant would deal with and then prepare a report, uh, explaining the entire allegation and what rule they broke. And that would go before, that person would have to appear at police headquarters and go before a Senior Officer whoever that is.

Respondents also discuss the informal methods of disciplining officers which include casual conversation with the officer, a more formal discussion in the office, embarrassment in front of peers, an undesirable assignment, additional training, heightened monitoring, riding with a sergeant, a '90 day review', less accommodating shift start times, the refusal of time off, and the denial of requests to work with preferred partners. Sergeant #2 discusses an example of how an officer might be formally disciplined. In doing so, this sergeant provides examples of a variety of informal discipline mechanisms that sergeants may use to correct behaviours should officers not follow the rules:

> Giving a certain officer a detail that they may not like. Having them work with an officer they may not like working with. Um, not giving them, um, preferential treatment when it maybe comes to their request for, uh, change of start time off or days off. Things that are within our right as supervisors to withhold.

Uniquely, sergeant #9 describes how embarrassment in front of peers is an effective method of informal discipline used by sergeants to gain conformance. This sergeant explains how this is accomplished:

> I like to take the approach that, talk to the guys, and I almost wanna say sometimes you could embarrass guys into doing…but not in a mean or nasty way. So if you go on parade, and I would just use the term, someone fucked something up, but you want to get it across that they fucked it up, but you don't want them to get pissed off, but peer pressure is a great thing, I find, so if you could address it, um, you know, and yesterday such and such did this, and you could get it across so you're not hurting the person's feelings, but you're getting it across that now everyone's aware of it and maybe there's a better way you could've done it.

Being Present

"*When the supervision starts to slack…they slack"* (Sergeant #8)

The literature demonstrates that active supervisors who spend more time in the field with their officers can have a positive impact on the behaviour of their officers (Engel, 2000, p. 283). Respondents perceive that by attending and being visible when and where officers are engaged in their duties, it motivates their officers to conform to policy. The interview data show that 94.1% of the respondents perceive that being present is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization.

Because they cannot be at every radio call, sergeants attend calls that are mandated by a procedure to attend, perceived more serious, or when responding officers are more junior in experience or have demonstrated a previous pattern of failing to conform to policy. Sergeant #2 suggests that his presence is especially effective when monitoring particular officers who tend not to follow the rules:

> There's frequently times where I would attend calls, even when I'm not necessarily required, to, uh, simply because I might be interested. Maybe it's not a busy day and I'm just curious, um, sometimes there's particular officers that need to be watched a little closer to ensure that they're doing the right thing. So even though the call doesn't dictate that I must attend or shall attend, I still choose to attend because I wanna see a particular officer and how they deal with the call.

Sergeants from my sample suggest that they also attend radio calls due to the need for urgent police response, to reduce the volume of outstanding radio calls, to participate as part of the team, and also out of curiosity. Sergeant #3 adds that sergeants attend calls for service to confirm that changes to policy are adhered to:

> When there are changes to the legislation, I will attend calls of that nature and observe in a formal fashion, as a sergeant, that the officers have understood the change, and they're adhering to the changes - in the way they're either addressing the public, completing the report, or filling out other documentation.

To illustrate the above, sergeant #14 provides an example of how supervisor presence improves officer conformance to a procedure that regulates when to wear a police forge cap:

> I have some time [experience], and I grew up in wearing your hat culture. So, I'm a big hat wearer. I believe it's part of your uniform and it shows your authority and they've proven that it reduces assaults on police officers. When I show up to a major scene, I expect them [police officers] to wear their hats. And if they're not wearing their hats, as soon as I show up guess what happens, because they have that learned behaviour that I won't tolerate it, especially if the media is present.

However, the same sergeant also suggests that being present too often at calls can at times have a negative impact on the behaviour of officers:

> You cannot be that micromanager, uh, following people around and examining and then you know…trying to detect things and uncover things, it doesn't work, it's counterproductive and I've seen supervisors who have done that and they, and once again create stress and anxiety over things you know what, in the grand scheme of things, really don't matter.

<u>Providing Guidance</u>

"It's that sense of empowerment" (Sergeant #12)

Policing scholarship suggests that a sergeant's feedback and support has a positive influence on the conforming behaviours of officers (Bradstreet, 1997, pp. 2-5; R. R. Johnson, 2015, p. 1172). Respondents perceive that by providing guidance, frontline officers are more likely to conform to policies because they have the knowledge of how to do so. The interview data show that 82.4% of the respondents perceive that providing guidance is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization.

Sergeant #3 describes how guidance is provided to officers by sergeants and the manner in which it is done. This sergeant provides an example of an interaction with an officer at a radio call who is experiencing difficulty conforming to a policy:

> I inform, I educate and I discipline. Um, as a sergeant, I will, if I know there's someone specifically that is having difficulty, I will attend, and I will go to the calls, and sometimes the education could be very informal, and go "step aside with me officer, remember what we talked about with the procedure, think about doing it this way, think about your approach, these are the rules you need to follow, do you understand?" and then document it.

Sergeant #12 explains an approach to providing advice, which includes first giving the officer an opportunity to explain what he or she should do in a particular circumstance. This sergeant suggests that this gives an officer more confidence when making decisions that relate to directives:

> A lot of the officers like when I get on the scene because I let them, I go up to the officers, as opposed to the victim or whoever saying what's going on, I ask my officers, again, it's that sense of empowerment, asking them, "what have you got?" One thing I do with my officers even if they call me for a simple domestic situation, I always ask them, "what do you think we should do?" And then they'll give me their information and I'll say, "well yes", or "no", and "we'll do it this way" or "that way."

Sergeant #13 describes a unique method to giving guidance to officers who are having difficulty performing. This sergeant explains how spending an entire shift with one officer in close

proximity is effective, and in at least one instance improved an officer's overall demeanor and performance:

> I regularly put them [police officers] in the car with me, once in a blue moon, it's not that I am checking up on them, but uh, if I think they're struggling, I would say, "I'll come spend a night in a car with you and see how you do"...It may be a fact they get in and they just need some clarification and they get over that and we go on and I had that on this platoon. I had a guy that was you know basically ready to give up and move on to whatever, and he's done a…he's done a 180. I'm not gonna say he's ever gonna be upper management or he's never gonna be that go-to-guy in a jam, but he's producing again. He's being a productive contributive member of the platoon and I accomplished that by upping the supervision, by getting into the car with him.

Leading by Example

"The problem is with the Chateau General" (Sergeant #13)

The literature posits that sergeants may be influential in achieving conformance from officers by demonstrating role modeling behaviours (Huberts et al., 2007, p. 238; R. R. Johnson, 2008, p. 347, 2011, p. 302). Respondents perceive that by leading by example, officers are more likely to mimic conforming behaviours of sergeants. The interview data show that 64.7% of the respondents perceive that leading by example is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization.

Sergeant #15 explains that role modeling is not only effective in gaining conformance to existing policies, but it is very helpful in gaining conformance to newly implemented policies. This sergeant discusses the 'microphone' policy and the 'in-car camera' policy to further clarify this point:

> When I'm out there, I'm always making sure that I'm following the rules first of all. So even as something as simply the in-car cameras or the microphones, I always make sure that I have my mic and camera on, and I'm wearing it, so that A; it's to show my officers that I follow the rules, and B; I expect them to follow the rules right…When there's a new rule that is brought about, I make sure I am following that rule first of all… I believe that police officers generally are accustomed to and willing to follow rules, um, directed to them by superior ranked officers, um. And I think primarily if they feel that the

> supervisors or the superior officers are following those rules themselves then the officers are much more likely to follow those rules.

According to respondents, leading by example is accomplished in several ways, including: participating in serious events such as SIU investigations or radio calls, adhering to and modeling new procedures, being aware of changes to, and new policies, letting officers feel that they are a regular part of the decision-making process, admitting to officers that you do not know everything (checking your ego), working weekends and holidays with officers, relieving officers when they need a break, and being present on the road.

Sergeant #10 discusses leading by example in the context of backing-up officers when they need it. This sergeant describes how sergeants lead the charge in dangerous encounters – this enables sergeants to earn respect from officers:

> So, when I go to a call, majority of the time I am their backup. Um, there's the respect for the rank okay. I'm not, this might sound cold and callous, but the guys and girls under my command know that when we step out here, I'm not your mom, I'm not your dad, I'm not gonna wipe your nose, okay, I'm not gonna cuddle you or give you a kind word. We have a job to perform out here, again this is my expectation, this is communicated to them. I will never put them in harm's way okay. If somebody needs to go through a door, you will be right behind me, but I will go through first.

Sergeant #13 discusses how leading by example includes being willing to take on the activities normally reserved for a subordinate. This sergeant discusses how sergeants may volunteer to direct traffic to allow officers to have a break. The sergeant perceives this as a means to build credence and confidence from officers:

> My guys [officers] do for me because I do for them. If I say go out there and direct traffic and it's busy and there's nobody out there, I put my coat on and I give those guys a 20-minute break. I could stay and swing my arms, I still do their job and that's how you build trust, that's how you build leadership, that's how you build the ability to affect people by merely asking them to do something because you've done it, because you do it for them when they need it done for them and you do it fairly with everybody.

Sergeant #13 also recounts a shooting incident when a senior officer attended the scene and demonstrated role modeling and leadership. The sergeant's recollection of the events demonstrates how the actions of this senior officer made this sergeant feel. This helps us understand how role modeling can influence officers to follow directives from their superiors:

> One night in July my partner and I took fire and we were shot at…we decided not to shoot back with kids in the park...there were three of them, all armed with handguns. After they were done emptying their guns, uh, we had sought cover, um, they started to run. We gave chase. We arrested all three of them, got all three handguns. I was the only supervisor on scene…and the duty inspector showed up. And while the duty inspector, she came up to me immediately and she said, you know, she went through the checklist, "are you guys okay, did you fire your weapons", no, we're good, and instead of just leaving, instead of just saying okay I got corporately what I need, and I had that before, she stayed there because I wasn't relieved. There was a crime scene, there was three bodies [arrested persons] and I was a victim…She stayed, she gave direction, she took over my role. And my whole point to this is… she was there with me, she knew I was in over my head…I had a huge scene spread over city blocks and she stood there and gave a direction that I should've given and she got me more resources… So we are 13 years from that now, didn't matter if that lady asked me to jump in a puddle on a day like this, I would do it, because I believe in her as a leader…. Instead of just taking that hands-off approach and going, "too bad it was you, suck to be you tonight you know, I'm leaving now to the comfort of my car, to the comfort of my station", she stayed.

<u>Knowing Your People</u>

"It's important to have that relationship" (Sergeant #5)

One theme that prominently appeared throughout the semi-structured interviews was the importance for sergeants to know which officers were likely to follow the rules and which officers were not. Respondents perceive that by knowing your people, sergeants are able to decide which officers should be supervised more often. This is important because sergeants cannot be everywhere and must ration their presence as efficiently as possible (R. R. Johnson, 2015, pp. 1156-1157). The interview data show that 58.8% of the respondents perceive that knowing your people is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization.

Sergeant #3 illustrates how officers are chosen for heightened levels of supervision. This sergeant explains how knowing an officer's previous work experience; in particular, experience with investigations, helps the sergeant decide which officers to spend more time with to ensure the steps of a procedure are followed:

> In every workforce, you have your 'A team' and you have your 'B team' and I know who my B-team is…I know when officer Y is going to a call relating to say a sexual assault where there's a lot of procedures surrounding the sensitivity and the nature of that investigation, where the victim needs to go for hospital follow-up, who needs to be contacted. I know if officer Y is on my 'B team' for that, I'm ensuring that I'm there as quickly as possible as I can…If officer X is there, and he's on my 'A team' and he's done two years at sex crimes, and he knows the investigations through and through, my level of concern about that officer missing a step or missing a procedure is at the lowest percentage…I can't be everywhere at once, and if I had to pick one of the two, I'm going to officer Y.

Respondents convey that by knowing their officers they are able to elicit information from trusted officers ("the walls have ears"), enabling sergeants to find out which officers may not be conforming to policy, without the need to directly observe any nonconforming behaviours. For instance, sergeant #3 states:

> What is sometimes said on parade would be one thing and officers among themselves, uh, will have conversations about their feelings that don't include supervisors and sergeants. And much like an investigator, sergeants have moles, they have trusted members that are often senior in the platoon that are comfortable enough to come back to a sergeant in an informal manner and let us know somebody has a problem with this change, somebody has a problem or a lack of understanding. So we'll get that feedback and this is simply from being in a tight-knit group and having people trust and trust, having a unit trust in your sergeant becomes very important and its one of the key factors I adopted after promotion.

Sergeant #17 suggests how knowing your people helps sergeants select which officers might work best together. This is important when forming pairs of officers who are more likely to perform well and follow the rules when working together. This sergeant explains:

> Another part of my job and it's funny, it's basically a role of managing personalities, and that's the first thing you do in the day, I do the parade sheets. I basically look at officers

> who I know that don't work well together or when they do they get a high output and that's the start of my day is managing my officers and putting them on the road.

This suggestion is echoed by sergeant #12 who conveys that knowing officers and their abilities assists sergeants to select which officers to send to certain types of radio calls. This is important for sergeants who must ensure that at a particular radio call, the officer that is sent can competently deal with the situation:

> Um, anybody could stand at the head of the class again, bark out orders and direct people. But I think it's the personal touch and again that's one thing I have. Know your people, know your people and how they work, know their strengths and their weaknesses. Know whose good at HTA versus criminal, whose good at dealing with the EDPs [emotionally disturbed person], whose more apt to go more hands on, whose more, uh, withdrawn. Um, that you will as a sergeant, know your people, know your other sergeants, know your staff sergeant, um, it's key.

Sergeant #3 discusses how knowing officers allows sergeants to anticipate the types of rules their officers may break, and plan accordingly. This sergeant provides a situation where instead of sending an officer who may have trouble conforming to a particular policy because of personal beliefs, may instead send another officer whom the sergeant knows is not in personal conflict with a particular policy and will have no trouble doing the job:

> We have officers from all walks of life, uh. We're sometimes tasked to keep the peace in certain circumstances that will go against a person's personal or religious beliefs, uh, for example, uh, the Morgentaler Clinic, or the pro-life or pro-choice decision. Some very, um, strong Christian or Catholics [officers] may have severe difficulty in dealing with, um, guarding. That, um, procedure is in place that our jobs is to keep the peace for everyone, free from influence or choice. As a supervisor, I also have to know my personnel and place my personnel in the best way, shape or form. Um, sometimes I will have no choice, but if I have opportunity, I will avoid those pitfalls and that frustration.

Summary

The interview data show empirical support for a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization. The methods that sergeants achieve conformance in a police organization are: (1) communication and translation; (2) rewarding; (3) disciplining;

(4) being present; (5) providing guidance; (6) leading by example; and (7) knowing your people. This section has further demonstrated that sergeants positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. The above methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization are illustrated in the following mind map labeled Illustration 3.

Illustration 3. Mind Map of the Methods Used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance in a Police Organization



In Section 7.4, below, I present the findings related to the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy).

6.4 The Methods Used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy

In this section, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy (the policy), are presented. The interview data show empirical support for a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy. The methods that sergeants use to achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) auditing; (2) being present; (3) rewarding; (4) training; (5) encouraging; and (6) disciplining. It should be acknowledged that 'disciplining', while reported as a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy here, may be seen to contradict the findings related to the internal factor 'internal discipline', which was reported in the previous chapter of findings to hinder a sergeant's capacity

to achieve conformance to the policy. This can be explained by considering that when conceptualized as an internal factor, 'internal discipline' influences officers to not engage in the policy altogether, whereas when conceptualized as a 'way used by sergeants', 'disciplining' represents the act of penalizing officers who do not follow the directives of the policy. This is consistent with the operationalization of the term 'hinder' that was presented in Chapter One:

> When considering the factors in a police organization that 'facilitate' or 'hinder' conformance, 'facilitate' refers to improving conformance and 'hinder' refers to decreasing conformance. However, in the case of the Regulated Interactions Policy, 'hinder' may also represent the act of frontline officers intentionally failing to engage in the acts ("street checks" and "carding") regulated by the policy.

Auditing

"Our Service requires us as sergeants do audits" (Sergeant #1)

Auditing is a term used in this research to represent the methods used by sergeants to verify an officer's conformance outside of being directly present. The literature suggests that sergeants may influence the conformance behaviours of police officers by monitoring them (Buerger, 2002, p. 385; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011, p. 222; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008, p. 307; Stanko, 2007, p. 217). Similarly, the respondents perceive that by auditing their officers, they are more likely to discover non-conforming behaviours, which in turn, motivates their officers to conform to the policy. The interview data show that 64.7% of the respondents perceive that auditing is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy.

To ensure conformance to the policy, respondents discuss how they review in-car camera footage (which records the regulated interactions), review documentation related to regulated interactions that are submitted to the records management system ('Versadex'), review hard

copies of the regulated interaction receipts, review memorandum book notes of officers, question officers about their actions and justifications, and monitor calls by listening to radio transmissions. Sergeant #3 provides a detailed version of how conformance to the policy is audited. This sergeant also suggests an additional method of auditing that is currently not available to officers:

> I will review in-car camera 'street checks' anytime an officer puts over I'm stopping to investigate one. There are procedures in place that they activate the camera, activate their microphone, and do everything they can to make sure the investigation takes place in front of the, uh, recording system. I'll make mental note of that stop, I will go back in a day or two to review. If I couldn't attend myself, I will review the video, see how they did, see how their approach was, see what they got out of it, was it within the legislation? I wish we had the money for each of my officers to have body-worn cameras. Every officer would love to have one. Currently, we don't. That would be another method for us to monitor. We rely heavily on technology on this component [auditing] because we can't be there all the time. Our cameras can.

Sergeant #7 discusses the process for submitting records of regulated interactions. Within that process, records can be rejected as a result of auditing and then sent to a sergeant for further examination. This represents another system of check and balance in relation to ensuring conformance to the policy:

> They [officers] fill out the cards and they come back and we find out they come back rejected where they get sent up to now. They get rejected and they will find out about it. And then we will talk to the officer about it…It's because of this, it's invalid.

Sergeant #2 recounts an interaction during which an officer's actions were questioned in relation to the policy. In doing so, this sergeant was able to audit whether the officer conformed to the policy:

> My initial thought was that he would have been into the Regulation, so I asked him [the officer] if he gave them a receipt? Because we're supposed to provide one whether or not the person provides their identification or not. In this case, they did, he said "no", I said, " why not?" he said, "well A they were coming in the back seat of my car and I felt for officer safety I should know who they were." He said, "B, the driver was on conditions not to be around certain people unless with their surety or something along those lines so he felt he needed to identify the other two people to make sure that the other person

> wasn't breaching his criminal conditions. And C, he felt they were all suspects in this hold-up, therefore he felt they should be identified…Um, so again this is where it comes down to articulation and, um, I then as a supervisor have to then perceive if the officer is telling me the truth and if his articulation meets a certain threshold for me to either agree with him or say no I disagree.

Being Present

"Sliding by to see what's happening" (Sergeant #11)

The method, being present, was discussed in the preceding section. Accordant with that discussion, the respondents perceive that being present is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy by monitoring and disallowing nonconformance. The interview data show that 41.2% of respondents perceive that being present is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy. Sergeant #8 explains why it is important to be at hand when officers are interacting or investigating members of the public:

> I have to make sure as a supervisor that they're not stopping anybody, uh, for no reason. Um, that they're not profiling, uh, so, and by doing that, it's about being out there and watching to see what they do.

Sergeant #14 suggests that one role of a sergeant is not just to be present to monitor officers, but rather, to be present to intervene immediately when the policy is not followed:

> If I saw that the interaction [between officers and a citizen] was going south, that it was becoming somewhat of a situation, I may intervene and ask the substance of why the person is being investigated. Having satisfied myself that it was within policy then I would let them continue.

Sergeant #5 recounts a situation when the presence of a sergeant improved his or her officers' conformance to the policy. In this case, these officers were unsure of the directives and this sergeant was able to guide them through the protocol and provide them with the confidence to begin a regulated interaction and elicit the proper information. This sergeant explains:

> I went to a call recently out in [name of the area removed] and there were some guys that were trespassing. The officer just went to ask them to leave, and I'm like well this is your chance. Talk to them, you have every right to talk to them, they're trespassing. So I

> stood by while a couple of the younger officers went to chat with the guy and he tried to get rid of them. You have every right to ask them, they've been asked to leave by management, he's not leaving, you know what I mean, so it's um, me being there guiding them, telling them, you know what I mean, you have the authority, you're allowed to ask and help them, and they said, oh that was good because he ended up talking to us, he goes to this school, I know his principal, you know what I mean. It turned out to be a really positive experience for them and I'm like alright that's not so bad. So I think they fear now because everyone challenges us.

Rewarding

"Proactive policing and going above and beyond" (Sergeant #4)

The method, rewarding, was discussed in the preceding section. Congruent with that discussion, the respondents perceive that rewarding is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy by encouraging the repetition of conforming behaviours among officers. The interview data show that 35.3% of the respondents perceive that rewarding is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy.

Respondents suggest that both the informal and formal rewarding of officers are effective methods to achieve conformance from officers to the policy. For instance, using an informal approach, Sergeant #1 explains how sergeants may speak to a senior investigator – someone who is respected by officers – and request that he or she personally recognize the work of an officer who engages in the policy lawfully and gleans important information. This sergeant explains:

> I may say to them, "you did everything right that was a good job", that led, you know, maybe that 'street check' leads to an arrest…Maybe that person groping women at some downtown location…I could speak to the detective, the detective sergeant, "hey that was great work by officer A, that's great work." Maybe that detective sergeant that hasn't even spoken to that officer actually goes up and says, "you know I really appreciate it"…that means a lot to a worker, a handshake, more than a lousy 4 hours or 8 hours. Sometimes a "thanks, that's a good job" you know, to a real police officer that's a big deal.

Sergeant #3 discusses how personal recognition in front of colleagues is a method to reinforce and encourage desirable conduct in relation to the policy:

> Sometimes it's just, uh, watched in front of a platoon so that's there other ears on it. "Saw your 'street check' yesterday, want to let you know love the way you did the approach, love the way you did the finish, you stayed out of the Regulation until you had to, and you did it right, good job, keep up the work." And that's, that's an informal reward of praise.

According to the respondents, formal rewarding for conforming to the policy is uncommon. However, sergeant #12 describes what might cause a sergeant to initiate a formal documentation in relation to the policy. This sergeant also discusses how a formal reward may be complemented with an informal one:

> I don't do a reward for doing a 'street check', um, if it's just a regular 'street check'. If it's something that could lead to an arrest or a bunch of occurrences that have been cleared up, okay that needs to be addressed and acknowledged. Um, usually if it's something big I would liaise with some of the other units, whether it be hold-up or the drug squad for example. If it's someone they've been looking at for doing a bunch of, uh, bank robberies or hold-ups at ESSOs or Shell Gas stations or whatever. Um, and ensure that the proper documentation has been put forward. Um, and recognize the officer again in a public forum saying, "hey good job well done, documentation to follow." And that's also something the officers would have in their personnel file to look at years gone by whether it be throughout their career or through retirement and say, I had a sergeant that actually spent the time and took the time to reach out and say to me, "thank you for doing my job", and recognized my efforts.

<u>Training</u>

"Give them a better understanding of it" (Sergeant #8)

Policing scholarship suggests that proper training can have a positive impact on the conformance of police officers (Bradstreet, 1997, pp. 2-5). Sergeants from my sample perceive that if officers are trained properly to understand the requirements of the policy and how to apply it on the road, they are more likely to conform to it. The interview data show that 35.3% of the respondents perceive that training is a method used by a sergeant to achieve conformance to the policy.

Sergeant #4 conveys the steps taken when the policy was implemented to ensure officers received the proper training. This sergeant also describes what sergeants do to complement this training:

> So when the procedure [Regulated Interactions Policy] was changed, again on a training date, we had somebody come in and do a presentation on what the actual changes entailed, what the procedure meant, and what it meant for how they [officers] conducted day-to-day operations and their day-to-day job. Um, we've had also subsequent conversations in regard to when they're able to utilize that interaction and the new definition of the interaction. Um, as well, to make sure that officers are aware of their authorities. So we review authorities quite often. Um, so that officers, uh, and ourselves are aware of when you could stop individuals, what authority you have to stop individuals, how you could justify stopping individuals. So it's done under that criteria, which is important.

This sergeant also suggests that by personally reviewing the policy with officers, sergeants are able to supplements an officer's training, which increases the likelihood that an officer conforms to the policy:

> We go over authorities quite often. We review the procedure. We reviewed it a couple times already, um, and are planning to do so again in the early New Year. Um, you know, discuss what it entails including receipts, including the questions that you have to answer, or the, how you have to interact and what you actually have to say.

Sergeant #5 recounts developing a training initiative to aid with officer conformance to the policy. This sergeant undertook this initiative after becoming aware that officers lacked comprehension of the policy. By combining several methodologies this sergeant was able to provide additional training to officers. The sergeant explains:

> I created some mock scenarios and we sort of did that on parade so people became more familiar and more comfortable because it was new and unfamiliar they didn't want anything to do with it. We did a bunch of scenarios, what if situations, and we talked about it as they became more familiar with it. It was almost like a light bulb went off and some of them, like okay this really isn't a big deal, we're still doing what we normally do, you just have to articulate, you know what I mean, articulate why you're doing it a little bit more and they realized it wasn't a huge deal. We had little cheat sheets for your memo book where officers could say, you know, if you ask someone for their identification in this scenario, what are your grounds? And that way if they needed a refresher they had it in their memo books. And they could just sort of use that as a

> refresher. I find that it's just um, not being educated on it enough is what was causing the biggest amount of fear, is the not knowing right.

Encouraging

"Bring them along with me" (Sergeant #3)

Previous findings demonstrate that supportive sergeants make their officers feel more reassured when executing their duties and less likely to face discipline if they make a mistake (Engel, 2001, pp. 349-350). Respondents perceive that encouraging frontline officers through motivational speaking and by providing examples of the benefits of conforming to the policy motivates officers to follow the rules. The interview data show that 29.4% of the respondents perceive that encouraging is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy.

Consistent with the above, respondents encourage officers to conform to the policy by reminding them that they will be protected as long as they demonstrate proper conduct. Sergeant #13 explains how this is done:

> I try to tell these guys [officers], stop trying to hide it, stop trying to covertly do your job. Do your job, be mindful, and as long as you conduct yourself professionally, you're going to be okay.

Respondents suggest that communicating benefits such as successful arrests, clearing occurrences, locating missing persons, gathering criminal intelligence, and improving police-public relations, encourages officers to engage in the policy. Sergeant #5 discusses the types of encouragements given to officers to motivate their conformance to the policy:

> I just encourage them [officers] to do it. It's intelligence, it's intelligence gathering. It's getting to know your community and it's not a bad thing, you know what I mean. Everyone's so afraid, like oh its negative and I say you know, back in the day, when we did 208's, which is collecting information on people, it wasn't just because we wanted to get the bad guys and know who their friends are. It helps locate missing persons because someone would go missing and we go back, you know we did a check on them six months ago, with these five people, so then we call those friends…Any intelligence for us is good and if you have the grounds to do it, there's nothing wrong with speaking with

> someone, getting to know them, and you know what I mean, and familiarizing yourself with them and who they are in the community. If anything it could help you in the future.

Sergeant #6 describes an occasion when his officers were encouraged to engage in the policy. This sergeant was honest with his or her officers. First, this sergeant acknowledged the challenges presented by the policy and then spent time discussing why understanding and engaging in the policy is important:

> I was honest, I said, "this [Regulated Interactions Policy] is not gonna make our job any easier that's the truth. I will be lying to you and I would lose credibility if I was to say it's going to make the job easier or better. It's not, it's more difficult and what we need to understand is that this is what it is now, this is what it is. And I know that some people, I know some of you are not going to want to use this at all, right. I understand that, but the reason why we have to learn it, and the reason why you have to understand it, and the reason why you have to still value it as a tool, is…a circumstance may arise, where you consciously, and your police instincts are gonna put you in a position where you're gonna have to get somebody's, ask somebody their name right and if you're in that position you need to know what to do".

<u>Disciplining</u>

"None of them want to be disciplined" (Sergeant #3)

The method, disciplining, was discussed in the preceding section. Consistent with that discussion, the respondents perceive that disciplining is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy, mainly due to the overwhelming desire of officers to avoid being disciplined. The interview data show that 17.6% of the respondents perceive that disciplining is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy.

Respondents discuss how the severity of the misconduct in relation to the policy dictates whether or not an officer will be disciplined informally or formally. For instance, sergeant #1 explains how repercussions for breaching the policy can range from a verbal warning to formally putting "pen to paper". This sergeant also discusses an approach used by sergeants referred to as

progressive discipline: the potential for the severity of an officer's punishment to increase in cases when an officer commits misconduct more than once. The sergeant explains:

> It all comes down to the severity of what they've [police officer] done. Have they forgotten? Is it to the point where maybe they used...have they cursed at the person to something as minor as they forgot to tell the person that they're on camera and audio? That's minor to something where they've cursed at the person, they said something, let's just say in an unprofessional manner or they acted or they've forgotten to put the proper paperwork in…But at the end of the day, that's a risk that has to be identified quickly and stomped on...It all depends on the officer and history. Is there a history of this? Then maybe it would have to result to putting it to paper. Is this a one-off situation, where maybe I'm speaking to and explaining, going over procedure, going over, this is what you did, let's watch the video, what were you thinking here? You know, something like that. But if you have a person that had a history of non-compliance of different types of things, you have to deal with it more serious because it's only going to grow.

In relation to the policy, sergeant #1 suggests that the type of discipline administered by sergeants is relative to the severity of the breach that is uncovered. This sergeant discusses how misconduct is investigated:

> Did this guy [officer] use racial slurs? Has this guy cussed at the person? I focus on race, but it could be a person of the same race. And that person swears you know, you drop an 'F' word or whatever. I have to take disciplinary action. I've done that personally in a, in a discipline investigation, an almost slang term, a side issue, I don't know, any, they use this term side issue but another disciplinary incident appears from an initial investigation so you're investigating something but the officer tells that person you know what um, I'll use my name for example, uh, you know, [name of respondent] you're a real fucking asshole. Well now, I've identified that, I can't pretend that's not happening. I'm watching it, my investigation is gonna be open to many eyes who's gonna view this video as well and they're gonna say, well you're in this position, you should know better, you know there's consequences for that action. Maybe not as serious, might be a caution to minimal hours but at the end of the day, you have to do it.

Summary

The interview data show empirical support for a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. The methods that sergeants achieve conformance to the policy are: (1) auditing; (2) being present; (3) rewarding; (4) training; (5) encouraging; and (6) disciplining. This section has further demonstrated that sergeants

positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. The above methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the policy are illustrated in the following mind map labeled Illustration 4.

Illustration 4. Mind Map of the Methods used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy



Further to the above, this section lends its support for an analytical model that illustrates the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. In developing this model, the following findings are acknowledged: (1) That rewarding and disciplining are recurring methods that a sergeant achieves conformance in a police organization, and in particular, to the policy; and (2) that auditing, being present, training, and encouraging are methods that a sergeant achieves conformance from frontline officers that is specific to the Regulated Interactions Policy. Combining these findings provides support for Illustration 5:

Illustration 5. Analytical Model Illustrating the Methods used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy

In Section 7.5, below, I present the findings related to officers' perceptions of the state of police-citizen interaction.

6.5 Findings on Officer's Perceptions of the State of Police-Citizen Interaction

The importance of positive police-community relations is supported in the literature of several policing scholars (Frank et al., 2005, p. 207; Gaines & Kappeler, 2011, p. 412; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998, p. 547; Tyler, 2005, p. 322; Worrall, 1999, p. 47). Notwithstanding, a gap in knowledge exists of the "social perception" on the part of the police. Few studies have examined the police officer's perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction. This last section of findings attempts to contribute to this dearth in literature and forms an assessment of police-citizen interaction from the perceptions of the respondents. In this study, police-citizen interaction refers to an actual physical interaction between frontline officers and members of the public – interactions or investigations that may, or do lead to "street checks" and "carding" as

defined in Chapter One. A consistent theme that emanated from the interviews, helping us to understand the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction is, 'reactive'. This is primarily demonstrated by the comments made by respondents that discuss 'depolicing' efforts (discussed in Chapter Seven) and the decline of "street checks" and "carding".

The respondents perceive that frontline officers do not proactively engage with members of the community unless they are compelled to do so by way of a radio call. This sweeping disengagement from the community is explained as the result of the perceived risks that are associated with, and repercussions for improperly interacting with members of the public. The respondents suggest that officers have weighed the pros and cons of proactively interacting with and investigating members of the public and have decided as a majority, that the cons outweigh the pros. The interview data show that 100% of the respondents perceive that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction, is one that is reactive. Sergeant #2 describes this view:

> Officers are taking a cautious approach and rather than stopping lots of people and having to justify why they're stopping them, they're simply not stopping people.

Sergeant #5 also provides support for this sentiment:

> Honestly, the attitude is um, we don't wanna bother. We're gonna get shit on, we're gonna get questioned about it. It's too much hassle. They just can't be bothered so they just drive around.

Sergeant #13 attempts to justify officers' disengagement from the public by citing manipulated statistics publicized in the media and public activists that use these numbers for their own agendas. This sergeant suggests that the relationship between the police and the public is uncompromising:

> We talk to people at a radio call. There'll be no proactive policing because it could be misinterpreted and it seems to be no middle ground. I understand what the Service is saying and in theory, in a utopia, I believe in it. But then there's the reality. The reality

> is that these statistics and those that are so against them, in their existence in their entirety. Desmond Cole for example, who for me has done more to destroy the relationship between some of these communities because he has his own agenda. And there's no common ground, there's no middle ground for him.

Sergeant # 13 also describes how changes in legislation (the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy) has changed the way police officers investigate members of the public – clearly suggesting that officers' hands are tied and criminals now have the advantage:

> As a PRU [Primary Response Unit] 10 years, if you see two suspicious males standing on the street corner in the middle of the night, in minus 25, out of place right, who in their right mind would stand on the street corner? So you would go up to them, what are you doing here and get some information and that would be investigative. Now you could see the same two guys standing on the street corner and I don't think it would fly as to, you could walk up to them and the guys could tell you, "fuck you, I don't have to tell what my name is" and they could walk away. I think as a police officer you can't do that – when you think something is up and the person walks away, they could challenge that, you can't go after them and try to get their information, and the guys on my shift they're all of that mentality, you let them know you have to let it go.

Sergeant #1 discusses how growing frustration and disappointment has caused he or she to take a step back and avoid confrontation:

> Um, I think, I know personally for me, it takes a lot out of me and uh, especially for people who really believe in what they do. You throw your hands in the air and say, "you know what, uh, maybe I should just shut up and do my job, do my calls, write my tickets, do what I'm required to do and other things unless it's really needed I'm just not gonna engage."

Sergeant #13 blames officer disengagement from the public on the irresponsible directions of senior management. This sergeant refers to the culture of the police service and claims that once you tell an officer to stop doing something – even once – there is no turning back:

> Out there the rank and file are saying, "well I'm not stopping anybody. I can't because if I stop anybody I'm a racist right". Measuring that against all, you only have to tell a police officer once don't do something and then you lost them for life. They will never do it again. It's inherent of what we are as a human being and their police culture. Just tell a cop he doesn't have to do anything. There you go. You've lost them for life.

When asked about the state of carding, sergeant #5 responds with intermittent laughter, stating:

> No one really fills out the um, the paperwork. That's another thing. Nobody wants to fill out those little pieces of paper. Nobody carries them. You could ask probably a 1000 officers if they carry them and probably two people will tell you they do. Like nobody even knows where they are. Nobody carries them.

Lastly, sergeant #10 conveys his perception of the outcome of police-community disengagement and the halt of "street checks" and "carding". This sergeant highlights the deteriorating relationship between the police and the public and links it to the rising levels of crime in the city:

> We see the impact of that now and homicide investigations um violent crimes, um break and enters, um, our homicide rate for solving is now down to 10%, hold-ups, uh both commercial, I'm sorry, small business…We should have, we should have as a Service looked at this a long time ago, and I'm talking decades. What has it created? A degree of animosity between the public and us. Um, basically now we've had to educate ourselves, look at how we conduct business, look at how we deal with people. Um, look at how we interact, um, unless the officer's actions are based in law they're putting themselves at a huge disadvantage and risk.

Summary

The interview data confirms that the respondents perceive that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction, is one that is reactive. This is consistent with research that demonstrates withdrawal of efforts by police when the perceived risks are high (discussed further in Chapter Seven) (see Oliver, 2017).

6.6 Conclusion

In Chapters Five and Six, three sections of findings have been presented as they pertain to our understanding of how sergeant's perceive (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance, in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; and (3) officers' perceptions of the state of police-citizen interaction. This chapter has provided empirical support for the existence of a number of perceived factors (factors) that

facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers. This chapter has also provided empirical support for the supposition that there are a number of methods that sergeants use to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. The first two sections of findings lend empirical support for accepting the following two hypotheses: (1) The factors that may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers vary across a police organization (from one division to another) and (2) that sergeants positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. A third section provides additional empirical support for the following finding: that officers' perceptions of the state of police-citizen interaction, is one that is reactive. It is important to recognize that this study did not measure the effectiveness of the perceived factors or methods identified by respondents that facilitate, hinder, or are used to achieve conformance.

Chapters Five and Six have lent additional support for Chapter Four, which suggests that the dynamics of the police institution – the structural and cultural elements - impact the typology and attributes of a police organization and that over time, and particularly in the case of the Anglo-American policing model, have instilled a divide between police officers and the communities they serve, manifesting as reactive police-citizen interaction. These findings also emphasize that the cultural factors that may exist in a police organization; specifically, respect for militaristic rank and its ubiquitous rules and policies, shape the organizational reality of police officers. This acts to reinforce the mechanisms available to sergeants to achieve policy implementation at the street level and policy objectives via the conformance choices of frontline officers. In the next chapter, a discussion is presented that attempts to explain the findings of this research and delineates the policy implications for police organizations as a result.

Chapter Seven - Discussion

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I synthesize the findings of Chapters Four, Five, and Six. In doing so, I attempt to explain why the influence of societal dynamics has an impact on the typology and attributes of a police institution. This chapter also tries to clarify how it is that these dynamics over time have led to an increasing separation between police officers and the public. I also attempt to explain why it is that the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization – which are characteristic of bureaucratization – function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance and successful policy implementations in police organizations. In addition, I endeavor to explain why the cultural factors that may exist in a police organization, in particular; respect for militaristic rank and its pervasive rules and policies assist sergeants to achieve policy implementation at the street level and policy objectives via the conformance choices of frontline officers. Lastly, I attempt to explain the findings of the previous chapter related to: (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction.

This chapter is divided into two main discussions: (1) The perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization and (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance. For each discussion, the relevant findings are summarized, the relevant literature is integrated, the theoretical implications are

discussed, and implications for the policy process in police organizations are delineated. Following these two main discussions, a third discussion focusing on the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction is presented. This chapter concludes with a synthesis of these three discussions surrounding any policy implications for police organizations brought to light by this research. The three arguments made in this chapter were: (1) Police officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline (2) sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, by blending the payoffs of two approaches: an authoritative approach and a supportive approach; and (3) that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive.

7.2 The Factors that Influence a Sergeant's Capacity to Achieve Conformance

In section one of the findings, the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers were presented. This section begins with a recap of the relevant findings.

7.2.1 The Relevant Findings: Factors and Conformance

The interview data show empirical support for a number of factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general (police organization). These factors can be considered either external factors or internal factors. The external factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization are: (1) media portrayals of the police; (2) civilian oversight; (3) perceived levels of respect; (4) relationship between the police and citizens; and (5) number of public complaints.

The internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization are: (1) supervision; (2) internal discipline; (3) policy and procedure; (4) top-down command; and (5) parade. The external factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization are: (1) the Association and (2) media portrayals of the police. The internal factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization are: (1) staffing shortage; (2) morale; and (3) decisions of internal management.

Further, the interview data show empirical support for a number of factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular (the policy). These factors can also be considered either external factors or internal factors. The external factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance to the policy are: (1) civilian oversight and (2) media portrayals of the police. The internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance to the policy are: (1) policy and procedure; (2) internal discipline; and (3) training. The external factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance to the policy are: (1) media portrayals of the police and (2) number of public complaints. The internal factors that hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance to the policy are: (1) internal discipline; (2) confusing policy; (3) staffing shortage; and (4) tedious reporting process.

From the findings, the contextual nature of the external and internal factors in a police organization is supported by the variation in the frequency of the respondents who perceive these factors. For instance, 94.1% of respondents perceive that 'media portrayals of the police' is an external factor that facilitates a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization. This contrasts sharply with the perception of the internal factor, 'morale'. In

relation to this factor, only 64.7% of the respondents perceive that morale is a factor that hinders a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization (see Chapters Five and Six where the frequencies are presented). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these findings offer support for the acceptance of the following hypothesis: The contextual factors that may be operating that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers vary across a police organization (from one division to another). This is the case for conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular.

I suggest that the external and internal factors identified above are akin to the structural, cultural, or social dynamics that exist in a police institution (see Chapter Four). These contextual factors help to define the typology and attributes of a police institution (the TPS). The contextual factors aid to explain the supposition that there is a divide between police officers and the public. Certain factors align with the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization – those elements that are characteristic of bureaucratization. Similarly, several factors are conducive to the cultural elements that may exist in a police organization, in particular; respect for militaristic rank and its proliferation of rules and policies. The next section integrates the relevant literature and the findings from the previous three chapters to further our understanding of why it is that these factors influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular.

7.2.2 Integration of the Literature: Factors in a Police Organization and Legitimacy

This section integrates the relevant literature to explain why it is that the perceived factors (factors) identified in this research facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve

conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy. In this discussion, it is theorized that frontline officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by either (1) improving police relations or (2) avoiding discipline. In this research, logic of legitimacy can be defined as a conformance-choosing logic, viewed through a sociological institutionalist lens by frontline officers, which helps evaluate conformance choices based on whether or not the choice is perceived to either improve police relations or avoid discipline. Legitimacy in this discussion can be defined as the interpretation by frontline officers that the public will perceive the police, whether represented as an individual police officer or an organization, as "succeeding at or fulfilling [his/her/its] raison d'etre" (Greene, 2017).

It is argued that the external and internal factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, influence frontline officers to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline. In other words, when officers choose whether or not to conform to a directive, they constructively formulate responses to two questions from their sociological perspectives: (1) Will my choice improve or damage police relations? (2) Will my choice increase the likelihood that I face discipline? This logic functions to operationalize or depict the influence (facilitate or hinder) that the structural, cultural, or social dynamics that exist in a police institution have on the conformance choices of frontline officers. This argument is supported below.

7.2.3 Conforming to Policy: Legitimacy and Improving Police Relations

The legitimacy of the Anglo-American policing model is grounded both in law and public consent (Mawby, 1999, p. 42). It is derived from the perception of "procedural justice",

meaning that the police must be authorized by the public to enact its business effectively (Tyler, 2004, p. 87). Notably, the decision of whether the actions of a police officer are perceived by the public as legitimate are less likely to be based on actual lived-experiences of the public and more likely to be based on whether such actions are understood post hoc to be procedurally fair (p. 91). Such a position is supported by Reiner (2010, pp. 71-77) who notes, when deconstructing the legitimacy of the modern police, the adherence to legal procedures and constraints is fundamental – it is the rule of law.

The importance of the public perception of modern police relations is made plain in the Peelian Principles: "the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions, and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect" (Reith, 1952, p. 157). Scholars also intimate that the police require a favourable level of support to be recognized as a legitimate institution by the public (Lai & Zhao, 2010, p. 685; Tyler, 2003, p. 286). The literature also demonstrates the benefits of good police relations, suggesting that improved working relations with citizens advance the objectives of the police (Gaines & Kappeler, 2011, p. 412; Lai & Zhao, 2010, p. 685; Tyler, 2005, p. 322; Worrall, 1999, p. 47). Of equal importance, scholarly research suggests that the failure of the police to appear legitimate can be disastrous and conducive to social tensions (B. Brown & Benedict, 2002, p. 545; Cox & Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 3; Tyler, 2003, p. 286): "If citizens do not trust the system, they will not use it" (M. Moore, 1997, p. 27). For instance, the Regulated Interactions Policy is a policy that governs the practices of "street checks" and "carding" of the TPS. It has been demonstrated that these practices have been perceived to impact negatively on the police relations that exist in Toronto (Rankin & Winsa, 2012b, par. 9; Toronto Police Service, 2013b, p. iii). Furthermore, perceptions of these practices have been equated to acts of

racial profiling (Rankin et al., 2002, para. 1-4). These negative public perceptions partner with a much larger history that involves the urban riots and protests that have occurred during the last half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Most of these riots have been attributed to unfavourable police actions and negative perceptions of police relations (Chernega, 2016, pp. 234-235; Cox & Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 143). In Canada, protests against police actions have followed the police-related deaths of Jermaine Carby, Andrew Loku and Marc Ekamba-Boekwa (Battersby, 2016, par. 1, 7, 18; Gallant & Gillis, 2015, par. 1). Consequently, the implementation of Regulated Interactions Policy – a policy implemented to prohibit the arbitrary detention of citizens - is viewed by police officers and government as paramount to re-establishing the legitimacy of the police and improving the relationship between the police and the impacted segments of society; namely, racialized communities.

From the above, it can be surmised that police officers recognize that a favourable level of support is required from the public for the police to be recognized as a legitimate institution. In other words, the police acknowledge that the public's assessment of police relations is considered integral for the police to maintain public consent to police society (Lai & Zhao, 2010, p. 685). It is posited that the external and internal factors identified in the findings that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, are significant because they are factors that influence frontline officers to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations. This argument also holds in situations when police officers avoid making choices that are not perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations. This includes police actions that result in outcomes perceived by the public as illegitimate, for instance, actions that do not conform to

the Regulated Interactions Policy: arbitrarily detaining a citizen, being perceived as racist, biased, or unprofessional. For instance, one respondent answers why an officer may be influenced to not engage in the Regulated Interactions Policy: "[It's] the fear of [being] publicly humiliated by the media, even though behaving lawfully" (Sergeant #13). This is an example of the use of the logic of legitimacy.

In summary, when considering both the findings and literature, it can be supposed that the external and internal factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, influence frontline officers to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations.

7.2.4 Conforming to Policy: Legitimacy and Avoiding Discipline

The present-day command and composition of the Anglo-American police organization remains a "quasi-military bureaucracy", operating under "legalistic and technocratic" conditions (Reiss, 1992, p. 57). Inside the organization, the chain of command reinforces these conditions, employing the militaristic notion of "unity of command" (McKenna, 1998, p. 117). Contributing to the professionalized workings of a contemporary police organization is the prevailing induction of administrative theory, which seeks to govern mandates and preserve legitimacy. As Manning notes,

> Policing is something like a business that produces a product for consumers; that police organizations are rational-legal bureaucracies; that administrators control through policy and decision making the mode and frequency of intervention of the police into daily life; and that administrators can guide, monitor, and control internal goal-attainment-related processes. (P. K. Manning, 1997, pp. 181-182)

Professionalization of the police organization has forged a "preoccupation with management, internal procedures, and efficiency" (Reiss, 1992, p. 92). Rules and regulations have been put in place to reduce the likelihood that employees commit misconduct, which may lead to individual and organizational disrepute. Outcomes that present as individual and organizational illegitimacy depart from the professionalized qualities of the modern police organization.

In support of this argument, consider the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy. This policy was implemented at the street level to govern police-citizen interactions. The intent of this policy is to restrict the choices of frontline officers that may be considered unfavourable by the public, illegitimate, or prone to discipline, in particular; to ensure voluntary police-citizen interactions are conducted without bias or discrimination and that the arbitrary race-based collection of identifying information by the police is banned (Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services, 2016d, par. 1, 2). Therefore, it becomes apparent that the Regulated Interactions Policy is an example of a policy implementation designed to decrease the likelihood that frontline officers will make conformance choices that result in discipline. This logic is also consistent with the finding of this study that demonstrates that an outcome of the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy has been a withdrawal of efforts by police in relation to public-police interaction because of the perceived high risks for officers associated to the policy (see Oliver, 2017).

The literature relating to police culture also reinforces the notion that the police institution is structured to preserve individual and organizational legitimacy by avoiding discipline. For instance, many of the "values, norms, perspectives, myths, and craft rules" (Reiner, 2010, pp. 110, 117) which inform police conduct are imbued with ways to avoid

discipline. Similarly, the "logic of appropriateness" (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 30) that has been proposed to also exist in police institutions, promotes occupational and organizational "coping mechanisms" (Paoline, 2003, pp. 200-201) that are designed so that officers avoid situations that may lead to misconduct. Therefore, it is conceptualized that aspects of police culture also serve to placate the hazards experienced by police officers that are likely to lead to discipline. As confirmed by one respondent who explains the perspective of an officer who does not engage in the Regulated Interactions Policy: "I don't want to get in trouble, it's the biggest influence" (Sergeant #4). This is an example of the use of the logic of legitimacy. This logic also serves to explain aspects of police culture including the exhibition of "coping mechanisms" which are thought to protect officers from their organizational and external environment (Kappeler et al., 1994, p. 74; Paoline, 2003, pp. 200-201). This logic also accounts for the suspicious attitudes held by officers toward their own administration (J. K. Cochran & Bromley, 2003, p. 89).

In summary, when considering both the findings and literature, it can be supposed that the external and internal factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, influence frontline officers to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by avoiding discipline. In the next section, the findings are discussed in the context of the conceptual framework.

7.2.5 Factors in a Police Organization: Theoretical Implications

This section explores what the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, mean for the assumptions of institutional theory. In particular, this section explores how these factors reconcile with the propositions associated with sociological

institutionalism. First, this section will discuss how the perceptions of the respondents afford the TPS the status of 'institution' as conceptualized within the institutional literature. Second, this section will confer how the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance meet the assumptions of sociological institutionalism.

7.2.6 The Toronto Police Service as an Institution

In this section, it is proposed that the TPS possesses a number of institutional qualities that confirm its characterization as an institution. These qualities are as follows: (1) The factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization lead to consistent perspectives surrounding the conformance choices of frontline officers; (2) the choices of frontline officers stemming from the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization are predictable; (3) the choices of frontline officers are governed by internally sanctioned rules and practices; and (4) frontline officers share a system of shared values and meaning. To support these propositions, institutional qualities that are conducive to the inner-workings of a police organization are discussed. For instance, institutions emit "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour" (Goodin, 1996, p. 21) much like a police organization. As such, police officers may be resistant to "idiosyncratic preferences" and "changing external circumstances" (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 3). Further, it is proposed that officers may make conformance choices under assumptions of "bounded rationality" (H. A. Simon, 1972, pp. 162-163). Consequently, police institutions may be replete with collections of rules and organized practices embedded in structures of meaning and resources (March & Olsen, p. 3). Lastly, the "cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements" that exist within a police institution may establish constancy and context to the social life (Scott, 2001, p. 48) of police officers.

Perspectives of the respondents surrounding the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance lend support for the assumptions of institutional theory, specifically, how an institution is characterized. For instance, 'parade', which is an internal factor that facilitates a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization, is perceived by the respondents to be a factor that creates aspects of "order and predictability" (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 4). This factor along with other factors presented in the findings, serve to "shape behaviour" and "define expectations" of its actors, constraining cognitive processes inside the organization's walls (Peters, 2012, p. 29). As one participant states: "On parade…I'll describe to them…anything they need to know" (Sergeant #8). Therefore, it is submitted that parade functions as a factor that constructs a 'logic of appropriateness' (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 30) for frontline officers. Further, parade serves to reinforce on a regular basis the "culturally-specific practices" and basic assumptions shared by officers, perpetuating common frames of reference, thoughts, and actions and supporting a collective "social reality" (Chan, 1997, p. 68; Sackmann, 1991, p. 33; Schein, 1983, p. 14). In summary, the findings demonstrate support for the characterization of the TPS as an institution according to institutional theory.

7.2.7 Conforming to Policy: The Assumptions of Sociological Institutionalism

In this section, it is suggested that the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the assumptions of sociological institutionalism. In particular, this section will demonstrate how these factors influence the conformance choices of frontline officers in ways that are consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of sociological institutional theory. Hall and Taylor (1996, pp. 946-947) suggest that institutions and

organizations are characterized by processes, policies, and practices that are "culturally-specific" – transmitted and adopted by actors through belief systems and "frames of meaning" rather than as a means to achieve organizational efficiencies. In other words, organizational policy and procedure stem from socially constructed and socially appropriated logic rather than for reasons of rational instrumentality such as cost-benefit outcomes (Campbell, 2004, pp. 18-19; Scott, 2001, p. 44). Therefore, the assumptions of sociological institutionalism rely on cognitive frames of reference and cultural belief systems to construct the governing rule systems of organizations (Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 2001, p. 44). Moreover, assumptions of sociological institutionalism suppose that institutional actors make decisions and behave according to "taken-for-granted cognitive structures" grounded in "scripts, schema, habits, and routines" that they possess and through which they interpret the world" (Campbell, p. 19). There is an emphasis on "cognitive processes" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 343) that are subscribed to by institutional actors for social purpose.

The findings further demonstrate how the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance meet the assumptions of sociological institutionalism as discussed above. For instance, the findings suggest that many of the external and internal factors that facilitate or hinder conformance in a police organization are endorsed organization-wide. For example, the external factor 'media portrayals of the police' and the internal factor 'supervision' demonstrate high frequencies (both 94.1%) associated with the perceptions of the respondents. Consequently, it may be inferred that these high frequencies among the respondents are considered "socially appropriate" perceptions of sergeants of the TPS (Hall & Taylor, p. 950). These findings further support the proposition that the perceptions of sergeants

in a police organization are constrained. This is consistent with assumptions theorized by sociological institutionalists.

Notwithstanding, the findings may also offer some sort for differentiating perspectives among officers of what may be considered "socially appropriate". For instance, only 47.1% of the respondents perceive that 'number of public complaints' is an external factor that facilitates a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance. This particular finding offers support for the initial hypothesis that the contextual factors that may be operating that influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers vary across a police organization (from one division to another). In addition, this finding may also offer support for the position that police culture may be better conceptualized in the plural. This position, which is supported by several contemporary scholars, suggests that the depiction of a universal culture that unites police officers may be overemphasized. Instead, scholars indicate that a number of different cultural or subcultural orientations may exist among officers and may be contextualized as a result of a number of factors, including an officer's background, social environment, and positional authority (Chan, 1996, p. 112; Mastrofski, 2004, p. 102; Paoline, 2003, p. 199; Paoline et al., 2000, pp. 576-577; Sparrow et al., 1990, pp. 133-134). Consistent with the findings from Chapter Four (structural elements and empirical support for professionalization and centralization) and Chapter Three (Study Participants: Sample Descriptives), Loftus (2010a, p. 2) suggests that increasing standards of education, more racialized and female officers, and other developments such as the professionalization and centralization of police organizations over the past three decades offer additional support for the plural conceptualization of police culture.

It can be further supposed that inside a police organization, institutional constraints normalize how frontline officers perceive social legitimacy. Such constraints may also dictate

the ways in which frontline officers respond to uncertainty or change (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 949-950). It is suggested that the cognitive limits that may exist in a police organization are analogous to the "logic of appropriateness" discussed earlier. For instance, in reference to the findings, when examining the internal factor, 'internal discipline', this factor is perceived by the respondents to be inherent, meaning police officers unanimously recognize accountability structures and make decisions that minimize exposure to situations that may result in discipline. As one participant states: "Everybody [police officers] is just sort of accountable to the person that they're accountable to, for lack of, I don't know really how to describe it, that's the way it works and everybody is sort of aware that's how it works" (Sergeant #4). Therefore, it is proposed that the participant perception of the factor internal discipline represents a socially constructed interpretation of a taken-for-granted institutional practice – a practice that protects frontline officers and maximizes the social legitimacy of the individual police officer and the police organization.

In addition, external and internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy, for instance, 'media portrayals of the police', help explain participant perceptions of factors that are understood to be institutionally and socially appropriate across a police organization. For instance, the choices made by frontline officers to avoid the media while on duty are considered conformance choices based on a socially constructed reasoning that media portrayals of the police impacts officers negatively. Consequently, frontline officers perceive that the negative portrayal of police by the media results in unfavourable outcomes that do not promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline. It is theorized then, that this awareness represents "preconditioned cognitive beliefs" (Zucker, 1977, p. 726) of frontline officers - acting

to constrain behaviour, or in the case of the Regulated Interactions Policy, influencing the choice of officers to conform. In summary, the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the assumptions of sociological institutionalism. In the next section, these factors are discussed in terms of their congruence with the policy implementation literature.

7.2.8 Conforming to Policy: The Policy Process

In this section, it is suggested that the perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the theoretical assumptions of a top-down policy process, including a top-down approach to policy implementation. Notwithstanding, it is also suggested that the findings support the value of a bottom-up approach to policy implementation in police organizations, in particular, the importance of input from sergeants and frontline officers charged with implementing policy at the street level. At the root of these findings is the supposition that the incorporation of a 'participative management-style' approach to policy implementation in a police organization may help prevent "policy failure" (Younis & Davidson, 1990, p. 3).

A police organization is inherently top-down in managerial style and generally compatible with Weberian bureaucratic principles (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 45; G. D. Russell, 1997, p. 569). In a police organization, Tayloristic sensibilities demand that policy implementation necessitates "formal rank, formal hierarchy, and a chain of unquestioned and unquestioning command" (Toch, 2008, p. 62). This is supported by Gau and Gaines (2012, p. 47), who suggest that for top-down implementation to be successful in a police organization, effective and authoritative communication must flow down the chain of command.

Consequently, police managers compose top-down initiatives for lower-ranking police officers to implement at the street level (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 46).

The findings of this research confirm this position. For instance, the internal factors that facilitate a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization, namely: (1) policy and procedure; (2) internal discipline; and (3) training, are also factors that are postulated to facilitate a top-down policy implementation. For example, the factor, 'policy and procedure', represents a formal construction of the desired policy outcome. The adherence to policy and procedure to accomplish policy goals is distinctive of the principles of scientific management. This action further corresponds with the theorizations of Goldstein (1990, p. 27): that policy in police bureaucracies serves to enliven "nonthinking compliance" from frontline officers. Policies and procedures act as "cultural artifacts" which act to perpetuate an organizational culture in police organizations and stabilize and reinforce the behaviour of individual officers (Schein, 2017, pp. 196-204). As one participant states: "If my officers don't follow them [policies], I potentially get in trouble with my supervisor, and likewise. So it kind of trickles down and trickles up, in that I'm responsible for the officers that work with me and my boss is responsible for my actions, and etc, etc, etc. That's how the rank structure works" (Sergeant #4). Therefore, it is suggested that the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the theoretical assumptions of a top-down policy process, including a top-down approach to policy implementation. This is especially the case for the Regulated Interactions Policy: a policy constructed at the Board-level (in adherence to Provincial Legislation) and implemented downwards from the Chief to frontline officers. It is suggested from the findings and literature

presented, that the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy is a firm example of how a police organization translates policy objectives into action via bureaucratic principles.

Despite the above position, the findings also provide support for the adoption of the bottom-up approach to policy implementation in a police organization. This is consistent with the literature that suggests that frontline officers are particularly resistant to reform and difficult to mobilize to effectuate change (Boba & Crank, 2008, p. 382; Goldstein, 1990, pp. 29-31; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008, p. 145). While many scholars attribute this resistance in-part to the occupational culture that exists in police organizations (Chan, 1996; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; G. Dean, 1995; Paoline, 2003), it has been suggested that this resistance may also be attributed to the general sentiment shared by sergeants and frontline officers; namely, that their views are often ignored and they are not included in the design and planning of an implementation (Toch, 2008, p. 60). This sentiment is further exacerbated by the common cultural belief of police officers that policies are frequently written by "civilians" (who do not understand policing), or are interfered with by politicians or other non-police characters (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, p. 316). For instance, the findings of this research suggest that the respondents perceive that 'confusing policy' is an internal factor in a police organization that hinders a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. This suggestion is grounded in the perception of the respondents that frontline officers who have the responsibility to implement the Regulated Interactions Policy at the street level, were not consulted at its design or planning stages. Frontline officers perceive this lack of consultation as the reason policies are written in confusing ways, and of consequence, choose not to conform to the policy. As one participant states: "I think the frustration from the officers is, I wanna do this, but you're making it so damn hard I'm just not gonna do it" (Sergeant #9). This outcome is

further supported in the literature. For instance, Applegate (2006, p. 369) suggests that policy-making is effectively continuous at the street level necessitating police officers to act as "street-level bureaucrats", modifying policy as needed despite top-down direction. A similar proposal is discussed by Fridell (2004, p. 7), who suggests that higher commitment from all ranks, including frontline officers, can lead to greater adherence to policy initiatives. This type of collaborative involvement referred to as "participative management" by Steinheider and Wustewald (2008, p. 146), may mitigate the resistance from frontline officers to well-intentioned and planned policy initiatives. Therefore, it is postulated in this discussion that a bottom-up approach to policy implementation in a police organization may also be an effective way of achieving implementation success.

In summary, it is suggested that the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, support a top-down approach to policy implementation. However, the findings and integrated literature also support the utility of a bottom-up approach to policy implementation in police organizations. This supposition acknowledges that the contributions of sergeants and frontline officers may be crucial to preventing an implementation failure – this is especially notable in the case of the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy, which is perceived by the respondents to be high risk, impractical, confusing, and contrary to perceived law enforcement objectives. In the next section, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance are discussed.

7.3 The Methods used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance

In section two of the findings, the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization in general, and the Regulated

Interactions Policy in particular, are presented. This section begins with a recap of the relevant findings.

7.3.1 The Relevant Findings: Sergeants

The interview data show empirical support for a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy. The methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, are: (1) communication and translation; (2) rewarding; (3) disciplining; (4) being present; (5) providing guidance; (6) leading by example; and (7) knowing your people. The interview data show empirical support for a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. The methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy, are: (1) auditing; (2) being present; (3) rewarding; (4) training; (5) encouraging; and (6) disciplining. It is safe to conclude that these findings offer support for the acceptance of the following hypothesis: That sergeants positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. In the next section, two approaches are proposed that explain the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers.

7.3.2 Integration of the Relevant Literature: Two Approaches

This section attempts to explain the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy. To do so, this section integrates the findings and relevant public administration, police supervisory, and police culture literature to offer explanations.

From an analysis of the findings, combined with the literature presented below it is theorized that sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers by blending two approaches: (1) an authoritative approach and (2) a supportive approach. By incorporating the

findings, it can be suggested that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization that are aligned with an authoritative approach, include: 'disciplining' and 'being present'. It is also suggested that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization that are aligned with a supportive approach, include: 'communication and translation', 'rewarding', 'providing guidance', 'leading by example', and 'knowing your people'. Similarly, by incorporating the findings, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy that are aligned with an authoritative approach include: 'auditing', 'being present', and 'disciplining'. In addition, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy that are aligned with a supportive approach include: 'rewarding', 'training', and 'encouraging'. In this section, support for the above is drawn from the police supervisory literature that relates to police supervisory styles. Lastly, it is proposed that these two police supervisory approaches are not dueling or mutually exclusive and can be combined in effective ways to achieve conformance from frontline officers. The next section begins with a discussion surrounding the authoritative approach.

7.3.3 Sergeants: An Authoritative Approach

In modern, professionalized and centralized police organizations it is the influence of the rank structure and rules and regulations that have formal charge over the behaviour of police officers (Crank & Langworthy, 1996, p. 225). As Kelling and More (1988, p. 6) submit, supervision, a limited span of control and the flow of instructions downward are employed by the heads of centralized police organizations to execute policy and regulate activity at the street level. Reiss (1971, p. 167) adds to this argument, noting that the actions of police officers that do not conform to policy are the lowest when the command of a police organization is

centralized and frontline supervision is conspicuous. This logic conforms to Wilson's (1968, p. 183) depiction of a "legalistic" police organization: the establishment of administrators over rank-and-file using formal authority and bureaucratic attributes. Such an approach further adheres to the regulatory schema associated with traditional public administration – "a firmly ordered system of super-and subordination" (Weber, 1946, p. 197).

The findings demonstrate support for the effectiveness of an authoritative approach in the supervision of frontline officers. Aligned with an authoritative approach, the findings suggest that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization include: 'disciplining' and 'being present'. Similar support for an authoritative approach is also observed in the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. In this case, the findings suggest that these methods include: 'auditing', 'being present', and 'disciplining'. For instance, consider the factor 'auditing' as an authoritative approach and a method that sergeants use to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. It is suggested that auditing by sergeants promotes the removal of discretion from the conformance choices of frontline officers. This is particularly important because the literature suggests that a frontline police officer's ability to exercise high degrees of discretion in their choice of self-initiated activities (for instance, those members of the public whom officers choose to stop and investigate) is problematic for achieving conformance (Chan, 1996, p. 12; Famega et al., 2005, p. 543; Van Maanen, 1983, p. 277). The problem of frontline officer discretion is further magnified because officers are able to exercise judgments related to how, when, and to whom they apply rules and regulations (R. Wortley, 2003, pp. 538-539). As one participant states: "We have a compliance check that we do every single day… watching a video, depending on what its title, like criminal…provincial offences, we will watch those…everything is being recorded…to

ensure that they're [police officers] being professional" (Sergeant #17). Consequently, it is submitted that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, are effective because they are aligned with an authoritative approach. This is primarily due to the command and control prerogatives of a sergeant's rank and a sergeant's organizational proximity to frontline officers.

To corroborate the above, it is also posited in the literature that the style employed by sergeants may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. For instance, in a formative study, Engel (2001) develops four distinct supervisory styles of sergeants; traditional, innovative, supportive, and active. Engel (pp. 347-350) reports that distinct supervisory styles lead to variable outcomes in terms of police behaviour. The authoritative approach discussed above is consistent with Engel's traditional supervisory style. A traditional supervisory style insists on controlling the behaviour of officers and measuring such behaviours against rules and regulations (pp. 347-348). It is submitted that the payoffs associated with the traditional supervisory style include frontline officers that are more likely to make choices that conform to policies due to their adherence to top-down command.

The effectiveness of an authoritative approach discussed above is also supported by Engel and Calnon (2003, pp. 135-136). They propose a 'command model of supervisory influence' to explain how sergeants influence the behaviour of police officers. In the command model, the actions and decisions of frontline officers are restricted through the influence of a sergeant's formal authority. With this authority, sergeants enforce compliance with policy and procedure constantly checking to see if standards are met.

Notwithstanding, it is important to point out that the traditional style suggested by Engel (2001) lacks an emphasis on seeking approval from the community, devalues police relations,

deprioritizes contact with citizens, and discourages new initiatives that depart form aggressive law enforcement tactics (pp. 349-350). This suggests that an authoritative approach to the supervision of frontline officers may not be an effective standalone supervisory approach to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and the Regulated Interactions Policy. An authoritative approach used alone may spur resistance to a policy implementation. Consequently, it may be beneficial to leverage the payoffs associated with a more supportive approach discussed below.

In summary, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, can be effective if aligned with an authoritative approach to the supervision of frontline officers. An authoritative approach maximizes the bureaucratic force that sergeants represent in a command and control hierarchy and their organizational proximity to frontline officers at the street level. The next section continues with a discussion surrounding the supportive approach.

7.3.4 Sergeants: A Supportive Approach

This section lends support for a supportive approach to the supervision of frontline officers. Despite the effectiveness of an authoritative approach discussed above, the literature suggests that this approach may have limitations. For instance, Johnson (2015, pp. 1156-1157) discusses three complexities related to police supervision: (1) It is difficult for sergeants to assess the actions of frontline officers because they are often subjective or contextual; (2) sergeants struggle to provide clear direction because the duties of police officers are frequently variable and contradictory; and (3) sergeants cannot be everywhere, meaning they cannot supervise all officers at all times. Propitiously, it has been suggested that there are other methods that sergeants may employ to be influential in achieving conformance from frontline officers without

being present or giving orders. For instance, the literature suggests the following mechanisms are effective: a sergeant's attitude, management skills, personal workload, and manner of communication (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002; Engel & Worden, 2003; Famega et al., 2005; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; R. R. Johnson, 2011); a sergeant's ability to demonstrate role modeling behaviours (Huberts et al., 2007, p. 238; R. R. Johnson, 2008, p. 347, 2011, p. 302); the amount of feedback and support provided by a sergeant (R. R. Johnson, 2015), a sergeant's ability to amass loyalty (Gau & Gaines, 2012, p. 54); a sergeant's degree of alignment of goals and objectives with frontline personnel (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 237); a sergeant's perception of the policy (Correia & Jenks, 2011, p. 30); a sergeant's ability to empower officers to make choices, and teamwork, coaching, tailoring efforts to individual officers, incorporating police traditions, keeping objectives small, public recognition, having practical and modest expectations, and working with the community (Bradstreet, 1997, pp. 2-5). From the above, it can be reasoned that the literature calls for a participative and inspirational style of supervision that is more likely to motivate officers to make choices that conform to policy.

A supportive approach to the supervision of frontline officers corresponds to Wilson's (1968, pp. 202-203) depiction of a "service-style" police organization: a police organization that has institutionalized a politically-sensitive bureaucracy – one that has high regard for local constituents and reinforces police relations and community concerns in all of its interactions with members of the public. The service-style police organization creates internal policies that emphasize service to the public by all ranks (1968, p. 203).

The findings demonstrate support for the effectiveness of a supportive approach to the supervision of frontline officers. Aligned with a supportive approach, the findings suggest that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization include:

‘communication and translation’, ‘rewarding’, ‘providing guidance’, ‘leading by example’, and ‘knowing your people’. Similar support for a supportive approach is also observed in the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. Aligned with a supportive approach, the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy include: ‘rewarding’, ‘training’, and ‘encouraging’. For instance, consider the factor ‘rewarding’ as a method that sergeants use to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. It is proposed that rewarding may be considered a supportive approach because it encourages frontline officers to conform to the Regulated Interactions Policy in the absence of direct supervision. Rewarding also encourages officers to make decisions that promote conformance choices that go above and beyond what is expected to advance police relations and improve service to the community. As one participant states:

> I saw officers dealing with kids, um at a call, the way they got down on the ground and talked to the kids…I brought it up on parade and training day in front of all the bosses that was in, and I said that was amazing that you guys got down on your knees, you brought yourself down to the kid’s level…and members of the public saw that. And then after one of the officers said to me, “oh it was awesome you brought that up in front of all the bosses”, and I always try to boost them up as much as I can (Sergeant #5).

In this case, it is proposed that rewarding encourages frontline officers to make decisions that surpass policy conformance expectations for a grander purpose: to seek recognition from peers, superiors and the public in situations that do not necessitate direct supervision or direct orders. This is particularly important because the literature suggests that the public’s assessment of police relations is indicative of whether or not a police organization is recognized as a legitimate institution within the community. Consequently, it is submitted that the methods used by

sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, are effective when aligned with a supportive approach. A supportive approach is compelling because when adopted by sergeants, it has the ability to encourage officers to conform to policy in a service-driven context without orders from, or the direct presence of sergeants.

Engel (2001, pp. 347-350) also corroborates the above in her formative study on distinct supervisory styles. It is submitted that the supportive approach discussed here is consistent with Engel's supportive supervisory style. A supportive supervisory style is a protective style that emphasizes encouragement through praise and the recognition of frontline officers (pp. 349-350). This supervisory style assures officers that they will be protected from unfair internal discipline (a form of rewarding) as long as their actions are in good faith (pp. 349-350).

The effectiveness of a supportive approach on the supervision of frontline officers is further supported by Engel and Calnon (2003, pp. 135-136) who propose an 'exchange or bargaining model of supervisory influence' to explain how sergeants influence the behaviour of police officers. In the exchange or bargaining model, the actions and decisions of frontline officers are proportionate to the support and rewards offered. Rewards may be considered protection from internal discipline, but may also be small favours, as confirmed in the findings. It is submitted that in exchange for rewards from sergeants, officers make choices - expressed as conformance to policies.

However, it is important to note that the supportive style suggested by Engel (2001, pp. 349-350) lacks emphasis on holding officers accountable for actions that do not conform to policy. A lack of accountability may lead to frontline officers that are not concerned with the repercussions of failing to conform to policy. This suggests that a supportive approach to the

supervision of frontline officers may not be sufficient on its own to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, without leveraging some of the payoffs associated with an authoritative approach discussed above.

In summary, the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, can be effective if aligned with a supportive approach to the supervision of frontline officers. A supportive approach advantages the impact of reciprocity rather than the influence of the formal chain command. This approach may be particularly effective when sergeants are unable to provide direct orders or when sergeants are not present to ensure conformance.

In conclusion, it is theorized in this discussion that sergeants achieve policy conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, by blending the payoffs of two approaches: an authoritative approach and a supportive approach. It is further theorized that these two approaches are not dueling or mutually exclusive and can be combined in effective ways to achieve conformance from frontline officers. In the next section, the findings are discussed in the context of the conceptual framework.

7.3.5 A Sergeant's Capacity: The Assumptions of Sociological Institutionalism

In this section, it is postulated that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, reconcile with the conceptual underpinnings of sociological institutional theory. It is posited that in a police organization, it is the sergeants that are most influential in compelling frontline officers to adopt "culturally-specific practices" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 946). Similarly, it is suggested that sergeants are positioned to exert organizational "values and cognitive frameworks" (Peters, 2012, p. 137) on frontline officers. In doing so, frontline officers adopt

practices considered institutionally "appropriate" (Campbell, 2004, p. 18). From the sociological institutional literature, it is further theorized that sergeants foster social knowledge (Zucker, 1977, p. 726) in police organizations, anchoring the behaviour and decisions of frontline officers. Consequently, it is supposed that sergeants act as transmitters, habituating a model of organizational and cultural appropriateness for frontline officers. Further, it is proposed, that in a police organization, the emergence of what is considered socially appropriate (Hall & Taylor, p. 949), serves to program the range of responses that are expected from frontline officers; namely, an officer's adherence to policy.

The findings further demonstrate how the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the assumptions of sociological institutionalism as discussed above. For instance, 'communication and translation', which is a method used by sergeants to achieve conformance in a police organization, is also perceived by the respondents to be a mechanism that translates policy directives into action organization-wide. As one participant states: "There has to be that transmission of knowledge from a corporate level to the field. And I think that's where sergeants are the best conduits for that information (Sergeant #14). Accordingly, it is posited that sergeants are able to impart on frontline officers a constructivist conceptualization (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948) of the meaning of organizational policies. In other words, it is postulated that sergeants assign institutional meaning to policies that are able to justify the desired conformance choices from frontline officers. It is further posited, that sergeants augment the social legitimacy of a policy by placing a high value on its adoption at the street level. Conceptualizing a sergeant as a social conduit of institutional and cultural practices conforms to the position of Skogan (2008, p. 25) who notes that it is the sergeants who possess the ability to

interpret for frontline officers the operational sense of a new policy, duly becoming the "transmission belt that translates policies …into action". In summary, it is suggested that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the assumptions of sociological institutionalism. In the next section, a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance is discussed in terms of its congruence with the policy implementation literature.

7.3.6 A Sergeant's Capacity: The Policy Process

In this section, it is suggested that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the theoretical assumptions of a top-down policy process, including a top-down approach to policy implementation. This is primarily due to a sergeant's key role in ensuring that directives are adhered to when policy implementations are adopted by police officers at the street level. This suggestion conforms to the general policy implementation literature which notes that frontline supervisors are key to securing a commitment from frontline workers to policy decisions (R. R. Johnson, 2011, p. 296). Moreover, it is suggested that frontline supervisors are a critical influence in determining the outcomes of any organizational change process (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 222).

The top-down approach to policy implementation appears as a series of commands carried down a bureaucratic chain of command (M. Clarke, 1992, p. 222). Under this approach, political influencers dictate the desired implementation and this preference is carried out with increased specificity as it reaches the lowest levels of the organization (p. 222). For implementation to occur as desired, obedience and administrative control are vital (Gunn, 1980, p. 5; Hood, 1976, p. 6). In addition, norms and rules must be embraced and objectives must be

carried out (p. 6). Likewise, Ham and Hill (1984, p. 99) suggest that total control over the implementing actors must be maintained during any implementation.

Police organizations mirror the policy process captured above. Police administrators issue directives which proceed down the chain of command through sergeants and eventually to frontline officers (Witte et al., 1990, p. 2). The paramilitary structure of the police organization serves to enhance the effectiveness of the rank structure and inherent chain of command (Toch, 2008, p. 62). Facilitating this process is the sergeant who plays a part in institutionalizing policies, meaning to ensure frontline officers conform to policy as customary (Boba & Crank, 2008, p. 384). Therefore, the literature supports the logic that police organizations rely on sergeants to achieve operational success (Engel, 2001, p. 341).

Sergeants are tasked to operationalize policy at the street level (Skogan, 2008, pp. 25-26) and are critical for the success of any policy implementation (Britz & Payne, 1994; Charles et al., 1992; J. R. Ingram & Weidner, 2011; G.L. Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Phillips, 2015; Skogan, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Importantly, the literature suggests that police organizations capitalize on a sergeant's ability to formally communicate information about new policies to officers. However, the literature also recognizes that it is the "informal, non hierarchical means of communication" between sergeants and frontline officers that serves to inform officers of what they ought to know. (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2005, p. 226).

The findings support the above propositions. Again, consider the method 'communication and translation'. The findings suggest that the respondents perceive that a sergeant can achieve conformance due their strategic positioning in a police organization, which permits them to communicate policies from the top - translating policy into action. According to the respondents, policies that are implemented by police organizations are often confusing, out of

date, or impractical. The respondents convey that sergeants are able to compensate for the above by communicating policies in easy-to-understand ways. Sergeants accomplish this task by using language that frontline officers can relate to - contextualizing the policy in ways that are relevant for officers and communicating any issues back up the chain of command that may be operationally problematic. As one participant states: "Sometimes I find that some, people [police officers] nod and say yes, when they don't really understand the terminology you've used. They haven't read between the lines or whatever it is. You sort of have to explain it in a certain way" (Sergeant #1).

These findings are consistent with the research of Brunetto and Farr-Wharton (2005, p. 226) who note that sergeants possess the ability to bolster official messages, serving to increase a policy's legitimacy. Consequently, it is suggested that in a police organization, it is the sergeants that facilitate a downward channel of communication – a linkage between the policy objectives of the Chief and the activities of frontline officers. In doing so, sergeants are able to influence the goal-alignment and conforming behaviours of frontline officers to policy objectives. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the literature and findings clearly articulate the supposition that sergeants are well-positioned to positively influence the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions.

The findings also support these propositions when considering the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. Take for instance the method 'encouraging'. The findings suggest that the respondents perceive that a sergeant achieves conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy by encouraging commitment to policy furnished from the top. For instance, sergeants encourage frontline officers to conduct regulated interactions with members of the public and complete the appropriate documentation.

Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that the respondents convey that sergeants encourage conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy in ways that officers understand and appreciate. For instance, the findings show that sergeants often explain how conforming to the Regulated Interactions Policy can improve public relations, improve intelligence for solving crimes, and make the jobs of frontline officers easier. As one participant states: "I just encourage them to do it. Its intelligence, its intelligence gathering, it's getting to know your community and it's not a bad thing you know what I mean" (Sergeant #5). This perception corroborates the policing literature that suggests that sergeants represent a "critical nexus" (Brewer, 2005, p. 506) in a police organization between all the potential activities that a frontline police officer may engage in and the work that is actually realized once that officer leaves the station. In summary, it is suggested that the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy, meet the theoretical assumptions of a top-down policy process, including a top-down approach to policy implementation. In the next section, the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction is discussed.

7.4 The Police Perspective of the State of Police-Citizen Interaction

While this dissertation did not initially intend to seek out the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction, this data did emerge during the interviews - primarily the result of the policy issue being investigated – and could not be ignored due to its importance in furthering our understanding of the contextual factors that exist inside a police organization. Accordingly, in this section, the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction is discussed. This dissertation has adopted a post-revisionist interpretation of the role of the professional police to account for the trending police relations that exist in contemporary society.

The post-revisionist interpretation acknowledges crime rates and other traditional factors, but also acknowledges the influence of societal pressures and places significant weight on class division and capitalistic lineaments (a function of a liberal-democratic society) (Jones, 1983, p. 153; Reiner, 2010, p. 48). This perspective in-part, emphasizes that when a segment of society does not conform to order, resists political conformism, departs from conservative morals, or engages in criminal activity, the police in bureaucratic form is to re-establish and preserve control of those segments (Reiner, pp. 41, 53). When adopted by the police, this prehension of police-public engagement may serve to exacerbate societal power relations that exist and the unequal treatment of society's oppressed: recurrently those that are marginalized and racialized (Silver, 1967, p. 8).

The findings demonstrate that the perceptions of the respondents are supportive of the above interpretation. For example, the respondents acknowledge in their own words that society is composed of inequality and privilege. Notwithstanding, the respondents express frustration with certain segments of the community: for instance, the "Blacks" (Sergeant #7, 17) and the "Desmond Cole types" (Sergeant #13, 17). This perspective is consistent with elements of the post-revisionist interpretation, criticizing the traditional interpretation by suggesting that the respondents perceive that the role of police is one of regulation - controlling the crime, morality, and nonconformism of certain segments of society, when necessary. As one participant states: "We don't come into contact the majority of time with 9 am to 5 pm employed, hard-working, two kids, soccer moms, soccer dads, whatever we deal with a small segment of community that unfortunately lives a lifestyle that's not necessarily compliant with the rest" (Sergeant # 10). This statement is also congruent with Reiner (2010, p. 53), articulating that the enactment of the professional police is "instrumental" for the capitalist class of society to manage disorder, control

crime and morality, and subdue political nonconformism in the interest of a plutocrat agenda. Notwithstanding, the above findings can also be critical of the revisionist interpretation by questioning the possibility that there is any amicable relationship between the police and citizens. As one participant states: "They [police] want to do a good job for people and make sure that it's done right" (Sergeant #4). This statement is consistent with a "preventative policing" mandate: (Reiner, p. 43; Reith, 1952, p. 171; Wilson, 1973, p. 589). Consequently, the post-revisionist interpretation holds after an analysis of the findings – the respondents perceive their role as population regulators and community helpers.

The perception of the public that the police engage in racial profiling has led to a mistrust of police officers and the criminal justice system in its entirety (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003, p. 23; C. C. Smith, 2007, p. 63). Reasonably, these negative attitudes toward the police have created social tensions (Cox & Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 3), which have increased the amount of conflict and hostility toward the police, resulting in a loss of respect for police officers and a loss of confidence in police credibility and legitimacy (Henry, 1994, p. 224; James, 1998, pp. 171-174; Melchers, 2003, p. 348; Ontario Human Rights Commission, pp. 26-28). Consequently, it is suggested that the social tensions that currently exist between the police and the community have had an impact on the coping mechanisms of police officers (see Paoline, 2003, pp. 200-201) – a manifestation of the occupational culture of police officers. For instance, it is posited that coping mechanisms such as cultural and social constructions of the "us versus them" mentality; conceptualizations of the "brotherhood in blue", and understandings of the "unquestioning loyalty" that police officers have to each other (see Bouza, 1990, p. 74) have been reinforced. For instance, one participant states: "Out there the rank and file are saying, well I'm not stopping anybody. I can't because if I stop anybody I'm a racist" (Sergeant #13).

It is proposed that the result of reinforced coping mechanisms within the police institution or organization is a disinclination by officers to proactively interact with members of the public, leading to a relationship between the police and the community that can be most accurately defined as one that is 'reactive'. This reactive relationship is further demonstrated in the findings. For instance, the findings demonstrate that the respondents perceive that any efforts of the police to operate proactively have been discontinued, that certain segments of the community, particularly those that are racialized, are hostile or threatening towards the police, and that the only reason to interact with members of the public is in response to a radio call. Further, the respondents convey that the practices of "street checks" and "carding" have been overwhelmingly eliminated. As one participant states: "I've never been in a situation with anything to do with a street check at all right…I never seen anyone do one and I've never heard anyone talk about them" (Sergeant #6). A second participant states: "I don't think any officer wants to stop somebody to talk to them and told, screw off" (Sergeant #7). Similarly, a third participant states: "We talk to people at a radio call. They'll be no proactive policing" (Sergeant #13). A fourth participant sufficiently summarizes this reactive proposition: "We're gonna get shit on, we're gonna get questioned about it. It's too much hassle. They [police officers] just can't be bothered so they just drive around" (Sergeant #5). Consequently, the research findings support a police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction that is one that is reactive.

This argument is supported by recent annual reports of other Ontario police services related to their "street checks" and "carding" practices. For instance the annual reports of the Peel Regional Police and the Ottawa Police Service post-implementation of Provincial racial profiling legislation demonstrate that the amount of documented interactions between the police

and the community has plummeted in recent months[22]. It is expected that an equivalent report authored by the TPS, will be released to the public sometime in 2018, and will demonstrate an identical and dramatic decrease in documented regulated interactions.

The findings, corroborated by the above reports, support a dramatic decline of proactive police-interaction and the practices of "street checks" and "carding" since the implementation of the Provincial racial profiling legislation and related internal policies. Furthermore, the findings support a dramatic disinclination by Toronto police officers to document regulated interactions and an aversion to engage with members of the public outside of radio calls. This perception is particularly pronounced in the findings and is congruent with a concept referred to as 'depolicing', which can be defined as a withdrawal of efforts by police in certain communities - in particular, those that are racialized (see Oliver, 2017). The implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy has had the effect of disuniting the police and the public by minimizing proactive policing because of a fear held by officers related to its potential to further damage police relations or face discipline. It is further submitted that the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy has led to increased centralization and bureaucratization of the police organization due to the creation and adoption of a more detailed and legalistic policy than what existed prior and the additional documentation requirements that are associated with a regulated interaction. Centralization and bureaucratization are structural elements of the police

[22] A report to the Peel Regional Police Services Board authored by the Peel Regional Police on February 27, 2018, showed that this police service had documented two regulated interactions for the entire year of 2017 (Peel Regional Police, 2018, 13/03). In previous years, the Peel Regional Police was averaging 26,000 documented interactions per year (Douglas, 2018, par. 1). Likewise, a report to the Ottawa Police Services Board authored by the Ottawa Police Service on January 29, 2018, showed that this police service had documented five regulated interactions between March 28, 2017 and December 31, 2017 (Ottawa Police Service, 2018, p. 4). This is a police service that conducted over 45,000 documented interactions between 2011 and 2014 (Cossette, 2018, "Between 2011").

organization that can have the effect of separating the police from the community. Therefore, the findings and discussion support the position that the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction (in Toronto) is one that is reactive.

Lastly, in terms of deciding whether the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy has thus far been a 'policy success' or 'policy failure', the findings from this research suggest the following: If the policy objective is to prevent police officers from requesting identifying information from members of the public in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner, then there has been significant 'policy success'. The increased accountability measures that have been achieved because of the introduction and consequences of a legalistic policy have caused officers to refrain from entering into regulated interactions with members of the public. However, if the implementation of this policy has led to a decrease in proactive policing and diminished police-citizen interaction, 'policy failure' may also be a reasonable assertion. It is expected that public, police, and government sentiment will continue to impress upon this policy issue, while police officers seemingly take a step back until clarity and protections are established. In the final section below, the policy implications of this research are discussed.

7.5 Policy Implications

In this final section, policy implications for police organizations brought to light by this research are discussed. This discussion contains: (1) general policy implications; (2) policy implications relating to the perceived external and internal factors that exist in a police organization that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance; (3) policy implications related to the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers; and (4) policy implications relating to the Regulated Interactions Policy. It is submitted that the policy implications for this research are important for police administrators, policy-

writers of police organizations, and legislators in all levels of government who oversee policing, public safety, and police relations matters.

7.5.1 General Policy Implications

The findings support several implications for policy-writers in a police organization. First, policy-writers should be cognizant that sergeants do not implement policy in a vacuum. On the contrary, in a police organization, particularly at the frontlines, there are influential external and internal factors that may facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. Second, these factors are contextual and vary across the police organization (from one police division do another). Consequently, what might represent the implementation environment for one sergeant may be distinct from the environment of another. Therefore, policies must take into account the variable nature of these factors, contextualizing directives when necessary (from one division or unit to another), to reduce the likelihood of policy failure. Third, in consideration of the postulation that police officers conform to policy in ways that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy, it is important that when policies are drafted, they communicate in straightforward language any information that explains how the policy promotes these same objectives. For instance, to promote individual and organizational legitimacy, frontline officers are more likely to conform if a policy is perceived to improve police relations or to assist in avoiding discipline. Fourth, with the acknowledgement that sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers by blending two approaches: an authoritative approach and a supportive approach, policies and training should provide mechanisms for sergeants to leverage conformance outside of relaying orders. Lastly, it is postulated that a bottom-up approach to policy implementation in a police organization may be an effective way of achieving implementation success. This is particularly

important when implementing policies that may be perceived as legalistic, such as the Regulated Interactions Policy. For instance, the findings reveal that frontline officers would prefer to be consulted at the early stages of an implementation to avoid confusing, out-of-date, or impractical directives. Consequently, police administrators may benefit from consultation with frontline officers at the earliest stage of policy development, even prior to its implementation.

7.5.2 Policy Implications: Factors and Conformance

Policy implications also relate to the influence of particular external and internal factors in a police organization. For instance, the findings demonstrate that 'media portrayals of the police' is an external factor that facilitates the capacity of sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers. This is because officers are hesitant to appear in front of the media and make a mistake. Consequently, policies should be written in a manner that provides officers with guidance on how to act in situations when in view of the media, including when and how to communicate directly with media representatives. Furthermore, police administrators should devote efforts to develop relationships with media organizations and release information, when appropriate, that may reduce or circumvent the negative impacts that the media may have on the professional and personal lives of police officers.

The findings demonstrate that civilian oversight and the number of public complaints are external factors that have an impact on the quality and quantity of police-community engagements. The findings demonstrate that officers perceive that civilian oversight agencies are biased and swayed politically. Consequently, police administrators may benefit from an information program presented to frontline officers that include representatives from civilian oversight agencies, facilitators of the public complaint process, and police officers tasked with investigating conduct and administering discipline in a police organization. This information

program may dispel any false information and reduce the likelihood that police officers avoid certain interactions with the public (for instance, using legally justified force or investigations of suspicious activity) to avoid a public complaint or a civilian oversight investigation.

The findings demonstrate that 'low morale', 'staffing shortage', and 'decisions of internal management' are internal factors that may hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization. Police administrators should pay attention to the root causes of these factors and attempt to leverage solutions through policy that may diminish this influence at the frontlines. Solutions may include consulting frontline officers and Association representatives regularly and at the earliest stages of policy development, as discussed above, to glean accurate street-level perceptions of the state of morale and management decisions. Second, police administrators should routinely engage experts to assess operational decisions such as the number of officers needed to keep a city, its population, and its officers safe. The results of these assessments should be promptly communicated to frontline officers and Association representatives to maintain transparency, dispel any rumors, and manage operational risk responsibly. Third, internal decisions made by management that have a significant impact on the day-to-day activities of frontline officers should be explained in language that is relevant to those affected. While this type of behaviour deviates from the militaristic practice of top-down command, it may be more sensitive and conducive to the contextual nature of an officer's perspective and cultural understandings that exist in the organization. Fourth, police leaders should make a significant effort to maintain open and productive relations with the labour groups that represent their officers. The findings demonstrate that the Toronto Police Association (the Association) represents an external factor that influences conformance from frontline officers. Therefore, it is suggested that police administrators routinely consider the impact of the

Association when designing and implementing policy. This was confirmed by the respondents who discussed their perceptions of the impact of the messages and direction that are conveyed by the Association.

7.5.3 Policy Implications: The Methods used by Sergeants to Achieve Conformance

The methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers have important policy implications. Policy-writers should be aware that sergeants are integral for communicating and translating new policies for frontline officers so that the desired policy outcomes may be realized. Consequently, policy-writers may consider consulting sergeants at the outset of the development of a policy so that any new implementation may experience a more streamlined approach when delivered to the frontlines. The findings also demonstrate that when sergeants are present during a police-citizen interaction, frontline officers are more likely to conform to policy decisions. Therefore, policies should explicitly indicate when the presence of a sergeant is necessary. Mandating the presence of a sergeant by policy may ensure an increase in conformance from frontline officers at times when conformance is expected to be or has been historically low. This may be especially important in high risk or sensitive situations – commonly perceived by officers when commenting on the Regulated Interactions Policy. Further, the findings demonstrate that auditing is a method used by sergeants that can positively influence the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions. Consequently, policies should state the requirement of a sergeant to audit the activities of frontline officers. This policy implication is especially relevant in cases of unpopular policies among frontline officers or when policies may have a significant impact on the legitimacy of the organization should there be an implementation failure. Lastly, sergeant training may benefit from key methods identified in this study that can be used to achieve conformance from frontline officers. These methods may be

useful in sergeant training programs that prepare sergeants for risk-management roles and the general supervision of police officers at the frontlines. Sergeants may be instructed to use both authoritative and supportive approaches to supervision. Further, sergeants may benefit specifically from the key methods identified in this study that can be used to achieve conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy; particularly, in police services that are currently dealing with police relations issues or are in the process of implementing internal policies that relate to racial profiling legislation.

7.5.4 Policy Implications: The Regulated Interactions Policy

This research offers important policy implications relating to the Regulated Interactions Policy. First, the findings suggest that frontline officers are not engaging in documented regulated interactions with members of the public out of fear of being disciplined. This implication is important as it suggests that until frontline officers are more confident that engaging in regulated interactions will not lead to potential discipline, they will unlikely undertake this activity. Therefore, it is important that police administrators are explicit and transparent when laying out the terms of any potential discipline that officers may face as a result of breaching the directives of the Regulated Interactions Policy. It is equally important that police administrators communicate to officers the steps that have been taken to protect officers from facing discipline should they decide to engage proactively with members of the public. Further, police administrators should make the details of all cases of discipline related to the Regulated Interactions Policy available to frontline officers to dispel any misconceptions and to clarify how often and for what reason an officer may be disciplined as a result of engaging improperly in a regulated interaction. These solutions may reduce the fear of discipline that officers have toward the Regulated Interactions Policy and may reduce the general hesitation that

officers have toward re-engaging with the community. Second, there is a lack of confidence held by frontline officers about the content of the Regulated Interactions Policy. This lack of confidence can be primarily attributed to a policy that is perceived as confusing and not well understood by frontline officers. The respondents also blame ineffective training to account for their inadequate understanding of the requirements of the Regulated Interactions Policy. This implication is important as it suggests that until frontline officers understand this policy, they will unlikely engage in regulated interactions. Therefore, it is important that training related to the Regulated Interactions Policy be reexamined and emphasis placed on areas of the policy that officers find complex or disconcerting. It may also be necessary to increase the amount of training officers receive related to the Regulated Interactions Policy. Respondents who communicated that one-year after the completion of mandatory organization-wide training, officers still do not fully understand the purpose or directives of this policy, evidenced support for this implication. Third, the findings suggest that frontline officers avoid engaging in regulated interactions because they perceive that the process of documenting interactions is tedious and time-consuming. This implication is important as it suggests that until methods are developed to expedite the process of documenting regulated interactions, frontline officers are unlikely to undertake this activity. Therefore, it is important for police administrators to have ongoing consultations with frontline officers with respect to efficiencies surrounding documented interactions. For instance, police leaders may implement and encourage frontline officers to participate in working groups that bring together officers with operational experience and information technology and records management experts. The formation of these groups may promote the development of credible, functional, and innovative ways to reduce the time associated with documenting a regulated interaction.

Finally, it is important that police administrators, policy-writers of police organizations, and legislators from all levels of government who oversee policing, public safety, and police relations matters, consider these implications when reviewing annual "carding" reports authored by Ontario police services, including the TPS. These implications may assist the above individuals more effectively interrogate why it is that documented police-citizen interaction has plummeted since the implementation of racial profiling legislation in the Province of Ontario. Moreover, these implications may assist to dispel inaccurate narratives that attempt to account for the newfound absence of "street checks" and "carding" in Ontario.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to explain the findings of the previous three chapters related to: (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. The two major discussions of this chapter were: (1) The factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization and (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance. For each discussion, the relevant findings were summarized, the relevant literature was integrated, the theoretical implications were discussed, and implications for the policy process in police organizations were examined. Following these two main discussions, a third discussion focused on the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction was presented. This chapter concluded with a synthesis of these three discussions surrounding any policy implications for police organizations brought to light by this research. The three arguments made in this chapter

were: (1) Police officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline; (2) sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, by blending the payoffs of two approaches: an authoritative approach and a supportive approach; and (3) that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive. There will likely be disagreement among police officers and members of the public as to whether the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy represents a 'policy success' or a 'policy failure'.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

8.1 Chapter Overview

This study has demonstrated that there are a number of contextual factors, or the factors pertaining to the institutional environment, that influence the sergeant's capacity as it relates to achieving policy conformance from frontline officers. These perceived factors (factors) are both internal and external and are akin to the structural, cultural, or social dynamics that exist in a police institution (the TPS). This study has demonstrated that sergeants have the ability to leverage many of these factors to facilitate conformance from frontline officers. To develop these points, Chapter One broadly introduced the issues surrounding the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy of the TPS and discussed the significance of this policy for both police officers and members of the public. In the same chapter, I introduced the research questions and design and operationalized many of the concepts discussed throughout this study. Chapter Two offered a thorough review of the relevant literature and discussed the gaps in the extant literature that relate to the areas of knowledge that this study sought to develop, in particular, the inner workings of the police organization. Chapter Three unveiled the conceptual framework of this study and communicated how a sociological institutionalist perspective offers theoretical insights to explain the conformance choices of police officers. Chapter Four demonstrated that the structural and cultural elements of a police organization shape the view of police officers, influencing their sociological perspective and their conformance choices. Chapter Five and Six presented the main findings of this research, demonstrating empirical support for the existence of a number of perceived factors (factors) that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers and the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. The findings

also demonstrate that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive. Chapter Seven attempted to explain the above findings by arguing that: (1) Police officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline; (2) sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, by blending the payoffs of two approaches: an authoritative approach and a supportive approach; and (3) that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive. Chapter Seven also conveyed that conflicting opinion is likely to result when questioning whether the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy represents a 'policy success' or a 'policy failure'.

The overall findings of this study include the uncovering of a number of perceived factors (factors) that facilitate and or hinder policy a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers. Findings also offer empirical support for the supposition that there are a number of methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers. The findings lend empirical support for accepting the following two hypotheses: (1) The factors that may influence a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers vary across a police organization (from one division to another) and (2) that sergeants positively influence the policy conformance of frontline officers. The findings also provide additional empirical support for the following: (3) that the respondents perceive that the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive. Additional findings include that societal dynamics: political systems, government structure, culture, history, and legal systems, impact the typology and attributes of a police institution; that over time, and in particular association with the Anglo-

American policing model, these dynamics foster an increasing separation between police officers and the public. Further, in combination with the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization, these elements under the umbrella of bureaucratization, function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. The findings also emphasize that the cultural factors that may exist in a police organization; specifically, respect for militaristic rank and its copious rules and policies shape the organizational reality of police officers. This acts to reinforce the mechanisms available to sergeants to achieve policy implementation at the street level and policy objectives via the conformance choices of frontline officers. It was suggested at the outset that it was the intent of this research to establish from sergeants the "lay of the land" as it pertains to their capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization.

8.2 Summary of Chapters, Research, and Key Findings

Chapter One introduced the TPS and the policy issue under investigation. Literature was presented that explained this study's significance, a review of racial profiling, and the significance of the public perception of the police. The evolution of "street checks" and "carding" was reviewed along with the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy in Toronto. In addition, the research questions, the conceptual framework, and an explanation of police culture was presented. Many of the terms used in the study were defined in this chapter.

In Chapter Two, the literature related to policy implementation and culture was reviewed. The chapter began with a review of the extant literature related to the policy implementation stage of the policy process. The various approaches to policy implementation were then reviewed. Next, the literature concerning the top-down approach to policy implementation that is undertaken in police organizations were presented. This was followed by a review of the

literature that suggests that police organizations may benefit from a bottom-up approach to policy implementation. Next, a review of policy implementation as it concerns frontline supervision in public sector organizations was conducted. This was followed by a review of the literature related to the capacity of sergeants to influence policy implementation in police organizations. Lastly, the existing literature was reviewed that relates to the impact police culture may have on the capacity of a sergeant to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers in a police organization. Key gaps in the extant literature were identified throughout this chapter, justifying research into this policy issue. Also identified from this review of the literature was that the top-down approach to policy implementation, while rational in explication, suffered from an absence of a sociological perspective that may be realized through a bottom-up approach. The literature further suggests that sergeants play a pivotal role in achieving conformance from frontline officers when leveraging elements of police culture and the existing policy implementation process.

In Chapter Three, the conceptual framework – sociological institutionalism - was presented. This chapter began by presenting an overview of institutional theory and related concepts. In this overview, a summary of new institutionalism, which is the conceptual root of sociological institutionalism, was provided. The assumptions of sociological institutionalism – a branch of new institutionalism - was reviewed and discussed. This aim of this chapter was to expose the assumptions of sociological institutionalism and the advantage of this perspective for understanding the inner workings of police organizations and the relevant components of this research. In this chapter, police organizations were conceptualized as 'institutions' and it was theorized that police officers might be subjected to conformance choices that can be attributed to a sociological institutionalism perspective. This chapter further confirmed how the assumptions

of sociological institutionalism; in particular, taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications may shape the social world of police officers through powerful myths and cognitive schema. This chapter also confirmed that the assumptions of sociological institutionalism offer powerful insights that help us explain institutional change, modes of constraint, and the power relationships that exist in institutions such as police organizations. Lastly, this chapter presented the research methodology, including the research questions, research design, and sample descriptives.

The focus of Chapter Four was the TPS. This chapter revealed that the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance from frontline officers to policy decisions. This may be because these elements support the bureaucratization of the police organization – enabling top-down command to assert control on the conformance choices of police officers and the implementation of policy at the street level. This chapter also demonstrated that cultural factors might also facilitate or hinder policy conformance in important ways: most importantly, that sergeants may leverage occupational culture to achieve a police service's policy objectives. This may be due to the cultural aspects of the police institution that reinforce a respect for militaristic rank and perforation of legalistic mechanisms that act to frame the organizational reality of police officers. These propositions are grounded in the idea that both the structural and cultural elements that exist inside the TPS, shape the view of its police officers, influencing their sociological perspective and their conformance choices. This chapter also showed support for a police organization that is imbued with structural and cultural elements that serve to protect the organization and its officers. One of the cultural elements discussed in this chapter was the existence of racist beliefs among Toronto police officers. Accordingly, this

chapter suggested that certain structural and cultural elements might serve to divorce the police from the public – diminishing the trust and confidence that the police and the public have for each other.

In Chapter Five and Six, the findings were presented. Chapter Five presented the findings as they pertain to our understanding of the perceived factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular. In Chapter Six, the findings were presented that relate to the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, and the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. These findings are perceived by, and represent the perspectives of the respondents, which in this case, are sergeants employed by the TPS. The findings provide empirical support for the acceptance of the research hypotheses. Chapters Five and Six also lent support for Chapter four, which suggested that the dynamics of the police institution – the structural and cultural elements - impact the typology and attributes of a police organization and that over time, and particularly in the case of the Anglo-American policing model, have instilled a divide between police officers and the communities they serve, manifesting as reactive police-citizen interaction. These findings also emphasize that the cultural factors that may exist in a police organization; specifically, respect for militaristic rank and its ubiquitous rules and policies, shape the organizational reality of police officers. This acts to reinforce the mechanisms available to sergeants to achieve policy implementation at the street level and policy objectives via the conformance choices of frontline officers.

In Chapter Seven, I synthesized the findings of Chapters Four, Five, and Six. In doing so, I attempted to explain why the influence of societal dynamics has an impact on the typology

and attributes of a police institution. This chapter also attempted to clarify how it is that these dynamics over time have fostered an increasing separation between police officers and the public. In this chapter, I also attempted to explain why it is that the structural elements of the TPS; namely command and composition, professionalization, and centralization – which are characteristic of bureaucratization – function to increase a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance and successful policy implementations in police organizations. In addition, I attempted to explicate why the cultural factors that may exist in a police organization, in particular; respect for militaristic rank and its pervasive rules and policies assist sergeants to achieve policy implementation at the street level and policy objectives via the conformance choices of frontline officers. Lastly, I attempted to explain the findings of Chapters Five and Six related to: (1) the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular; and (3) the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction. The two major discussions included in this chapter related to: (1) The factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance in a police organization and (2) the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance. For each discussion, the relevant findings were summarized, the relevant literature was integrated, the theoretical implications were discussed, and implications for the policy process in police organizations were examined. Following these two main discussions, a third discussion focused on the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction was presented. This chapter concluded with a synthesis of these three discussions surrounding any policy implications for police organizations brought to light by this

research. The three arguments made in this chapter were: (1) Police officers employ a 'logic of legitimacy' to make conformance choices that are perceived to promote individual and organizational legitimacy by improving police relations or avoiding discipline; (2) sergeants achieve conformance from frontline officers in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, by blending the payoffs of two approaches: an authoritative approach and a supportive approach; and (3) that the perspective held by police officers of the state of police-citizen interaction is one that is reactive. It was concluded that there would likely be disagreement between police officers and members of the public as to whether the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy represents a 'policy success' or a 'policy failure'.

8.3 Limitations and Delimitations

There are a number of limitations associated with this research. Limitations are constraints associated with the methodology and research design – mostly beyond my control - that impact the findings of this dissertation (M. K. Simon & Goes, 2013, p. 2). First, only a given policy is examined. It would be difficult to generalize findings related to policy conformance to the hundreds of other policies that regulate the activities and choices of police officers. For instance, contrary to the findings in this study, it is unlikely that sergeants would have to employ the method of 'encouraging' officers to conform to the 'arrest policies' of a police service. From the data that emerged during the qualitative interviews, officers attribute a high level of importance to arresting criminals and appear likely to undertake and conform to this activity without any support or reassurance from their sergeants. Second, the suggestion that the experiences reported by sergeants during data collection can be generalized to the experiences of all sergeants across the TPS would be inaccurate. Purposive sampling was used in the recruiting

process. There are approximately 800 sergeants employed by the TPS. It is conceivable that any given sergeant may offer a different perspective on the relevant research questions based on the area that they work in, years of experience, or other demographic factors. Third, additional research would be required to generalize these findings to other urban, medium, or smaller rural police organizations. The TPS has been documented as the largest municipal police organization in Canada and third largest in North America (Vella, 2015, "I've got"). It is expected that perspectives may be correlated with the size of the organization. Fourth, this research was conducted over a certain interval of time. Consequently, participant perspectives of the given policy may vary at another point in time – an earlier or later stage of the policy implementation. Factors that may cause this variation may include additional training, current affairs, or decisions from internal management. Fifth, data collection does not include police sergeants who may not directly monitor police officers at the frontline. However, these sergeants may still have the capacity to achieve conformance from frontline officers. Six, the extent to which sergeants provide honest and complete responses to the interview questions cannot be verified. There are a number of factors that exist in a police organization that may influence the responses of participants, including concerns of confidentiality, promotional considerations, the reputation of the participant, the reputation of the organization, exposure to the media, misconduct allegations, and fear of disciplinary consequences.

There are a number of delimitations associated with this research. Delimitations refer to the characteristics of this study that have emerged from the limitations in its scope and by the "conscious exclusionary and inclusionary decisions" that were made related to its methodology (M. K. Simon & Goes, 2013, p. 4). First, the sample population was geographically confined to uniform sergeants stationed at each one of the 17 divisions in the City of Toronto. This

boundary was established to access participants most relevant to the policy issue. Notwithstanding, there are many other units that belong to the TPS outside of divisions that employ sergeants. These sergeants may also be influenced by environmental factors in a police organization and are tasked to ensure conformance in various ways. Second, the sample population was only sergeants. Again, the participant rank was confined to sergeant, as this rank is the most relevant to the policy issue under investigation. However, all employees of the TPS are required to conform to the Regulated Interactions Policy and are impacted by its environmental factors. Therefore, it is reasonable to submit that staff sergeants, senior officers, and civilian personnel all have a capacity to influence the conformance of frontline officers to policy decisions, which include conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy. Third, the number of factors in a police organization that were identified from the participant interviews has boundaries. For instance, participant interviews were limited by time and constrained by semi-structured interview questions. It may be safe to conclude that there are more perceived factors that facilitate or hinder policy conformance in a police organization in general, and to the Regulated Interactions Policy in particular, than those that emerged during the 17 interviews. It is also important to recognize that the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance and the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance are 'perceived'. This study did not measure the effectiveness of these factors or methods for facilitating, hindering, or achieving conformance. Lastly, the sample of participants was restricted to the TPS. While this delimitation was practical in terms of anticipating scope (number and length of interviews), it restricted a large pool of data from potential participants employed by a multitude of law enforcement agencies across Ontario and beyond. However, the threat of this delimitation

can be moderated when considering the extraordinary amount of access over a long period of time that was provided to me by the TPS.

8.4 Recommendations for Future Research

It is postulated that the findings would benefit from additional and complementary quantitative research. A quantitative approach, including additional survey research, may facilitate data collection from a much larger participant population – lending to an increased ability to generalize (Creswell, 2014, p. 13). Further, the measurement and analysis of additional variables allow for additional testing of hypotheses, the inference of any temporal order, and the confirmation or denial of data collected during qualitative data collection (Neuman & Robson, 2012, p. 154). For instance, a quantitative survey design may facilitate the collection of data from hundreds of sergeants from police organizations across Ontario.

It is important to recognize that the factors that facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve conformance and the methods used by sergeants to achieve conformance are 'perceived'. This study did not measure the effectiveness of these perceived factors or methods for facilitating, hindering, or achieving conformance. Further research that attempts to measure such effectiveness may assist to either corroborate or disprove the findings of this study.

It is further submitted that the findings of this research would benefit from the addition of the perspectives of other employees of a police organization, in particular from frontline officers and other supervisory ranks. It is proposed that every rank or civilian personnel employed in a police organization may perceive constructs related to this research in different ways. Additional perspectives of a variety of classes of participants who are employed in a police organization may serve to corroborate the findings or disprove some or all of the propositions that are contained in this research.

This research focused on a given policy - the Regulated Interactions Policy. However, future recommendations include the suggestion that other policies of police organizations are given attention. Restrictive policies implemented by police organizations have demonstrated the ability to control or at minimum influence police responses and discretion (Klinger, 2004, p. 128). For example, research in the United States has supported increases in conformance by police officers to policy related to firearm discharges (Fyfe, 1979, p. 322) and mandatory arrests in domestic violence investigations (Hirschel et al., 2007, p. 297; Phillips & Sobol, 2010, p. 112; Simpson et al., 2006, p. 312). Therefore, it is submitted that the examination of other policies using these or adapted research questions, may provide additional insights to explain the factors that exist in a police organization that may facilitate or hinder a sergeant's capacity to achieve policy conformance. In addition, by giving focus to other policies, additional observations can be made that may further contribute to our understanding of the police perspective of the state of police-citizen interaction.

This research has considered in its findings only the perspective of sergeants who are police officers. The findings of this research have not gleaned perspectives of the public. Notwithstanding, the successful introduction of, and conformance to the Regulated Interactions Policy has significant consequences for Canada's racialized communities, markedly in its ability to influence police-citizen interaction and officer discretion. Therefore, future research may include qualitative and quantitative designs that attempt to elicit the public's perspective in relation to the activities of police officers and sergeants that pertain to the implementation of the Regulated Interactions Policy. It is further submitted that the collection of this data will also serve to confirm any hypotheses, the inference of any temporal order, and the confirmation or denial of data collected during this research (Neuman & Robson, 2012, p. 154).

Lastly, this research has attempted to realize an application of sociological institutionalism as a conceptual framework for understanding the inner workings of a police organization. However, sociological institutionalism is just one of three branches of new institutionalism that can assist in conceptualizing police organizations as institutions. It is submitted that rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism, alone, or in combination with sociological institutionalism, may offer valuable conceptual, theoretical, and methodological tools for analyzing institutions. It is suggested that these additional conceptual applications may contribute to a more robust institutional analysis that may further advance our understanding of police organizations and the social world of police officers and sergeants.

Appendices

9.1 Regulated Interactions Policy: Toronto Police Service

This internal policy has been removed for publication.

9.2 Regulated Interactions with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information: Toronto Police Services Board

TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD

REGULATED INTERACTION WITH THE COMMUNITY AND THE COLLECTION OF IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

APPROVED	April 24, 2014	Minute No: P102/14
REVIEWED (R) AND/OR AMENDED (A)	November 17, 2016 April 16, 2015 (R/A) June 18, 2015 (R/A)	Minute No: P250/16 Minute No: P108/15 Minute No: P173/15
REPORTING REQUIREMENT	Refer to sections 17, 18, 25, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 45	
LEGISLATION	*Police Services Act,* R.S.O. 1990, c.P.15, as amended, s. 31(1). Ontario Regulation 58/16, under *Police Services Act,* R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* Ontario *Human Rights Code* *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*	
ASSOCIATED POLICIES	Race and Ethnocultural Equity Human Rights Collection, Use and Reporting of Demographic Statistics	
DERIVATION		

Preamble

The Board recognizes that the practice known as 'carding' or 'street checks' has had a negative impact on public trust. This policy seeks to address that legacy and replace it with a process that will enhance public trust concerning the collection of identifying information, promote police-community engagement and improve community relations. Enhanced public trust increases police legitimacy and, in turn, improves public safety.

This policy should be read with Ontario Regulation 58/16 and the Board's Race and Ethnocultural Equity Policy.

The Board recognizes that conversations between police officers and members of the public are an integral part of community-based policing. The policy is intended to support proactive policing, to ensure that stops are not arbitrary or based on biased policing and to promote professional interactions between police officers and

individuals. It permits informal greetings and interactions, observations and undercover activities. It permits interactions between police officers and individuals who actively assist the police in the performance of their duties. It does not regulate interactions between police officers and individuals who actively enlist the help of the police, such as victims of offences, individuals reporting lost property or individuals engaged in educational efforts.

The policy intends that identifying information associated with 'carding', 'street checks' and Regulated Interactions should be retained, accessed, or disclosed in a manner consistent with section 9(10)(2) of the Regulation. Data collected contrary to the Regulation or this policy will be restricted and accessible only with the permission of the Chief or a senior officer appointed by the Chief. The choice of appointee should reflect the importance of the role and responsibility being delegated.

The goals and objectives of this policy are to:

a. acknowledge that the collection of Historical Contact Data has disproportionately affected some communities and encourage the Chief to create procedures that acknowledge this history and the social costs and impact of this activity on police legitimacy;

b. ensure that the Chief understands that the Board does not expect or require Service members to attempt or conduct Regulated Interactions;

c. ensure the Chief's procedures acknowledge that the effective delivery of police services does not obligate officers to conduct Regulated interactions;

d. ensure that Regulated interactions are evaluated in conjunction with, and sensitive to, the potential social cost associated with such interactions;

e. ensure that the Chief's procedures consider the need to collect and record the information and the potential social cost of Regulated interactions;

f. ensure that Regulated Interactions are only conducted when necessary and, if conducted, carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements in the Regulation and this policy;

g. ensure that considerations of social costs associated with the collection of Historical Contact Data are not intended to prevent officers from engaging positively with the community;

h. prevent arbitrary or discriminatory Regulated Interactions;

i. ensure that police officers do not attempt to gather identifying information in a Regulated Interaction or prepare a Regulated Interaction Report solely for the purpose of:

    i. Building a body of general intelligence information;

    ii. Investigating an unsupported suspicion;

    iii. Prolonging an interaction in the hope of acquiring the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain;

    iv. Meeting a quota or performance target; or

v. Raising awareness of police presence in the community.

j. respect the individual's decision about whether to freely participate in a Regulated Interaction;

k. ensure that police officers can explain why they initiated a Regulated Interaction and, if relying on an exemption under the Regulation, why they could not tell an individual (i) that he or she is not required to provide identifying information and/or (ii) about the reasons for the Regulated Interaction;

l. in the context of the Regulation, provide strategic direction to the Chief consistent with the Board's expectations of transparency and accountability as integral components of the effective delivery of police services;

m. ensure the delivery of police services is fair, impartial, and free from both individual and systemic biases; and

n. provide strategic direction to the Chief on the areas of the Regulation for which the Board has the ability, and is required by law, to address, including:

   i. the content of the Receipt;

   ii. retention, access, and disclosure of Historical Contact Data and Regulated Interaction Data; and

   iii. reporting requirements that ensure transparency and accountability.

It is, therefore, the policy of the Toronto Police Services Board that:

Definitions

1. The following definitions apply:

   a. Abstracted Data is a simplified representation of a larger body of data that includes only relevant *non-identifiable* data.

   b. Annual Report means the annual report provided by the Chief of Police to a Board under section 31 of Ontario Regulation 3/99 (Adequacy and Effectiveness of Police Services) made under the *Police Services Act*.

   c. Historical Contact Data refers to all Person Investigated Card (Form 172), Field Information Report (Form 208), Community Inquiry Report (Form 306), and Community Safety Note (Street Check) records submitted into the Service's records management systems prior to January 1, 2017 and may include any such submitted record whether or not it would have been categorized as a Regulated Interaction Report had it been submitted on or after January 1, 2017.

   d. Identifying Information is any information that, alone or in combination with other information, can be used to identify an individual. It may include information about an individual's race, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital or family status, economic circumstances, and education, medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history.

e. Regulated Interaction is an attempt by a police officer to collect identifying information by asking an individual, in a face-to-face encounter, to identify himself or herself or to provide information for the purpose of identifying the individual, and includes such an attempt whether or not identifying information is collected,

   i. if that attempt is done for the purpose of,
      a) inquiring into offences that have been or might be committed;
      b) inquiring into suspicious activities to detect offences; or
      c) gathering information for intelligence purposes;

   ii. but does not include an attempted collection made by a police officer for the purpose of investigating an offence the officer reasonably suspects has been or will be committed;

   iii. and does not include an attempt by a police officer to collect identifying information from an individual if,
      a) the individual is legally required to provide the information to a police officer;
      b) the individual is under arrest or is being detained;
      c) the officer is engaged in a covert operation;
      d) the officer is executing a warrant, acting pursuant to a court order or performing related duties; or
      e) the individual from whom the officer attempts to collect information is employed in the administration of justice or is carrying out duties or providing services that are otherwise relevant to the carrying out of the officer's duties.

f. Regulated Interaction Report is the electronic record of a Regulated Interaction submitted into the Service's record management system, whether or not identifying information was collected during the Regulated Interaction.

g. Restricted is a classification which applies to Historical Contact Data and may apply to Regulated Interaction Reports for which the Service will institute constraints that prevent access to the record unless:

   i. approved by the Chief or, in his absence, a designate; and

   ii. consistent with the Regulation, access to the record is required:
      a) for the purpose of an ongoing police investigation;
      b) in connection with legal proceedings or anticipated legal proceedings;
      c) for the purpose of dealing with a complaint under Part V of the Act or for the purpose of an investigation or inquiry under clause 25(1)(a) of the Act;
      d) in order to prepare the annual report described in subsection 14(1) of the Regulation or the report required under section 15 of the Regulation;
      e) for the purpose of complying with a legal requirement; or
      f) for the purpose of evaluating a police officer's performance.

General

2. The Chief shall establish procedures regarding Regulated Interactions that:
   a. ensure compliance with Ontario Regulation 58/16, Board policy, the *Police Services Act*, the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the Ontario *Human Rights Code*, and the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (*MFIPPA)*;
   b. ensure Regulated Interactions are not conducted on the basis of biased policing, including racial profiling, or in an arbitrary manner;
   c. acknowledge that collecting "identifying information" includes collecting any "information for the purpose of identifying the individual" as defined by this policy;
   d. ensure police officers approach all attempts to collect personal information in the same way, regardless of whether the police officer intends to identify the individual; and
   e. emphasize both the individual's right to disengage from a Regulated Interaction and that an officer's disengagement from a Regulated Interaction is an acceptable, valued and sometimes necessary policing practice.
3. The Chief shall ensure that Service members understand the importance of police-community engagement and proactive policing and that this shall be reflected in training.

Attempts to Collect Identifying Information

4. A police officer shall not attempt to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual if:
   a. any part of the reason for the attempted collection is that the officer perceives the individual to be within a particular racialized group unless,
      i. the officer is seeking a particular individual,
      ii. being within the racialized group forms part of a description of the particular individual or is evident from a visual representation of the particular individual, and
      iii. the officer has additional information, in addition to information about the particular individual being in a racialized group, that may help to identify the individual or narrow the description of the individual; or
   b. the attempted collection is done in an arbitrary way.
5. Without limiting what might constitute the additional information required under subparagraph 4(a)(iii), such information may consist of information about:
   a. the appearance of the individual, including information about the individual's

clothing, height, weight, eye colour, hair colour or hair style;

b. the location where the individual might be found;

c. the type of vehicle the individual might be found in;

d. the associates the individual might be found with; or

e. the behaviour of the individual.

6. The additional information required under subparagraph 4(a)(iii) may not consist only of the sex of the individual, the approximate age of the individual or both.

7. For the purpose of subparagraph 4(b), an attempted collection by a police officer from an individual is done in an arbitrary way unless the officer has a reason that the officer can explain that complies with all of the following:

   a. the reason includes details about the individual that cause the officer to reasonably suspect that identifying the individual may contribute to or assist in an inquiry into offences that have been or might be committed or into suspicious activities to detect offences or the gathering of information for intelligence purposes;

   b. the reason does not include either of the following:

      i. that the individual has declined to answer a question from the officer which the individual is not legally required to answer, or

      ii. that the individual has attempted or is attempting to discontinue interaction with the officer in circumstances in which the individual has the legal right to do so; and

   c. the reason is not only that the individual is present in a high crime location.

Rights Notification

8. A police officer shall not attempt to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual without first informing the individual:

   a. that he or she is not required to provide identifying information to the officer; and

   b. has informed the individual why the police officer is attempting to collect identifying information about the individual;

   unless the police officer is exempt from a requirement to notify the individual because of a specific exemption in section 6 of the Regulation or paragraphs 9 and 10 of this policy.

9. A police officer is not required to inform the individual under paragraph 8(a) or (b) if the officer has a reason to believe that informing the individual under that clause might compromise the safety of an individual.

10. A police officer is not required to inform the individual under paragraph 8(b) if the officer has a reason to believe that informing the individual under that clause,

a. would likely compromise an ongoing police investigation;

b. might allow a confidential informant to be identified; or

c. might disclose the identity of a person contrary to the law, including disclose the identity of a young person contrary to the *Youth Criminal Justice Act* (Canada).

Receipts

11. The Chief shall establish procedures that require police officers conducting Regulated Interactions to comply with the Receipt requirement in section 7 of the Regulation, including the exemptions described in the Regulation.

12. The Chief shall ensure that the Receipt contains:

    a. the name and badge number of the police officer and any partner or supervisor who is present at or assists in conducting the Regulated Interaction;

    b. the date, time and location of the Regulated Interaction;

    c. information about how to contact the Office of the Independent Police Review Director;

    d. an explanation that the individual can request access to information in the Service's custody or control under *MFIPPA* and information about how to make such a request; and

    e. an explanation of the reason for the Regulated Interaction.

Retention, Access, Use and Disclosure of Historical Contact Data

13. The Chief shall develop procedures that ensure all Historical Contact Data is Restricted in a manner that prevents Service members from accessing it without authorization.

14. Historical Contact Data must be stored in a way that leaves an auditable technological trail. All Historical Contact Data stored in hard copy report forms generated before January 1, 2017, (i.e. Person Investigated Card (Form 172), Field Information Report (Form 208), or Community Inquiry Report (Form 306)) should be digitized, as soon as possible if not already digitized, with the hard copy report form retained only as required by law (e.g. evidence in a matter before the courts).

15. Access to Historical Contact Data under paragraph 13 of this policy shall be authorized by the Chief, in accordance with the constraints imposed on records classified as Restricted, and only when access is required for a substantial public interest or to comply with a legal requirement.

16. The Chief shall develop procedures that control access to Historical Contact Data in accordance with paragraphs 13 to 15 of this policy. The procedures shall ensure the Chief provides the Board, on a quarterly basis, with a public report on;

    a. the number of requests, submitted to the Chief by Service members, for access to Historical Contact Data;

b. the number of approvals, by the Chief, for access to Historical Contact Data;

c. the purpose(s) of the requests and approvals identified in subparagraphs 16a and 16b;

d. whether or not accessing the Historical Contact Data fulfilled the purpose(s) for which it was accessed; and

e. when hard copy report forms generated before January 1, 2017 are digitized, the number of records digitized and the records management system to which the records were added.

17. The Board will establish a Regulated Interactions Review Panel composed of three persons: a Board member, a retired judge and a community member, with the mandate to:

a. review the quarterly report for compliance with paragraphs 13 to 16 of this policy;

b. identify and track any significant trends;

c. summarize its review of the Chief's quarterly report, in a report to the Board including, if necessary, suggestions or recommendations for consideration by the Board; and

d. make its summary review of the Chief's quarterly report available to the public by submitting it to the Board at the same time that the Chief's quarterly report is submitted to the Board.

18. At least two weeks in advance of submitting the quarterly report to the Board, the Chief will make the quarterly report available to the Board's Regulated Interactions Review Panel to enable it to conduct its review.

19. If, as part of its review, the Regulated Interactions Review Panel requires additional information, it will submit, through the Board, any request(s) for additional information required to assist with fulfilling its mandate.

20. The Service must not use Historical Contact Data as a basis for classifying an individual as "known to police".

21. The Chief shall ensure Historical Contact Data does not result in an entry on an individual's Clearance Letter, Police Reference Check, Vulnerable Sector Check, or any other police record check required by the *Police Record Check Reform Act*.

Retention, Access, Use and Disclosure of Regulated Interaction Reports – Compliant

22. The Chief shall establish procedures dealing with the retention, access, and disclosure of Regulated Interaction Data collected on or after January 1, 2017, that provide:

a. the Chief or his or her designate shall determine whether identifying information collected during Regulated Interactions complies with the Regulation and this policy by reviewing Regulated Interaction Reports upon their entry into the

Service's records management system(s) or within thirty days of their entry, in accordance with sections 9(4) and (5) of the Regulation;

b. any Regulated Interaction Report which has not been reviewed shall contain an indication that the report has not been reviewed for compliance with the Regulation and this policy; and

c. Regulated Interaction Reports shall not result in an entry on an individual's Clearance Letter, Police Reference Check, Vulnerable Sector Check, or any other police record check required by the *Police Record Check Reform Act*, S.O. 2015 C.30.

d. The Service must not use Regulated Interaction Reports as a basis for classifying an individual as "known to police".

23. Access to any Regulated Interaction Report collected in compliance with this policy and the Regulation shall be Restricted five years after the date it was submitted to the Service's record management system.

Retention, Access, Use and Disclosure of Regulated Interaction Reports – In Violation

24. Subject to paragraph 26 of this policy, access to any Regulated Interaction Report determined to have been collected in violation of this policy or the Regulation shall be Restricted immediately upon such determination, whether;

a. upon initially being reviewed by the Chief or his or her designate;

b. during the course of an internal or external complaint investigation; or

c. as a result of a finding by the judiciary, a tribunal or other governing body.

25. As required by section 12(2) of the Regulation, this policy provides that identifying information collected on or after January 1, 2017, contrary to the Regulation shall not be retained longer than is reasonably necessary to ensure the information is available

a. for the purpose of an ongoing police investigation;

b. in connection with legal proceedings or anticipated legal proceedings;

c. for the purpose of dealing with a complaint under Part V of the Act or for the purpose of an investigation or inquiry under clause 25(1)(a) of the Act;

d. in order to prepare the annual report described in subsection 14(1) of the Regulation or the report required under section 15 of the Regulation;

e. for the purpose of complying with a legal requirement; or

f. for the purpose of evaluating a police officer's performance.

26. Where identifying information has been identified as being required under paragraph 25 of this policy, it may be retained only as long as reasonably necessary for the specific purpose(s) for which it was retained and, when no longer required for that purpose(s) or otherwise by law, shall be deleted.

27. The Service must not use Regulated Interaction Reports as a basis for classifying an individual as "known to police".

28. The Chief shall ensure Regulated Interaction Reports do not result in an entry on an individual's Clearance Letter, Police Reference Check, Vulnerable Sector Check, or any other police record check required by the *Police Record Check Reform Act*.

Training

29. The Chief shall ensure that all police officers, prior to conducting Regulated Interactions or acting as the Chief's designate under section 9 of the Regulation, have successfully completed:

    a. the training required under section 11 of the Regulation within the previous 36 months; and

    b. additional training on the Service's procedures, as developed in accordance with this policy, within the previous 12 months.

30. The Chief shall ensure that, the training referred to in paragraph 29 includes the mandatory training required by section 11 of the Regulation on the topics of:

    a. the right of an individual not to provide information to a police officer, the limitations on this right and how to ensure that this right is respected;

    b. the right of an individual to discontinue an interaction with a police officer, the limitations on this right and how to avoid an unlawful psychological detention of an individual;

    c. bias awareness, discrimination and racism and how to avoid bias, discrimination and racism when providing police services;

    d. the rights that individuals have to access information about themselves that is in the custody, or under the control, of a police force;

    e. the initiation of interactions with members of the public;

    f. the Regulation and its application; and

    additionally includes, at a minimum, instruction on the topics of promoting public trust and public confidence by recognizing;

    g. the social cost of historic police practices; and

    h. how the use of respectful language, tone and demeanour, during Regulated Interactions benefits the community, individuals, officers, and the Service.

31. The Chief shall ensure that police officers who are reassigned or temporarily assigned to a new neighbourhood or Division communicate and cooperate with community-based liaison officers and receive any other support, training and resources necessary to familiarize themselves with the new assignment and community.

32. The Chief shall ensure that police officers responsible for supervising the initiation of Regulated Interactions and the creation of Regulated Interaction Reports

receive the training necessary to ensure all police officers comply with this policy and the Regulation.

33. The Chief shall provide to the Board copies of all training modules on Regulated Interactions for review upon request from the Board.

Supervision

34. The Chief shall establish procedures regarding Regulated Interactions to ensure that:

    a. supervisors understand that the Regulation and this policy do not impose an obligation on officers, implicitly or explicitly, to conduct Regulated Interactions;

    b. supervisors understand that Regulated Interactions should occur only when necessary and, if conducted, are carried out in compliance with both the Regulation and this policy;

    c. police officers receive effective supervision related to Regulated Interactions;

    d. supervisors are trained to critically examine the circumstances leading to a Regulated Interaction and any resulting Regulated Interaction Reports to determine compliance with this policy and the Regulation and are held accountable for any failure to do so;

    e. supervisors consider using a variety of Service technological resources, if available, to effectively review for compliance leading up to, during and after, Regulated Interactions; and

    f. where discipline is justified, police officers are subject to the full range of disciplinary measures in s. 85 of the *Police Services Act* in relation to Regulated Interactions.

Reports to the Board

35. As part of the Annual Report required under Adequacy Regulation 3/99, the Chief shall include a section relating to Regulated Interactions.

36. The annual report relating to Regulated Interactions shall include, at a minimum:

    a. the number of attempted collections and the number of attempted collections in which identifying information was collected;

    b. The number of individuals from whom identifying information was collected;

    c. The number of times a police officer chose not to tell an individual that he or she was "not required to provide identifying information to the officer" and/or the reason "why the police officer is attempting to collect identifying information" as otherwise required under subsections 6(2) and (3) of the Regulation, and the reason(s) for making the choice;

    d. The number of times a police officer chose not to give an individual a Receipt and the reason(s) for making the choice;

e. The number of times each of the following clauses was relied upon to not offer or give a Receipt:
    i. might compromise the safety of an individual (subsection 7(2)(a) of the Regulation); or
    ii. might delay the officer from responding to another matter that should be responded to immediately (subsection 7(2)(b) of the Regulation);
f. The number of attempted collections from individuals who are perceived, by a police officer, to be within the following groups based on the sex of the individual:
    i. male individuals;
    ii. female individuals; or
    iii. individuals who self-identify otherwise
g. For each age group established by the Chief, the number of attempted collections from individuals who are perceived, by a police officer, to be within that age group;
h. For each racialized group established by the Chief for the purpose of this paragraph, the number of attempted collections from individuals who are perceived, by a police officer, to be within that racialized group;
i. A statement, based on an analysis of the information, as to whether the collections were attempted disproportionately from individuals within a group based on:
    i. the sex of the individual;
    ii. a particular age;
    iii. a racialized group; or
    iv. a combination of groups and, if so, any additional information that the Chief of Police considers relevant to explain the disproportionate number of attempted collections;
j. The neighbourhoods or areas where collections were attempted and the number of attempted collections in each neighbourhood or area;
k. The number of determinations made by the Chief or his or her designate as to whether the information entered into the database:
    i. complied with limitations on collection set out in section 5 and 9(4)(a) of the Regulation; and
    ii. the results of the review(s), done at least once a year, of an appropriately sized random sample of entries of identifying information included in the database to estimate within a margin of error of plus or minus five percent, at a 95 percent confidence level, whether it appears that section 5 (limitations on collection of information), section 6 (duties to inform of rights and reasons before collecting, with exceptions) or section 8 (document for individual – document, with exceptions) of the Regulation were complied

with;

l. The number of times, if any, members of the police force were permitted to access identifying information to which access must be restricted by virtue of one or more of the following:

   i. for the purpose of an ongoing police investigation;

   ii. in connection with legal proceedings or anticipated legal proceedings;

   iii. for the purpose of dealing with a complaint under Part V of the Act or for the purpose of an investigation or inquiry under clause 25(1)(a) of the Act;

   iv. in order to prepare the annual report or a report required due to disproportionate collection (under section 15 of the Regulation);

   v. for the purpose of complying with a legal requirement; or

   vi. for the purpose of evaluating a police officer's performance;

m. The number of complaints resulting from or related to Regulated Interactions, along with their status or outcome; and

n. The results of any audit conducted under procedures enacted pursuant to this policy.

37. If an analysis of the Regulated Interaction data forming the basis for the annual report reveals that Regulated Interactions were conducted disproportionately in relation to individuals based on perceived sex, age, race, or a combination thereof, the Chief shall review the Service's practices and prepare a supplementary report to the Board setting out the results of the review and his or her proposals, if any, to address the disproportionality.

38. The Chief shall make the abstracted data underlying the annual report available to the Board as requested.

39. The need for and contents of any supplementary report may be determined by either the Chief or the Board after review of the data in the annual report.

40. The Board, upon receipt of the annual report and any supplementary report, shall:

   a. publish all reports and the underlying abstracted data on the Board's website so they are available to the public free of charge; and

   b. consider the report and the proposals, if any, set out in any supplementary report and consider whether to give directions under clause 31(1)(e) of the *Act* to direct the Chief and monitor his or her performance.

Retention, Access, Use and Disclosure of Abstracted Data

41. The Chief, in consultation with the Board, shall compile and retain abstracted data with respect to Regulated Interactions and Historical Contact Data for the purpose of evaluating the quality and effectiveness of police services in Toronto.

42. The Chief shall ensure that any data compiled and retained for the purpose of evaluating the quality and effectiveness of police services is de-identified, stored in

a restricted database and not used for any purpose other than that of evaluating the quality and effectiveness of police services in Toronto.

43. The Chief shall give the Board, and any person designated by the Board, any de-identified data or de-identified internal or external report related to Regulated Interactions compiled and retained under paragraphs 41 and 42 of this policy upon the Board's request.

44. The Board and the Service shall only use the data compiled and retained under paragraphs 41 and 42 of the policy to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of police services in Toronto in accordance with provincial law, including the Adequacy and Effectiveness Standards in Ontario Regulation 3/99, enacted under the *Police Services Act*.

45. The Service and the Board shall disclose data compiled and retained under paragraphs 41 and 42 of the policy to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services as necessary for the preparation of the Ministry's report on the Regulation as described in section 17 of the Regulation.

Policy Consistent with Regulation

46. This policy is intended to be consistent with Regulation 58/16. However, if any provision is or appears to be in conflict with the Regulation, it shall be deemed to be modified to make it consistent.

9.3 Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties: Ontario Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services

Français

Police Services Act

ONTARIO REGULATION 58/16

COLLECTION OF IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES - PROHIBITION AND DUTIES

Consolidation Period: From January 1, 2017 to the e-Laws currency date.

No amendments.

This is the English version of a bilingual regulation.

CONTENTS

PART I
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION

Application — attempts to collect

1. (1) This Regulation applies with respect to an attempt by a police officer to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual, if that attempt is done for the purpose of,

(a) inquiring into offences that have been or might be committed;

(b) inquiring into suspicious activities to detect offences; or

(c) gathering information for intelligence purposes.

(2) Despite subsection (1), this Regulation does not apply with respect to an attempted collection made by a police officer for the purpose of investigating an offence the officer reasonably suspects has been or will be committed.

(3) Despite subsection (1), this Regulation does not apply with respect to an attempt by a police officer to collect identifying information from an individual if,

(a) the individual is legally required to provide the information to a police officer;

(b) the individual is under arrest or is being detained;

(c) the officer is engaged in a covert operation;

(d) the officer is executing a warrant, acting pursuant to a court order or performing related duties; or

(e) the individual from whom the officer attempts to collect information is employed in the administration of justice or is carrying out duties or providing services that are otherwise relevant to the carrying out of the officer's duties.

Application — information collected

2. (1) This Regulation applies with respect to identifying information collected on or after January 1, 2017 as a result of an attempt to collect to which this Regulation applies.

(2) This Regulation applies with respect to identifying information that was collected before January 1, 2017 only as provided under paragraph 5 of subsection 12 (1) and under subsection 13 (1) in relation to that paragraph.

Non-application — person appointed under the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009*

3. This Regulation does not apply with respect to attempts to collect information by a person appointed as a police officer under the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009* or with respect to information collected by such a person.

Interpretation — attempt to collect identifying information

4. For the purposes of this Regulation,

"attempt to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual" means attempt to collect identifying information by asking the individual, in a face-to-face encounter, to identify himself or herself or to provide information for the purpose of identifying the individual and includes such an attempt whether or not identifying information is collected.

PART II
PROHIBITION — CERTAIN COLLECTIONS OF INFORMATION

Limitations on collection of certain information

5. (1) A police officer shall not attempt to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual if,

(a) any part of the reason for the attempted collection is that the officer perceives the individual to be within a particular racialized group unless,

  (i) the officer is seeking a particular individual,

  (ii) being within the racialized group forms part of a description of the particular individual or is evident from a visual representation of the particular individual, and

  (iii) the officer has additional information, in addition to information about the particular individual being in a racialized group, that may help to identify the individual or narrow the description of the individual; or

(b) the attempted collection is done in an arbitrary way.

(2) Without limiting what might constitute the additional information required under subclause (1) (a) (iii), such information may consist of information about,

(a) the appearance of the individual, including information about the individual's clothing, height, weight, eye colour, hair colour or hair style;

(b) the location where the individual might be found;

(c) the type of vehicle the individual might be found in;

(d) the associates the individual might be found with; or

(e) the behaviour of the individual.

(3) The additional information required under subclause (1) (a) (iii) may not consist only of the sex of the individual, the approximate age of the individual or both.

(4) For the purpose of clause (1) (b), an attempted collection by a police officer from an individual is done in an arbitrary way unless the officer has a reason that the officer can articulate that complies with all of the following:

1. The reason includes details about the individual that cause the officer to reasonably suspect that identifying the individual may contribute to or assist in an inquiry described in clause 1 (1) (a) or (b) or the gathering of information described in clause 1 (1) (c).
2. The reason does not include either of the following:
   i. that the individual has declined to answer a question from the officer which the individual is not legally required to answer, or
   ii. that the individual has attempted or is attempting to discontinue interaction with the officer in circumstances in which the individual has the legal right to do so.
3. The reason is not only that the individual is present in a high crime location.

PART III
DUTIES RELATING TO COLLECTIONS OF INFORMATION

OFFICER DUTIES

Duties to inform before attempting to collect information

6. (1) A police officer shall not attempt to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual unless the police officer, in accordance with the procedures developed under section 13,

(a) has informed the individual that he or she is not required to provide identifying information to the officer; and

(b) has informed the individual why the police officer is attempting to collect identifying information about the individual.

(2) A police officer is not required to inform the individual under clause (1) (a) or (b) if the officer has a reason to believe that informing the individual under that clause might compromise the safety of an individual.

(3) A police officer is not required to inform the individual under clause (1) (b) if the officer has a reason to believe that informing the individual under that clause,

(a) would likely compromise an ongoing police investigation;

(b) might allow a confidential informant to be identified; or

(c) might disclose the identity of a person contrary to the law, including disclose the identity of a young person contrary to the *Youth Criminal Justice Act* (Canada).

(4) A reason required under subsection (2) or (3) must be a reason the police officer can articulate and must include details relating to the particular circumstances.

Document for individual

7. (1) A police officer who attempts to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual shall,

(a) offer to give the individual a document that provides a record of the attempt; and

(b) give the individual such a document if the individual indicates that he or she wants it.

(2) A police officer is not required to comply with subsection (1) if the officer has a reason to believe that continuing to interact with the individual,

(a) might compromise the safety of an individual; or

(b) might delay the officer from responding to another matter that should be responded to immediately.

(3) A reason required under subsection (2) must be a reason the police officer can articulate and must include details relating to the particular circumstances.

(4) The document required under subsection (1) shall contain at least the following information:

1. The officer's name and officer identification number and the date, time and location of the attempted collection.
2. Information about how to contact the Independent Police Review Director.
3. An explanation that the individual can request access to information about himself or herself that is in the custody or under the control of a police force, under the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* in the case of a municipal police force, or under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* in the case of the Ontario Provincial Police, and information about how to contact persons to whom such a request may be given.

Police officer must record reason and other information

8. A police officer who attempts to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual shall record the following:

1. The officer's reason for the attempted collection, including the details referred to in paragraph 1 of subsection 5 (4).
2. Whether the individual was informed as required under clauses 6 (1) (a) and (b) or, if informing the individual under one of those clauses was not required under subsection 6 (2) or (3), the reason why that was not required.
3. Whether the individual was offered the document as required under clause 7 (1) (a) or, if offering the document was not required under subsection 7 (2), the reason why that was not required.
4. Whether the individual was given the document offered under clause 7 (1) (a) or, if giving the document was not required under clause 7 (1) (b) or subsection 7 (2), the reason why that was not required.
5. Such other information as the chief of police requires the officer to record.

INCLUSION OF COLLECTED INFORMATION IN POLICE DATABASES

Collected information in police databases

9. (1) This section applies with respect to the inclusion, in databases under the control of a police force, of identifying information about an individual collected by a police officer from the individual.

(2) The chief of police shall ensure that the requirements under this section are complied with.

(3) Access to identifying information shall be restricted in accordance with subsection (10) unless the information may be included in a database, under this section, without limiting the access of members of the police force.

(4) Identifying information may be included in a database without limiting the access of members of the police force if,

(a) the police officer who collected the information,

(i) has indicated that the attempted collection complied with section 5,

(ii) has indicated that the individual was informed as required under clauses 6 (1) (a) and (b) or, if informing the individual under one of those clauses was not required under subsection 6 (2) or (3), has indicated the reason why that was not required,

(iii) has indicated that the individual was offered the document as required under clause 7 (1) (a) or, if offering the document was not required under subsection 7 (2), has indicated the reason why that was not required, and

(iv) has indicated that the individual was given the document offered under clause 7 (1) (a) or, if giving the document was not required under clause 7 (1) (b) or subsection 7 (2), has indicated the reason why that was not required; and

(b) either,

(i) the chief of police or a person designated by the chief of police has determined, after considering the officer's reasons for the attempted collection, including the details referred to in paragraph 1 of subsection 5 (4), that it appears that section 5 was complied with and has ensured that clause (a) has been complied with, or

(ii) the database indicates that what is required under subclause (i) has not yet been done.

(5) The following apply if what is required under subclause (4) (b) (i) was not done when the identifying information was included in the database:

1. The chief of police or a person designated by the chief of police shall conduct a review, within 30 days after the information was first entered into a database under the control of the police force, to determine, after considering the officer's reasons for the attempted collection, including the details referred to in paragraph 1 of subsection 5 (4), whether it appears that section 5 was complied with and whether clause (4) (a) has been complied with.
2. If it is determined that it appears that section 5 was complied with and that clause (4) (a) has been complied with, the indication required under subclause (4) (b) (ii) may be removed.
3. If it is not determined, before the end of the 30-day period described in paragraph 1, that it appears that section 5 was complied with and that clause (4) (a) has been complied with, the identifying information shall be retained, subject to the procedures developed under section 13 in relation to paragraph 4 of subsection 12 (1), in a database under the control of the police force but access to such retained information shall be restricted in accordance with subsection (10).

(6) At least once a year, the chief of police or a person designated by the chief of police shall conduct detailed reviews of an appropriately sized random sample of the entries of identifying information included in a database under subsection (4) to estimate, within a margin of error of plus or minus 5 per cent, at a 95 per cent confidence level, whether it appears that sections 5, 6 and 7 were complied with.

(7) If, as a result of a detailed review under subsection (6), it is determined, with respect to identifying information included in a database under subsection (4), that section 5, 6 or 7 was not complied with, the identifying information shall be retained, subject to the procedures developed under section 13 in relation to paragraph 4 of subsection 12 (1), in a database

under the control of the police force but access to such retained information shall be restricted in accordance with subsection (10).

(8) The chief of police shall consider the results of the detailed reviews under subsection (6) and take such actions as the chief of police considers appropriate.

(9) Access to identifying information shall be restricted in accordance with subsection (10) after the fifth anniversary of the date on which the information was first entered into a database under the control of the police force.

(10) The following apply with respect to identifying information to which access must be restricted:

1. No person may access the information without the permission of the chief of police or a person designated by the chief of police.
2. A member of the police force may be permitted to access the information only if the chief of police or a person designated by the chief of police is satisfied that access is needed,
   i. for the purpose of an ongoing police investigation,
   ii. in connection with legal proceedings or anticipated legal proceedings,
   iii. for the purpose of dealing with a complaint under Part V of the Act or for the purpose of an investigation or inquiry under clause 25 (1) (a) of the Act,
   iv. in order to prepare the annual report described in subsection 14 (1) or the report required under section 15,
   v. for the purpose of complying with a legal requirement, or
   vi. for the purpose of evaluating a police officer's performance.

RESTRICTIONS ON PERFORMANCE TARGETS

Performance targets not to be used in evaluating work performance

10. A chief of police shall ensure that no performance target based on any of the following factors is used to evaluate the work performance of a police officer on his or her force:

1. The number of times, within a particular period, that the officer collects or attempts to collect identifying information about individuals from the individuals.
2. The number of individuals from whom the officer collects or attempts to collect identifying information within a particular period.

PART IV
OTHER MATTERS

TRAINING

Chiefs of police must ensure training

11. (1) A chief of police shall ensure that every police officer on his or her police force who attempts to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual, or who acts as the designate of the chief of police under section 9, has successfully completed the training required under this section within the previous 36 months.

(2) The training referred to in subsection (1) shall include training on the following topics:

1. The right of an individual not to provide information to a police officer, the limitations on this right and how to ensure that this right is respected.
2. The right of an individual to discontinue an interaction with a police officer, the limitations on this right and how to avoid unlawfully psychologically detaining an individual.
3. Bias awareness, discrimination and racism and how to avoid bias, discrimination and racism when providing police services.
4. The rights that individuals have to access information about themselves that is in the custody, or under the control, of a police force.
5. The initiation of interactions with members of the public.
6. This Regulation and its application.

(3) The training referred to in subsection (1) shall be provided at the Ontario Police College or by a trainer who has been trained, at the Ontario Police College, to provide the training referred to in subsection (1).

(4) The training referred to in subsection (1) shall be based on a curriculum approved by the Director of the Ontario Police College.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Boards and Minister must develop policies

12. (1) A board shall develop policies regarding the following matters:

1. The document to be given to individuals under section 7.
2. The contents, in relation to matters to which this Regulation applies, of the annual report described in subsection 14 (1).
3. The report required under section 15.
4. The retention of, access to, and disclosure of identifying information collected on or after January 1, 2017, including the retention of identifying information collected contrary to this Regulation.
5. The retention of, access to, and disclosure of identifying information collected before January 1, 2017 with respect to which this Regulation would have applied had the collection taken place on January 1, 2017.

(2) The policy developed under paragraph 4 of subsection (1) shall provide that identifying information collected contrary to this Regulation shall not be retained longer than is reasonably necessary to ensure the information is available in the circumstances in which access may be permitted under paragraph 2 of subsection 9 (10).

(3) The duties imposed by subsections (1) and (2) on boards in relation to municipal police forces apply to the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services in relation to the Ontario Provincial Police.

(4) The policies developed under this section shall be consistent with this Regulation.

Chiefs of police must develop procedures

13. (1) A chief of police shall develop procedures regarding the matters set out in subsection 12 (1).

(2) The procedures developed under subsection (1) shall be consistent with this Regulation and the relevant policies developed under section 12.

REPORTS, REVIEWS AND COMPLIANCE

Annual report

14. (1) This section applies to,

(a) an annual report provided by a municipal chief of police to a board under section 31 of Ontario Regulation 3/99 (Adequacy and Effectiveness of Police Services) made under the Act; and

(b) the annual report provided by the Commissioner under subsection 17 (4) of the Act.

(2) A chief of police shall ensure that his or her annual report includes the following information in relation to attempted collections of identifying information:

1. The number of attempted collections and the number of attempted collections in which identifying information was collected.
2. The number of individuals from whom identifying information was collected.
3. The number of times each of the following provisions was relied upon to not do something that would otherwise be required under subsection 6 (1):
   i. subsection 6 (2),
   ii. clause 6 (3) (a),
   iii. clause 6 (3) (b), and
   iv. clause 6 (3) (c).
4. The number of times an individual was not given a document under clause 7 (1) (b) because the individual did not indicate that they wanted it.
5. The number of times each of the following clauses was relied upon to not do something that would otherwise be required under subsection 7 (1):
   i. clause 7 (2) (a), and
   ii. clause 7 (2) (b).
6. The number of attempted collections from individuals who are perceived, by a police officer, to be within the following groups based on the sex of the individual:
   i. male individuals, and

ii. female individuals.

7. For each age group established by the chief of police for the purpose of this paragraph, the number of attempted collections from individuals who are perceived, by a police officer, to be within that age group.

8. For each racialized group established by the chief of police for the purpose of this paragraph, the number of attempted collections from individuals who are perceived, by a police officer, to be within that racialized group.

9. A statement, based on an analysis of the information provided under this subsection, as to whether the collections were attempted disproportionately from individuals within a group based on the sex of the individual, a particular age or racialized group, or a combination of groups and if so, any additional information that the chief of police considers relevant to explain the disproportionate attempted collections.

10. The neighbourhoods or areas where collections were attempted and the number of attempted collections in each neighbourhood or area.

11. The number of determinations, referred to in subsection 9 (5), that section 5 or clause 9 (4) (a) was not complied with.

12. The number of determinations, referred to in subsections 9 (6) and (7), that section 5, 6 or 7 was not complied with.

13. The number of times members of the police force were permitted under subsection 9 (10) to access identifying information to which access must be restricted.

(3) A chief of police shall establish age groups for the purpose of paragraph 7 of subsection (2).

(4) A chief of police shall establish racialized groups for the purpose of paragraph 8 of subsection (2) and shall do so in a way that allows the information required by subsection (2) relating to the racialized groups to be comparable to the data referred to in the following paragraphs, as released by the Government of Canada on the basis of its most recent National Household Survey preceding the period covered by the chief of police's annual report:

1. For each derived visible minority group set out in the National Household Survey, the number of individuals who identified themselves as being within that group.

2. The number of individuals who claimed Aboriginal identity.

(5) This section does not require the inclusion of information about anything that occurred before January 1, 2017.

Chiefs of police must review practices and report

15. (1) If an annual report referred to in section 14 reveals that identifying information was attempted to be collected disproportionately from individuals perceived to be within a group or combination of groups, the chief of police shall review the practices of his or her police force and shall prepare a report setting out the results of the review and his or her proposals, if any, to address the disproportionate attempted collection of information.

(2) A municipal chief of police shall provide his or her report to the relevant board, and the Commissioner shall provide his or her report to the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

(3) When a board receives a report from a municipal chief of police under subsection (2), and when the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services receives a report from the Commissioner under subsection (2), the board or the Minister, as the case may be,

(a) shall publish the report on the Internet in a manner that makes it available to the public free of charge and may make the report available to the public free of charge in any other manner that the board or the Minister, as the case may be, considers appropriate; and

(b) shall consider the report and the proposals, if any, set out in the report and consider, in the case of a board, whether to give directions under clause 31 (1) (e) of the Act or, in the case of the Minister, whether to give directions to which the Commissioner would be subject under subsection 17 (2) of the Act.

Chiefs of police must make records available

16. (1) For the purpose of carrying out a duty, or exercising a power, under clause 3 (2) (b), (d), (e) or (h) of the Act, in relation to matters to which this Regulation applies, the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services may request a chief of police to provide any relevant information that is in the possession or under the control of the chief of police's police force.

(2) A chief of police shall comply with a request made under subsection (1) and shall do so in the manner specified by the Minister.

Review of Regulation

17. (1) The Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services shall ensure that a review of this Regulation is conducted and that a report on the findings of the review is published no later than January 1, 2019.

Review not by a government employee

(2) The Minister shall ensure that the person who conducts the review is not a public servant within the meaning of the *Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006* and is not employed in the Office of the Premier or in the office of a minister.

Consultation with Minister Responsible for Anti-Racism

(3) The Minister shall ensure that the person who conducts the review consults with the Minister Responsible for Anti-Racism.

PART V (OMITTED)

18. OMITTED (PROVIDES FOR COMING INTO FORCE OF PROVISIONS OF THIS REGULATION).

Français

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9.4 Survey Questionnaire

Frontline Uniform Supervisor (Sergeant) Survey Questionnaire
(Dec. 2017 and Jan. 2018)

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey, which is part of a larger research study being conducted by Paul Rinkoff, Research Investigator at Ryerson University. Further information about this study is provided in the Consent Agreement.

Please be assured that all information you provide will be kept entirely confidential.

This survey will take 5 – 10 minutes to complete, and your opinions are highly appreciated.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Paul Rinkoff by email prinkoff@ryerson.ca or Dr. Tuna Baskoy by email tbaskoy@politics.ryerson.ca.

Q1. Your sex __Male __Female __Prefer Not To Answer	Q2. Your age _____ __Prefer Not To Answer	Q3. Your marital status ___Single, never married ___Legally married ___Common-Law Union ___Married, but separated ___Divorced ___Prefer Not To Answer
Q4. Do you have children? ___Yes ___No ___Prefer Not To Answer If yes, how many? ___ __Prefer Not To Answer	Q5. Were you born in Canada? ___Yes ___No __Prefer Not To Answer	Q6. If NOT born in Canada, Where were you born? _____ __Prefer Not To Answer When did you come to Canada? _____ __Prefer Not To Answer

Q7. Your highest completed level of education ___Elementary school ___Some high school ___High school graduate ___Some community college ___Community college certificate/diploma ___Some university ___University degree ___Graduate degree ___Prefer Not To Answer	Q8. If you WERE born in Canada where were your parents born? Father_____ Mother_____ __Prefer Not To Answer If your parents were NOT born in Canada, when did they come to Canada? Father_____ Mother _____ __Prefer Not To Answer	Q9. Your current division at TPS _____ __Prefer Not To Answer Or if not at a division what is your current position? _____ __Prefer Not To Answer Q10. How many years have you been a police officer? _____ __Prefer Not To Answer
Q11. Are you currently a Frontline Uniform Supervisor? ___Yes ___No __Prefer Not To Answer	Q12. How many years have you been a supervisor? _____ __Prefer Not To Answer	Q13. How many years have you been a Frontline Uniform Supervisor?_____ __Prefer Not To Answer
Q14. How many years have you been at your current division? _____ __Prefer Not To Answer	Q15. What is your ethnicity(s) or cultural identity(ies)? You can answer with more than one. _____ __Prefer Not To Answer	Q16. Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not well understood at all and 5 is very well understood, how strong is your understanding of the "Regulated Interactions Policy"? 1.___Not strong at all 2.___Not so strong 3.___Somewhat strong 4.___Strong 5.___Very strong

Q17. Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not well understood at all and 5 is very well understood, how well do your frontline officers understand "Regulated Interactions Policy"? 1.___Not strong at all 2.___Not so strong 3.___Somewhat strong 4.___Strong 5.___Very strong	Q18. Do you believe that conformance with the "Regulated Interactions Policy" by all frontline police officers will improve relationships between members of TPS and members of the community? ___Yes ___No ___Don't know	

The factors which impact the daily duties of police officers in my divisional community are…

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q19.	Level of respect from citizens					
Q20.	Media portrayal of the police					
Q21.	The level of violence in the community					
Q22.	Local Political Influence					
Q23.	The number of public complaints					
Q24.	The relationship between the police and citizens					
Q25.	The level of crime					
Q26.	The level of poverty or income					
Q27.	Decisions of Internal Management					
Q28.	Police Technology					
Q29.	Internal Discipline					
Q30.	Available resources					

This completes the survey. Thank you very much for your time and assistance.

9.5 Interview Guide

- Think of this more as a conversation over coffee rather than an interview – very informal
- Think of me as a student with almost no knowledge trying to learn as much as possible about the role of a sergeant
- Nothing you tell me today will ever be communicated to anyone in a way that will identify you
- You will always remain anonymous
- My research contract ensures your anonymity
- So for the purpose of this meeting you are the authority and I am the learner
- Because of this, I may ask you to clarify common terms that both of us know, for instance 1 and 1, or parade
- I may also ask you for examples along the way

Frontline Uniform Supervisor (Sergeant) Interview Guide
(December 2017 and January 2018)

Background Information on Interviewee:
Participant Code:
Date:
Name:
Location of Interview:
Rank: Sergeant
Position: Uniform Sergeant - PRU
Division or other location where working:
Years as a police officer:
Years as a supervisor:
Time as a frontline uniform sergeant:
Currently a frontline uniform sergeant y/n:

I am conducting this interview to find out more about how sergeants get their officers to follow rules and procedures. I am seeking to find out more about what sergeants do and the methods and resources that sergeants use to make officers aware of the rules and procedures and follow them. I am also trying to find out more about what factors exist in your organization and outside of your organization that either encourages or discourages officers from following rules and procedures. To help me do this, occasionally some of my questions focus your attention to a specific policy – in this case it will be Regulated Interactions Policy, which is the procedure that

regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding". Other times, I am speaking about rules and procedures in general. Do you have any questions?

Questions relating to the roles and responsibilities of supervisors:

Q1L. As a PRU sergeant, what are your roles and responsibilities?

Q2L As a PRU sergeant, what methods and resources do you use to get your officers to follow rules and procedures?

Q3L As a PRU sergeant, how do you inform your officers about new rules and procedures and/or changes to existing rules and procedures?

Q4L As a PRU sergeant, how do you alter the behaviour of your officers so that they follow new rules and procedures or changes to existing rules and procedures?

Q5L As a PRU sergeant, how do you use your formal rank and authority to get your officers to follow rules and procedures?

The next few questions focus on the role of sergeants in the regulation of the practice of "Street Checks" and "Carding". Do you have any questions?

Questions relating to the "Regulated Interactions Policy"

Q6L. In your own words, can you explain to me the purpose of the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

Q7L. As a PRU sergeant, what are your roles and responsibilities in relation to your officers conducting "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

Q8L. How would you describe your frontline officer's understanding of the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

Q9L. As a PRU sergeant, what methods or resources do you use to get your officers to follow the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

The next few questions relate to rewards and discipline in the police organization. Sergeants have been often credited with using formal rewards such as documentations or informal rewards such as time off or preferred assignments to get officers to follow rules and procedures. Alternatively, Sergeants have been credited with using formal discipline such as documentations or informal discipline such as the denial of time off or undesirable assignments to get officers to follow rules and procedures. The next section of questions allows me to explore what types of rewards and discipline sergeants may use in your organization. Do you have any questions?

Questions relating to Rewards and Discipline

Q10L. (A) As a PRU sergeant, do you reward officers who follow the rules and procedures?

(B) What types of rewards do you use to encourage your officers to follow the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

Q11L. (A) As a PRU sergeant, do you discipline officers who do not follow rules and procedures?

(B) What forms of discipline do you use to get your officers to follow the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

The last section of questions explores the factors or influences that exist in your police organization that impact how your officers decide whether or not to follow rules and procedures. I am exploring influences inside and outside of your organization. Inside influences may include organizational structure, rank structure, Command, management, fear of discipline, resources, training, technology, work schedule, culture, and morale. Outside influences may include relations with community members, media, special interest groups, politicians, crime rates, the socio-economic status of the surrounding neighborhoods, and investigative oversight. For example, the outside influence of politicians may change how officers follow procedures surrounding marijuana enforcement. This would be an example of an external influence. Alternatively, the internal influence of a resource or officer shortage may effect whether or not officers follow rules and procedures. This would be an example of an internal influence. Do you have any questions?

Questions relating to the factors in a police organization that influence following rules and procedures:

Q12L. What inside your organization influences officers to follow the rules and procedures?

Q13L. What inside your organization influences officers to bend or ignore rules and procedures?

Q14L. What outside your organization influences officers to follow rules and procedures?

Q15L. What outside your organization influences officers to bend or ignore rules and procedures?

Q16L. Do any of the influences we have talked about so far, either inside or outside, encourage officers to follow the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

Q17L. Do any of the influences we have talked about so far, either inside or outside, discourage officers from following the procedure that regulates "Street Checks" and "Carding"?

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