LESSONS FROM DEVELOPING FOOD POLICY THROUGH A MULTISTAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE NETWORK: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN FOOD STRATEGY

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Developing Food Policy in a Multistakeholder Governance Network: A Case Study of the Canadian Food Strategy

Doctor of Philosophy, 2019
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Abstract

Globally, we are facing a food system in crisis. Now more than ever, food policies are crucial to the future of food. In Canada, there has never been a national food policy that looked at the food sector holistically. It has traditionally centred on food safety and agriculture, sidestepping many other vital issues. However, between 2010 and 2014, four non-state actors developed national food policy documents. In response to these developments, this study asks: What are some unique characteristics of multistakeholder networks in the policymaking process? To answer this question, the Canadian Food Strategy (CFS) created in 2014 by the Conference Board of Canada (CBoC) was used as a case study. This strategy was unique because it involved a range of food policy issues, food policy actors, and had financial support from several key food industry players. Participants in this policy development experiment did not deem this strategy a success regardless of its abundant financial resources, its topic comprehensiveness, and widespread buy-in from food industry, government, and other non-governmental organizations. Semi-structured and elite interviews were used to shed light on why this case was not successful, to extract lessons from this initiative for future food policymaking efforts in Canada. This dissertation integrated wicked policy, governance, policy network, and multistakeholder literature to understand how food policy may be developed and governed in Canada. The study resulted in three key findings. First, food policy in Canada is very complex, exhibiting both tame and wicked

qualities. Second, the state must have a significant position in a multistakeholder food governance network (MFGN). Lastly, while the structure of the MFGN and the actors involved in it are important to a network's successful policy outcome, the CFS initiative revealed that process was fundamental to the outcome.

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List of Abbreviations

AoA	Agreement on Agriculture
AAFC	Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
CAPI	Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute
CBoC	Conference Board of Canada
CETA	Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement
CFA	Canadian Federation of Agriculture
CFIA	Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CFIC	Centre for Food in Canada
CFS	Canadian Food Strategy
CSO	Civil society organization
DFO	Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FHC	Food Horizons Canada
FSC	Food Secure Canada
MSI	Multistakeholder initiative
MFGN	Multistakeholder food governance network
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPM	New public management
NWG	Network governance school
OFA	Ontario Federation of Agriculture
OMAFRA	Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
PFC	People's Food Commission
PFPP	People's Food Policy Platform
PHAC	Public Health Agency of Canada
PNA	Policy network analysis school
TNC	Transnational corporation
USC Canada	Unitarian Service Committee Canada
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

Our current global industrial food system is one of the most efficient systems the world has seen, producing high yields, cheap food, and high profits (Norberg-Hodge, Merrifield, Gorelick, 2003). However, many observers voice concerns about the unsustainable nature of the global industrial food system and express the need for major restructuring and reform (Blay-Palmer et al, 2013; Pimbert & Anderson, 2018). We continue to experience growing rates of diet-related chronic disease including diabetes, hypertension, high rates of obesity (Jacobson, Krieger & Brownell, 2018; Weis, 2003), climate change, water, soil, and air pollution (Gillon, 2019; Weis, 2017), deforestation (FAO, 2018a), high rates of hunger (FAO, 2018b) and food waste (FAO, 2013), increasing concentration of profit and power in fewer hands (Constance, Hendrickson & Howard, 2014), farmers not making enough money to survive (Weibe, 2017), and many other issues. Some scholars like Barling, Lang, and Caraher (2009) and Candel and Pereira (2017) have argued that previous agriculturally-focused policy regimes have not solved these problems, and an integrated food policy that draws on various policy domains and jurisdictions is needed to address these issues.

The food governance landscape has changed in the past two to three decades due to political and economic shifts towards a more neoliberal system. Food governance is how policies are coordinated and organized. Under neoliberalism, the state has retreated from certain key areas, and the food system is one of the best examples of this retreat. The state has taken an anti-interventionist approach to the food system by deregulating it and creating a self-regulating system (Lang, 1999, p. 219-

220). The state has also lost many financial resources because of economic and political restructuring and ceded many of its responsibilities to the private and third sector (Evans, Richmond & Shields, 2005; McBride & Shields, 1997). Governments now have just enough resources to sustain minimal regulation and implementation standards (Webb, 2005, p. 244-245). To fill these voids, many non-state actors[1], such as civil society and industry, have assumed the roles of food policy actors (Koc et al, 2008; Fuchs, Kalfagianni & Havinga, 2011; Fuchs et al, 2011). Food governance has thus become a multi-actor arena (Fuchs, Kalfagianni & Havinga, 2011; Fuchs et al, 2011; Busch, 2008; Newell, 2005).

Since the 1970s, many non-state initiatives aimed at improving the food system have been largely led by civil society actors (Koc et al, 2008). Increasingly, however, industry has become more active in non-traditional areas of the food system and food policy, such as environmental sustainability, and social issues. Food retail has largely been at the forefront of this change where private standards, certifications, and rules are often expected of suppliers (Fuchs, Kalfagianni & Arentsen, 2009; Fuchs, Kalfagianni & Havinga, 2011).

Focusing on the Canadian context, MacRae (2011) has come to similar conclusions as Lang, Barling, and Caraher (2009) and Candel and Pereira (2017), arguing that many food system issues in Canada are exacerbated because Canada does not have an integrated food policy as a tool to address them holistically (MacRae, 2011). Historically, Canada has relied on agricultural and food safety policies dispersed

[1] In this study, non-state actors will be referred to as any actor that is not part of government, including industry, industry associations, civil society, foundations, and interest groups.

between different levels of government to solve some food system issues (Hedley, 2006; MacRae, 2011). There were some attempts at food policymaking in the past (see Chapter 2), however, they never materialized into an integrated food policy. For the most part, the Canadian government has taken a back seat to food policymaking[2]. More recently, non-state actors have risen to the challenge and proposed comprehensive food policies or national frameworks for Canada to fill the food policy lacunae. These attempts are reflective of the governance era in policymaking, where the state no longer monopolizes policymaking power but shares it with many non-state actors (Bevir 2012; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Webb, 2005). In the past decade, four non-state organizations developed national food strategies or policy documents: the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (2011), the Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute (2011), Food Secure Canada (2011), and the Conference Board of Canada (2014).

1.1.1 The Case Study: Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy

This dissertation focuses on one of these cases, the Conference Board of Canada's (CBoC) Canadian Food Strategy (CFS). The CBoC is a research organization that supports industry in navigating public issues, often working on economic forecasting, organizational performance, and some public policy issues. It is financially supported by many public and private actors through fees charged for research and report services (CBoC, n.d.; n.d.a.). In 2014, the CBoC came out with the CFS, a food strategy for Canada which covered a wide range of topics and was developed with a group of investors of which most were in the food industry.

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[2] With the very recent exception of the announcement of a food policy for Canada by the federal government and its subsequent unveil on June 17th, 2019.

The CBoC's CFS is the focus of this study because it is a unique case of food policymaking in Canada. The CBoC's CFS stands out for two reasons. First, the food strategy developed by the CBoC is based on a "holistic vision" (CBoC, n.d.b), one which connects many key players in the food system with the potential of developing "shared objectives" (*ibid*) and "shared goals" (*ibid*). This holistic approach examined a variety of food system issues, including how food affected the environment, communities, and the health of people, rather than focusing on one or two areas of the system (CBoC, n.d.b). This approach is similar to the approaches taken in the other three non-state actor food strategies mentioned above. Secondly, CBoC's major investors in the CFS included many of the largest food corporations in Canada. Other investors also included government ministries and philanthropic organizations and charities (CBoC, n.d.b). The other three strategies either did not have any financial support from the food industry or had very little of it. Nevertheless, none of the previous strategies have had the same amount of financial support and industry participation as the CBoC's CFS. The combination of a holistic food policy approach and strong industry support is a unique case of food policy development in Canada. Traditionally, more holistic or comprehensive visions of food strategies were put forth by civil society, rather than by industry, which is often viewed as an obstacle in the formation of a healthy and sustainable food system. Given the combination of actors and food topics involved in the CFS, this food policy initiative was unlike any other.

1.2 Purpose and Research Questions

At the time this study was initiated, the food policy environment in Canada was in flux. Given the larger involvement of non-state actors in policymaking during this period, it

was clear that more actors were demanding that they participate in food policy development in Canada. This dissertation looks at the CBoC's CFS as a largely unsuccessful multistakeholder food governance network that involved various state and non-state actors in the development of food policy. It draws insights from the CFS development process about the complexity of food policymaking in Canada involving several policy actors in an era of "governance" rather than "government". The purpose of this case study is to better understand the policymaking process in food policy specifically, but also to understand the role of state and non-state actors in complex policymaking processes. This is an important topic to examine because our food systems require restructuring and reform through policy to address many of the food system issues that have been intensifying over the last several decades. Examining this case study reveals insights on how to move forward with developing food policy in Canada through a multistakeholder process.

The following questions guide this study:

- What are some unique characteristics of multistakeholder networks in the policymaking process?
    - Why did the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy as a multistakeholder governance network policy development process fail?
    - What lessons does the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy initiative provide in terms of multistakeholder policymaking?

This study is an empirical and qualitative governance study that is actor-centred, focusing on state and non-state actors in the policymaking process. It builds on the current theoretical knowledge in food policy literature, governance literature, network literature, and multistakeholder literature through the CFS as a case study.

1.3 Significance and Contribution of the Study

There are few studies done on the development of food policy in Canada on a national level, and none have focused on the roles of state and non-state actors in food policymaking. Furthermore, the effectiveness of multi-actor collaboration in food policy of state and non-state actors has not been studied in Canada, although some studies have been done at the international level (Zanella, Goetz, Rist, Schmidt, Weigelt, 2018). Researching this will help to understand state and non-state actor collaborations, which are becoming very common in policymaking. My study will provide a cautionary tale for those looking to create multistakeholder collaborations participating around food policy.

My work contributes to two major interdisciplinary fields: policy studies and food studies. In policy studies, I nuance the idea of wicked policy problems[3] by looking at food policy as a sliding scale of "wickedness" which includes aspects of both tame and wicked policy problems. Second, I add to the understanding of the roles of state and non-state actors in policymaking under the era of governance, noting that the state's role continues to be significant. Lastly, policy studies does not tend to make use of multistakeholder studies which focus more on power imbalances and practical characteristics of the collaborative policymaking process in a network. I add to network studies by fusing multistakeholder literature with network literature to bring out some practical discussions of policymaking in networks made up of state and non-state actors. What I find is that "process" becomes a significant characteristic in

[3] These are difficult or sometimes impossible to solve policy problems

multistakeholder policymaking, one that can determine the success or failure of a multistakeholder initiative.

Secondly, I contribute to food studies. While the national food policy and governance literature in Canada is growing, it remains in its early stages. New literature is emerging as more scholars have been giving this topic more attention over the last few years after the call for a national food policy in Canada in 2015. My discussions around the roles of state and non-state actors in food policy will open new dialogue and refresh other conversations around the roles and responsibilities of actors in the food system especially when engaging in multistakeholder initiatives. This is particularly significant now that the first ever food policy for Canada was released on the 17th of June 2019, which called for a multistakeholder Canadian Food Policy Advisory Council to “inform collaborative food system decision-making” (AAFC, 2019, p. 5).

1.4 Outline of Dissertation

Chapter 2 provides historical contextualization of Canadian food policy, both on the national and global level, identifying why developing food policy can be particularly challenging and problematic in Canada. It also outlines state and non-state attempts of food policymaking in Canada. Chapter 3 presents my theoretical foundations for the study, explaining each body of literature being used and what key ideas and assumptions I take from them to understand insights in the CFS case. I organize this chapter according to two bodies of literature: the policy side of the project, discussing wicked policy problems and conceptualizing food policy, and the governance side which looks at the political economic changes that encouraged the participation of non-state actors in the policymaking process. This second body of literature draws on governance

literature, private governance, policy and governance networks, and multistakeholder initiatives.

Chapter 4 discusses my research design, my research methods, and my analytic approach used to draw observations from my data. Chapter 5 presents the general findings from the CFS case. It describes the CBoC and how the development of the Centre for Food in Canada (CFIC) and CFS came about, concluding from the point of view of participants, that the CFS was not a successful initiative. Chapters 6 presents the experiences of participants in the CFS development. These centred on three main themes: the complexity of food policy as a barrier to food policy development in Canada, government's role in food policymaking, and opportunities and challenges in multistakeholder governance networks: structure, process, and actors in the CFS. Chapter 7 considers my findings in relation to the theoretical and analytical tools introduced in Chapter 3. It comes to three main conclusions: food policy is a complex policy problem with a sliding scale of "wickedness", the state must be involved in food policymaking, and while structure and actors are important in multistakeholder governance networks, the policymaking process became vital in the development of the CFS. As such, the process of developing the policy outcome should be emphasized in multistakeholder governance networks. Lastly, in Chapter 8, I highlight the scholarly and policy contributions of this research, the importance of these findings for Canada's current food policy environment, and limitations of the study.

Chapter 2: Canadian Food Policy in Historical and Global Context

To understand the Canadian food policy environment and the complexities involved in food policymaking, it is important to contextualize the present food system "moment" or the political-economic snapshot in history in which we find ourselves nationally and globally. Contextualization of food policy gives us a historical map of what has been attempted previously (and why it worked or did not work) and the relationships between different stakeholders. It also helps outline the possibilities for future policymaking. This chapter begins by providing a brief review of the historical context within which Canadian food policy has developed, noting key events since the 1970s that have influenced its trajectory. Second, it outlines the global context that has increasingly affected food policy development in Canada since the 1970s. Third, it traces the complex dimensions of food policy and the current state of scholarly knowledge related to food policy in Canada. Finally, this chapter summarizes the unique policy obstacles in Canada that can make food policymaking particularly challenging and the need for policy research that focuses on both state and non-state attempts at food policy development in Canada in this broader historical and global context.

2.1 Canadian Food Policy in Historical Context

Many policies currently in place are food-related but cannot be rightly called "food policy". Scholarship about the Canadian food policy system from political science and sociology highlights that Canada's food system was and continues to be dominated by the agricultural sector. This sector has been riddled with contradictory developments: on the one hand, it involves market-friendly policies, and on the other, the protection of the

domestic market and farming incomes. As Fowke (1978) explains, the agricultural sector was not always a significant or productive sector in the Canadian economy. The development of sustainable agricultural growth by Canadian producers took many years and significant investment from the state. This investment, however, often did not target the agricultural sector directly, but instead, agriculture served other interests like national security, immigration, and economic development (Fowke, 1978). The capacity of the state to deal with social and economic problems greatly expanded in the 1900s. In the postwar period, the Canadian government began developing many new social and economic policies. The state expanded and became more involved in society and the economy during this time.

Policies became progressively more complex as Canada's population increased and as the international politico-economic climate became more integrated and global. Domestic policymaking became increasingly internationalized, developing new multi-level and multi-actor structures and policymaking processes (Skogstad, 2005). For this reason, Canada's food system generally reflected global food system tendencies. The 1970s global economic crisis replicated a domestic crisis in Canada termed the "price squeeze" (Skogstad, 1987). The "price squeeze", or farm crisis, caused agricultural commodity prices to fall, while causing retail prices of food products to rise throughout the 1980s (Wiebe, 2017; Winson, 1993). As a result, both the federal and provincial governments intervened to stabilize producer incomes (Skogstad, 1987) through supply management in the 1970s. This program controlled the national supply and leveled the price of certain foods (Skogstad, 2008). The late 1970s also experienced a substantial civil society response to the economic changes in farming and socio-economic

transformations in the country. Canada experienced a shift in public and social policies that aimed to decrease state intervention in the market and in social programming (Koc & Bas, 2012). As the state's role receded in social policy, many people were left unemployed and in poverty. Local government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and families became responsible for addressing the needs of this marginalized population (Koc & Bas, 2012). In 1978, in response to these socio-economic restructurings, the People's Food Commission (PFC) was created. This was a large group of food activists and NGOs developing the beginnings of Canada's modern food movement. Collectively, the PFC created a report, *The Land of Milk and Money* drawing attention to problems in the Canadian food system (Koc, MacRae, Desjardins & Roberts, 2008). Also, in response to the economic crisis and growing food insecurity, Canada's first food bank was opened in Edmonton in 1981. Since then, food banks have mushroomed all over the country (Riches, 1986).

Many multilateral and bilateral trade agreements had an impact on the Canadian food system. Some scholars like Smythe (2018) argue that trade agreements can shrink the policy space for developing policies within a country because they must be harmonized in accordance with stipulations within these agreements. She notes that this can be particularly difficult if attempting to support local sustainable food. The 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement increased farming for export (Wiebe, 2017) and the availability of American food products and foreign investment in Canada (Winson, 1993). This period witnessed many American takeovers of key Canadian food industries coinciding with the government's adoption of neoliberal policies (Winson, 1993). Winson (1993) notes that this threatened the survival of Canadian fruit and

vegetable producers because of competition with their American counterparts who had larger operations and lower-cost structures. This eventually contributed to the significant restructuring and eventual dissolution of the fruit and vegetable canning industry in Canada. The 1980s was generally a period where the Canadian agri-food system experienced many mergers and consolidations across the sector and increasing participation of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the Canadian market, resulting in high rates of corporate concentration in the system (Winson, 1993).

A very clear market concentration occurred in the food retail sector. “By 1987, for instance, the largest five grocery distributors in Canada accounted for about 70 per cent of all sales. In the United States, by comparison, the top five firms had only 24 per cent of total sales” (Winson, 1993, p. 165).

The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also influenced intra-continental trade in agricultural and food products between Canada, US, and Mexico. It amplified the trade rules already in place from the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, while harmonizing phytosanitary and technical measures to alleviate trade barriers (Skogstad, 2008). The World Trade Organization (WTO), created the following year, in 1995, affected Canada’s food system through the establishment of three things: The Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (Skogstad, 2008).

These agreements created a more market dominated food system but did not completely rid the Canadian state of its regulatory control in agriculture (Skogstad, 2008). Skogstad (2008) argues that these trade agreements did not shift the agricultural paradigm in Canada. She notes that in the late 1990s, early 2000s, the Canadian

government continued to spend significant amounts of public money supporting the sector, although, these subsidies could no longer influence production levels. The Canadian Wheat Board was one mechanism developed to maintain farmer incomes, not surprising, it was often challenged by other countries as being non-compliant with trade obligations. However, trade disputes did not dismantle the Wheat Board (Magnan, 2013). Instead, in 2012, the Conservative government repealed the Canadian Wheat Board Act and consequently dismantled it (Magnan, 2013). Magnan (2013) argues that this has significantly weakened the power of grain farmers in Canada.

During the Conservative government years, between 2006 and 2012, little domestic policy on food emerged. In addition to the dismantling of the Canadian Wheat Board, there were a couple of other critical changes. In 2013, following some serious food safety outbreaks in the Canadian meat industry, the government moved the Canadian Food Inspection Agency from the Agricultural portfolio in Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, to the health portfolio led by Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada (The Canadian Press, 2013). In addition, from 2013-2015, both Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) underwent food labeling modernization which included the updating of food labels (CFIA, 2018). For the most part, little was done to harmonize and lead the food policy file during this government.

In contrast, the Liberal government that followed, in 2015, created a food policy file (more on this below). During this time, the Healthy Eating Strategy was launched in 2016, and we began to see some bolder nutrition policies emerge, including an overhaul of *Canada's Food Guide*, a ban on artificial trans fat, and an update on the nutrition

facts table and ingredient list on food packaging. Front-of-pack labeling and restrictions on food marketing to children are also pieces of legislation that are being developed (Government of Canada, 2019a). Health Canada was adamant about not consulting with industry when developing the new *Canada's Food Guide* (Government of Canada, 2019a), because of public criticisms around industry influence in the development of previous Canadian food guides. However, this does not mean that the Liberal government was anti-business or industry. In fact, the Liberal government has signed several new and updated trade agreements that have opened Canada's supply managed sectors to foreign products.

One such trade agreement is the *Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement* (CETA) between the European Union (EU) and Canada, signed in 2017. While Canada gained slight advantages in market access for meat without growth promoters and seafood, the Canadian supply-managed dairy industry was targeted by the EU. As a result, part of the Canadian dairy market was opened to EU dairy products (Smythe, 2018). A few months later, the *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific-Partnership* (CPTPP), an agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, was signed in March 2018 (Government of Canada, 2018a). Like CETA, it opened supply-managed sectors like dairy, poultry, and eggs to the countries in this agreement (Government of Canada, 2018b). More recently in September 2018, the re-negotiations of NAFTA, now renamed the *United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement* (USMCA) were finalized (Government of Canada, 2018c). The USMCA has several agricultural concessions for Canadian farmers, including, again, the opening up of the Canadian

supply managed sectors dairy, chicken, and egg markets to American products (Government of Canada, 2018d). Previously, these were protected markets.

2.2 The Global Food System Context

On a global scale, the food system is embedded in a neoliberal politico-economic structure and is characterized by several big ideas and processes identified by numerous scholars. Globally, the food system has become very integrated through the globalization of food and agricultural product production, trade, and marketing. This environment has encouraged the dominance of transnational corporations in various areas of the system, including governance (Clapp, 2015). Pechlaner and Otero (2008) note the dominance of biotechnology and “neoregulation” (policies supporting neoliberal globalization) in the global food system. Burch and Lawrence (2005) discuss the transformation of agri-food supply chains which shifted market power to supermarkets and the overall financialization of agriculture and food, while McMichael (2005) examines the corporatization of agriculture, deregulation, and casualization of labour, and Friedmann (2002) focused on the development of new spheres of capital accumulation by emphasizing environmental and social concerns of various actors (Friedmann, 2002). Other scholars like Scrinis (2008) and Dixon (2009) noticed the rise of nutritionism and the changes in the way we view food under increased corporate power. Some classify this global agri-food system as a system of particular politico-economic relations identifying it as the Third Food Regime, the Neoliberal Food Regime (Pechlaner & Otero, 2010), the Corporate Food Regime (McMichael, 2005), or the Corporate Environmental Food Regime (Friedmann, 2002). These authors argue that new politico-economic relations have shifted global food system governance. Clapp and

Fuchs (2009) assert that TNCs have been the architects of a changed global food system, dominating key points of production, processing, distribution, retail, and trade. This has allowed them to influence the regulations that govern their actions in governmental and intergovernmental arenas and create forms of private governance or rules developed by industry itself.

The current global food policy climate has been shaped by post-war Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank) which structured the global neoliberal economic system. Subsequent multilateral and bilateral trade and economic agreements such as the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) from the World Trade Organization, and other trade agreements have locked in governing rules for the global production, pricing, and food trade. These in turn created power relations which favoured TNCs rather than small producers and businesses (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009).

Periodic world economic crises have also affected the food policy climate. In the mid-1970s, the world experienced an energy crisis which produced a global economic and debt crisis. Oil prices quadrupled almost overnight. The industrial agricultural system was heavily dependent on petroleum-based products (i.e. agro-chemicals), as well as oil for shipping products around the world. Because of this, the cost of food production rose sharply (Clapp, 2016a). In 1975, prices for staple crops such as corn and wheat tripled from 1971 prices. World food stocks also reached an all-time low. The combination of high food prices and low amounts of food on the global market made it difficult for countries, especially developing countries, to import food (Clapp, 2016a). The subsequent Washington Consensus and Structural Adjustment Programs, crafted

by the Bretton Woods institutions to end the crisis, developed global neoliberal governance (Öniş & Şenses, 2005).

This governance system embedded a neo-imperialist trade model between the Global North and the Global South, transforming the global agri-food system and policy environment (Patel & McMichael, 2009). This resulted in the intensification of global economic relations, fundamentally restructuring state and economy relations. Neoliberalism served as a legitimizing tool, justifying many societal and policy changes including the dismantling of the welfare state, a more precarious labour environment, and a shrinking state role in the economy and social programs (Koc & Bas, 2012). These changes sparked large waves of hunger around the world. In response, the United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) held the first World Food Conference in 1974 pledging to end hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition in the next decade. Needless to say, these goals were not achieved. Several World Food Summits followed, including in 1996 when the FAO historically created and compelled numerous nations to adopt the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action (FAO, n.d.).

The 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were decades riddled with opposition and resistance of national and international agreements from NGOs reacting to the consequences of the industrial food system and the new challenges stemming from changes in the state-society relation. For example, in response to a more globalized market, the 1980s and 1990s saw the rise of the fair-trade movement, and the 1990s saw the development of the food sovereignty movement reacting to the WTO AoA (Clapp, 2016a).

The next major economic crisis that significantly affected the agri-food system was the 2008 global economic crisis which jeopardized the long-term sustainability of the global food system (Clapp, 2016b). Van der Ploeg (2010) identified speculation, low global grain reserves, the rise of biofuel production, and extreme weather events affecting major crop exporting countries as key contributors. This crisis significantly increased food prices, especially in the Global South which sparked food riots and submerged large segments of the global population into poverty and hunger (van der Ploeg, 2010). Since then, many multilateral organizations reacted to the food crisis and the rise in global food insecurity. These reactions have underscored the need to enhance social, environmental, and economic sustainability of the global food system and a pressing need to change the way the global food system functions[4] (Clapp, 2016a). Policymakers were especially concerned about feeding a growing global population (Clapp, 2016b). Some examples of key reports stemming from these institutions include: The World Economic Forum's reports on a *New Vision for Agriculture* beginning in 2010, the World Bank's *Global Food Crisis Response Program* (2013), and the Food and Agricultural Organization's report, *Agroecology: A Global Paradigm to Challenge Mainstream Industrial Agriculture* (2016). Since the 2008 crisis, there has been growing attention placed on biofuels, global hunger, the ecological sustainability of industrial agriculture, land grabs, and financial manipulation of food stocks (Magnan, 2015).

[4] Although some reports demanded food system change, their prescriptions further entrenched a neoliberal food system and outlined a business as usual framework.

The result of the evolution of this policy domain domestically and significant globalization of agriculture and food systems over the past 50 years has resulted in this policy domain becoming very complex. Any attempts at a national food policy in Canada will be crafted within the confines of its international free trade obligations, however as MacRae (2014) notes, there remains some flexibility within the rules of free trade agreements that can allow for the development of our own national food policies in Canada.

2.3 Food Policy as a Complex Policy Domain in Canada

Traditionally, Canada's food-related policies have centred on agricultural and food safety areas (Hedley, 2006; MacRae, 2011). Canada has never developed an integrated policy reflecting the complexities of food. As Andrée, Coulas and Ballamingie (2018) note, "Canada has had a disparate array of food-related legislation, regulations, directives, standards, and guidelines (which we collectively define as 'policy') at all levels of government" (p. 8). Andrée, Levkoe, and Wilson (2018) note that Canada's "existing policies tend to work in isolation from one another and some in contradiction, leading to even more complex challenges" (p. 2).

This has deterred conceptions of a different approach to food in Canada. Scholars like MacRae (2011) are therefore calling for a comprehensive approach to food policymaking in Canada, or joined-up food policy, to link various facets of food across government bodies (not just agriculture or food safety), jurisdictions, scales, and actors, using a variety of policy instruments to achieve health, social justice, and environmental goals (MacRae, 2015). MacRae and Winfield (2016) identify joined-up food policy as

> the coherent and comprehensive policy environment that links food system function and behaviour to the higher order goals of health promotion and environmental sustainability. A joined-up policy unites activities across all pertinent domains, scales, actors and jurisdictions. It employs a wide range of tools and governance structures to deliver these goals, including sub-policies, legislation, regulations, regulatory protocols and directives, programs, educational mechanisms, taxes or tax incentives, and changes to the loci of decision making. (p. 141)

A joined-up food policy is defended to reflect the complexities and interconnections of food and would take on a systems approach to looking at this multi-sectoral policy area (MacRae, 2011; MacRae & Winfield, 2016).

2.3.1 Multi-dimensional and Multi-Jurisdictional

Food policy is multidimensional because it affects different social, economic, environmental, and cultural spheres. It therefore reaches into various policy areas (Barling, Lang & Caraher, 2002). In Canada, food policy is affected by an additional layer of complexity. Canada is a federal state, with divided and shared jurisdictional roles and responsibilities between the federal, provincial, and municipal governments. Each level of government has power to govern over different policy areas of shared responsibility with other levels of government. Agriculture and health are two examples of shared jurisdictions which have historic roots in the Canadian Constitution. While both shared policy areas relate to food, there are no clear rules as to where food policy would fit and who would be responsible for it (MacRae, 2011). Federal-provincial minister meetings are common in Canada and often are reserved for unique policy domains such as health, agriculture, or environment. A meeting of mixed policy domains is very rare. For policies like food, additional collaboration is necessary horizontally across federal departments/agencies and provincial ministries to reflect the different policy areas food touches. However, in Canada, policy domains have been historically

siloed between governments, departments, and ministries. Even horizontally, between provincial governments for instance, there are challenges. For example, regions in Canada, or even single provinces, have specific interests that may contradict or clash with another province's interests. It is well known that central Canada, or the Prairies, is the grain basket of the country. Their interests will differ from those of Quebec which may be more concerned about its dairy industry. For this reason, opportunities to build interdepartmental policy initiatives have been difficult. In addition to these challenges, there is no institutional body where policy food can be housed and governed (i.e. no department of food) (MacRae, 2017).

Richardson and Lambek (2018) argue that many of the policy areas relating to food policy are not clearly demarcated between jurisdictions which results in three major consequences. First, governments may be unwilling to develop or change policies relating to food because they may overreach and encounter conflicts with other levels of government. Second, lacking jurisdictional clarity provides opportunities for governments not to act. Lastly, the Canadian federalist system has divvied up policy roles and responsibilities between governments without mandating coherence or communication between them. Furthermore, Richardson and Lambek (2018) point to both vertical and horizontal governance fragmentation. Vertical governance fragmentation occurs between the three levels of government, and horizontal governance fragmentation occurs within each level of government between different government ministries and bodies or between provinces. Each government body in charge of a policy area that touches on food is thus governed separately from any other policy area touching on food.

2.3.2 Food Policy Actors, Interests, and Organizations

There are several different state and non-state actors in the food policy arena. Generally state actors have been emphasized as the main players in the sector. As we can see from the graphic below (Figure 1), an interpretation of the farm and food policy community in 1980s shows that Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) was the most powerful actor in the policy community. It can be argued that this dominance continues today given that the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food was presented with a mandate to develop food policy for Canada. AAFC is also the department that is housing and coordinating the development of food policy for Canada.

***Figure 1*. Institutions and Interest Groups in Canadian Food Policy**



Figure 1: Institutions and Interest Groups in Canadian Food Policy. Reprinted from Group Politics and Public Policy (p. 101), by P.A. Pross 1986, Toronto: Oxford University Press. Copyright 1986 by Oxford University Press Canada.

The power of other organizations in the graphic has eroded, for example, the Canadian Wheat Board has since been dismantled, and consumer pressure groups no longer play an important role in policy. New players have entered the food policy arena

as well, like community food groups, NGOs concerned with the environment and social justice issues, and social movements. Food Secure Canada (FSC) is one of the bigger and more well-known NGOs actors involved in the food policy community. Other industry associations like the Retail Council of Canada, Food and Consumer Products of Canada, and the Canadian Beverage Association are also participants. Recently, four non-state organizations have begun to play especially prominent roles in the food policy arena because of their latest developments of Canadian food strategies or food policy documents. Not identified in Pross' food policy community in 1986 is the Canadian Agri-food Policy Institute (CAPI), Food Secure Canada (FSC), and the Conference Board of Canada (CBoC). The Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) is identified in the farm pressure group.

The CFA, founded in 1935, is Canada's largest farm organization. It represents over 200,000 Canadian farmers and speaks on their behalf with government in Ottawa. The CFA is made up of provincial groups and national commodity organizations (personal communication, NGO 5)[5]. The goal of the organization is to enable the success of Canadian farmers (CFA, n.d.), and to bring forward a policy consensus to the Canadian government from the farming community (personal communication, NGO 5). The CFA responds to policies created by government affecting the farming community, but also suggest policy options to the government (personal communication, NGO 5)

[5] This is data from interviews completed in my study.

The CAPI is an independent, non-partisan policy research institute that focuses on the agri-food sector. It was established in 2004 by the federal government. Its stakeholders are broadly defined as agri-food players (CAPI, n.d.a.). CAPI is funded by AAFC, some provinces, and Farm Credit Canada. In 2006, AAFC committed to give CAPI a 15 million dollar grant valid until 2022 (AAFC, 2018). Projects are also funded by different organizations and the private sector. CAPI's mandate is to take a mid to long term perspective on emerging issues in agriculture, and to create space for research and balanced discussion relating to current policy and the food system (personal communication, NGO 1).

FSC is a non-governmental organization (NGO) and considered by many civil society organizations and academics to be one of the leaders in the Canadian food movement. It is the only national member-based organization working on food issues across Canada. FSC is made up of individuals and organizations that come together to advance food security and food sovereignty through three objectives: zero hunger, healthy and safe food, and sustainable food systems (FSC, n.d.).

The CBoC was not known as an organization with an interest in agriculture or food policy until its establishment of the CFIC in 2010. The CBoC is an organization unlike the other three because it is not an agriculture or food organization. It is a research organization primarily catering to industry, assisting it with navigating a wide range of public policy issues, affecting a wide range of policy sectors (Conference Board, n.d.).

It is interesting to note, that all these non-state actors got engaged in thinking about food policy at around the same time. To understand this process, we need to look at food policymaking attempts in Canada from a historical perspective.

2.4 Attempts to Develop a National Food Policy in Canada

A national food policy is not a new idea in Canada. Many civil society actors, social movements, governments, and industry players have worked on this idea for decades (Andrée, Levkoe & Wilson, 2018). However, until June 2019, Canada did not have a comprehensive national food policy. Canadian food policy thinking has been dominated by what MacRae (2017) calls the "traditional food safety and fraud prevention framework" (p. 308). Hedley (2006) argues that the Canadian government's focus on food has been rooted in John Stuart Mill's writings on government intervention which centred on "the prevention of force and fraud" (p. 21). During the Keynesian era, the government acknowledged that some state intervention in the agri-food was necessary because of market failures. This intervention centred on "food safety and quality, food additives, packaging and labeling, weights and measures, advertising and false claims, buyers' and sellers' competitive behaviour, and trade agreements affecting Canadian consumers" (p. 21). The Canadian government has generally been averse to regulating consumer food choices.

2.4.1 National State-led Food Policy Attempts

Nevertheless, there were few attempts to develop a national food policy in Canada from the 1970s and onward. These attempts were fueled by crises rather than forward thinking policy. In the 1970s, the Canadian government was influenced by Norway's

food policy work and prompted by the food and farm crisis to develop three major reports: Nutrition Canada National Survey of 1970-1972; the Lalonde Report on Health Promotion (1975); and the Report of the Committee on Diet and Cardiovascular Disease (1976). In 1973, the federal government created a Special Committee on Trends in Food Prices made up of 25 members of Parliament. In their final report, this Special Committee recommended that the Government of Canada develop a “realistic long-term food policy for Canada” (Morris, 1976, p. 20). That same year, a report from the Canada Nutritional Survey stated that every Canadian had the right to be properly nourished, and any government policies should be geared towards realizing that right. This effectively stated that Canada did not have an adequate nutrition policy. In 1974, the federal government announced that it would develop a national food strategy in 1977 based on a handful of objectives: including adequate and dependable supply of food at reasonable prices that do not require significant portions of citizens’ income; enough income for producers; and the creation of a competitive sector for export and international food aid contribution (Morris, 1976, p. 21-22).

The Food Strategy for Canada was headed by AAFC and Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada in 1977. It was nested in the food and economic crisis at the time, concerned with food prices, nutrition, income for farmers and fishers, and reflected the strong environmental movement at the time - the conservation of land and resources. Nonetheless, the general principles of the Strategy remained trapped in the agricultural productionist paradigm, encouraging more production, export, sector competitiveness, and food safety (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada & Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1977). This Strategy also created the Deputy Ministers’

Committee on Food Policy and an Interdepartmental Steering Group on Food Policy. However, this Strategy did not differ much from earlier food policy philosophies which were dominated by agricultural production and food safety (MacRae, 2017).

Another failed attempt at food policy was Canada's Action Plan for Food Security, in 1998, in response to the World Food Summit of 1996. This was a document that had clear food security objectives nationally and internationally and included the federal, provincial, territorial governments, civil society, and the private sector. This document had a multisectoral approach spanning across several departments (Koc & Bas, 2012). Koc and Bas (2012) argue that Canada's Action Plan for Food Security, like many earlier documents, failed to problematize the productionist agricultural model and did not stray from traditional thinking about food in Canada. Nonetheless, this document was never implemented.

In 2002, although not a food policy, the federal government, with Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada as the lead on the project, developed a national agricultural policy framework with five pillars: business risk management, environmental protection, food safety, innovation, and rural renewal. Again, this framework was nestled in Canada's traditional agricultural production and food safety paradigm. This framework has been updated every five years since its implementation. In the early 2000s, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Health Canada, and the Public Health Agency of Canada began discussions on a national food policy again. A 2005 draft document titled: *National Food Policy Framework: Overview* stressed the importance policy coordination. However, this effort, like others, was also shelved (MacRae, 2017).

After the 2005 document, no other public documents emerged from the federal government about a national food policy. The Conservative Party of Canada was elected in 2006 with Stephen Harper serving as prime minister. For the 2011 federal election, all major federal political parties included the development of national food policy as part of their political platforms. Stephen Harper was re-elected in 2011. After the election, the government re-evaluated the idea of a national food policy. A small group of civil servants in the AAFC did a survey and inventory of every federal government policy that was food-related, grouped it together and called it a food policy. They thought that this would be more “palatable” to the government. However, at the end of the day, the government was not interested in the document (personal communication, FG 2), so it never surfaced beyond the work of the civil servants in AAFC.

In 2015, a new Liberal government was elected. Prime Minister Trudeau mandated the creation of a comprehensive national food policy in a letter to the Minister of AAFC. Consultations for this policy began in mid-2017. After a slow start, on June 17, 2019, the federal government announced the release of the first ever Food Policy for Canada, “Everyone at the Table”. While details are yet to be revealed, Minister Bibeau listed a few programs that will be in the policy including: Canada Brand and Buy Canada promotional campaigns, support for community-led projects addressing food insecurity in Northern and isolated communities, a challenge fund to reduce food waste in the food chain, funds to crack down on food fraud, and steps towards the creation of a national school food program. What is also notable is the creation of a Canadian Food

Policy Advisory Council as a governance mechanism going forward with the policy (Government of Canada, 2019b)

2.4.2 The Involvement of Non-State Actors in Food Strategies and Policymaking in Canada

In the early 2000s, four non-state actors began working on their own national food strategies or documents: the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA), the Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute (CAPI), Food Secure Canada (FSC), and the Conference Board of Canada (CBoC). This may have sparked the inclusion of food policy in major political platforms at the time. However, none of these documents have been implemented by government, and it appears that they have been shelved by many of their creators since their development.

Around 2008, FSC began engaging in campaigns to develop a national food policy where they worked to bring peoples' voices to the federal government (Andrée, Cobb, Moussa & Norgang, 2011; Levkoe, Sheedy, 2019; Martin & Andrée, 2017; Wittman, Desmarais & Wiebe, 2010). The FSC developed the People's Food Policy Platform (PFPP) in 2011. The Platform was cultivated from cross-national talks with over three thousand five hundred Canadians. The PFPP had core funding from the Heifer International Canada, with additional sponsorship from Inter Pares, the Assembly of First Nations and USC Canada. It was instigated by members of FSC (FSC, 2011). Cross-national discussions produced ten policy discussion papers which were translated into ten policy topics in the PFPP. The PFPP had priority recommendations for each of these topics and was rooted in the concept of "food sovereignty" throughout. The core elements of PFPP were: indigenous food sovereignty, food sovereignty in rural and remote communities, access to food in urban communities, agriculture,

infrastructure and livelihoods, a sustainable fishery and reasonable livelihood for fishers, environment and agriculture, science and technology for food and agriculture, food trade and international aid, healthy and safe food for all, and food democracy and governance (FSC, 2011). The PFPP was meant to promote local, small scale, sustainable agriculture (personal communication, NGO 2), and was based on public forums that were open to everyone. Over 3500 volunteers worked on the document, with one FSC staff member pulling it all together over a few years. Because FSC has very limited resources, the development of the PFPP did not use many resources. It was also used as part of the FSC's Eat, Think, Vote campaign in federal elections (personal communication, NGO 7).

The CFA developed their National Food Strategy (NFS) in 2011 drawing on the ideas of farmers, input suppliers, and processors (personal communication, NGO 4). Sponsors included Syngenta, RBC Royal Bank, Keystone Agricultural Producers, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, Dairy Farmers of Canada, Egg Farmers of Canada, Canadian Pork Council, Kubota, Chicken Farmers of Canada, and Canadian Hatching Egg Producers (Currie & Etsell, 2011). No retailers were involved in the NFS. The Strategy was based on four key ideas (Currie & Etsell, 2011, p. 5):

1. Food is a basic human need and right
2. Maintaining a strong and healthy domestic food chain contributes to national food security
3. Food production must be sustainable
4. A "sustainable" food system is one which is:
    - Economically sustainable (those in the food chain have the opportunities to prosper)
    - Environmentally sustainable (the food chain is resilient in unpredictable climate conditions, the food system "conserves, protects, and regenerates resources"
    - Socially sustainable (food is accessible and culturally appropriate)

The NFS used these ideas throughout its nine strategic objectives. Each strategic objective had key outcomes which were categorized into three to four perspectives: business perspective, environmental perspective, education and marketing perspective, and occasionally the health and science perspective. The NFS did have minor financial support from industry members participating in its development which was used to publish the NFS in print form, rent rooms in Toronto for meetings, and some travel support for key people working on the NFS. The process of the NFS development was very informal and attempted to draw on feedback from traditional participants in the farming community, but also from stakeholders not traditionally tied with farmers, like dieticians. There was one CFA staff member working on this strategy, acting as a facilitator between the discussions of different commodity and processor working groups. Comments from discussions were consolidated by the staff member and the document itself went through several iterations. The NFS document has been relatively dormant since its development. Once the Local Food Act[6] was developed in Ontario, the CFS encouraged the government to do more on food literacy based on ideas from the NFS. They developed a program called “6 by 16”, which is to have children prepare six nutritious meals by the time they reach age sixteen. However, because CFA has limited resources, not many were put behind this initiative, or behind encouraging government to pick up some other ideas from the NFS (personal communication, NGO 4; NGO 5).

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[6] The Local Food Act is a piece of legislation in Ontario that aims to support the production and consumption of local food by fostering resilient economies within Ontario, increasing the awareness of local food and the diversity of it in Ontario, and by creating new markets for local food (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2013).

CAPI's policy document, *Canada's Agri-food Destination,* was developed in 2011 by a mix of agri-food value chain actors, government, academics, and non-state organizations (CAPI, 2011). It was sponsored by a number of organizations: Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development, Campbell Company of Canada, Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers, Canadian Pork Council, Canola Council of Canada, Dairy Farmers of Canada, Dieticians of Canada, Environment Canada, Health Canada, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Maple Leaf Foods Inc., Manitoba Agriculture, Food & Rural Initiatives, McGill World Platform for Health and Economic Convergence (McGill University), Meyers Norris Penny LLP, Ministère de L'Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l'Alimentation du Québec, Nestlé Nutrition Canada, North America Strategic Agriculture Institute, Nova Scotia Agricultural College, Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture, Public Health Agency of Canada, Pulse Canada, Research and Development Institute for the Agri-Environment, Richard Ivey School of Business (University of Western Ontario), Royal Bank of Canada, Sustain Ontario, Spur Ventures, L'union des productuers agricoles du Québec, University of British Columbia, University of Toronto, University of Waterloo, Veg Pro International Inc., Vineland Research and Innovation Centre, and Y U Ranch (CAPI, n.d.b.). CAPI's process involved both sponsors and non-sponsors in the development of the document. These stakeholders were involved at different times and different levels of the policy document. The Strategy was based on five "enabling conditions": Centre for Good Food Citizenship, Food System Smart Innovation, Food System Risk Management, Leadership in Sustainability, and Enabling Regulatory Change. The document was meant to link economic objectives with social, health, and environmental objectives in the Canadian

food system. Rather than focusing on vision statements, CAPI chose to focus on a "destination" in the future Canadian food system. This translated into having core principles and concepts around the food system rather than many recommendations (personal communication, NGO 1).

The Conference Board of Canada developed its CFS in 2014. In 2010, it developed a research centre, the Centre for Food in Canada, to examine the food issue in Canada (CBoC, 2010). It had a different approach to developing a food strategy for Canada than the other organizations. It was based on twenty research reports and a board of investors which included twenty-nine actors, eight government bodies, seventeen food industry actors, four non-governmental[7] actors, and one academic institution. This development was different than any of the other three non-state attempts at food policy given that the investor buy-in was higher, industry participation was prevalent, and the amount of resources used to develop the CFS was much larger than what the other organizations had worked with. The CFS was developed out of the CFIC, a mini research institute within the CBoC, and was considered the deliverable that was sold to investors. The CFS had several investors of differing levels (depending on how much money they contributed) (personal communication, CBoC 1). The Strategy was meant to raise awareness, show how different stakeholders can better participate in food policymaking, but also to influence policymakers and industry leaders to take action on food in Canada. This was going to be supported by the release of annual report cards provide a snapshot of where Canada is on the ideas developed in

[7] In this study, non-governmental actors will include civil society and not-for-profit groups, including Canadian farm organizations.

the CFS (personal communication, CBoC 2). More will be discussed about this strategy in Chapter 5.

In the summer of 2011, the McConnell Foundation developed a Change Lab Process workshop in Toronto, which included participation from all four organizations and civil servants from the AAFC. This process included face-to-face meetings for about a year a half. This was a point in time when CBoC was the only organization that had not yet developed their own strategy. Nonetheless, while common ground was found between all four attempts at food policy, McConnell could not get all four groups to co-produce a document (personal communication FPE 1; NGO 1; NGO 2; NGO 3; NGO 7).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the politico-economic policy environment in the Canadian and the global contexts. It discussed unique characteristics particular to the Canadian policy environment that make food policy especially complex, including working between jurisdictions, policy sectors, and the changes in the policy community. It ended by outlining some federal state food policy attempts and four non-state food policy attempts and their outcomes.

As many food policy advocates celebrated the unveiling of a national food policy in June 2019, previous efforts by non-state actors, such as the CBoC's CFS, provide important insights into the challenges of food policymaking in Canada. Looking at the multistakeholder process of the CFS case offers us insights into the opportunities and challenges presented by working with many different stakeholders and joined-up food policymaking in the Canadian context. I also hope that these insights will be helpful for those who will face the challenge of implementing the newly adopted national food

policy. The following theoretical chapter discusses some analytical and conceptual tools that will be used to make sense of the CFS process.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundations for Analyzing Food Policy in Canada

This chapter draws on several bodies of theoretical literature to outline the foundations for this research to understand multistakeholder governance networks as potential mechanisms of policy development. This will be done to examine the case of the development of the CFS by the CBoC.

This study draws on different theoretical approaches to understand the involvement of non-state actors in the policymaking process and how it affects policy outcomes specifically in the food policy sector. To approach this analytically, I examine two large bodies of theories. The first theoretical body examines the policy side of the study by discussing wicked policy problems and conceptualizing food policy. The second group contextually grounds the study in the political economic changes which brought on the era of governance and a more meaningful and consistent engagement of non-state actors in the policymaking process. This group also includes discussions on state and non-state actors involved in policymaking drawing on ideas from literature on governance, private governance, policy and governance networks, and multistakeholder initiatives.

Integrating these bodies of literature pushes our understanding of how to approach and manage pressing and complex issues in an era of policymaking that involves and requires multiple state and non-state actors. This study thus draws on scholarship from food studies and policy studies. In food studies, my research will nuance the conversation around the complexity of food policy and develop a Canadian conversation around the involvement of non-state actors in food policy development. Food policy and governance is an area of research in Canadian food scholarship that

has not focused much on the roles of non-state actors in food policymaking. It tends to be discussed in European literature and largely focuses on the global level. In policy studies, I will re-visit the question of the state and its value in today's policymaking era, a central theme in the governance literature. I will fuse discussions on governance networks with multistakeholder initiatives to develop a better understanding of the nuances involved when state and non-state actors engage in complex policy development.

These bodies of literature provide the key theoretical assumptions, concepts and foundations related to the central research questions, providing a fuller understanding of the ways in which non-state actors are involved in complex food policies and governance.

3.1 Conceptualizing the Food System and Food Policy

The food system is a cyclical web of interrelated elements based on systems thinking. It is comprised of feedback loops and cycles embedded in social, economic, political, and environmental systems. A food system is:

> A system encompassing all the activities and resources that go into producing distributing, and consuming food; the drivers and outcomes of those processes; and, the extensive and complex relationships between system participants and components. The food system's functional parts include land-based parts (e.g., agriculture, farmland preservation); environment (e.g., water, soil, energy); economy (e.g., distribution, processing retail); education; policy; social justice; health; and food cultures (Neff & Lawrence, 2014, p. 2)

Various scholars depict a food system in different ways depending on their discipline and research focus (Koc & Dahlberg, 1999). However, food systems in general, tend to take on similar components to a food supply chain such as production, processing,

transporting, retailing, consumption, and waste. Below is an example depicting a relatively simple idea of a food system:

***Figure 2*: Food System Components**



Figure 2: Food System Components. Adapted from Community Food Systems, by the University of Idaho, May 19, 2019, retrieved from https://www.uidaho.edu/extension/ county/teton/community-food-system/ Copyright 2019 by the University of Idaho.

There is also no such thing as *one* food system. Several food systems exist simultaneously and intersect with each other. For example, we can have a local Toronto food system, a regional Greater Toronto Area or even Ontario food system, a national Canadian food system, and a global food system. All these systems are inter-connected and embedded within each other. Food systems can therefore exist on different scales (i.e. local, regional, national, global).

Food policy stems from these characteristics of the food system. Maxwell and Slater (2004) argue that the term “food policy” originated around the 1970s and early 1980s when many multilateral institutions began to develop on the global arena in reaction to the world food crisis in the 1970s. Lang, Barling, and Caraher (2009) are food studies scholars who use a systems approach when looking at food. They summarize food policy as:

> who eats what, when and how; and whether people (and animals) eat and with what consequences... Ranges from how food is produced and grown, to how it is processed, distributed and consumed; from the structures that shape food supply, to those that determine health and environment; from the sciences and processes that unlock food’s potential, to the formal governance and lobbies that seek to control it; from the impact the food system’s dynamics have on society, to the way its demands are factored into policy-making itself (p. 21-22).

The authors also depict food policy visually, as a policy that touches many different policy issues, and therefore interacts with several policy areas:

***Figure 3*: Food Policy as an Intersection Point of Competing Issues**



Figure 3: Food Policy as an Intersection Point of Competing Issues. Revised from Food Policy: Integrating Health, Environment & Society (p. 7), by T. Lang, D. Barling, M. Caraher 2009, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Copyright 2009 by Oxford University Press.

Following Lang, Barling, and Caraher (2009), I will define food policy as the components of a food system, the relationships between them, and the political, economic, social,

and environmental contexts within which they are embedded. Food policy involves various policy areas, all scalar levels, and both public and private policy actors who have their own interests in the food system. Food policy can therefore be public policy coming from government or a mix of government and private actors, or private policy developed solely by private actors. Food policy deals with a diverse range of issues such as, food security, climate change, healthy eating strategies, labeling, food safety, food waste, agriculture, trade, and agriculture. From this alone, we can see already that food policy is complex.

3.2 Wicked Policy Problems

The wicked policy literature from policy studies is one of the foundational literatures of my study because food policy is very multifaceted, and as outlined in Chapter 2, has become more complex over time. Although the classic policy cycle as imagined by Lasswell (1951) is a simple way to understand public policy and the policy process, public policy scholars increasingly recognize that public policies and the reality of the policy process is extremely complex, best viewed as a complex *system* (Morçöl, 2010).

For some time, public policy scholars have been grappling with the rising complexity of policy problems. Some have identified unique characteristics in these problems and have named these policy problems “wicked policy problems” (Churchman, 1967), or stubborn policy controversies (Rein & Schön, 1993).

Wicked policy problems are distinctively difficult to tackle, and they can best be understood in relation to what Rittel and Webber (1973) call “tame problems”. Tame problems are policy issues that have a clear problem definition and solution. They can be multifaceted but usually have distinct root problems and identifiable causes. As such,

a solution can be objectively correct, and it can be known when a problem is solved. If the incorrect solution is chosen, it does not fundamentally affect the problem. Tame issues are usually technical and tend to be addressed in a linear way (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Many can also be grouped into classes of issues, that have similar causes and solutions. They are issues that do not have serious conflicts of interest between stakeholders. Knowledge needed to solve the problem is accessible in some way, and power is usually dispersed between stakeholders (Alford & Head, 2017).

Wicked policy problems, on the other hand, are very intricate and complex societal issues. They border the natural (the physical world) and social world (dealing with human complexity) (Rittel & Webber, 1973). They cannot be imagined in a linear and mechanistic way, and for this reason, their solutions cannot be products of linear and mechanistic thinking (Morçöl, 2012). In addition, they cannot be carved up into smaller parts which can then be solved in isolation of the bigger issue (Head, 2018). Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 161-166) portray wicked problems as having 10 key characteristics:

1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem;
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule (no absolute solution);
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad (no correct solution, only good or bad solutions for those affected by the problem);
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem (solutions can have negative consequences and create additional problems that are bigger than the original);
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there is no opportunity to learn by trail-and-error, every attempt counts significantly;
6. Wicked problems do not have enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan (impossible to know all of the possible solutions);
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique;
8. Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem;

9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution (no way to determine exact causes or combinations of causes of the problem, and different people have different perspectives of what created the wicked problem);
10. The planner has no right to be wrong (failure is not tolerated by the public).

Table 1 below shows a summary comparison between wicked problems and tame problems drawn from Rittel and Webber (1973). The ways in which tame and wicked problems differ are through their problem definitions and solutions as compared in Table 1.

Table 1. Main attributes of tame and wicked problems

Tame Problems	**Wicked Problems**
Scientific and engineering problems	Societal problems
Problem definition is clear	Problem definition is not clear
Solutions are clear and knowable, problem can be fully solved	Problems are never fully solved, just re-solved over and over, solutions are dependent on problem definition
Solutions can be objectively right or wrong	Solutions to problems are subjective and can be seen as "better or worse" or "satisfying" or "good enough"
Solutions do not have fundamental consequences for the problem	Solutions can fundamentally affect the problem, even creating new problems
Can identify whether a solution is the final solution to a problem	No test to find out whether a solution is the final solution to a problem
Classes of problems can exist	Every problem is unique
Causes of problems are objective and defined	Causes of problems are subjective and multiple

Newman and Head (2017) argue that the distinction made by Rittel and Webber (1973) between technical (tame) and societal (wicked) problems is false, since every problem whether technical or societal, can exhibit wickedness in different tendencies. Along the same lines, some authors note that problems can have a sliding scale of wickedness, a problem does not have to be either tame *or* wicked, it can have degrees of wickedness

(Alford & Head, 2017; Newman & Head, 2017). The degree of wickedness has to do the characteristics of wicked and tame problems: how complex their definitions and solutions are. Figure 4 below depicts a sliding scale of wickedness (and tameness) in both policy problems and solutions. Roberts (2018) articulates this as shifting levels of complexity. She argues that the complexity of policy issues varies depending on the perceptions of problems and solutions. A simple or tame problem will have a clear problem definition and a clear solution. A wicked policy problem will have several undefined problems and solutions. The degree of wickedness thus can vary from issue to issue. In Figure 4, we can see a simplified variance between tame and wicked problems based on the clarity of the problem and solution definitions. The Y-axis depicts the sliding scale of tameness and wickedness in the solution definition, and the X-axis shows the sliding scale of tameness and wickedness in the problem definition. The sliding scales of both can become tamer or more wicked depending on the issue and can, therefore, have different degrees of wickedness and tameness. The binary between tame and wicked problems is, therefore, more complex, since no single problem can be perfectly tame or perfectly wicked.

Figure 4. **Sliding Scales of Wickedness Found in Policy Problems**



3.2.1 The Importance of Problem Definition

Problem definition is a key characteristic of wicked policy problems. Perhaps one of the most difficult stages of policymaking is the problem definition stage, where understandings of what a given problem is can vary tremendously. There is a significant literature on problem definition in public policy (Dery,1984, 2000; Kingdon,1984; Rochefort & Cobb, 1993), but for purposes of this study some key contributions from scholars who focus on problem definition related to wicked policy problems are highlighted.

Stone (1989) argues that our understanding of situations is facilitated by ideas, which are always generated, altered, and contested in politics. This means that "problems do not exist 'out there'; they are not objective entities in their own right" (Dery,

1984, p. xi), but are created and framed by policy actors. Rein and Schön (1993) argue that because conflicting frames are used to observe the same issues, these policy issues appear to be unsolvable. As such, it turns out that the same body of evidence is used to come up with different problem definitions and policy solutions (Rein & Schön, 1993). This also occurs because of the variability of the nature of the problem which is always changing. The knowledge required for implementation of some of these complex solutions may be inadequate, disjointed, and challenged (Head, 2008). This makes complexity of policy problems more difficult to address and study. Fischer (2003) notes that,

> policymaking is a constant discursive struggle over the definitions of problems, the boundaries of categories used to describe them, the criteria for their classification and assessment, and the meanings of ideals that guide particular actions (p. 60).

3.2.2 Tackling Wicked Policy Problems

Traditional hierarchal forms of governance have not been favourable environments to solve wicked policy problems because of their rigidness, and siloed approaches to policymaking and governance (Head & Alford, 2015; Wilson, 1989). Head and Alford (2015) argue that wicked policy problem literature supports cooperative approaches and arrangements when addressing wicked problems. These have been exhibited in partnerships between organizations, different government agencies/jurisdictions, across sectors, industry, and civil society which have developed into policy networks (Head & Alford, 2015). Similarly, Roberts (2000) proposes collaboration as a viable course of action to cope with wicked policy problems where no one actor is in control or in power. Fischer (1993) has found that wicked policy problems require participation from stakeholders involving collaboration. Innes and Booher (2016) propose “collaborative

rationality". This systems approach to collaborative thinking about wicked policy problems emphasizes a simultaneous development of the policy problem and the policy solution.

Complexities in wicked policy problems deepen as they are embedded in particular "structures, processes and institutional arrangements, including power, authority, and procedural rules" (Head, 2008, p. 104). These issues cut across jurisdictions, organizations, and traditional governance boundaries in the public and private sector. As a result, government, industry, or civil society are unable to resolve these problems on their own and are pushed to work collaboratively. Wicked policy problems are not meant to be solved by one actor. The complexity of the problem requires multiple stakeholders (Dentoni, Bitzer & Schouten, 2018). Given that various scholars studying wicked policy problems call for increased and more effective collaboration, it is not surprising that many are also interested in governance and networks. In fact, Daviter (2017) argues that collaborative or networked governance is the most popular response to wicked policy problems. Morçöl (2012) agrees and states that networks are effective ways of dealing with complexity in public policy. Collaborative or networked governance are valuable ways of gaining local knowledge, sharing resources, and building legitimacy (Daviter, 2017). Weber and Khademian (2008) also reflect this approach by discussing the importance of knowledge transition and integration which ultimately requires a network allowing collaboration between different stakeholders.

Van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan (2003) find that the nature of wicked problems also portrays a strong interdependence between actors affected by the problem. This

interdependence is a “collective action problem” where every actor’s actions influence another’s. However, this also makes it difficult for one actor to undertake something, given the common differences in understanding the issue.

Wicked policy problems take on an additional layer of complexity with the globalization of many of these issues. Even on a national level, wicked problems overlap policy sectors, cut across government agencies, hierarchies, and jurisdictions, connecting them intricately with other problems (Head, 2008; Weber & Khademian, 2008) and other actors.

Complexity theory emphasizes the need to look at a system as a network of interacting parts that make up a whole rather than its individual parts acting on their own (Cairney, 2012). Morçöl (2012) views public policies as systems made up of nonlinear relationships between “many individual and collective actors act[ing] upon their interpretations of the principles and rules that are influenced by social construction processes and self-interests of actors” (p. 10). Complexity theory also negates the idea that a system always tends to reach equilibrium. Instead, it argues that systems gravitate away from equilibrium. Complex policies then cannot be looked upon as “solved” or reaching equilibrium between social actors. Instead, they are “dynamic”. Solutions and problems are simultaneously created in the same issue (Morçöl, 2012). As such, these issues cannot be approached in a linear fashion as reductionist and mechanistic schools of thought might do. Relationships between policy actors and the policy arena are not linear. For this reason, more complex mechanisms and tools need to be used to understand these policy issues (Morçöl, 2012).

3.2.3 Food Policy as a Wicked Policy Problem?

Some authors, like Peters and Pierre (2014), identify food policy as a wicked policy problem. Other scholars like Termeer et al (2015), identify several wicked problems in policy domains like climate change, water management, and agriculture, however, they do not explicitly refer to food policy. Anthony (2012) has labelled food policy as a wicked policy problem in reference to climate and food security in Alaska. Food security tends to be the most popular aspect of food policy that is readily identified as a wicked policy problem in the literature (Anthony, 2012; Candel, Breeman, Stiller, & Termeer, 2014; Grochowska, 2015), Often, the literature also implies that because an aspect of food policy or a specific issue in the food system is a wicked policy problem, that food policy in and of itself is a wicked policy problem. Alford and Head (2017) and Peters (2017) for example, caution about the conceptual overuse of “wicked policy problems”, noting that certain policies can be complex, but not necessarily “wicked”. Peters (2017) in fact argues that food policy should be perceived as a complex policy issue, not wicked. It is therefore important to re-visit this idea of food policy as being complex and “wicked”.

Wicked policy problem literature serves as a critical starting point for this study. This literature is the basis needed to begin understanding what happened in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy, by looking at food policy as difficult to confront and requiring a collaborative approach through networks and multistakeholder initiatives. In this study, drawing on various scholars examined above, wicked policy problems are defined as multifaceted complex policy issues that cross policy domains and jurisdictions, involve multiple stakeholders, are value-based, and hover between the natural and social world, requiring a collaborative multi-actor approach to tackling them.

Some key points are emphasized from the wicked policy problems literature. Given that food policy encompasses so many different issues in the food system, where some of these issues may be tame, and others wicked, the idea of a sliding scale of wickedness (as shown in Figure 7) is fundamental assumption in my understanding of wicked policy problems and food policy. The importance of collaboration and the involvement of multiple actors in policy development was emphasized in the literature and this theme weaves through the rest of the literature covered in the chapter. Lastly, while some scholars might infer that wicked policy problems are not solvable, I take Head's (2010) perspective, and see wicked problems as not something to solve, but something that needs to be continuously managed.

3.3 Governance, Private Governance, and the Role of State

The rise in the complexity of policy issues in a more integrated world requires a broader response to developing policy solutions. Both governance and private governance have developed out of politico-economic changes and state-society shifts which have not just played into the rise of governance and private governance, but also coincide with the increased complexity of policy issues. Molin and Masella (2016) argue that in the 1990s, many public sector scholars found that to solve increasingly complex issues, collaboration between government and other non-governmental and private actors became necessary. Klijn (2008) contends that because of the increase in complexity of issues, governments have become dependent on non-governmental and private actors (or societal actors) in the policymaking and implementation stages. This has resulted in a more prominent role for non-state actors in the definition of policy issues, public

service delivery, and policy implementation in some policy areas (Molin & Masella, 2016).

Head and Alford (2015) argue that concerns around wicked problems and the difficulties that arise in present-day governance and policymaking are connected to the continuous debates on the state about the role and scope of government. In political science and international relations, recent discussions have centred on how globalization and the current neoliberal economic system have affected the nature and responsibilities of the state, and the power and policy opportunities other non-state actors have received.

Some scholars (Bevir, 2012; Kennett, 2008; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Pierre & Peters, 2000) argue that governance arose because of the politico-economic changes occurring in the 1980s and onwards in the international arena. Fundamental changes in technology, the economy, and a growing societal interdependency encouraged governments to work collaboratively with a variety of actors (Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2013). The information society and economy began to emerge challenging the exclusive role of state actors in public policy. Furthermore, the 1970s and 1980s experienced state crises that tarnished the trust in hierarchic bureaucracy (Bevir, 2012, p. 15). Governance arose in the public realm due to the perceived loss of citizens' trust in the government and the danger in losing whatever legitimacy government had left (Bovaird & Löffler, 2001; Pierre & Peters, 2000).

Globalization has moulded the state in different ways and scholars disagree on the significance of the state in today's globalized world. It is asserted by Gill (1995) that "…globalisation is part of a broad process of restructuring of the state and civil society,

and of the political economy and culture" (p. 405). Bieling (2007) identifies three major globalization trends in relation to the state: de-nationalization of the state, de-statization of the political system, and internationalization of policy regimes (p. 13-14).

De-nationalization of the state occurred through the re-location of state machinery to subnational and supranational levels of governance. The de-statization of the political system arose through the distortion of governance between the public and private sphere, prompting a shift from government to governance. Lastly, the internationalization of policy regimes rendered global and transnational political decisions and policies fundamentally significant for national governments (Bieling, 2007). These three trends indicate a more competitive state, concerned about its position in the world economy (Bieling, 2007, p. 14). This has affected the way the state and other non-state actors engage in policy.

Around the 1970s and 1980s, after the rise of neoliberal policies and restructuring of the welfare state, many political leaders decided that the state was too large and frequently overstepped its role. As such, the size and roles of government significantly decreased, and greater responsibility was downloaded onto individuals and communities (Head & Alford, 2015). Governments shifted from hierarchal and centralized forms, to more decentralized ones that shared policy roles with private, non-governmental actors (Frederickson et al, 2012, p. 219), and international institutional and market forces (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 223). Since then, the roles and responsibilities of the state have been changing (Frederickson et al, 2012). Governments were required to "…reinvent, downsize, privatize, devolve, decentralize, deregulate and de-layer themselves, subject themselves to performance tests, and

contract themselves out" (Salamon, 2000, p. 1612). This forced states to transform the way "governing" was executed because it was increasingly split with non-state actors (p. 1613). Peters and Pierre (1998) thus argued that the conventional concept of "government" as the key actor in policymaking, and in managing and regulating society was no longer convincing.

Other scholars like Bovaird and Löffler (2001) argue that the governance approach was developed through New Public Management (NPM). Emerging in the neoliberal era, NPM's main goal was to embed corporate and market values, goals and practices into the bureaucratic structure, ridding it of the traditional Weberian structure of bureaucracy (Frederickson, 2012, p. 233). This structure of administration was intended to reflect the values and principles of neoliberalism through the resemblance of market economics to increase productivity within the private sector (Evans & Shields, 2010). NPM decreased the roles and responsibilities of traditional governments and shifted their roles to non-governmental actors (Frederickson, 2012), where the government continued to "steer" policy, but non-governmental actors did the actual "rowing", or policy implementation. As Wanna (2008) claims, "Collaboration was by now the next wave of public-sector reform (after hierarchy, managerialism, 'new public management' and outsourcing and market delivery)" (p. 7).

In recent years, governance has become very popular in the literature and continues to be contested (Bevir, 2012; Frederickson, 2007; Hughes, 2010; Jordan, 2008; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Peters, 2012; Plattner, 2013; Robichau, 2011). Consequently, many argue it has lost its utility (Hughes, 2010). Although the concept of governance is challenged, it remains quite "fashionable" in

scholarly literature (Frederickson, 2007), and has successfully described and explained many forces which have changed the state and policy relationship.

Generally, the idea of governance that has surfaced in the literature in the last two decades has referred to a changed manner of governing of the state and society (Rhodes, 2007), or a new configuration of state-society interactions (Kooiman, 1993). However, the governance framework has differing definitions across disciplines and theories. Frederickson (2012) argues that this is a fundamental change that has been affecting the powers, roles and responsibilities of government. The boundaries between the public and private are blurring, becoming less hierarchal, less bureaucratic and more reliant on a non-centralized authority. However, most scholars' definitions of governance or understandings of governance tend to lead towards Stoker's (1998) claim that "…the world of governing is changing in ways which mark a substantial break from the past and that that changing world is worth studying" (p. 26). In the end, "[i]t is difficult to argue that nothing has changed, but it is also easy to assume that everything has changed, so this debate must be considered carefully" (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 16).

Many scholars have opted to frame their work around general definitions of governance, often contrasting with government. Kennett (2008) argues that "old government" was established by the Westphalian system of sovereign states with a domestic focus and holding a power monopoly over its citizens. Under such a hierarchal order of authority and administration, the state held dominance in the policy process. Under governance however, the state is only one of several players in the policy arena. The boundaries between private and public actors have blurred, changing the nature of

the policy process. Bevir (2012) sees governance as different from government, because governance does not just focus on the state and its institutions but rather puts more emphasis on policy practices and activities of diverse actors, including corporate actors, NGO and not-for-profit service providers, as well as multi-jurisdictional governments. Governance is thus "…an increasingly hybrid, multi-jurisdictional, and plural phenomenon" (Bevir, 2012, p. 7), focusing more on the "processes of rule" rather than on state institutions (p. 10). Similarly, Kooiman (1993) argues for governance as encompassing both public and private actors which operate in conjunction with each other through social, political, and administrative activities that purposefully steer, manage, and regulate society (Kooiman, 1993).

One of the important debates in the governance framework is the 'governance without government' discussion (Rhodes, 1996) - whether the state continues to be involved in governance, and if so, to what extent (Bevir, 2012; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Peters, 2012, p. 15).

It is largely accepted that there are many types of "governance". Possibly, the most widely known and cited typology is Rhodes' (1996): governance as the minimal state, corporate governance, governance as new public management, good governance, governance as a socio-cybernetic system, and governance as self-organizing networks. However, there are scholars like Hughes (2010) who find that Rhodes' (1996) list of governance typologies is not useful when trying to understand governance. Other authors propose different typologies. For example, Klijn (2008, pg. 507-508) identifies four major interpretations of governance in the literature, which he

argues share common elements of concentrating on the processes of governing rather than the structure of government.

Bell and Hindmoor (2009) and Robichau (2001) separate governance into two camps as state-centric and society-centric. State-centric governance is when the state continues to be at the centre of governance and policymaking. However, its roles and capacities have changed, in that it no longer governs unilaterally, and tends to use "softer instruments", rather than "command and control instruments" (Bell & Hindoor, 2009, p. 8). Society-centric governance is a perspective that identifies a fundamental transformation ("hollowing-out") and weakening of the state, and its subsequent "roll back" in governance and policymaking. This perspective can be described as the "governance without government" group which describes the world of governance as made of self-organizing networks of state and non-state actors that govern better and more democratically than the traditional ruling of the state (Peters, 2012, p. 15). Under this view, traditional state governance models are "…slow, clumsy, bureaucratic and largely incapable of the style of governing required by a modern society" (p. 16). As such, the state is no longer at the core of governance and policymaking, but non-state actors take on a dominant role in governance and policymaking. Society-centric governance, pushed by British governance scholars, has been generally debunked and determined an exaggeration (Bell & Hindoor, 2009; Marinetto, 2003).

Hughes (2010) argues that the perception that the state no longer has the same power to govern and has a reduced ability to steer is overstated. Instead, the state is including other actors in the policy process because it has realized that the traditional bureaucratic model is no longer working. As such, governance, is the state trying to

govern more effectively and efficiently without ceding state power – the inclusion of non-state actors in policy does not create a weak state. Another group of scholars entirely remain between both sides of the debate. The 'state-centric relational' approach posits that the state continues to lead the policy process as the main authority and controls governing capacities but has also created collaborative and strategic relationships with non-state actors (Hughes, 2010). Similarly, Pierre and Peters (2000) and Plattner (2013) agree that while fundamental changes have occurred to the state and thus the way in which it governs, in the new governance, the state continues to be at the centre of the process. Although the state's role has changed from one that grounds itself in constitutional powers to govern, it now acts as a coordinator and synthesizer of public and private resources (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 25).

Some authors discuss collaborative governance which is also relevant to my research. This is a type of governance that discusses the cooperation of multiple actors with the state, by pointing out the failures of top-down policymaking (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This type of collective governance emphasizes "collaboration" between actors that goes beyond just consultation. This is a governance that implies co-creation of policy through two-way communication where groups of actors can influence each other and be directly involved in decision-making, eventually reaching consensus (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) define collaborative governance in broader terms than other scholars (Ansell & Gash, 2008), as:

> The process and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished (p. 2).

This definition stretches collaborative governance beyond formal state-initiated efforts, or beyond government and non-governmental actors. It instead emphasizes 'multipartner governance' which includes the state, the private sector, and civil society. In addition, it also includes joined-up government and other forms of hybrid governance like public-private partnerships (PPPs). These are partnerships that are formed between public and private actors, which often scholars consider business and NGOs, that together achieve "societal goals". This becomes a co-production model between government and a private actor in society (Skelcher, 2007).

My research understands governance as a historic process that emerged out of global politico-economic shifts which changed the way the state interacts with policy. Increased complexity and understanding of everyday policy issues that resulted from economic crises and a rise in social movements at the time (i.e. a more sophisticated environmental movement, feminist movement, food movement) also influenced the rise of governance which gave space to non-state actors in the policy environment. Nonetheless, this study does not go as far as to say that governance occurs without government, or that government is equal to a private actor in the policymaking process as might some society-centric scholars. The state continues to be the primary actor in policymaking. Private actors have encroached on policymaking space, but I understand governance in a 'state-centric relational' way which acknowledges changes in the way the state is now governing in a more collaborative way with other non-state actors, but where the state continues to play a role in the policymaking process. My definition of governance draws on Klijn's (2008) idea of network governance as an interaction between state and non-state actors. Governance can thus be defined as a historically

situated process in policymaking where the state seeks increased collaboration with non-state actors to develop and work with complex policy issues which it can no longer confront on its own.

However, at the same time, there has also been a rise in private actors, specifically business, developing policies on their own through corporate social responsibility, and with other businesses, developing something called private governance (Auld, 2014; Brammer, Jackson, Matten, 2012; Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2012).

3.3.1 Private Governance

Private governance is closely linked with the governance debate. It is grounded in Rhodes' (1996) idea of "governance without government" through the leadership and engagement of private actors in policymaking. Much like how governance was described above, private governance arose from the growth in complexity and politico-economic changes of a more globalized world (Büthe, 2010). Both reasons have incited an increase in cooperation, between states and between corporate bodies (*ibid*). The involvement of private actors in governance is not a new phenomenon. However, the type of private governance experienced in the 20th and 21st centuries is what Falkner (2003) calls a "re-emerged private governance", reflecting the changes undergone in the 20th century. Private governance began with the decentring of the state and the shift in policy management on different governance levels, leaving the state as one amongst several authorities in policy (Casey, 2009; Pattberg, 2005). Globalization has created various economic and technological interdependencies that require governance beyond strictly the state, one that also encompasses the private sector (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002, p. 41; Pattberg, 2005; Webb, 2005). Mayer & Gereffi (2010) find that

private governance also resulted from social activism that erupted with the “dis-embedding of markets from governance” (p. 5).

Private governance is seen by Cutler, Haufler, and Porter (1999) as private authority. For them, authority is when an actor has “decision-making power” within a policy sector and is seen as exercising this power legitimately. Falkner (2003) argues that private governance emerges first from the cooperation between private actors which occurs with behavioural adjustments towards common beneficial objectives. This leads to the institutionalization of interaction between private actors out of an acknowledgement of a legitimate governance system (Falkner, 2003, p. 73). As Pattberg (2005) confirms, private governance is more than cooperation between actors. Beyond creating behavioural changes in particular actors towards a set of goals, private governance also involves shared norms, values and roles (p. 606). Since globalization and the subsequent shifts in the political economy, Pattberg (2005) contends that it appears that states have lost some of their authority in governing. Corporate entities are rising and gaining authority through acquiring legitimacy from governments. Authority is also obtained through private sector activities such as the creation of forums for discussion and deliberation, creating and disseminating knowledge and information, as well as using third party verifiers of norms and standards to ensure compliance (Pattberg, 2005).

Private governance has largely concentrated in private sector regulation expressed in industry’s involvement in codes of conduct, corporate social responsibility, private certification and labelling (Challies, 2013; Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2012). These types of private governance have become very political as industry begins to engage in

social and environmental issues in society which is especially visible in the food system (Bancerz, 2016). Private governance regulation is enacted by non-state actors which include industry and civil society actors (Hatanaka & Konefal, 2013). Bain, Ransom and Higgins (2013) describe private standards as "…agreed-upon criteria or rules intended to measure a product, person or service's performance or specific characteristics…or the process through which the food was produced…" (p. 2). These are used to "…classify and categorize in order to create uniformities and equivalences" (Bain et al, 2013, p. 2). While previously food regulation was used to ensure product standards consistency, the last two decades have seen a rise in standards that have had differing objectives such as "…access to new markets, coordination of operations, quality and safety assurances to consumers, and the establishment of new brands, niche products and markets" (Bain et al, 2013, p. 4). However, private regulation is not driven by the state or enforced by it. Instead it is the market that drives regulation and enforcement (Challies, 2013; Maciel & Bock, 2013), while legitimacy is granted by consumers through responsible corporate conduct (Bain et al, 2013; Challies, 2013). Lockie, McNaughton, Thompson, and Tennent (2013) discuss private regulation in the food system, especially on the global level, as arising due to the development of new risks through the lengthening of food supply chains. It is often assumed in the literature that private standards fill a public regulatory void that has resulted from the retreat of the state, its regulatory limitations, or its inability to keep up with the rapid rate of product innovation (Lockie et al, 2013). Maciel and Bock (2013) assert that the rise in private regulation in the food system has resulted because of the 'governance shift' that has

developed a private regulatory environment dependent on soft law mechanisms of self-governance and co-governance as “innovative policy instruments” in the food system.

While private governance fills policy voids or lacunae, where the state does not want to make policy or cannot make policy, the participation of non-state actors makes policymaking more complex, not only because of the increase in the number of actors, but also because of the different values and interests present in the policymaking process.

3.3.2 Metagovernance

While non-state actors have been encroaching in policymaking space, during other times the state continues to play an important role in governing and policymaking. When understanding governance in a ‘state-centric relational’ way, it is important to discuss the role of the state in governing and policymaking. Metagovernance is a body of literature that discusses where the state fits in “governance”. It has served as a body of literature that bridges the two perspectives of society-centred and state-centred governance (Daugbjerg & Fawcett, 2015), leaving us in the territory of state-centric relational governance.

Metagovernance can be described as the ‘governance of governance’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 240), or ‘the organization of self-organization; (Jessop, 1998, p. 42). Metagovernance forms an environment within which different actors can collaborate, rather than developing specific strategies or initiatives for members (Jessop, 2002). Metagovernance does not remove other forms of governance like hierarchy or the market but co-exists in what Jessop (2002) calls ‘negotiated decision-making’ (p. 243). Bell and Hindmoor (2009) understand metagovernance in nine functions: steering,

effectiveness, resourcing, democracy, accountability and legitimacy. Steering involves the setting of ground rules for governance, which involves goal setting, outlining expectations of the setting, as well as the expectations of state and non-state actors within network, acting as the referee for any conflicts, and maintaining a balanced power arrangement between actors in the network. Effectiveness occurs with the help of the state that sets goals, evaluative criteria, and monitors performance of the network. Resourcing does not mean that the state is the only one providing resources for the network, but that it partners with other non-state actors. Democracy, the inclusion of elected politicians in networks can be seen to boost democratic legitimacy of the governance arrangement. Accountability is maintained by the state in networks, because the "buck stops with them". Government tends to accept responsibility in a group where many other actors are involved because there are state mechanisms designed to hold governments accountable, though of course this does not always happen. It also holds to account other actors involved in the group. Lastly, legitimacy is maintained by governments involved in networks because they are expected to strive towards a fair and balanced process through clear direction and goal setting.

Metagovernance is a way to boost coordination in a governance system that tends to be very fragmented based on the multitude of actors, perspectives, and self-regulation involved in it (Sørensen, 2006). This occurs when a certain actor(s), usually the state, "combine, facilitate, shape and direct particular forms of governance in accordance with specific rules, procedures and standards embodying the hegemonic concept of what constitutes 'good governance'" (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, p. 246). However, metagovernors should not inhibit the capacity of the network to "self-regulate".

Metagovernance must thus take place through “subtle” and “indirect” ways of governing (p. 246). Metagovernors can thus use different tools to guide the network through: network design (shape the scope and rules of process of the network); network framing (influence different goals of the network, aligning them with policy objectives); network management (work to reduce mistrust, settle conflicts, and empower marginalized actors within the network); network participation (shape the policy agenda, policy options and outputs) (p. 246-247). Typically, states perform a key role in metagovernance,

> They provide the ground rules for governance and the regulatory order in and through which governance partners can pursue their aims; ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanism and regimes; act as the primary organizer of the dialogue among policy communities; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations; serve as a ‘court of appeal’ for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to rebalance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities and interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts, and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics; and also assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure (Jessop, 2002, p. 242-243).

Jessop (1997) maintains that the state is the only actor with authority and legitimacy to establish rules, resolve conflicts, and balance power within network structures. Some authors argue that metagovernance is not solely led by state actors; other non-state actors can also become metagovernors (Fransen, 2015; Christopoulos, Horvath & Kull, 2012; Sørensen, 2006). Metagovernance is a complex undertaking – where too much metagovernance or too little metagovernance can be detrimental to the network. It is meant to democratize the policy network (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). Doberstein (2013)

finds that decision-making authority is crucial to the sustainability of the network, where bureaucrats provide the most stability.

The shift from government to governance has been identified as democratically problematic because of the number of non-elected actors involved in policymaking (Sørensen, 2006). Sørensen (2006) argues that metagovernance also develops a new form of representative democracy in network governance. Doberstein (2013) claims that when government is the metagovernor in a network, it maintains accountability and legitimacy in the network. Government is “motivated” and “empowered” to supervise and manage others in the network because in the end, it is the government that answers to its citizens. Government can do this by fostering “transparency, fair process and effectiveness, and thus has both input and output dimensions” (Doberstein, 2013, p. 589). Input dimensions or input legitimacy refers to the democratic reflections of the network, while output dimensions, or output legitimacy, is the effectiveness of the network (Daugbjerg & Fawcett, 2015).

Metagovernance literature brings out the role of the state in governance literature. Because I am understanding governance as a process that continues to involve the state, metagovernance literature becomes particularly important in defining the persistent role of the state in policymaking. Metagovernance will be understood as the role of the state participating in the governance era of policymaking through governing or policymaking efforts involving both state and non-state actors.

3.4 Networks and Governance

Governance scholars also discuss networks when referring to state and non-state collaborative efforts, making networks very characteristic of the governance era.

Networks became governing alternatives in the 1970s when older versions of governing, markets and bureaucracy failed to solve increasingly complex policy issues (Isett et al, 2011). Policy networks have been a response to the increasing changes in the policymaking environment described in governance and wicked policy problem literature. Networks are viewed as common tools used to deal with wicked policy problems and are likely to continue increasing "in number and importance" in the policymaking arena (Isett et al, 2011; Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock, 2004; O'Toole, 1997; Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2013; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Voets, Van Dooren & De Rynck, 2008). Morçöl (2012) argues that complexity theory and policy studies intersect and find commonalities in networks.

Although the existence of networks is no longer debated in the literature (Wacchaus, 2009), the definition of policy networks related to governance continues to take on a "Babylonian" approach (Börzel, 1998). Rather than furthering theoretical developments of policy networks, network literature discusses many cases and concept variations creating conceptual stretching (Carlsson, 2017). In addition, network literature has not been an ordered progression of analytical thought throughout the years. In the last three decades, network scholars have focused on defining networks, explaining their increasing importance in public policy and governance, and analyzing their impacts on the policy process and policy outcomes. Common topics include typologies of networks (Börzel, 1998; Börzel, 2011; Rhodes, 1997), the rise of networks (Keast et al, 2004; Ferlie et al, 2011; van Bueren, Klijn & Koppenjan, 2003), conceptual clarity of "networks" (Blanco, Lowndes, Pratchett, 2011; Börzel, Heard, Lauréote, 2009; Wachhaus, 2009), usefulness of the "network" concept (Börzel, 1997; Klijn, 1996; Pope

& Lewis, 2008; Thatcher, 1998), network management (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Barrutia & Echebarna, 2011; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2007), internal workings of networks (Evans, 2001; Henry, 2011; Henry, Lubell & McCoy, 2010; Lowndes & Sklecher, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2000; Peters, Klijn, Stronks & Harting, 2017; Weare, Lichterman & Esparza, 2014), network effectiveness (Provan & Milward, 2001; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2013), and network outcomes (Howlett, 2002; Fawcett & Daugbjerb, 2012; Klijn, Steijn & Edelenbos, 2010).

The “policy network” concept emerged from other conceptual precedents which according to Marsh (1998) can also be classified under American, British, and European literature. The “policy network” concept was initially developed in Britain and later evolved with theory and research in other jurisdictions. Interest flowed from actor-centred policy studies in Europe and Canada (Marsh, 1998). The network approach stemmed from other conceptual precedents discussing relations between business and the state (Skogstad, 2005) such as literature on corporatism and interest group studies. Van Waarden (1992) contends that policy networks have replaced corporatism as a descriptor of business-state relations. Corporatism, he argues, is a type of network within which the state and business may engage.

More recently, the idea of policy networks as spaces of collaboration has surfaced. NPM was partly designed to address complex issues in the 1980s, but it has not been able to do so (Head & Alford, 2015; Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen & Rethemeyer, 2011). As explored earlier, wicked policy problems require multidisciplinarity, collaboration, and resource sharing (Durant & Legge, 2006). O’Toole

Jr. (1997) goes as far as to say that complex policy issues *require* networked structures. Multiple actors are necessary to solve wicked problems (Agranoff, 2006; Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett, 2011; Dal Molin & Masella, 2016; Raab, Mannak & Cambré, 2013). The contribution of various stakeholders (i.e. industry, civil society, citizens) in the policy process is expected to be a useful exercise. It enriches knowledge by drawing on local expertise, heightens awareness of the policy and policy issues, develops legitimacy in the process, and helps construct networks and collaborative environments. Participatory processes involving different stakeholders are meant to provide politicians with enough insights to make sound policy choices (van de Kerkhof, 2006). In part, collaborative efforts through networks became a response to the inadequacy of New Public Management's ability to solve complex problems (Isett et al, 2011).

Head and Alford (2015) argue that collaboration in networks tackles wicked policy problems in three ways. First, the nature and causes of the wicked problem may be better understood because of the diverse insights and perspectives of different actors involved in the network. This can form a well-rounded understanding of the issue. Second, collaboration also produces comprehensive temporary solutions to the wicked problem, developed from a wide range of insights. This can lead to some more permanent solutions through a joint and desired problem-solving environment down the road. Lastly, collaboration ensures implementation of the developed solutions because there is more agreement on the solution. It "enables shared contributions, coordinated actions, and mutual adjustments" (p. 726) between actors in the network as other implementation issues arise.

Agranoff (2006) states that networks have become more than just collaborative management. They have fundamentally altered governance by complementing traditional hierarchies and market models of policymaking and governance. As Lipnack and Stamps (1994) announce, "'the 'age of network' has arrived" (as cited in Agranoff, 2006, p. 56). Skogstad (2005) claims that networks have become "the crucial linchpin in the capacity of governments to adjust their economics and public policies to the constraints and opportunities posed by globalization" (p. 10-11). Networks are thought to have come about through the changes in domestic politics that had created a more "complex, specialized, and fragmented" policy environment (Skogstad, 2005) as suggested by governance and wicked policy problem literatures. Networks allow the coordination of "resources of information, support, and authority across state and non-state actors" (Skogstad, 2005, p. 9). They are thought to be useful tools to provide an analysis of the policymaking process (Skogstad, 2005).

Policy network managers are important in the promotion of collaborative relationships (Henry, Lubell & McCoy, 2010, p. 419), however network managers differ from network to network. Provan and Kenis (2008) have identified three different forms based on who is leading the network: participant-governance networks, lead-organization governed networks, and network administrative organizations. Participant-governed networks are governed by network members themselves. They can be formal or informal networks, highly decentralized and sharing governance responsibilities. Generally, power is shared symmetrically among members. Lead organization-governed networks are networks where all network activities and decisions are coordinated by and through one participating member. This creates a very centralized

and brokered network where power is distributed asymmetrically. The leading organization or member may provide administration services and facilitate activities to achieve network goals which can be very aligned with the participant's or organization's goals. The lead organization or participant may also become the treasurer for the network, either paying for administration, applying for funding, or collecting contributions from members. Lastly, the network administrative organization network is one where a separate administrative body is developed to run network activities. This can either be an external organization or an individual whose key task is to coordinate the network (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Canadian network literature focused largely on the structures of networks and macro aspects (Skogstad, 2008). It tends to differentiate between policy networks and policy communities. Coleman and Skogstad (1990) understood policy communities as the collection of public and private actors involved and interested in a particular policy issue's advancement. Policy communities consist of two segments: sub-governments (a very small group of those directly responsible for policymaking and program provision in that policy field), and the attentive public (an undefined collection of public and private actors including pressure groups and individuals who are interested in specific policies) (Pross, 1986). Policy networks were understood as the relationships between actors involved in policy communities of the subgovernment[8] segment in a policy domain (Coleman & Skogstad, 1990), which drew attention to the attentive public generally excluded from policy networks (Skogstad, 2005).

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[8] A small group of actors responsible for policymaking and implementation (Skogstad, 2005).

One major confusion in network literature is around policy networks and governance networks. Blanco, Lowndes, and Pratchett (2011) classify network literature into two schools: policy networks and governance networks, arguing that while both are quite different, they are often used interchangeably in the literature. They found some major differences between policy networks and governance networks, including differences in their historical interpretation, contextual determinants, network composition and dynamics, network focus, level of institutionalization, nature of exchanges within the network, democratic impacts, and understandings of power and politics (Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett, 2011).

3.4.1 Policy Networks

Policy network literature identifies policy networks as established elements of government. It challenges the idea of a monolithic government as the only policymaking actor, arguing instead that policymaking occurs within different policy subsystems and with several actors (Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett, 2011). Policy network literature does not situate itself temporally as part of a societal shift in governing. Instead, policy network scholars focus on comparative cross-sectoral and cross-national studies. They focus on variations between types of policy networks, including the relationships within the network and its characteristics. Policy network literature focuses on more traditional policy sectors like agriculture that follow conventional administrative policy subsystems. There is less focus on cross-sectoral collaboration. Policy networks tend to be less formal and are part of the policy process (Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett, 2011). One of the assumptions behind policy networks is that neither public nor private actors have the

capacity or resources to address many public policy issues on their own (Damgaard, 2006).

3.4.2 Governance Networks

Governance networks did not evolve from policy networks, and policy networks continue to be relevant in policy studies independently of governance networks. Governance network literature describes networks as a historical phenomenon that arose with the politico-economic changes in the 1980s (Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett, 2011). Networks are seen to have emerged as empirical manifestations of the governance era (Tomlinson, 2010). These societal shifts altered the state-society relationship, which required a different way of governing than the traditional bureaucratic processes. The increase in the complexity of policy issues and actors involved in them, financial limits of the public sector, and general shifts in citizen attitude towards governance prompted the emergence of networks. Governance network scholars focus on the shift from "government to governance" and the different modes of governance. They emphasize emerging wicked policy problems such as environmental sustainability that cut across traditional subsystems, requiring the collaboration of many public and private actors. However, O'Toole (2014) argues that they have not replaced traditional bureaucratic governance or processes, but rather have become an additional layer of complexity in the governance and policymaking processes. Governance networks are formalized and are something that can be managed, hence the literature on network management, and metagovernance (Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett, 2011). Governance networks must constantly be nurtured to be successful (Klijn, 2008). Metagovernance can increase success (Torfing, 2012), and assist with coordination issues usually encountered in

horizontal governance of networks (Fransen, 2015). Networks ought to be "metagoverned" to promote effective governance and contribute positively to society (Doberstein, 2013; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). As Klijn (2008) notes, "If there is one point that all the authors agree upon, it is that although network governance requires a different form of government, it certainly does not require a less active one" (p. 520). While some scholars (Rhodes, 1996) argue that the governance era of networks has replaced the state in policymaking, many argue that the state continues and should continue to play a prominent role in network governance (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). As Klijn (2008) notes, the involvement of more actors in policymaking does not necessarily result in better or more cooperation, nor does it automatically create better solutions in a more democratic process.

In response to Blanco, Lowndes, and Pratchett's (2011) differentiation of policy networks and governance networks, Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012) take the discussion further. They argue, like Blanco, Lowndes, and Pratchett (2011), that policy networks and governance networks may appear as though they should naturally be combined into one body of literature, but this can be problematic. Both policy and governance networks have significant epistemological differences between positivist, interpretivist, and critical realist approaches which prevent them from being combined into one concept, as many scholars confuse in the literature.

Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012) argue that the network governance school (NWG) focuses on macro-level questions looking at state-society relations and the changing role of the state. Within that school, there are three different epistemological approaches: positivist (views networks as static structures that had replaced the

hollowed-out and weakened state), interpretivist (governance as a set of competing beliefs and practices grounded in an anti-foundational theory of the state, views networks as a bottom-up construction), and critical realist (associated with meta-governance, concerned with the state's role in redesigning governance in a changing world) which all debate each other in the literature.

The policy network analysis (PNA) school concerns itself with meso-level questions looking at resource exchanges in networks, and power-dependent relationships in networks. Like in NWG school, there are variants in PNA. Pluralists within the school argue that networks develop a more inclusive policymaking process, while the structuralists find that networks make it more exclusionary. Another debate in the PNA literature, developed by Dowding (1995), challenges the fundamental explanatory power of the "network" concept.

3.4.3 Networks and Policy Outcomes

The main goal of any network is to develop public policy or implement policy to achieve effective outcomes. Generally, network scholars imply that policy networks themselves affect policy outcomes; however, they debate what affects these outcomes and how. It is important to consider how networks affect policy outcomes because policy outcomes then affect policy change (Marsh, 1998). This is a debate between structure and agency, one that predominantly only concerned philosophers and sociologists, but has since captured the attention of political scientists and international relations scholars (Hay, 2002). Indeed, Morçöl (2012) has proposed that the "biggest challenge in policy studies is an understanding of the micro-macro relationships and transformations" (p. 91). Different schools of thought within network literature emphasize certain aspects of

networks in their analysis. They can be thus thought of as broadly divided among groups of scholars who think of networks as interpersonal relationships (agency), and those who consider networks as structures of interests, institutions, and actors (Skogstad, 2008). These schools of thought, therefore, base their network analysis on either agency or structure.

Marsh (1998) argued that network analysis could not be either agency or structure, because both are present in networks, and both interact with each other. He, therefore, posited that networks are made up of a dialectical relationship between agency and structure (Marsh, 1998). Marsh and Smith (2000) developed a much more detailed analysis of the relationship between networks and policy outcomes. They claimed that any approach emphasizing one aspect of a network over any other was severely limited analytically. They, therefore, theorized that networks were made up of 3 dialectical relationships: agency and structure, network and context, and network and outcome.

Dialectical relationships can mean different things to different scholars. Marsh and Smith (2000) understand dialectical as “an interactive relationship between two variables in which each affects the other in a continuing iterative process” (p. 5). This means that both variables constantly affect and influence each other at the same time. They explain this process by using the structure and agency relationship:

> Action is taken by an actor within a structured context. The actor brings strategic knowledge to the structured context and both that strategic knowledge and the structured context help shape the agent’s action. However, the process is one of almost constant iterations, as the action affects both the actor’s strategic knowledge and the structured context, which then, in turn, shape, but of course do not determine, the agent’s future action (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p. 5).

The “structure” of a network encompasses the rules governing the network, a “box” within which everything happens. The construction and type of the box determine what can go inside it and what one can do within the box. Agency represents the actors and their relationships within the box. While the box outlines what actors can do within it, the actions of the actors and the very actors themselves influence the shape of the box and what is within it. These two fundamental characteristics of a network (in addition to other important factors such as context) influence the policy outcome. Skogstad (2008) finds that one of the earlier critiques of policy networks has been the lack of contextual attribution to the existence of the network such as broader “macro political, ideological, and economic structures within which policy networks are situated” (p. 212). Canadian scholars have contended for a long time that policy networks must be understood within the broader macro structure within which they exist as seen in Coleman and Skogstad (1990). This relationship can, therefore, be visually conceived as depicted in Figure 5:

Figure 5: **Dialectical Relationship Between Agency and Structure in Networks**



Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012) play off Marsh's (1998) understanding of dialectical forces within the network by combining PNA literature and NWG literature using critical realist epistemology to understand network outcomes. A typology of networks (see Table 2) that differentiates between vertical coordination (state-centred governance versus society-centred governance) and horizontal coordination (input legitimacy versus output legitimacy) suggests that there is a difference between state-dominant networks and society-dominant networks.

Table 2: **Explaining Governance Outcomes**

Vertical coordination (NWG school)	**Horizontal coordination (PNA school)**	
	Exclusion	**Inclusion**
State-centred governance	I • Medium input legitimacy • High output legitimacy	II • High input legitimacy • Medium output legitimacy
Society-centred governance	III • Low input legitimacy • Medium output legitimacy	IV • High input legitimacy • Low output legitimacy

Table 2: Explaining Governance Outcomes. Reprinted from *Explaining Governance Outcomes: Epistemology, Network Governance and Policy Network Analysis* by P. Fawcett, C. Daugbjerg, 2012, *Political Studies Review, 10*(2), 199. Copyright [2012] Paul Fawcett, Carsten Daugbjerg, Political Studies Review, Political Studies Association.

The NWG, a macro approach, is more inclined to focus on questions related to the vertical axis but does not discount the horizontal axis. Likewise, PNA would be more apt to focus on questions surrounding legitimacy in the horizontal axis, but it too does not discount the other axis. The PNA school has focused largely on input legitimacy (process through which decisions are made) by looking at resource exchange between network actors and ideologies within networks that determine who is included and who is excluded from the policymaking process. Input legitimacy focuses on the meso scale. The NWG school, on the other hand, has focused on output legitimacy, which centres

on outcomes and results achieved from networks (policy outcomes and their success), a more macro approach.

This typology shows the relationship between different governance arrangements and their network outcomes by combining both macro and meso perspectives developed by the PNA and NWG literature (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012). This table thus allows me to combine insights from both literatures by linking macro and meso characteristics of a network to better understand the outcome of the CBoC's CFS. This approach also complements Marsh and Smith's (2000) dialectical approach and stays true to Giddens' (1984) structuration theory by combining both macro and meso levels of analysis.

For this study, the network will be understood as an entity that is historically situated in politico-economic changes that have affected policymaking. My understanding of networks largely focuses on the European approach to network scholarship. However, I draw on Canadian insights that focus on macro aspects of networks. The network is seen as something that can coordinate state and non-state actor collaboration in complex policy areas where more actors are needed to come up with solutions. Network policy outcomes are one of the main focuses of the CFS case study, looking at the results of the collaborative efforts of the CBoC. My understanding of the network flows from Marsh's (1998) conception, as shown in Figure 5: comprising a dialectical relationship between structure and agency embedded in context. However, not discounting the research efforts of both policy (focusing on meso scale) AND governance (focusing on macro scale) networks, I use Fawcett and Daugbjerg's (2012) findings that both PNA and NWG literatures can be combined if the macro and meso

scale are considered when examining policy outcomes. In 1996, Klijn identified a gap in network literature about process (a meso level concept) and how it relates to the development of networks. He also pinpointed three other scholars who have singled out this research gap in the early 1980s (Benson, 1982; Wamsley, 1985; Whetten, 1982). Since then, there has been little written on the topic of processes in networks. However, there has been a body of literature looking at institutions, networks, and multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and their input legitimacy or throughput legitimacy. This type of legitimacy somewhat takes process into account. For example, scholars such as Bäckstrand (2006) explain input legitimacy as the procedural demands in a multistakeholder partnership, which include stakeholder representation, collaboration, deliberation, transparency, access of stakeholders, information sharing, accountability, and reporting mechanisms. Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Havinga (2011) distinguish input legitimacy as having to do with participation, and throughput legitimacy as having to do with issues of transparency, responsiveness, and the fairness of procedures in an institution.

Similarly, Daugbjerb and Fuchs (2015) identify input legitimacy as outlining the democratic qualities of a network, which include inclusiveness, fairness, accountability, and transparency. Schmidt (2013), looking at the EU, recognizes procedural legitimacy as the things that occur within the “black box” of policymaking within institutions. Nonetheless, while concepts like input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy or procedural legitimacy (Schmidt & Wood, 2019) focus on process, they tend to emphasize the democratic nature of an MSI, a network, or an institution. Many concepts are borrowed from democratic theory looking at democracy, accountability, and procedural norms

(Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008). For this study, my interests align more with process as a contributor to policy outcomes of a network, largely omitting discussions in the democratic nature of networks or MSIs. As such, I take Marsh's (1998) idea of what contributes to network policy outcomes (see Figure 5) and combine it with the conceptual ideas of Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012) to create a new image of a network that encompasses the meso concept, process.

3.4.4 Factors Related to Policy Networks Effectiveness

Networks are often commended as innovative, efficient mobilizers of resources, informed decision-making (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). DeLeon and Varda (2009) argue that while the benefits of networks are obvious, the collaboration that occurs within them "has the classic elements of public-private partnerships and the potential for failure when the mixing of values, norms, power, trust, and experience might clash and produce undesirable conflict and tension" (p. 63). Therefore, networks do not automatically produce desirable policy outcomes because there are difficulties in sustaining and motivating collaboration between network actors (deLeon & Varda, 2009). Torfing (2012) and Sørensen & Torfing (2017) find that networks can also have a high risk of failure. They can "lead to a stalemate, poor and biased decisions, or directionless consensus" (Torfing, 2012, p. 107). Networks can also fail because of vague and undefined goals, conflicts of interests, misalignment of network strategy and government strategy, exclusion of important actors, lack of trust, and pursue agendas against the public good (Sørensen & Torfing, 2017).

For networks to be successful, they must be effective. Provan and Milward (2001) identify an effective network as one with legitimacy, external support, and

satisfaction from its members, clients, and service users. Provan and Lemaire (2012) see effective networks encompassing good network design with suitable levels of integration and coordination, appropriate network governance or management, the development and maintenance of legitimacy, and stability (p. 643-644). Following this, Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that to create a successful network, a few key characteristics must be present: trust, size, goal consensus, and nature of the network's task. Several other characteristics also lead to the successful formulation of the crucial milestones like problem definition, provisional solutions, and implementation of the issue: effective network management, different types of knowledge (expert and experiential) shared by network actors, mutual trust and commitment between actors involved in the network (Head & Alford, 2015). From these, I combine both Provan and Kenis' (2008) and Head and Alford's (2015) elements of successful networks by focusing on key characteristics of successful networks: trust, problem definition, and network management.

3.5 Insights from Multistakeholder Studies

While networks tend to be the most discussed collaborative initiatives under the governance era, another form of collaboration in policy development arose shortly after. Multistakeholder literature tends to be disconnected from network literature. "Multistakeholder" tends to be a term used more often in practice rather than in theory. However, multistakeholder scholarship exists in international relations and international studies disciplines. Network literature, on the other hand, can be found in political science, public policy, and public administration disciplines. Nonetheless, both literatures possess many similarities, especially when discussing the effectiveness of

multi-actor collaboration. Network literature is older and therefore, more theoretically developed. Multistakeholder literature broadly focuses on more practical aspects of collaboration. However, both literatures can reinforce and complement each other. Multistakeholder literature will thus be used to complement existing literature on networks and form bridges between disciplines to better understand collaborative policymaking at this time.

The development of the CFS can be considered a MSI involving both state and non-state actors. Multistakeholder literature will be used as a body of literature that can shed light on the effectiveness of collaboration in networks involving both state and non-state actors.

Multistakeholder literature generally focuses on the global level and on initiatives in internet governance (Antonova, 2011; Powers & Jablonski, 2015; Waz & Weiser, 2012), environmental initiatives (Fransen, 2012; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012), sustainable development (Bäckstrand, 2006; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016), and increasingly agriculture and food (Breeman, Dijkman & Termeer, 2015; Cheyns, 2011).

3.5.1 What are Multistakeholder Initiatives?

Multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) became common in the international relations literature in the 1990s (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Roloff, 2008; Utting, 2002) and used increasingly in the post-Cold War era (Almeida, Geschko & Afonso, 2015). Wong (2014) contends that MSIs emerged out of the unease surrounding imbalanced relationships between transnational corporations, citizens, and the government. Scholars like Martens (2007) argue that MSIs emerged out of frustration in the multilateral process, because of the slow and burdensome negotiations lacking

commitment from governments. Similarly, Bäckstrand (2006) contends that intergovernmental diplomacy was not enough to deal with complex issues, and for this reason, MSIs have become a popular alternative. Along the same lines, Zeyen, Beckmann, and Wolters (2016) identify MSIs as important “new governance arrangements” that have developed out of reaction to complex and urgent sustainability issues on the global level. Gitsham and Page (2014), writing about the UN Global Compact initiative, claim that MSIs allow the private sector to be involved in complex issues or global challenges that require the engagement from industry. MSIs thus become important governance tools in places where traditional state governance is lacking.

There is no single definition of a MSI (also named partnerships or arrangements) (Epstein & Nonnecke, 2016). Roloff’s (2008) definition of an MSI is as a network of business, civil society, government or supranational institutions who “come together to find a common approach to an issue that affects them all and that is too complex to be addressed effectively without collaboration” (p. 234). He finds MSIs are issue driven, where an “urgent” and “complex” (p. 238) issue brings together affected actors to solve the problem, without a clear leader. This definition specifically focuses on MSIs as networks of both public and private actors who share concerns on issues that could be considered wicked policy problems. Pinkse and Kole (2012) identify MSIs as non-hierarchal partnerships, cutting across different sectors and creating a level-playing field between actors, with no clear regulator. Rühli et al (2015) explain an MSI as “an integrative social interaction process among three or more affected actors to address a wicked issue with the intention to develop innovative products and services” (p. 3).

Epstein & Nonnecke (2016) identify MSIs as “a principle of state and nonstate actors deliberating, and ultimately making, policy decisions as equals” (p. 148), though acknowledge that MSIs come in many “shapes and flavors reflected in format, organization, and agenda” (p. 167). Powers and Jablonski (2015) see “multistakeholderism” in general as the bringing together of private sector, non-state actors, and state actors. Zeyen, Beckmann, and Wolter (2016) approach MSIs as products of corporate and other stakeholder behaviour, institutionalizing corporate social responsibility. Generally, most MSI definitions discuss actors in some degree of cooperation or interactive engagement that centre on a complex issue affecting everyone involved in the created network. They have also been identified as effective collaborative initiatives for dealing with wicked policy problems (Foley, Wick, Kay & Rushforth, 2017; Rühli et al, 2015; Waddock, 2012).

3.5.2 Multistakeholder Effectiveness

MSIs can be very effective policymaking tools, especially for wicked policy problems because of dialogue, collaboration, and inclusivity found within MSIs (Rühli, Sachs, Schmitt & Schneider, 2015). Pattberg and Widerberg (2016) add that MSIs are flexible, adaptable, and decentralized in nature. These characteristics are beneficial when working with wicked policy problems. They could help realize policy goals that would otherwise be unattainable if actors worked on their own (Almeida, Geschko & Afonso, 2015). Examples of such goals could include various global climate change initiatives or the successful Montreal Protocol.

Rühli et al (2015) argue that MSIs spur trust and new relationships between stakeholders, which can overcome issues harmful to collaboration such as stereotypes,

prejudices, and discrimination. In Antonova's (2011) study on MSI development, she found that participants were motivated to participate in MSIs because they wanted to have a voice in a dialogue that creates policies. This dialogue allowed them to benefit from a medley of perspectives, values, and discourses that encouraged them to rethink their own beliefs and values and allowed actors to "'adjust their 'cultures,' and 'learn to talk with one another'" (p. 431). Pinkse and Kolk (2012) and Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) argue that these partnerships are opportunities for learning through interaction with different stakeholders. Antonova (2011) identifies MSIs as "capacity-building," "network building," and being able to develop "accelerating learning" (p. 427) between different stakeholders through the co-creation of shared language. These can result in the "…accumulation of intellectual capital, development of relational infrastructure for the domain ('epistemic communities'), and emergence of common global consciousness" (p. 426). These can also be opportunities where actors can develop empathy for traditionally disadvantaged groups, leading them to better understand the goals and interests of other actors (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001). Many "weaker" actors like civil society can even benefit from voicing their concerns in MSIs (Antonova, 2011).

While MSIs are generally considered to be valuable and are commonly used, some argue that they frequently do not meet expectations, and are complex to maintain (Sloan & Oliver, 2013). Several scholars also note risks (Biermann, Chan, Mert & Pattberg, 2007), often pinpointing the challenges for "weaker" members of MSIs. Opponents label MSIs as "market-based narratives" that give more power to the private sector in policymaking (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016), reflecting the current neoliberal

policymaking climate. Private actors thus may have more impact on policy discourse and agenda-setting, developing “elite models” of governance (Martens, 2007, p. 5-6). This allows government to avoid responsibility while also creating potential governance gaps with selective stakeholder representation (Martens, 2007).

Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) claim that MSI negotiations can be destructive for disadvantaged groups because they often conceal power inequities between stakeholders in the partnership. This can occur when consensus is being sought by the group, where “stronger actors” can push their idea of consensus onto others. Wong (2014) identifies these situations as imbalanced power relationships or potential “power traps” in MSIs (p. 27). However, he notes that these “power traps” focus on transnational corporations and tend to exaggerate and overgeneralize power imbalances. Similarly, Utting (2002) recognize the marginalization of traditionally disadvantaged and politically weaker actors in MSIs. Often, actors can feel forced to participate in MSIs so that their criticism of the partnership will be legitimate (Powers & Jablonski, 2015).

MSIs can fail if they are not “properly planned, structured, managed, led and supported, and if there is insufficient common vision” (Häring, Vairo, Dabbert & Zanoli, 2009, p. 268). Conklin (2006) identifies forces of fragmentation as an obstacle in collaboration. Fragmentation occurs when stakeholders involved see themselves as separated than integrated, and when information and knowledge about a given problem are spotted and disjointed. In addition to this, he identifies social complexity as a factor of fragmentation, which is the number of stakeholders and the diversity of players involved. Tensions often exist within MSIs because of the variety of different actors

involved in the initiative (Calton & Payne, 2003). The solution to this fragmentation Conklin (2006) argues, is a shared understanding of the issue and shared commitment to developing solutions. Shared understanding, however, is not necessarily agreement on the definition of the problem or consensus, but rather understanding everyone else's position on different problem interpretations and ways in which to move towards solutions. Shared commitment usually develops out of strong shared understanding, which ensures that decisions are made with everyone involved, and the discussion involves everyone's contributions.

Foley et al (2017) argue that there can be other factors that prevent the success of multistakeholder collaboration: the absence of a comprehensive and mutual understanding of the problem, the absence of a common vision of a solution, and a deficiency in a united, evidence-supported strategy to tackle the policy issue. The authors also identify underlying factors that cause these issues: mistrust that can originate from a lack of transparency in process and decision-making, inertia that stems from a long decision-making process and overall timeline, and power asymmetry that can develop out of "instances of withholding information, expertise biases, meeting settings, and exclusive decision-making" (Foley et al, 2017, p. 131). Sloan and Oliver (2013) also identify trust as a key factor leading towards success and effectiveness of MSIs. Truex and Søreide (2010) isolate low levels of participation of members in MSIs among major factors for MSI failure.

Like in network literature and wicked policy problems, problem definition is a common thread used to discuss effective collaboration necessary to solve complex issues. Trust, discussed in network literature, also makes a reappearance in

multistakeholder literature, as do other factors like transparent processes, timelines, decision-making, and biases that can be grouped into network management. However, one important thing that multistakeholder literature has brought the table that network literature has not is the question of how power affects the participation of actors within a network.

3.5.3 Analyzing Multistakeholder Networks

Gray (2007) identifies four different phases in the MSI: problem setting, direction setting, implementation, and institutionalization, which will be referred to in this section. Phase 1 (problem setting) involves identifying and committing important partners to the initiative. Phase 2 (direction setting) includes identifying problems and solutions. Phase 3 (implementation) is putting the agreed upon direction into action. Phase 4 (institutionalization) is the structured and continued interaction of partners in the MSI. I will be focusing mostly on the first two phases.

Pattberg & Widerberg (2016) discuss several conditions for an MSI's success under three different categories: actors, process, and context, which I have adapted here.

3.5.3.1 Actors

Who is involved in the MSI is very critical. Optimal partner mix involves the inclusion of not only the most influential actors but also some of the most important ones. Häring et al (2009) determined that the optimal partner mix involves "those with authority, resources, information, expertise and need" (p. 265). The legitimacy of an MSI stems from having the right players around the table. This does not mean that an MSI must include *all* possible stakeholders related to the issue. Membership should have critical

mass or enough participants to address the issue. The MSI will not succeed if it fails to include powerful organizations that may block its progress in the issue. Membership must also be inclusive, even if this requires financially supporting certain organizations to participate in the MSI. Thus, membership is not based on “quantity and homogeneity,” but “quality and diversity” (Gitsham & Page, 2014, p. 20). Through his analysis of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Wigell (2008) shows that the exclusion of certain actors in the early stages of an MSI leaves conflict and mistrust between actors. Success also depends on the eagerness of stakeholders to participate in MSIs (Häring et al, 2009), and so the membership “must be comprised of members who are fully committed to the cause” (Truex & Søreide, 2010, p. 6).

Gitsham and Page (2014) argue that trust and common purpose are based on the relationships and the processes within the MSI. This begins by creating space where members of the MSI can develop trust, common understandings of the issue, the purpose behind the MSI, and space where conflict can be managed. The development of trust has been identified by the authors as key to a successful MSI. Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) see “trust” as the glue necessary for collaboration. MSIs must also involve a membership that is willing to contribute time and energy to develop a successful collaboration. Conflict resolution or dispute settlement has been identified as an important aspect of the MSI solution (Dentoni, Bitzer & Schouten, 2018).

MSIs should not be considered as apolitical mechanisms of governance because they are very political (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001). At times, a specific actor mix could create power asymmetries with less powerful members. Symmetrical power arrangements, on the other hand, ensure that each actor is on an equal playing field

(Foley et al, 2017). Also, acknowledging the power inequalities between actors can help table differences and polarizing topics to better understand each actors' interests and needs (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001). Pattberg & Widerberg (2016) advise that a value and identity map could be useful in terms of identifying shared interests and where collaboration could be effective.

Effective leadership is also important for a successful MSI. Pattberg and Widerberg (2016) argue that distinct leadership is necessary for different stages of the MSI. Early stages of the partnership require leaders to be conveners. Effective leaders can attract the right participants, combine different points of view, pay close attention to process and the dynamics within the network, and implement agreed upon decisions. Gray (2007) identifies leadership intervention tasks as critical throughout different phases of the MSI. For example, in phase 1 (problem setting), leadership should engage in appreciation and visioning. Appreciation involves identifying interdependencies between partners and how collaboration can occur between them. Visioning is the ability to see the different political, economic, and social realities that partners exist in and how this can affect collaboration. Convening is also an important task done by leaders in phase 1, which ensures a successful MSI. This includes determining whether consensus is possible (or desired), ensuring that all stakeholder interests and views are represented, finding resources to support the MSI process, and organizing and designing the process with participants or a facilitator. Having the right representation is critical. In phase 2 (direction setting), leaders must focus on developing common understandings of issues and then solutions. Leaders are also

tasked with helping foster trust between its members and resolve any conflicts (Gray, 2007).

Like in metagovernance literature, the state can be an important player in MSI collaboration. For example, VanNijnatten (1998) argues that consultations may break down if government guides the MSI too little or too much. This implies that government should have a leadership role in MSIs. VanNijnatten (1998) further notes that government should engage in MSIs with policy frameworks that fit into and can work with public policymaking. Others discuss convenors and facilitators, in general, rather than discussing that state (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001) as having power to determine who gets represented as a stakeholder in MSIs.

3.5.3.2 Process

The way stakeholders are involved in an MSI is also important. Process is a crucial component and is often forgotten or underestimated in initiatives (Gray, 2007). Gray (2007) notes that it may be useful to have process designers that think of “guidelines for representation and participation, decision-making processes, ownership of and responsibility for outcomes, power sharing and conferring with constituents, the media and the larger community” (p. 38).

Zanella, Goetz, Rist, Schmidt, Weigelt (2018) examine multistakeholder participation in the Committee on World Food Security. They use Dryzek’s deliberation system framework to examine power within MSIs. The authors discussed 3 principles for achieving deliberation: authenticity (encourage reflection on perspectives that do not align with everyone’s point of view and communicate those perspectives in a way that allows members to find some of those perspectives meaningful and worth engaging in),

inclusiveness (enable the opportunity and ability for everyone to participate), and consequentiality (debate should be reflected in outcomes). The process of deliberation, which involves interaction, negotiation, and discussion, should lead to shared problem definition, encouraging a common solution (Dentoni, Bitzer & Schouten, 2018).

A successful MSI will have a process that develops a common vision and shared goals from the beginning (Gray, 2007; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). Gray (2007) underlines the importance of framing in an MSI. Rühli et al (2015) stress the importance of developing shared interpretations when dealing with a policy issue. Even if there is a shared vision, Gray (2007) notes that deeply entrenched identities can cause rifts in MSIs. Some participants may feel as though they are losing a part of their identity by participating in the initiative. Cultural differences are also potential obstacles. While Gray (2007) is likely referring to cultural differences between different countries engaging in global MSIs, the differing culture between stakeholders like government, industry, and civil society can also be significant. Trust and better collaboration are built on the degree of consensus on goals and visions of the MSI (Visseran-Hamakers, Arts & Glasbergen, 2007).

Governance structures are essential when managing the MSI process. While there is no consensus on which structure is the most effective, Pattberg and Widerberg (2016) note Liese and Beisheim's (2011) advice that a small governing board of major donors, a secretariat and a space for the input of other stakeholders. Full-time staff (Beisheim, 2012) and the institutionalization of the MSI have also been noted as helpful (Reiniecke et al, 2000). The governance structure of an MSI becomes an important part of decision-making (Dentoni, Bitzer & Schouten, 2018). Decision-making is a crucial

part of the process. It should be used to foster trust and transparency to smooth over any power inequalities between members involved in the MSI. Transparency becomes essential to developing a legitimate and accountable process in an MSI (Wigell, 2008). VanNijnatten (1998) found that MSIs broke down when decision-making was not transparent or clear, creating distrust, and when there were no formal rules or guidelines for consensus.

Another important part of the MSI process is the enforcement of decisions and agreements in the MSI. This is where monitoring and implementation of decisions occur which determine effective outcomes of the MSI (Dentoni, Bitzer & Schouten, 2018). Monitoring, reporting, and evaluation are strongly recommended, and Pattberg & Widerberg (2016) have found that transparent monitoring, reporting, and evaluation have been proven to be tools used for effective MSIs. Momentum or making progress and acting on decisions to avoid member fatigue is very valuable to MSI effectiveness (Foley et al, 2017).

Lastly, sustainable funding stabilizes the MSI process. Voluntary funding can be unstable and can be detrimental to the MSI and its goals (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). The context within which the MSI operates can influence its success. Political and social contexts can determine whether an MSI will be effective. Pattberg and Widerberg (2016) recommend mapping the social and political context to better understand the opportunities and challenges in society, which may impact the way recommendations are presented. MSIs also cannot operate independently from the policy world. It is important that MSIs connect aspects of their work with other organizations and

initiatives working on similar policy issues. This will maintain continuity in policy learning (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016).

3.5.4 Multistakeholder Initiatives and the Assumption of the State's Autonomy

There is a big assumption in multistakeholder literature around the autonomy of the state, meaning whether the state has control over its actions. When multistakeholder initiatives are discussed, there is an assumption that the state within the initiative has complete autonomy over its actions. This indicates that the state is not influenced by any other actor in the initiative. However, this is something that should be examined further.

There are different understandings around the autonomy of the state within state theories. While this brief discussion will not list all the theories of the state and go into detail on each of them, it will outline some key theories that understand the autonomy of the state on different points of the spectrum for our discussion on multistakeholder initiatives. Generally, theories of the state and their understandings of state autonomy can be understood as a spectrum (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 6: **State Autonomy Spectrum**



Pluralist state theories (positioned on the far left of the spectrum) argue that the state is completely autonomous from any group in society (Smith, 2006). Dahl (1963) noted that the state is divided up into different spheres holding separate powers to prevent government capture by any single actor or group in society regardless of their resources. This means that the state is a neutral ground and does not favour any group's interest over another's (Lundberg, 2013).

The instrumentalist and elitist theories of state perceive the state as lacking autonomy (positioned on the far right of the spectrum). The fundamental assumptions in those theories are that there are elite groups of people (or classes) who have more power than others, and they can control and dominate the actions of the state in their favour. This suggests that the state has no autonomy (Knutilla & Kubik, 1992).

The structuralist approach (positioned in the middle of the spectrum) understands the state as being a site of class struggle between different groups carrying different power. It must mediate between classes, but also ensure the continued existence of the capitalist system. As such, it is semi-autonomous, having been captured by the structure and dominant classes, but also able to act on its own (Knutilla & Kubik, 1992).

While multistakeholder literature likely assumes that the state is pluralist, where it is a neutral ground that can make its own decisions, I take on the assumption that the state is semi-autonomous, or relatively autonomous. This means that certain societal groups may have more influence on the state than others. However, the state is also able to act on its own. Marks (2019) critiques the idea of multistakeholder initiatives within the public health sector. He notes that it is impossible for the state not to be influenced by the private sector working with them on public health policies and

programs. For example, he discusses the situation of a soft drink company like Pepsi or Coca Cola working with a government public health unit on obesity policies in the community. He explains that this partnership is inherently problematic and contradictory. While the government's purpose is public health and well-being, the soft drink company's purpose is commercial, which he argues does not align with the public good. I acknowledge that many multistakeholder partnerships such as the one discussed by Marks (2019) are problematic, I also maintain that there are some partnerships that can have effective policy outcomes if they are structured in a way that gives power to the purpose of the public good. This requires, at a minimum, a semi-autonomous state.

3.6 Theoretical Assumptions and Approaches

Key major ideas will be drawn from these two large groups of theories: the first is the policy umbrella, which grounds us in concrete ideas of the policy. This includes the conceptualization of food policy and the discussion on wicked policy problems. The second group contextualizes non-state actors working in policy. It is based more broadly in the governance approach which acts as a theoretical umbrella for the other theories and approaches examined which look at non-state actors in policy development: private governance, metagovernance, network approaches, and multistakeholder literature.

The first theoretical group examines policy, food policy specifically, but also complex and multifaceted group of policies termed wicked policy problems. As explored at the beginning of the chapter, food policy is a multifaceted problem. However, there are different issues within policy that vary in complexity and wickedness. For example, food security might be considered a wicked problem, but something like food waste could be considered a tame problem where the problem and solution are either defined

or can be known. Therefore, certain parts of food policy are tame, others complex, and some are wicked. Because of these variances, food policy cannot be referred to as a wicked policy problem as a whole, because it displays varying degrees of wickedness. Some issues may therefore need to be managed (rather than solved) in different ways. The clarity of problem definition and solutions become key markers of complexity. Food policy will, therefore, be considered on a “wickedness” continuum, where certain aspects of food policy can be considered “tamer” and others more wicked (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: **Food Policy Wickedness Continuum**

The second group of theories grounded in the governance approach contextualizes the apparition and need for the integration of several non-state actors in the policymaking process, which re-evaluates the role of the state in policymaking. The involvement of state and non-state actors can vary in different situations and policy issues. Governance will, therefore, be understood as a blend of state-led governance, private governance, and metagovernance. Governance can be visualized as a continuum where, on one end, we can find pure private governance, where only non-state actors are involved in a policy initiative. On the opposite end, we find a pure state-led approach, where only government is involved in a policy initiative. These different versions of governance can

differ from time to time, country to country, and especially policy to policy. This can be visualized in Figure 8:

***Figure 8*: The Continuum of Governance**

The way in which governance takes place anywhere left of the right side of Figure 8 will involve collections of state and non-state actors working together in different capacities and degrees on a policy initiative. These collaborations can transform into networks and multistakeholder initiatives.

As discussed earlier, my understanding of networks draws on both PNA and NWG schools where the rise of networks in policymaking is historically situated in the politico-economic changes occurring in the 1980s that changed state-society relationships. What is important in each network is the policy outcome. There are many factors that can affect policy outcomes in networks. I understand policy outcomes through Marsh and Smith's (2000) dialectical diagram of a network which includes structure, agency, and context. However, I also follow Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012) who merge policy network assumptions with governance network assumptions to understand policy outcomes as based on both macro and meso level characteristics. For this reason, I expand Marsh and Smith's (2000) understanding of network outcomes by including process as seen in Figure 9:

Figure 9: **Dialectical Relationship Between Agency, Structure, Process in Networks**



Lastly, multistakeholder literature acts as a supporting literature for networks that is better at bringing out and understanding some of the dynamics and power imbalances within state/non-state collaborations, and some more practical components that affect policy outcomes. It is also used to understand the network developed by the CBoC through the creation of the CFS. While I initially suspected that the CFS was a private governance experiment, I quickly realized that this was not the case further into the process. The CFS development led the network towards a multistakeholder path which included both state and non-state actors. For this reason, I blend both literatures and use the term, multistakeholder food governance network (MFGN) to depict a state/non-state collaboration within a network that aims to reach a food policy outcome. The CFS was considered a multistakeholder food governance network. While the CBoC did not

have the authority to make and implement national policies, this initiative was treated as a policy process that aimed to develop a strategy or a collection of policies to guide the Canadian food system in a given direction. The MFGN itself was the collection of state and non-state actor collaboration that was involved (all the investors) in the policy process that developed the policy outcome, or the CFS. The diagram below visually depicts how I use both groups of theories and how MFGN emerges.

***Figure 10*: The Combination of Group Theoretical Approaches Used to Conceptualize MFGNs**



Chapter 4: Research Methods

This chapter outlines the research design of the study related to the following research questions:

- What are some unique characteristics of multistakeholder networks in the policymaking process?
    - Why did the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy as a multistakeholder governance network policy development process fail?
    - What lessons does the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy initiative provide in terms of multistakeholder policymaking?

It includes an overview of the research design, research phases, and methods of data collection and analysis used in the study. It begins by briefly examining the ontological assumptions underpinning the research design. This is followed by a review of the qualitative research methods used for data collection and analysis. Finally, this chapter ends with a with discussions of some of the limitations of the study, including a discussion of reliability, validity, generalizability of the findings.

4.1 Research Design

This qualitative study is embedded in the social constructivist approach. Social constructivism is a philosophical approach that believes in the shaping of meanings through social experiences (Crotty, 1998). How an individual interprets a situation is not predetermined mechanically but is a relational and interpretative process. Reality is understood as being constructed both socially and historically. In a research setting, this translates into a study dependent on the views of research participants as agents that can experience and attribute meaning from their contextualized experiences. Questions in constructivist studies are formulated broadly to allow participants to develop their own meanings of experiences or situations without imposition from the researcher. Research

processes under such a philosophical view are generally inductive, where the researcher generates meaning through the interpretation of collected data (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 2003). This study was grounded in the observations, experiences, and meanings constructed by interview participants.

This study examined the CBoC's CFS as a single case study (Yin, 2003, p. 39, 41-43) and experiment in private governance. A case study was deemed appropriate for this study because the CFS was considered a unique initiative of food policymaking in Canada because of the actors involved and the relative comprehensiveness of the Strategy. The case study will also be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Many inquiries focusing on policy networks use case study methods to design their research (Arnold, Nguyen Long & Gottlieb, 2017; Lubell & Fulton, 2007; Marsh, 1998; Moschitz, Hrabalova & Stolze, 2016; Provan & Milward, 1995; Robinson, 2006; Toke & Marsh, 2003; Tomlinson, 2010; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). Others also use statistical network analysis (Angst & Hirschi, 2017; Robins, Lewis & Wang, 2012), and social network analysis (Drew, Aggleton, Chalmers & Wood, 2011). The case study has become a respected method in the social sciences (Flyvberg, 2006; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Fidel (1983) finds that case studies are best used for situations where "(1) a large variety of factors and relationships are included, (2) no basic laws exist to determine which factors and relationships are important, and (3) when the factors and relationships can be directly observed" (p. 273). The CBoC's creation of the CFS is thus an ideal case to use because it involves a wide range of relations across sometimes unexpected participants.

The case study as a research method, has often been criticized for three main limitations: theory creation, reliability, and validity. Flyvberg (2006) debunks these factors by directly tackling some common misunderstandings of the method. He claims that social science is not a field where “predictive theory and universals” (p. 224) can be found, and so this should not be expected of case studies. Searching for predictive theories can misdirect a researcher, where tangible and more effective knowledge is found in context-specific knowledge that a case study can provide. Following Eysenck (1976), the CBoC’s creation of the CFS was thus not meant to prove something, but rather used as a case study to learn something. While some may argue that case studies lose scholarly credibility because they cannot be generalized, Flyvberg (2006) maintains that they are essential to the development of knowledge. Cases are excellent tools to use as falsifiers of existing theories (Flyvberg, 2006). While I am not looking to debunk theories, I aim to add nuance to existing ones as outlined in Chapter 3.

Case studies are also seen as a method to be used at the beginning of research to develop hypotheses. Flyvberg (2006) argues that case studies are even better used at the falsification or verification of the theory stage of the study if a case study is well chosen. He goes on to say that “Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied” (p. 229). For this reason, I have chosen the CBoC’s development of the CFS as my case study to highlight particular relationships that may not be typical in other food strategy or policy developments. This, in turn, allows me to dissect the CBoC case, and contribute to nuancing network and multistakeholder theory.

The CFS as a case can be considered as an “extreme” or “unique” case (Yin, 2003, p. 40) compared with the other three non-state food strategies developed around the same time. The CBoC’s creation of the Strategy was an atypical development of food policy in Canada due to industry’s involvement in the development of a “holistic” (CBoC, n.d.b) food strategy. This was also an attempt at private governance in the Canadian food system, something that was not entertained by the Canadian government before. This is important for policy studies because it examines whether private governance and/or multistakeholder initiatives in policy areas like food can be effectively used to develop policy.

This case study used two units of analysis (Yin, 2003, p. 41-43): policy actors/interview participants and policy artifacts. Interview participants focus on individuals or groups as units of analysis, while policy artifacts are the products created by individuals or groups. Policy artifacts included any documents, reports, interviews, presentations or videos directly relating to the development of the food strategy found on the CBoC’s website or distributed during one of their three Canadian Food Summits throughout the development of the CFS, and subsequent Canadian Food and Drink Summits. Policy artifacts were included as sources of data in my study because they confirmed information I collected from interviews, acting as a triangulation tool, and they provided new information to develop a fuller picture of the creation of the CFS. Nonetheless, they were not a primary source of data, and were largely relied on to explain the CFS as a document.

4.2 Interviews (Sample interview guides attached in appendices)

Research on the CBoC's development of a Canadian Food Strategy was not readily available in documents, and it was necessary that it be studied through the perspectives of real actors in the process. Yin (2003) considers interviews in case studies as an important source of evidence (p. 89), as do many policy scholars, as was mentioned above. Interviews were used in this study to understand the perspectives and experiences of investors involved in the CFS. They are excellent tools to collect perceptions of individuals, where the researcher can better understand the participant's interpretation of something (Kvale, 1996). Responses are unique to the interviewee and their experiences, which are invaluable for qualitative research. Interviews are interactive, and for this reason, they also provide opportunities for probing, elaboration, and clarification (Alshenqeeti, 2014). However, the interview method has disadvantages that rest on its subjective nature. In a conversation between the researcher and the interviewee, there may be assumptions and expectations by both parties. For example, Diefenbach (2009) emphasizes that the researcher and/or interviewee may be subconsciously influenced by the "interview situation" where they feel they must say particular things to follow "cultural scripts" or norms. Similarly, Denscombe (2007) discusses how the interviewee may answer differently and divulge varying amounts of information based on how the interviewee perceives the researcher. Along the same lines, Gomm (2004) argues that the information the interviewee shares is dependent on what they believe is expected of them by the researcher or what response they believe the researcher is looking for. Some of these challenges are particularly true for elite interviews where there is a clear power imbalance between the elite interviewee and the

researcher. There may also be feelings of distrust or apprehension on the part of elite interviewees towards the interviewer (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen & Tahvanainen, 2002).

Welch et al (2002) define an elite interviewee as

> …an informant (usually male) who occupies a senior or middle management positions; has functional responsibility in an area which enjoys high status in accordance with corporate values; has considerable industry experience and frequently also long tenure with the company; possesses a broad network of personal relationships; and has considerable international exposure (p. 613).

In this study, the last descriptor of international exposure was not relevant. Morris (2009) adds that elites can include political, corporate, or professional elites (p. 209). In this study, elite interviewees included industry representatives, a senior executive of the CBoC, and senior ranking public servants.

Walford (2011) alleges that many policy studies have been completed using semi-structured interviews (p. 2). However, Montpetit, Allison, and Engeli (2016) have found that since the 1980s, policy research in Canada has become more varied, using qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. Semi-structured interviews tend to be most commonly applied in case studies (Yin, 2003), and are often used in policy research (Montpetit, Allison & Engeli, 2016). This study primarily gathered data through semi-structured and elite semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are those that have themes and questions planned for the interview, though the interview itself is flexible. Questions do not have to be asked in order, can be re-worded, or omitted altogether. The researcher can probe participants and ask questions that were not anticipated previously (Kvale, 1996, p. 124-125; Healey & Rawlinson, 1993, p. 343-344; Richards, 1996, p. 202). This is important because some elites do not like to be bound

by an order of questions (Kincaid & Bright, 1957, p. 309). The elite aspect was added to semi-structured interviews because of the nature of some of the participants interviewed.

Semi-structured interviews are also vital if the researcher is looking to unearth constructed meaning from participant interviews (Morris, 2009, p. 211), which was central in this study. I found that participants felt more comfortable discussing their experiences when they could do it on their terms. This was especially important for government representatives, who at the time, under the Conservative government, felt very limited in what they could say and with whom they could speak (Jiwani & Krawchenko, 2014). Even industry professionals preferred more flexible interviews to the rigid and strict question structure. Industry participants also did not seem comfortable with a simple question and answer structure. For this reason, I allowed them to speak freely about their experiences, probing specific questions when needed.

4.3 Interview Participants and Sampling

Seven groups (see Table 3) of interview participants were sampled, and a total of thirty-eight interviews were conducted. Most of the interviews were drawn from the groups listed in Table 3. Additional participants were drawn from Food Summit attendee lists.

Table 3: Financial Investors of the Canadian Food Strategy Listed on the CFIC website

GOVERNMENT	CORPORATE	PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATION/ OTHER ORGANIZATION	ACADEMIA
OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs)	Loblaw Companies Limited	The J.W. McConnell Family Foundation	University of Guelph
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care	Maple Leaf Foods	Metcalf Foundation	
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada	Heinz Canada	The Canadian Federation of Agriculture	
Public Health Agency of Canada	Nestlé Canada Inc.	The Heart and Stroke Foundation	
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO)	Parmalat Canada		
Government of Prince Edward Island	Cavendish Farms (Irving Group)		
Government of New Brunswick Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture and Fisheries	Cott Beverages Canada		
	McCain Foods		
	Olymel L.P.		
	Saputo Inc.		
	Deloitte & Touche LLP		
	Weston Foods		
	Cargill Limited		
	IBM Canada		
	PepsiCo Canada		
	KPMG LLP		
	Farm Credit Canada		

The first group consulted was made up of Canadian food policy experts. They were interviewed about not only the Strategy itself but about how they see the food policy process in Canada developing in the future. The second group included senior management staff working in the CBoC's CFIC directly involved in the past or present in the development of the Strategy. These participants were consulted to better

understand the process of the development of the CFS, the role different actors played within this process, and their perspectives on food policy in Canada. The third group was made up of public servants from ministries and departments financially involved in the Strategy as investors, as well as two non-financially involved departments that provided comments on the Strategy drafts. These participants were interviewed to better understand how government has positioned itself in relation to the CFS, how it was involved with the Strategy and with other investors. The fourth group included representatives of those food and non-food corporations listed as financial investors in the CFS on the CBoC's CFIC website. Industry participants were consulted to gain insight into their involvement in the CFS and the food policy process in general. The fifth group included foundations involved in the Strategy as investors. This group was interviewed to develop a more nuanced picture of the CFS and investor meetings, to gain more insight into the general ambiance, and process of the CFS. Sixth, other non-state actors who had developed Canadian food strategies were conferred with to better understand the process of the CFS by comparing it with other strategies already created, and to identify how and why these non-state actors were involved or not involved in the CFS. Lastly, major industry associations that represent companies financially involved in the Strategy were consulted to gain a deeper understanding of industry's position in the food sector and thoughts on their involvement in the CFS.

The following table outlines the abbreviations that are used for each personal communication or interview throughout the study:

Table 4: Interview Participant Abbreviations

Type of Interview Participant	Abbreviation #
Food Policy Expert	FPE 1-6
CBoC Staff/Researchers	CBoC 1-3
Government Representatives • Provincial Government • Federal Government	 PG 1- 4 FG 1-8
Industry Representatives	IND 1-7
Non-Governmental Organizations (including foundations, farmers organizations, not-for-profits, and others who developed a food strategy or policy document)	NGO 1-7
Industry Association	INDAS 1-3

This study was a qualitative investigation with multiple stakeholders included in the sample from the population listed in Table 3 and Food Summit attendee lists. As such, it used a multi-stage purposeful sampling strategy (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 115). This approach used "information-rich cases" to learn more about the CFS (Patton, 2002, p. 230). All seven social groups were sampled differently.

4.3.1 Key Informants: Canadian Food Policy Experts

Canadian food policy experts were interviewed to provide insights on the policy context within which the CFS was created. These key informants were selected through

intensity sampling (Patton, 2002, p. 234) to find the most information-rich experts in Canadian food policy to verify research findings and explore new issues (Chen, Farh & Macmillan, 1993). Intensity sampling refers to selecting information-rich (but not unusual) cases that show particular features of interest “intensely” (Patton, 2002, p. 234). Key informants were not chosen as representatives of any population, but rather as well-informed and knowledgeable individuals who were willing to share insight with the researcher (Campbell, 1955; Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993).

In this study, there was a sample of five academics, from different institutions, and one civil society member. Huber and Power (1985) suggest that knowledgeable and well-informed people can nominate key informants in a study. These experts were thus identified collaboratively with my supervisor, a food studies expert. The number of key informants sampled was based on a sample size of two to five experts that is typical of similar studies (Ashton & Ashton, 1985; Bakir, Rose & Shaham, 2005; Deery & Iverson, 2005; Wagner, Rau & Lindemann, 2010). Academics were my main key informants because of their expertise and popular use in other studies (Chen, Farh & Macmillan, 1993).

Key informants were contacted directly via email, and all accepted my invitation to participate in the study. The civil society informant interview came about through opportunistic sampling (Patton, 2002). Either my supervisor or I personally knew each one of the key informants. To mitigate any obligation of participation, participants were reminded both in my invitation email and letter that their participation was completely voluntary and would not impact any previous relationships with myself, my supervisor, or Ryerson University.

4.3.2 Senior Management Staff from the CBoC

Senior CBoC management staff at the CFIC who worked on the Strategy were considered important to this study to understand the process of the CFS development as well as to better identify corporate and public servant interviewee candidates. However, no further interviewees from government or industry were recommended by the CBoC staff, citing privacy concerns. As in the previous group, these individuals were intensity sampled (Patton, 2002, p. 234) to identify the most information-rich experts working on the CFS. Two major architects of the CFS were identified, one part of the executive board of the CBoC, and another in a lead research capacity. A third participant was identified who was also part of the executive board of CBoC when the CFS was developing. However, they were not involved in the development of the CFS themselves. Other participants in the CBoC were not considered because this sample included the most involved and most knowledgeable individuals in the CFIC. Participants were emailed directly. All three participants accepted my invitation to participate in the study.

4.3.3 Financial Investors of the CFS

Second, investors, or those organizations financially invested in the CFS, were considered as key research participants in this study. There was a total of twenty-nine financial investors in the Strategy (see Table 3 above). They were sampled using homogenous sampling (Patton, 2002, p. 235), which categorized investors into type: corporation, government, philanthropic and/or other organization and academic as shown below in Table 3. From the investor pool, the study initially focused on industry and government investors. Some additional philanthropic organizations were later

consulted to construct a fuller picture of the CFS development. Academia – in this case, the University of Guelph, doubled as a key informant from the first group consulted, and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture doubled as a non-state actor from the sixth group consulted.

4.3.4 Government Actors and "Investors"

Government investors were from departments that were food-related, meaning that their roles and responsibilities touched on food-related matters. Representatives of the government bodies financially invested in the Strategy were purposefully stratified according to financial contribution, as shown below in Table 5. Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency did not participate as investors in the CFS, because they felt that investing in the CFS would create a conflict of interest because of their role as regulators (personal communication, CBoC 2). However, because they partnered with other federal departments to provide comments on draft reports, they were included in the sampling. The Government of Prince Edward Island and the Government of New Brunswick's Department of Agriculture did not actively participate or in most cases did not attend investor meetings (personal communication, CBoC 2), and did not attend the CFIC's Food Summits. As such, these two government bodies were not pursued as interview participants for two main reasons: there were no obvious contacts to recruit from either government, and neither government had a large role in the construction of the Strategy.

Table 5 Government Investors Stratified per Amount Invested

CHAMPION INVESTORS	**PARTNER INVESTORS**	**PARTICIPANT INVESTORS**	***NON-INVESTING FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN PROVIDING COMMENTS ON REPORTS***
OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs)	Government of Prince Edward Island	Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO)	*Health Canada*
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care		Government of New Brunswick Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture and Fisheries	*Canadian Food Inspection Agency*
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada			
Public Health Agency of Canada			

Public servants from government bodies were criterion sampled in a multi-stage sample. Initially, those who spoke at the CBoC Food Summits (2012, 2013, 2014), or annual conferences, put on by the CBoC in relation to the CFIC and the Strategy, were chosen to participate in the study because it was assumed that they would be more involved in the CFS than those who came as conference delegates. If no one spoke from one of the nine government bodies, I looked for conference delegates who represented these government bodies in Food Summit participant list. The attendee lists of all three Food Summits (2012, 2013, 2014) were cross-referenced to find public servants who attended at least two of the three Summits, suggesting a deeper familiarization with the CFS than those who only attended one of the Summits or none. One to three participants were chosen from each government investing body found in Table 3 (except for in the Government of Prince Edward Island and the Government of

New Brunswick Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture and Fisheries). The preliminary round of participants depended on how many representatives from a given government body attended at least two of the Summits, and second, the point at which data saturation was reached. If more than three state representatives from one government body attended all three Summits, they were then sampled using purposeful random sampling.

However, some government representatives who attended these Summits were not always meaningfully involved in the CFS, especially if they were sent to the Summit instead of a colleague or a superior. This was determined at the point of contact, and for the most part, many of the targeted public servants on my list were well chosen. Occasionally, snowball sampling was used at the end of an interview, where I asked participants to pass on my name to others who might be important to speak with. I found that not all public servants were comfortable providing additional names to contact, and some did not wish their name to be mentioned when contacting others.

One government body was contacted through a sponsor because I was not successful at contacting participants to interview from this particular body. However, the participant I finally did get in touch with did not partake in the CFS' development or the Food Summits, which led to a very general interview. The agricultural bodies on both the provincial and federal levels of government have the highest sample size in the study because out of all the government bodies; they were most involved with the development of the CFS. These were also the bodies that had the most delegates at the Summits.

Government research participants were first approached through email. If no response was received after a few attempts, I would follow-up with a phone call. Contact information was easy to find for each targeted participant because of provincial and federal government directories. Occasionally, I found that some public servants had left the government altogether, and those individuals proved difficult to find. A total of twenty-five participants were contacted, and thirteen participated in interviews. Government bodies sampled included:

- The Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
- Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
- Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
- Public Health Agency of Canada
- Fisheries and Oceans Canada
- Canadian Food Inspection Agency
- Health Canada

Of those who did not participate, four recommended others to speak with; one said they were waiting for clearance from managers, and did not schedule an interview despite many follow-up calls and emails; five representatives agreed to an interview, but I was not able to schedule anything after several emails and phone calls; some public servants declined interviews because they could not remember much about the CFS or were too busy and did not respond. Thirteen appeared to be a sufficient number for data saturation to be achieved. This participant sample size for government interview participants was also considered sufficient given that two other qualitative studies interviewing public servants and politicians using semi-structured interviews had

samples of eight and eighteen participants respectively (Mamhidir, Kihlgren & Soerlie, 2010; Masibigiri & Nienaber, 2011). It is also important to note that interviews for this study were taking place when the Conservative government was in power and many government scientists expressed that they were being muzzled, and public servants often felt the same way. As such, the interviewing of thirteen public servants at that time was deemed methodologically sound under the circumstances.

4.3.5 Industry Investors

In addition to government bodies as investors, the CFS also had industry investors (see Table 3). This list was divided into champion investors and partner investors depending on their financial contributions to the CFS (see Table 6). Partner investors (twelve) outnumbered champion investors (five). To overcome this difference, I initially attempted to stratify the sample and further categorize it using quota sampling (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 114), where roughly a minimum of 60% of investors from each category would be targeted so to sample at least half of the category. Using the Food Summit participant list from the first (2012), second (2013), and third (2014) Summits, I made a list of all the attendees from companies that invested in the Strategy. Following Kincaid and Bright (1957), I sought elite interviews at the highest level possible, even occasionally trying to (unsuccessfully) recruit the CEOs of companies. I paid special attention to senior executives that worked with policy, corporate affairs, and government relations. They proved to be the most knowledgeable on how the Strategy fit into the overall goals of the company, and the agriculture and food policy and governance landscape in Canada. Emails were sent directly to the executives unless an executive assistant was identified, and in that case, the assistant was contacted.

Contact information proved very difficult to find. Often, I searched on LinkedIn to learn more about a potential participant that I was targeting and to determine whether they had an executive assistant. LinkedIn provided more professional information on the participant, such as the length of time working in the food industry, at a specific company, and their current position. This additional information assisted in identifying interview candidates. For example, preference was given to executives who had been at the company and in similar executive positions for several years. To ensure that I was contacting the right person, I also used LinkedIn to map connections between key people at the Conference Board and industry representatives. I found that those connected with key researchers at the CBoC were usually the ones most involved with the CFS.

Table 6 Corporate Investors Stratified per Amount Invested

CHAMPION INVESTORS	**PARTNER INVESTORS**
Loblaw Companies Limited	Cavendish Farms (Irving Group)
Maple Leaf Foods	Cott Beverages Canada
Heinz Canada	McCain Foods (Canada)
Nestlé Canada Inc.	Olymel L.P.
Parmalat Canada	Saputo Inc.
	Weston Foods
	Cargill Limited
	PepsiCo Canada
	IBM Canada
	Deloitte & Touche LLP
	KPMG LLP
	Farm Credit Canada

The bulk of the contact information of participants and their executive assistants was found by trying different Google searches. If after searching on Google, I still could not locate their contact information, I attempted to deduce the email address format of the company through a Google search (ex: firstname.lastname@nestle.ca or

firstletteroffirstname_lastname@nestle.ca). I would then follow that structure and apply it to whoever I was trying to contact in that company. Occasionally, if Google searches of email formats did not work, I attempted to send emails using different email formats, until one of them was successfully sent. Direct telephone numbers were, for the most part, impossible to find. If they were publicly available and a prospective participant was not responding after several follow-ups, I called their office and left a message.

This was, by far, the most difficult group to recruit due to the lack of contact information of desired participants, difficulties in contacting participants, and scheduling. As I began recruiting industry participants, quota sampling proved to be unrealistic. The challenge in recruiting elite industry participants had constrained my sampling to convenience sampling (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 114), where individuals who were willing to participate were included in the study. The industries sampled were:

- Loblaw Companies Limited
- Maple Leaf Foods
- Nestlé Canada Inc.
- Parmalat Canada
- Deloitte & Touche LLP
- Farm Credit Canada

Of the twenty-six industry representatives contacted, seven representatives were interviewed; one participant was interviewed once and suggested a follow-up interview so that they could gather more information, but the follow-up interview could not be scheduled; five representatives declined to participate in the study (one of whom sent an official letter from the company stating this); five representatives did not feel close

enough to the topic, or felt they had “nothing to add”; seven representatives did not respond to the invitation, two representatives agreed to the interview, but I could not schedule them because they did not respond when asked to schedule a meeting. Of the five participants who did not feel close enough to the topic, two suggested I reach out to their representing industry associations for more information. All interviews were conducted in the offices of the industry representatives, except for one, that was conducted in a local restaurant. Snowball sampling was not very useful since participants either mentioned a person who was already on my interview list or were not aware or not comfortable sharing names of other industry representatives involved with the CFS.

4.3.6 Foundations

A total of three foundations participated as investors in the development of the CFS. Initially, I did not intend to interview foundations because I perceived them to be peripheral players in the development of the CFS. However, I found that the McConnell Foundation was mentioned in several interviews, and many participants were asking whether I had already spoken with McConnell. I learned that McConnell had funded some civil society passes to attend the Food Summits organized in Toronto because members of civil society could not afford to purchase a delegate pass to participate (personal communication, NGO 2). The Metcalf Foundation was also mentioned in an interview, and I was asked whether I had interviewed someone from there. I considered these suggestions as a form of snowball sampling and had decided to interview representatives from both McConnell and Metcalf. Both were contacted through email, and both agreed to an interview. The foundations sampled included:

- McConnell Foundation
- Metcalf

4.3.7 Actors from Other Non-State Food Policy Initiatives

As mentioned in Chapter 2, over the 2005-2015 period, there were four major non-state food strategies (see Chapter 2), one of which was the CFS from the CBoC. The other three were from the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (non-paying investor) (CFA), Food Secure Canada (FSC), and the Canadian Agricultural Policy Institute (CAPI). Although CFA was the only (non-paying) investor from the group of three, all the organizations either participated in the Food Summits as delegates or spoke at the Food Summits. I thought it was important to gather the perspectives of others who had completed a similar project as the CBoC because they were able to compare the CFS process with their own. I did not use a sampling strategy with this group, choosing instead to interview all three non-state actors that had created national food strategies or policies. All three organizations were contacted via email. All three organizations agreed to be interviewed, two were completed in-person, and one was a telephone interview. The representatives from non-state organizations sampled included:

- Canadian Federation of Agriculture
- Food Secure Canada
- Canadian Agricultural Policy Institute

4.3.8 Industry Associations

Industry associations were not part of my original research participant list, because they were not investors in the CFS and did not appear to have a strong presence throughout the three Food Summits leading to the creation of the CFS. However, not only were

industry associations mentioned in some interviews, I was referred to them when some industry representatives declined to be interviewed. I considered this as snowball sampling. I thought industry associations might include some important insights about industry and their relationship with government, and industry's interests and reasoning for participating in the development of a food strategy. I used criterion sampling to identify three major industry associations that represent the industry players that invested in the CFS. The three associations were contacted through email and were all interviewed in-person. The industry associations sampled were:

- Retail Council of Canada
- Canadian Beverage Association
- Food and Consumer Products of Canada

4.4 Analysis of Data

Analysis was completed using a qualitative data analysis software, MAXQDA. Interviews were coded using two-cycle methods. The first cycle was completed using elemental methods (Saldaña, 2013) made up of both structural coding, which uses the content and concepts to create introductory codes to begin organizing data and descriptive coding which assigns a topic code to a large segment of data. Both were used as preliminary methods of coding to help break down and organize large amounts of data that are closely linked with the research questions (Saldaña, 2013). Subcoding and simultaneous coding (*ibid*) were also used to further organize data from elemental methods. The second cycle of coding consisted of both pattern coding, which identified and summarized re-occurring themes in the data, as well as focused coding which

helped identify the most frequent, significant and most analytically relevant codes in the data (*ibid*).

4.5 Research Ethics

Ethics approval from the Research Ethics Board at Ryerson University was sought before recruiting research participants. Research participants were assured of their confidentiality. It was agreed that no participant, government department or ministry, organization, or company names would be used in attributions throughout the study. Nonetheless, certain quotes or information may facilitate the uncovering of certain names, especially in a small group of participants. I have attempted to maintain confidentiality by using generic attribution within participants' respective research participant groups.

Some elite interviewees were concerned that I would have contact with the media, and almost all of them had concerns over attribution. It was decided early in the study that attribution would be very general, for example, identifying the level of government, but not the name of the ministry or department, and using a general title of the person being interviewed. For industry, only general titles of the people interviewed were used because identifying the type of industry spoken to would most likely reveal the company.

4.6 Generalizability

In conducting a qualitative study, it is difficult to claim generalizability. Generalizing a researcher's interpretation of a given phenomenon may prove to be very difficult since this is an interpretation shaped by the individual's social realities and experiences.

Generalization usually may not be possible in qualitative research because research is done in a particular place and time. However, theories may be developed as forms of generalizations of a specific social reality that help in understanding similar phenomena and situations (Maxwell, 1992, p. 293).

Maxwell (1992) suggests two forms of generalizations. The first is internal generalizability, which is "…generalizing within the community, group or institution studied to persons, events, and settings that were not directly observed or interviewed…" (p. 293). This means that the researcher is incapable of examining all situations and actors in a given study and is thus forced to generalize to a certain degree. Internal generalizability undoubtedly occurs in every study because of the physical and time constraints of given research, as well as the mere imperfection of the researcher's ability to gather objective information on the world. The second is external generalizability, which is generalizing to other actors and places not studied (Maxwell, 1992, p. 293), which do not always correspond to every study.

My study reflects internal generalizability because I have not been able to interview every possible investor that participated in the development of the CFS. However, my intent in this study was to provide insights into the way industry, government, and non-state actors function in an era where multiple state and non-state actors engage in governance and policymaking. Though not reflecting true external generalizability, I aimed to draw some common and general learnings from the CFS to other similar policy collaborations.

4.7 Methodological Limitations

This study is limited by a few methodological considerations that are unavoidable given the nature of the methods used and the limited timeframe of doctoral studies. These limitations may have adversely affected my data collection. These are listed below:

4.7.1 Elite interviews

I was able to identify a few concerns related to conducting elite interviews. First, access to elites was very difficult because of their time constraints, and because of the barriers that are put up between elites and the rest of society (Welch et al, 2002, p. 614). It was largely challenging to access elites, whether it was because of a lack of contact information, busy schedules, or no responses. Researchers admit that this is a common challenge with elite interviewing, and often, sampling strategies are compromised because of this (Welch et al, 2002). For this reason, especially with industry elites, as many people as possible were contacted in hopes of recruiting several industry elites. In the end, some of the biggest players of the CFS were recruited for interviews, though having more industry interviews would have without a doubt been beneficial to the study.

Public servants, on the other hand, were fairly open to being interviewed and generous with their time. Generally, I managed to narrow down a select number of people from each department or ministry that were involved with the CFS. However, occasionally, another participant was recommended to me that had more knowledge in the area or was better suited to speak with me on the topic. For this reason, I often ended up speaking with only one or two people at any given governmental agency, since participant's peers were usually aware that I had come in and spoken with others

in their department/ministry because they had shared this information themselves. Once this information was shared by their peers, they would often say that they have nothing more to add. This experience was particularly prevalent on the federal level. The restrictiveness of whom I could speak with at a given department decreased my sample size but may have put me in touch with the most informed participants.

Second, there were concerns with openness in elite interviews. Elites tend to speak on behalf of their corporation (Kincaid & Bright, 1957; Welch et al, 2002, p. 621). However, in this study, this was not an issue because I was not seeking the personal opinions of elite participants. Nonetheless, once I established in the interview that names and companies were not being attributed to comments, participants tended to open up more. For example, after explaining this, one senior industry executive said, “now I can take the gloves off” (personal communication, IND 7). Often, I received a mix of personal opinions and professional positions.

4.7.2 Number of Interviews

It was not possible to interview all desired participants due to time constraints of the doctoral program as well as resource limitations. This was especially relevant for industry participants. My interview period began in February 2015 and finished in October 2016. A large majority of this time was spent on recruitment and scheduling. By October 2016, I was still not able to schedule two industry participants over several months, after they had agreed to be interviewed. At that point, I decided to conclude my interviews. However, in January 2018, a food policy expert had approached me offering to discuss their experience in the CFS’ development, which I accepted as my last interview. A total of thirty-eight interview were completed.

4.7.3 Reliability and Validity

Often when conducting elite interviews, there are some extra challenges around data reliability and validity. Berry (2002) argues that to maintain reliability in elite interviews, the researcher should attempt to interview several elites, although he admits that this is easier said than done.

Generally, there are two major concerns with elite interviews. First, elite participants may not speak openly during the interview (Healey & Rawlinson, 1993). Second, Richards (1996) finds that there could be “memory failures,” especially if the participant is older, or the interview takes place sometime after the event in question. This confusion is not deliberate but may nonetheless cause reliability issues. Similarly, this would affect the validity of the data collected.

Some scholars like Morris (2009) argue that even though elite participants may not always be truthful in their interview, this is not problematic, because the interview process should be seen as a narrative that creates meaning. This suggests that even though an elite participant may not be telling the whole truth, researchers can still come to understand the perspectives of the participant through the way they interpret situations, gloss over details, or emphasize or leave out others. Berry (2002) reminds us that interview participants have no obligation to be truthful and objective in the interview. However, he continues, if an elite participant agreed to an interview, they likely had a purpose of doing so and will have something to say.

Berry (2002) notes the importance of applying many of the tips and tricks that researchers have developed over the years to counter the potential challenges with elite interviews which will help maintain validity and reliability in the study. A few measures

were enacted to maintain reliability and validity throughout the study, specifically focusing on elite interviews. I made sure to take time at the beginning of interviews to discuss attribution with the research participant. I found that once participants were notified of a very general attribution, they felt more comfortable speaking about their experiences, provided more details, and included their perspectives (as opposed to just company perspectives). Some participants were also nervous about what I was going to use and how they were being portrayed. A copy of the transcript was sent to each research participant so that they were aware of what was captured during the interview. They were also given the freedom to edit or delete any data they did not feel comfortable with. Again, I found this put the participants at ease. This was also done for reliability purposes, for any corrections needed or missing information. However, rarely did a participant react to the transcript I emailed. Only four participants reviewed the transcripts and responded with revisions. Lastly, I attempted to create rapport with the elite participants at the beginning of the interview, which included asking about their position and general but informed questions about the company and their division. I found this made elite participants more comfortable with me as the interviewer by first tackling simple, non-threatening questions before getting into others that were tied to their experiences with the CFS.

Triangulation was used to ensure the validity of data from elite and non-elite interviews. Denzin (1989) argues that a single method in a study portrays a specific angle of reality. As such, he reasons that multiple methods must be used to corroborate data. Denzin (1989) understands triangulation in qualitative research as composed of four types: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation,

methodological triangulation. Data triangulation is the use of various data points to understand a particular event. To do this, I had a set of questions I asked every participant group. This helped me piece together pieces of an event from different perspectives to create a larger picture. Similarly, if a participant shared an unverified piece of information concerning another participant in my study, I often checked with the participant in question to determine whether the information was accurate. Theory triangulation is the use of different theoretical approaches to invite different interpretations of data. This study was grounded in the understanding of governance and the changes in governing while using both the policy network approach and the multistakeholderism to understand the efficacy of the CFS. Lastly, methodological triangulation, which is the use of different methods to collect data, was achieved using multiple methods: semi-structured elite and non-elite interviews, in addition to qualitative document analysis, and non-participant observation.

Chapter 5: The Case of the Canadian Food Strategy

This chapter presents the general observations and findings from the semi-structured interviews about the case study of CBoC's CFS. Findings from five different groups of participants in the multi-stakeholder food governance network are presented: Canadian food policy experts, senior management staff from the CBoC, Financial investors of the CFS (government, industry, not-for-profit organizations), and industry associations. First, the findings present evidence that the CBoC's CFS initiative was determined to be a multi-stakeholder food governance network. Even though government was involved in this process, the findings presented in this chapter outline how the development of the CFS was a type of private governance with the goal being the development of a national policy strategy. The chapter also presents findings related to why this initiative was not seen as successful.

5.1 The Conference Board of Canada and Food Policy in Canada

The CBoC, founded in 1916, is a global research association with a business base membership. Its main purpose is to support business leaders in navigating some of the biggest issues affecting industry and to operate more effectively in society (Conference Board of Canada, n.d.). The CBoC is affiliated with the Conference Board in the United States but acts independently of it. The CBoC identifies itself as an independent, not-for-profit, objective, evidence-based, non-partisan, and non-state organization. It has defined itself as leading the way in shaping the national dialogue on important policy issues (CBoC, 2010, p. 5). The CBoC is financed through fees charged for services to public and private sector partners. The CBoC is a self-proclaimed expert in "conducting, publishing, and disseminating research; forecasting and economic analysis; helping

people network; running conferences; developing individual leadership skills; [and] building organizational capacity" (CBoC, n.d.a), specializing in economic trends, organizational performance, and public policy issues. The CBoC aims to maintain neutrality through not lobbying for particular interests (CBoC, n.d.a). Abelson (2009) classifies the CBoC as a policy research institution rather than a think tank. It is the largest policy institute in Canada and has been able to create a niche in the policy community specializing in business issues and providing knowledge to its members rather than attempting to influence the public debate through their publications (Abelson, 2009). The CBoC is also one of the most cited policy institutes in Canada (Abelson, 2009).

5.1.1 The Centre for Food in Canada (CFIC)

In 2010, the CBoC developed a research centre – the CFIC which acted as a "mini-institute"[9] within the institute. The CFIC was created to examine the "mega-issue" of food in Canada (CBoC, 2010, p. 1) by working "…closely with leaders and partners from Canada's food industry, governments, educational institutions, and other organizations to achieve its goals" (p. 2). It was established with two purposes in mind. First, it was intended to increase public awareness of the Canadian food sector and its importance to Canadians and the Canadian economy. Second, it was tasked with creating a national food strategy for Canada that would look at short and long-term approaches to Canadian food policy. The Centre's research involves four elements: "the current reality of increasing food requirements, changing consumer preferences, a highly globalized

[9] According to Lindquist (1993) CBoC's research centres act as mini institutes within the think tank.

food marketplace, and mounting environmental pressures" (CBoC, 2010, p. 6). The Centre had six guiding principles: a focus on food; a holistic vision of the greater food sector; a short-to long-term perspective; an action-oriented approach; inclusive, rigorous, and strongly independent research; and a partnership-based approach. The Centre recognized food as a mega-issue because of the way it stretches across all Canadian regions and the way it, directly and indirectly, affects the entirety of Canada's and Canadians' social and economic well-being. Despite food being a "mega-issue," the CBoC argues that food in Canada has not benefitted from a grand vision, or national strategy, that connects all aspects and players in the food system. For this reason, the CBoC's second principle was based on a holistic vision of the food sector that includes the complexities between stakeholders and issues. A short- to long-term vision was proposed that involved a one to twenty-year approach, which resulted in concrete actions and suggestions for the food industry, government, not-for-profit organizations for both the immediate, short, and long-term. Research priorities were expected to be guided by member contributions, as well as from non-member individuals and organizations. Research partnerships were sought with appropriate individuals, researchers, and organizations (CBoC, 2010).

The CFIC and its research were funded by the membership fees of investors from the public and private sector who were appealed to by the institute. These members consisted of "…businesses, government representatives, and key partners from the academic and not-for-profit sectors" (CBoC, 2010, p. 10), who pledged to invest for three years (CBoC, 2010). Investors were classified into three ranks: champion, partner, and participant investors. These ranks differed based on the

investor's annual financial contribution and consequently, their involvement in the Centre's Steering Committee, research plans, and meeting agendas. Champion investors contributed $50,000 annually, sat on the CFIC Steering Committee, and were intimately involved with CBoC staff in developing CFIC research plans and meeting agendas. Champion investors had early access to research results and had priority hosting two annual CFIC plenary meetings and other special events (CBoC, 2010). Partner investors contributed $30,000 annually, sat on the CFIC steering committee, and worked with CBoC and the champion investors in developing research plans and reviewing research progress. They had priority access to research results and were invited to host two annual CFIC plenary meetings and other special events (CBoC, 2010). Participant investors contributed $11,400 annually and sat on the CFIC steering committee. They were invited to participate in two annual CFIC meetings and other special events. They had access to detailed research results and were able to provide input on research and meeting topics (CBoC, 2010).

The purpose of having investors was three-fold. First, investors were providers of data. Industry and government actors would provide CBoC with data that CBoC would otherwise not be able to access. Second, investors were treated as committed and engaged experts in the project. Third, to generate interest beyond the actual project and see action and implementation on some of the ideas in the CFS, the CBoC had to engage some of the stakeholders that would be implementing these ideas. Recognizing that if the CBoC created the CFS on their own without any industry, government, or other input, no one would want to implement their recommendations. As such, the investors were treated as a "natural set of allies" who would act as champions of the

ideas developed in the CFS (personal communication, CBoC 1). The steering committee was described as an “advisory committee.” The steering committee was regularly asked for input on research (personal communication, CBoC 1). Another participant described the steering committee as a “governing body advisory panel” and a “board of directors,” who acted as an oversight on research, but did not make the final decisions (personal communication, CBoC 2). Other “interested stakeholders” (p. 10) such as “associations, NGOs, and non-member associations” (CBoC, 2010, p. 10) were also encouraged to contribute ideas to the Centre’s goals.

From a couple of interviews with the CBoC, it was discovered that CBoC was working on a food research centre with industry partners before the CFIC in 2008, but for unknown reasons, this initiative did not materialize (personal communication, CBoC 1). Also, one CBoC staff member discussed their own interest in food with the executive team at CBoC, and how that drove the development of a food research agenda in the organization (personal communication, CBoC 3). The participant explained that the CBoC takes on various issues every year and writes numerous reports; however, the idea for a food research agenda also came out of the policy environment. The participant here referred to a large and deadly food safety crisis coming from Maple Leaf Foods and their cold cut production (personal communication, CBoC 3).

In the second attempt to create a food research agenda at the CBoC, the Centre for Food in Canada was developed. At times participants, especially those at CBoC, were not clear on how the CFIC came about, citing both personal and organizational motivations to develop the CFIC. Some stated that it was their personal interest which spurred the research as noted above, but a different CBoC interview seemed to be

suggesting that the idea of a CFIC and the CFS came out of CBoC who then approached Loblaw,

> the President of the Conference Board, and Michael Bloom, the Vice President and head of the Centre for Food at the time, and they had been reaching out, and they had a chance and opportunity to speak to Galen Weston who was really a key figure at the time too, and was convinced by the project and expressed a need and the desire to support it, by inviting also many other large food businesses in the country, and through those networks and our own networks were able to reach out to different players setting up support for the project. (personal communication, CBoC 2)

In addition, the participant suggested that this idea was "shopped around," as some federal government representatives suggested below, to industry to see if there was interest in food policy. A federal government representative who attended CFIC investor meetings explained, contrary to what the CBoC staff member explained, that the Strategy was not always a goal of the CFIC (personal communication, FG 3). Another participant from CBoC agreed, stating that the CFIC did not always come with the idea of developing the CFS, although the CBoC participant seemed to be referring to the earlier idea of a CFIC and not the one that was developed in 2010 (personal communication, CBoC 1).

Many different interview participants identified Galen G. Weston of Loblaw[10] as the instigator of this second attempt, including a CBoC researcher who claimed that Galen Weston and Loblaw, in general, was the spark of the CFIC (personal communication, CBoC 2). One participant discussed the role of Galen Weston in the second attempt of creating a food research agenda as follows:

> I guess he'd talk to somebody who had been at it seven years ago. At the time, we hadn't expressed it as a Centre for Food in Canada; we had been talking

[10] From here on will be referred to as f

> about some centre or multi-funder initiative around food (personal communication, CBoC 1).

The participant continued, explaining that Galen Weston approached the CBoC in 2010, familiar with CBoC's earlier efforts to reignite the idea of a food research agenda at the CBoC. Galen Weston said that "he would be pleased to host a meeting and help us bring together some people from the food industry" (personal communication, CBoC 1).

At times throughout data collection, the impetus of the CFIC and the CFS was unclear, with the same participants expressing different, and at times conflicting, statements about how the CFIC came about. A CBoC participant explained that they went to speak with Galen Weston several times about the creation of the CFIC and the purposes behind it. After these meetings, he agreed to host the first meeting with about 30 producers and distributors and agreed to make the first financial contribution to the CFIC. After that, other companies followed suit because he was considered an important figure in the food sector (personal communication, CBoC 3).

This explanation of how CBoC approached Galen Weston shows how important he was in the development of the CFIC and the CFS. In some ways, he acted as a partner in the CFIC and CFS development because of his involvement in bringing investors to the table by writing a joint letter with CBoC to encourage investment from other companies (personal communication, CBoC 1). Galen Weston also provided a physical location for some of the investor meetings. Here is how one participant explained it:

> So, the plan which we initiated which we actually carried out, was to bring together a group of industry and government representatives at a meeting hosted by Galen G. Weston, at one of his business locations, I forget which one it was, but, in Toronto. (personal communication, CBoC 1)

However, a federal government representative familiar with other CBoC initiatives speculated that it was CBoC who instigated this and brought this idea to industry based on their past patterns. This government representative said:

> Well, Conference Board does try to push these things, I can see them pitching it to industry saying, “yeah that’s a good idea,” it could happen, stranger things have happened. Because it wasn’t the first time they’ve used this model, and it wasn’t the last. You know, they run into somebody at an event and say, “hey what about a food ….”, “yeah that’s a good idea,” it’s possible. (personal communication, FG 2)

After the CFIC produced the CFS in 2014, the CFIC continued to hold annual Food Summits. Nearing the end of 2014, the CBoC was “selling” the Canadian Food Observatory to new investors which was the next step in the CFIC after the CFS came out (personal communication, CBoC 2). Like in the CFIC, investors were stratified in terms of contributions (champion, lead, partner, participant). However, the threshold for membership levels was higher (the highest was $100,000 annually), a new level of investors was added (lead), and a different amount for NGOs was added at the lowest level of contribution (participant) (CBoC, 2014). Over the year, the website showed that Parmalat Canada was the only investor in the Food Observatory at the time. As such, the uptake on this second phase of the CFIC was not as meaningful as it was when the CFIC was first established and was developing the CFS. The Food Observatory’s purpose was to “monitor progress on improving food performance, spur the required changes and encourage action to make the Canadian Food Strategy a reality” (CBoC, 2014, p. 2). It was a point in time in which the CFIC conducted annual report cards to evaluate the progress of Canada as a whole, in relation to other countries, and Canadian provinces in comparison to others. At the same time, a CBoC participant

explained that since the CFS, some organizations have been coming to the CFIC to ask that some research be done on things like food waste and agricultural labour markets (personal communication, CBoC 2).

In mid-2017, the CFIC was renamed to Food Horizons Canada (FHC). It has been referred to as a forum with the objectives of advancing knowledge on key issues for stakeholders in the Canadian food sector, focus on significant food sector challenges to research future outlooks and develop scenario building, and to address issues from a short to long-term approach (CBoC, 2017). The FHC has a slightly different purpose than the CFIC, as it engages in developing an annual report card series, foresight planning, and focused research, which includes learning from international perspectives (CBoC, 2017).

5.1.2 The Canadian Food Strategy (CFS)

The CFS was a new development in the struggle for the creation of national food policy in Canada. It went beyond traditional food policy borders (i.e. food safety and agricultural policy) by including the social and environmental aspects of food (Bloom, 2014). The idea behind the Strategy was the improvement of the Canadian food system. It was based on twenty research reports developed by the CBoC with feedback from investors and benefitted from three annual Food Summits that brought together various state and non-state stakeholders, consultations, and a board of investors. The CFS is based on a pyramid involving five key elements (industry prosperity, healthy food, food safety, household food security, and environmental sustainability), from which stem strategic challenges, major goals, desired outcomes, action strategies, specific actions, metrics, and finally the actual actions of stakeholders (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: **The CBoC's Canadian Food Strategy Pyramid**



Figure 11: The CBoC's Canadian Food Strategy Pyramid. Adapted from Canadian Food Strategy by M. Bloom, 2014. Copyright [2014] by The Conference Board of Canada.

The CFS was a flexible framework that attempted to include different food system stakeholders. Though industry was quite involved with the CFS, the final report on the Strategy argued that it "…is much more than a food industry strategy, although industry has an important place in it" (Bloom, 2014, p. 3). Traditionally, more holistic or comprehensive visions of food strategies have been put forth by civil society, rather than by industry which has often been viewed by civil society actors as an obstacle in the formation of a healthy and sustainable food system. In the case of the CFS, industry financially and politically supported the Strategy.

The CFS was created because Canada lacked “a national vision for food” (Bloom, 2014, p. 4). As was explained in the document, the CFS aimed to stimulate collaboration towards common national economic, social, and environmental goals. A national food strategy would not only help address the challenges the Canadian food sector faces, but also take advantage of available opportunities (Bloom, 2014). The Strategy was envisioned as a living document acting as a framework for developing change in Canada’s food system (Bloom, 2014). The CBoC claimed that the Strategy “…takes a comprehensive approach to the issues [in the food system], linking prosperity to innovation, productivity, competitiveness, sustainability, and resilience” (Bloom, 2014, p. 3). The Strategy was completed in 2014.

The CBoC described its consultation as “large-scale” (CBoC, 2013, p. 8). The CBoC used online and live consultations with business, government, academia, associations, communities, and consumers. Live consultations were held across Canada consisting of a brief presentation and a “facilitated evaluation” of the CFS’ goals, outcomes, and actions (CBoC, 2013, p. 8). Several research reports also identify *Centre for Food in Canada’s Omnibus Canadian Food Industry Survey* and *Household Survey* as a source of data. The CBoC developed surveys to gain insight about experiences in Canada’s food system from business and households. These surveys were conducted by Forum Research. The industry survey randomly surveyed 1,186 food companies during June 23-July 22 in 2011. The household survey sampled 1,056 Canadian households between September 8-11 in 2011 (CBoC, 2013, p. 4). Some reports with methodology sections also mention the interviewing as part of data collection.

The CFS is a case of non-state food policymaking led by a non-state actor, which included the participation of some of the largest food industry players in Canada, provincial and federal governments, and other non-state actors. The development of the CFIC by the CBoC and the bringing together of both state and non-state actors is considered a multistakeholder network. It is considered multistakeholder because it brought together various state/non-state actors to find a common solution to a problem that affects every member. It is considered a network because it is a coordinated collaboration between state and non-state actors in a complex policy area.

While this initiative is a clear development of the governance era of policymaking where non-state actors enter the policymaking environment through the development of the CFS, what is more significant is that this is also an example of private governance. CBoC and, according to a few other interviews, Galen Weston from Loblaw, came together and decided to form a network of state and non-state stakeholders from the food system. CBoC was seen, at least near the beginning of the initiative, as a legitimate actor calling different state and non-state actors to the table to draft a food strategy for Canada. While this initiative cannot be considered *pure* private governance given that state actors were involved as members of the CFIC and provided feedback on the development of the CFS, this initiative does move closer to the private governance side of the governance scale (see Figure 8) because it was largely governed by non-state actors.

The CFS was not the first non-state food strategy to be created in Canada. This strategy was chosen as a case study over the other three that were created at the time because it portrayed some unique and significant qualities. The CBoC had some

advantages over other food strategy developments. First, the CBoC undertook a relatively comprehensive approach to food policy. Typically, more comprehensive approaches were developed by civil society actors, but in this case, a research institute that catered largely to industry and was supported financially by industry took on a comprehensive approach to food policy. It also had significantly more funding than other strategies, as well as industry and government buy-in. While some of the other strategies also had industry sponsors, the level of investment was nowhere near as much and as structured as in the CFS. Lastly, the CBoC had a certain level of prestige among research institutes in Canada. When the CFIC was first created, many civil society actors and others, thought that because the CBoC with the support of many big industry players was proposing a food policy, this would be the push government needed to finally develop a national food policy in Canada.

For this reason, at the outset of the initiative, there was a lot of excitement and hope that this would have a good outcome since many groups promoted the idea of a food policy for Canada. As one government representative noted,

> It was quite hopeful at the beginning; we were really happy people were paying attention. It was an issue that was floating out there, the government wasn't particularly keen on doing a food policy, but the NDP had done that cross country tour, the Liberals had come out, the People's Food Project had done something, so it was buzzing around. So, we thought oh finally, and now industry's engaged, that's a good thing (personal communication, FG 2).

Despite these favourable factors that would likely lead towards the creation and implementation of a successful national food strategy; the CBoC's CFS "fizzled out" (personal communication, FPE 3), "tapered off" (personal communication, FG 1), and "fell apart" (personal communication, NGO 5). This outcome was determined from

interviews and my own observations. The initial unique qualities of the CFS, and this subsequent “fizzling out” convinced me to study the CBoC’s development of the CFS.

As time went on, the annual Food Summits participant lists were smaller, and Summits were moved to smaller venues. Participants also noticed decreasing numbers and interests at Food Summits (personal communication, PG 1; NGO 1; FG 2; NGO 2), as well, some government representatives noted that their department was sending lower-ranking civil servants to speak at the Summits (personal communication, FG 2). Through interviews, I found that industry, government, and civil society were not happy with the way the CFS unfolded. Some participants who spoke with industry investors observed that industry was not happy with the process and the conclusion of the CFS, and many times, they threatened to pull out (personal communication FPE 1; FPE 3; FPE 5; CBoC 3; PG 1; NGO 5). One participant specifically mentioned Loblaw and Maple Leaf as dissatisfied with the process and the CFS (personal communication, PG 1). Others, in addition to industry participants, noted that they did not expect and were unhappy about the controversy that came out of the CFS (personal communication, FPE 1; NGO 3; IND 7). To the point where, one non-governmental participant said that industry was fed up and that the CFS and industry’s relationship with the CFIC became a “net liability” (personal communication, NGO 7). In addition, farmers were also perceived as unhappy with the process and the outcome of the CFS (personal communication PG 1, NGO 4).

Government also expressed dissatisfaction. Most government representatives cited the research and the misperceptions that came with it, and the outcome as something they were not happy with (personal communication, PG 1; PG 2; FG 2; FG 3;

FG 6; FG 7; FG 8). One federal government representative said, “I was just so fed up, I just trashed all my stuff… I honestly can’t remember if I finished reading the damn thing. I wasn’t impressed” (personal communication, FG 2). A food policy expert said that it seemed like the federal government did not want to touch it in the end because of all the negative press around the CFS.

Civil society actors, generally represented by NGOs, were not investors in the CFIC. It was found that they perceived the process as very problematic. Civil society also found the name “the Canadian Food Strategy” problematic, because it implied that it was a national inclusive strategy, but they felt that it was largely a Canadian food industry strategy (personal communication, FPE 5, CBoC 2; NGO 2; IND 1; FPE 6).

In addition to general dissatisfaction by different groups, many government representatives also had no desire to implement the CFS or parts of it (personal communication PG 1; PG 2; PG 3; PG 2; FG 3; FG 6; FG 7). One government representative explained that it was decided that the CFS was a “useful contribution to policy discourse and [we] kind of left it at that” (personal communication, FG 7), while another said that they might use it as part of a literature review (personal communication, PG 3). Some noted that implementation would not happen because the policy prescriptions were off in terms of what was possible jurisdictionally and/or politically. However, others admitted that what CBoC was suggesting was already happening within government (personal communication, PG 1, PG 2; PG 3). Although one non-investing government representative said that the whole CFS process encouraged them to think about their global role in food safety (personal communication, FG 4). However, a CBoC staff member explained that some groups like

the Ontario Agrifood Education Inc. were using the CFS and research reports as part of their education plans for Ontario schools (personal communication, CBoC 1). However, for the most part, the CFS was not implemented.

While CBoC seemed to have chosen a time where the political and social context were opening to the idea of national food policy, government may not have been open to the idea at the time. Government was often cited by numerous participants as not genuinely participating in the CFS. Government may also have been discouraged in their participation because the CFS failed to acknowledge several existing government policies and programs.

At times, the CFS was called unrealistic in terms of recommendations and the substance behind the Strategy. Largely it was government identifying the flaws in some of CBoC's recommendations, asserting that implementation of these recommendations is much more complex than the CBoC imagines. A big problem government found with many of the recommendations in the CFS was that the CBoC ignored the fact that food and agriculture are a shared policy jurisdiction between the federal, provincial, and at times the municipal government. As one federal government representative explained, there are federal-provincial-territorial (FPT) realities that the government must follow (personal communication, FG 6). For example, one government participant explained that for programs like a national school food program, provinces must collaborate and work together to set up such a program because that would largely fall within provincial jurisdiction. The participant continued explaining that it is not easy urging all the provinces and territories to work together (personal communication, FG 3).

Some industry association representatives had a similar outlook noting that “I think there are a number of things in here that are pretty much unworkable, and I think almost naïve” (personal communication, INDAS 3). The participant determined that the CFS is, therefore, only the beginning of a conversation but should not be taken at face value to implement any policies (personal communication, INDAS 3).

In addition to questioning the realistic and practical side of the CFS, many participants admitted that much of what the CBoC was doing with the CFS was not new. The novelty of the whole CFS initiative was questioned, in terms of whether the CBoC produced something new and unique to think about. It was largely the federal government that questioned the originality of the CFS, especially the recommendations presented. One federal government representative remarked that “It was a *really* big project, but how novel are their recommendations?” (personal communication, FG) Similarly, another noted that the recommendations presented were not much different from what government is already aware of (personal communication, FG 5). Another federal government participant reiterated this opinion citing a lack of novelty in the CFS (personal communication, FG 8).

Some federal participants explained that many of the recommendations presented in the CFS were ones the government was already doing or implementing (personal communication, FG 1; FG 3; FG 5; FG 7). Some civil servants said that often, the CBoC left out many programs and policies that the federal government had implemented, which likely resulted in the lack of novelty surrounding the recommendations (personal communication, FG 6).

An industry participant agreed with government's comments around the lack of novelties in the CFS. S/he said, "But I'm not sure that my world was rocked in any particular way as a part of that process [of the CFS development]" (personal communication, IND 5). Likewise, a representative from an industry association said, "around things like food safety and health and wellness to use the two examples, it confirmed things that we knew" (personal communication, INDAS 1).

Furthermore, as the CFS process continued, I noticed that certain investor names were not being included in research reports. More importantly, some investor names were not included in the final strategy: (as champion investors) the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, and the Public Health Agency of Canada, (as partner investors) Cargill Canada, Government of Prince Edward Island, (as participant investors) the J.W. McConnell Foundation, the Metcalf Foundation, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, (and as participants) the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Another prominent government department noted that there was a big debate around keeping their name on documents coming out of the CFIC but ultimately decided that they should keep their name on to continue providing recommendations and to avoid bringing attention to a big change (personal communication FG 2; FG 6). Other government representatives said that they took their name off the final document because of several reasons: the CBoC's mediocre research and analysis, the CBoC's ideological bias in reports, the lack of inclusion of other perspectives in reports (including the government's), and exclusion of the government's input in reports. These government bodies did not want to be seen as endorsing their research and recommendations (personal communication, PG 1; PG 3;

FG 1; FG 3). Supply management was deemed a very sensitive issue by government and other groups who decided to take their names off reports and the CFS.

After the CFS was released and the CBoC began its newest phase of the CFIC, the Food Observatory, only one company, Parmalat, was listed as an investor in the CFIC website. The CBoC requested more money from CFS investors to continue funding the CFIC and the Food Observatory. Some government participants revealed that their ministry/department did not invest in the Food Observatory because of issues they had with the process and outcome of the CFIC earlier. Others noted that the subsequent phase of the Food Observatory was a conflict of interest for them since they would be funding their own evaluation, and others said that they did not see this as a useful investment anymore and would remain only as observers (personal communication, PG 1; PG 3; FG 3). One industry participant explained that the person in their company that was interested in this and sparked their involved in the CFIC was no longer working on the same file and moved on (personal communication, IND 5), while another admitted that they were not sure of the ongoing purpose of the CFIC and were funding other projects (personal communication, IND 7).

For these reasons, I argue that the CFS was not considered a successful alternative policy development process by its participants, as well as by others not invested in the CFIC. This was determined by the reductions in number and stature of those attending the annual Food Summits as evidenced by shorter delegate lists; a dissatisfaction with the CBoC's CFIC and the CFS; a general dissatisfaction felt by many different groups involved in the CFIC; no implementation plans from many government bodies and other investors; many investors not including their names on

research reports and the CFS; many investors pulling out of the CFIC as investors after the CFS was released; and less interest in the subsequent phase of the CFIC as evidenced by a lack of investment by industry. My research inquiry focuses on why this effort was not considered a success by its participants which led me to look at a variety of literatures having to do with food policy itself and the development of policy between state and non-state actors.

Chapter 6: The Complexity of Food Policy in Canada Demonstrated by the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy

Using the CBoC's CFS as a case to look at the complexity of food policy in general and in Canada, this chapter discusses key themes identified through interviews which help address my main research questions:

- What are some unique characteristics of multistakeholder networks in the policymaking process?
    - Why did the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy as a multistakeholder governance network policy development process fail?
    - What lessons does the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy initiative provide in terms of multistakeholder policymaking?

As was determined in the previous chapter, the CFS case has been labeled as an unsuccessful attempt at private governance in food policymaking in Canada. In addition to this general finding, three major themes were identified:

1. The complexity of food policy as a barrier to policy development
2. Government's role in food policymaking
3. Unique opportunities and challenges in multistakeholder governance networks

6.1 The Complexity of Food Policy in Canada as a Barrier to Policy Development

This theme explores some of the difficulties many research participants encountered during the CFS process as they relate to food policy. The complexity of food policy was a common thread discussed throughout several interviews from different participant groups. A few different sub-themes emerged when discussing food policy throughout the interview process:

1. Food policy fragmentation: policy areas and jurisdictions

2. Questioning the need for a national food policy
3. Disjointed knowledge and expertise
4. Conflicting policy and governance values

These subthemes are explored below.

6.1.1 Food Policy Fragmentation: Policy Areas and Jurisdictions

Food policy, because of its vastness and reach into different policy areas, crosses multiple levels of government, and touches some policy sectors that are shared between the three levels of government. This fragmentation occurs on two levels: in policy areas, and different levels of government. This section shows some participant discussions related to food policy as a blended policy area, and the jurisdictional complexities in Canadian policymaking.

A few participants discussed food policy as something that stretches across several policy domains. Generally, as one food policy expert noted, Canada does have policies that touch food policy areas; however, the problem is that these policies function in isolation. They are not connected in a way that would enable an integrated look at food issues. There are only “component pieces,” like agriculture which is the most prominent, but we also have social policies and waste management policies, nutrition policies, and labour policies that do not intersect with food. Each one of these policies occupies its own “sphere” (personal communication, FPE 1).

Another food policy expert stated that Canada does not have a food policy, because government does not recognize food as a policy, meaning that it does not take an integrated approach to all the policies relating to the food system (personal communication, FPE 2).

A senior industry executive identified Canada's general lack of national strategies for many sectors, including an industrial strategy, a mining strategy and an energy strategy. The participant blamed the diverse interests of provincial governments across the country, which makes it extremely difficult to find a common voice (personal communication, IND 3).

However, taking a broader approach beyond the typical policy siloes as the CFS did, was also not always considered a good approach. A government player discussed the sheer size of the CFS and how unlikely it is that the strategy will be implemented. There were too many things included in the Strategy and too many actors involved in the food system in general, making this a very complex undertaking that was not actually reflected in the CFS,

> The problem with a national strategy is that there are so many issues covered by that national strategy, you're never going to get agreement from everybody – being this idea that all it takes is this articulation of a grand plan to move forward, it's not quite as simple as that, so I think, it's what we got from the Conference Board is a helpful contribution, but we shouldn't think that they're going to create some kind of federal, provincial, local, global industry, consumers, NGO kind of grand bargain – that's simply, probably too ambitious from what the Conference Board can do. (personal communication, FG 7)

Another type of fragmentation identified by participants was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional fragmentation is the complexities involved in multi-level government policymaking. In Canada, there are three levels of government involved in different policies. Some participants brought attention to food policy's complexity because of the fragmented policymaking approach in multi-level governance in Canada. A food policy expert explained that because of these jurisdictional complications, there are substantial challenges to developing a Canadian food policy because each layer of government is

responsible for food policy in some aspect. As such, food policy would have to involve every jurisdiction (personal communication, FPE 5).

A participant from the CBoC reinforced this idea about the different policy areas involved in food policy, explaining that these different areas in government do not "speak strategically around food," which is why the CBoC thought that Canada needed a national food strategy (personal communication, CBoC 2). The CBoC participant continued, noting that there are several complexities involved in food policymaking because of multi-level governing in Canada, which creates a lack of communication between different departments, ministries, and levels of government when developing food policy (personal communication, CBoC 2). When looking at the CFS document, the CBoC explains that the CFS exists because food is a big part of Canadians' lives, but the approach to food in Canada has been very piecemeal:

> Food powerfully affects the economy, jobs, lifestyles, health and wellbeing, communities, and the environment. Yet, the opportunities and challenges of food have not been addressed comprehensively in Canada. Approaches to food opportunities and issues have largely been made in isolation—tactical rather than strategic—limiting their impact and value. (Bloom, 2014, p. 4)

Policy fragmentation was identified on two levels by participants: on a policy level and a jurisdictional level. Food policy stretches across several policy domains which are treated separately, and often, these policy domains are scattered across different jurisdictions. This double fragmentation is a complexity that impedes an integrated food policy in Canada. A food policy, however, requires that these different policy domains and jurisdictions are integrated and connected between policy areas and levels of government.

6.1.2 Questioning the Need for a National Food Policy

In addition to the two types of fragmentation identified by participants as a challenge in food policymaking in Canada, not all stakeholders were convinced of the need for a national food policy which became apparent when participants explained why they joined the CFIC. At the outset of my research, I assumed that everyone involved was in support of a nationally integrated food policy because most participants interviewed were part of the development of the Canadian Food Strategy. One non-governmental participant who previously developed a national food strategy agreed with my assumption (personal communication, NGO 1). However, some comments suggested that not every participant believed in the development of a national food strategy and had other motivations for investing in the Strategy.

A CBoC participant noted the challenges which arose when not everyone understood the need for a strategy in Canada. Many people were unhappy, and there was much disagreement over what a food strategy is and whether it is needed. The participant suggested that more education was needed to help people realize the necessity of a national food strategy (personal communication, CBoC 2). One non-governmental participant, who had also developed a national food strategy commented that “To this day, I don’t think there’s huge consensus on the need for a national food strategy” (personal communication, NGO 4). They continued to describe their own challenges when developing their food strategy, admitting that they also did not experience uniform agreement and enthusiasm across the country for their own strategy, because different regions of the country had different interests, purposes, and ideas of what a Canadian food strategy should be (personal communication, NGO 4). The participant continued suggesting that many CFS industry participants joined the

initiative because they were coerced by Loblaw, who was perceived to be one of the drivers of the CFS (personal communication, NGO 4).

An industry participant echoed this hunch by stating that their involvement was not only because they wanted to be at the table, but also because Loblaw, a very important customer of theirs, was part of it (personal communication, IND 3). Some industry players also identified reasons for their company's involvement in the CFIC. Many of them said that the CBoC approached them and asked them to invest in the CFIC (personal communication, IND 2). Another industry participant said something similar, recalling that Anne Golden from CBoC called first and spoke with the company CEO who then decided that the CFIC and the CFS was a good idea (personal communication, IND 7). One more industry participant explained that their company already had a former relationship with the CBoC and worked with them before, as customers and as co-researchers. The company's preceding CEO had previously been on the Executive Board of the CBoC. However, it was the encouragement of a common partner on the Executive Board that convinced them to become involved in the CFIC (personal communication, IND 5). One industry investor also mentioned that another reason they invested in the development of the CFS was because there just simply was no other place to develop a national food strategy, suggesting that an industry association would not undertake a project like this because it is not part of their mandate and they represent diverse industry actors (personal communication, IND 7). An industry participant admitted that some participants paid attention to whether industry players were already participating in the CFS, like Loblaw, it may have

discouraged other similar players from investing in the initiative as well, suggesting a territoriality issue,

> we were the only retailer at this [referring to Conference Board]. You can figure that out for yourself, we were the first ones in, it was like if you've got us, you don't need the other guys, and nobody complained, nobody from Sobeys or Metro said "we want in", they just had an interest in what was growing, and that information was more or less fed them as it came out. (personal communication, IND 7)

Federal government representatives agreed with this idea, one noting that, for example,

> if I'm Maple Leaf Foods, and I see Loblaws, one of my biggest customers putting their money in, I'm going to pay to play, I'm going to try to influence outcomes. (personal communication, FG 1)

Here the government representative suggested that other companies who have an important business relationship with Loblaw were coerced by this relationship to participate in the CFIC and attempted to influence its results.

Even though the organization in question had a more homogenous member base than the investors of the CFS, the participant described the difficulty in trying to get everyone on board to think about the need for a national food strategy. The other challenge was the agreement on one direction for food policy, as another non-governmental participant explained: "food" is a really big and complex policy topic, and it is very difficult to try to distill this into a manageable piece which opens up possibilities for disagreements over the different approaches of how you get to that point (personal communication, NGO 5).

A few participants discussed the lack of a defined problem in the CFS. For this reason, as well, many questioned the need for the CFS because the CBoC did not identify a problem needing a solution. One food policy expert weighed in on this issue. While reading the CFS introduction right before our interview, s/he noticed a few things.

First, the participant noticed that the CBoC did not clearly outline in the CFS document why a food system change was needed in Canada (personal communication, FPE 4). S/he also noticed the lack of a destination in the CFS, remarking that there was no discussion around what the CBoC envisioned for Canada's food system,

The CFS describes the document as,

> The Canadian Food Strategy is a comprehensive, action-oriented framework to guide and stimulate change in food and the food system. It has been developed from a conviction that changing our nation's food system is both an opportunity and an imperative. It also stems from a sense that real change requires a framework broad and flexible enough to include every stakeholder, without being prescriptive. The Strategy is intentionally aspirational, driven by an optimism about our future—but it is an optimism tested empirically against the reality of our capacities and our understanding of this country's potential (Bloom, 2014, p. 1).

We see that from these excerpts from the CFS, the food policy expert brings attention to a real problem in the CFS: the "food problem" is not identified. The document only mentions a lack of comprehensiveness when addressing food issues. Because there were no clear definitions of the "food problem," the food policy expert questioned the path the CFS developed for itself, noting that it was unclear why the CFS was needed and what the envisioned goals were in the Strategy. Similarly, a government representative observed the lack of a defined problem in the Strategy, explaining that having a clear problem is vital to make a policy document relevant and attractive to policymakers (personal communication, FG 2).

The need for a national food policy was thus not an agreed-upon path by the stakeholders involved in the CFIC and the CFS' development. Their participation did not occur because not everyone was convinced of the need for the CFS. The participation of some stakeholders in the CFS seemed to converge around reasons beyond a commonly understood "food problem." In addition, there was disagreement over what a

national food strategy should look like, which was exacerbated by the lack of problem definition in the CFS document itself.

6.1.3 Disjointed Knowledge and Expertise in the Food System

What further complicates the development of national food policy in Canada is the varying knowledge and expertise embedded in different stakeholders of the food system. The complexity of food policy in terms of knowledge and expertise required to understand it was a common thread found throughout interviews. One senior vice-president from industry reflected for a moment during the interview about why there might be no food policy in Canada given its economic importance in the country, remarking that it is because food policy is so “multi-pronged and complicated” (personal communication, IND 2).

One food policy expert described the complicated policy as also involving many different actors and interests throughout the system and value-chain, explaining that “it gets to be a pretty complicated mishmash” (personal communication, FPE 5). A non-governmental representative of an organization who developed a different national food strategy also touched on the challenge of developing food policy because of the different players involved. The participant used the analogy of different trains on the same track,

> there’s so many different trains going down that track, there’s a health train, a Growing Forward train [referring to Canada’s agri-food strategy], international trade train, and each have different timelines and bring in a whole lot of other players (personal communication, NGO 1).

A provincial government representative explained this complexity and the challenges around the knowledge of food policy. They found that knowledge on this topic is also challenging because different ministries and different stakeholders hold different

knowledge, implying that this information is usually not shared or discussed. The participant explained that the interconnections required in food policy are very new for government,

> I think we've started to wrestle with more and more. I think we haven't really got our heads around that yet. The fact that food policy does affect so many different ministries, levels of government, different stakeholder groups, it's really challenging, it makes moving forward very difficult. Even that prioritization exercise becomes really difficult. (personal communication, PG 2)

A non-governmental actor who developed a food policy document also recognized this complexity. The participant admitted that when they first began looking at food, they were not aware of its complexity, its broad policy reach, and the number of different perspectives involved (personal communication, NGO 1). Many participants suggested that CBoC was not fully aware of the complexity involved in food policy when they first set out to do food research. In the beginning, CBoC did not have any food researchers or people specializing in food studies of any kind, until later in the process when they hired a food researcher who was more aware of the complexities and intricacies involved in food systems and food policy. Government was especially critical of the lack of expertise of the CBoC, which will be explored later in the chapter.

Food policy therefore becomes quite large and complex because it encompasses many policy areas, policy actors, and different levels of government. Each policy actor has specific knowledge and expertise on certain aspects of the system, and quite often, these knowledges are not shared between different actors. As such, the knowledge and expertise needed to develop an integrated national food policy are parceled out between different stakeholders and government bodies who are not always willing to collaborate and share information.

6.1.4 Conflicting Policy and Governance Values in the Food System

In addition to policy and jurisdictional fragmentation, disconnected knowledge and expertise, food policy is also very political and value-laden. This is because there are many stakeholders and government bodies with a distinctive purpose behind their participation in the food sector, which translate into different interests. There are many differences in terms of how food policy should look like between these stakeholders, but there also exist common goals that many stakeholders can agree on.

Some participants described what might be differences in values and ideologies that would cause disagreements. For example, one provincial government representative touched on the diverging values between approaches to food production, reflecting rural versus urban interests (personal communication, PG 1). As one non-governmental participant put it, “there’s just so many people with so many divergent views” (personal communication, NGO 4), s/he continued, “It’s a very complicated industry, and there’s thousands and thousands and thousands of players in it, each with completely different interests and priorities…” (personal communication, NGO 4). The current food system, as a food policy expert described, is still “conducted” and “dominated” by many of the same interests, however, more recently, civil society interests have entered the arena as new actors with differing values (personal communication, FPE 3).

An industry representative noted that during the development of the CFS, he noticed that different investors were interested in different aspects of the CFS. These interests aligned with their own viewpoints and needs, not considering a “country-wide, community-wide policy framework” Canadian view of food (personal communication, IND 5). However, s/he also stated that given the number of different actors and interests

on the table, it was difficult to create a solution that reflected everyone's vision and goals. The participant explained that "The beauty of diverse opinion is that in theory, you create the most acceptable and the best solution to the stakeholders' problem, but sometimes that also does require enough compromise to make the solution less impactful" (personal communication, IND 5).

One food policy expert said a bit more on the topic of civil society entering the food arena. The participant stated that many NGOs and other civil society organizations (CSOs) tend to disagree in terms of how the food system should look not only with big food but also with farmers and farm organizations. As such, it makes it difficult to include everyone at the table, but also have everyone talk to each other. The participant said, "I fear that there's been more movement toward the various groups differentiating from another than trying to look for commonality" (personal communication, FPE 5).

Some non-governmental actors also agreed, mentioning that there were a lot of overarching goals people could have agreed on, likely more than one would think. However, the devil was always in the details in terms of how to approach these goals (personal communication, NGO 5). Another mentioned, "The funny thing is, is we can all agree, no matter where you are in the sector, it's a bad idea to not have a strategy" (personal communication, NGO 7).

Some participants discussed high-level ideas as easy things to agree upon. A participant from the CBoC observed that "There's agreement at the higher aspirational level. There's agreement on the outcomes usually, at the sublevel, but then you get into specifics" (personal communication, CBoC 2), suggesting again, that the devil is in the details.

A food policy expert commented more abstractly and explained the importance of finding common ground and approaching food policy incrementally rather than trying to get everything on the table right away. The participant identified some common ground principles that everyone could agree on, for example, food safety, health, food waste, and to some extent, local food. S/he continued, explaining why it is particularly important to identify commonalities between different stakeholders, noting that it provides some building blocks to create a good foundation for multistakeholder initiatives,

> it could be that there are conundrums that just a few players are worried about, and, and it could be that all the other players are indifferent, so conundrum A may really be a bee in the bonnet for 2 or 3 or 4 participants, and everyone else could be really indifferent. So, we could say, ok well that's an issue for you folks, you're the ones who should work that out, and the rest of us will just sit back and see what you come up with… maybe that's part of what needs to be done too, figure out who's worried about what, and really engage the people on the conundrums that are where they have an issue. I think there are quite a few things where people would be indifferent (personal communication, FPE 5).

A non-governmental actor who also developed a national food strategy reiterated the idea that it is important to find common agreement on high-level ideas, which then could be broken down into components and worked on separately (personal communication, NGO 5). S/he said that the most important part of developing a strategy is once you have agreement on those high-level abstract principles – where do you go from there? What are the next steps that are crucial to keeping that collaboration alive? (personal communication, NGO 5).

However, the participant continued to explain that these disagreements often end up being the focus of *all* food policy thinking. Differences are emphasized, even though

there are many common and intersecting interests that could form the basis of progression in food policy thinking (personal communication, FPE 5).

To summarize, there are different approaches to food policy because of the interests and values of numerous stakeholders involved in the food system. Their interests and values are reflected in the purpose of their participation in the system and what they would like to see in a food policy.

6.1.5 Summary

This theme explored the complexities involved in food policymaking in Canada as barriers to developing food policy in Canada. Four themes were explored. First, food policy was identified as being fragmented on two levels: policy areas and jurisdictions. Food policy spans across many different policy domains as well as levels of government in Canada. Second, there was no consensus among the CFS participants on the need for a national food strategy; different players joined the CFIC for different reasons. Third, the knowledge and expertise required to develop an integrated national food policy were found to be split between different stakeholders in the food system, each holding key components of knowledge and expertise separately, and not always willing to share information and collaborate. Lastly, food policy was found to be very political and value-laden. Each stakeholder participates in the food system for a specific purpose nested in their own values and interests. For this reason, there are many disagreements when trying to develop food policy. Often these differences are emphasized, but some participants expressed that it is vital that many of the high-level common goals between stakeholders are emphasized instead.

6.2 Government's Role in Food Policymaking

There are many actors involved in food policy, and this calls into question the role of government when developing food policy. Should government be at the forefront of food policy development, or just one of the many actors collaborating to develop the policy? This section explores my discussions with participants and their perspectives on the role of the state, specifically in food policymaking, based on their experience with the CBoC's CFS.

The CFS was led and developed by the CBoC, a non-state actor. It also had several other investors who participated in the development of the CFS. Although seven were from the provincial or federal government, the majority were industry (personal communication, FG 5), or NGOs (personal communication, NGO 3). For this reason, at the outset of my research, I began with the assumption that this was a private governance initiative spearheaded in partnership by industry and CBoC. However, when I began my interviews, I realized this was not the case. Many different groups of participants, including industry, were calling for the inclusion of government in food policymaking.

My interviews revealed that no one was suggesting that food policy be undertaken by industry alone. They generally suggested the (increased) participation of government in food policy in Canada. Many believed that government ought to support the development of food policy. Industry and industry association representatives argued that government must begin looking at food as an important policy issue in Canada and take responsibility and support others working in that policy area. One industry representative discussed the complexity of food policy noting that government

is reluctant to tackle such a political issue, but ultimately, to develop this policy, political momentum is crucial, and it is something Canada has not had (personal communication, IND 5).

Generally, government's participation was discussed in two different ways which had implications for the type of governance sought by certain participants. There were two approaches identified:

1. Government as metagovernor of food policy
2. Government as a leader in food policy

6.2.1 Government as "Metagovernor"

Some participants recognized that while there may be different actors involved in food policy, government should take on a special role as the manager and convenor of a network. Government as a "metagovernor" occurs when government acts as the manager of a group of stakeholders involved in policymaking. Here, government is a facilitator and bridges ideas between different stakeholders. Government is likely the actor bringing everyone to the food policymaking table, and while it consults with everyone, it also develops the policy with the stakeholders involved.

An industry association representative acknowledged that government has many policy priorities and groups vying for attention looking to push ideas and policies through. The participant argued that while government should support and acknowledge food's importance, it is also up to industry and others in the sector to voice the importance of food policy to government and support the food sector (personal communication, INDAS 3). Furthermore, the participant remarked that government could bring these different groups in the food sector together (personal communication,

INDAS 3). One industry representative suggested a roundtable that could potentially still be led by CBoC, focusing on a couple of priorities in the Canadian food system. When probed further about who would lead the roundtable and how, the participant suggested a partnership between industry and government leading the roundtable together, but ultimately said: “you’re going to need government, no doubt about it” (personal communication, IND 4). A CBoC researcher also noted government’s role as an actor that facilitates and bridges support between different actors but continues to be there as a general funder and investor, which is ultimately the only role that was played by government in the CBoC’s CFS (personal communication, CBoC 2). Civil society saw government as the bridge between actors as well, functioning as the glue between all actors and interests, a connector for everyone that can forge a common policy from everyone’s goals and interests, weaving together different pieces (personal communication, NGO 2). The civil society representative continued, explaining that because there are different pieces of the story, you need a special actor, like government, involved to connect all of them,

> None of them is complete in and of themselves, but you need some kind of intermediary to help weave all of those pieces together, negotiate which one of them is going to take precedence and on what issue. (personal communication, NGO 2)

Another non-governmental representative who had also created their own food strategy stated that government is the only “legitimate interlocutor” between different organizations and actors in the food sector. Convening everyone around the table to build consensus and basic frameworks or ideas is the role of government. The participant noted that convening different people together to find common agreed-upon

ideas should have happened a long time ago, “this is not revolution; this is common sense” (personal communication, NGO 7).

A representative of the provincial government briefly discussed government sometimes struggling to involve itself in an industry initiative. Some of my research participants, namely a CBoC participant, claimed that government wants industry to lead in policy and governance. When asked about this and the general government-industry relationship, the government participant shared some frustrations. S/he noted that government tends to be treated as strictly a funder but would rather be treated as a partner with industry, helping develop an initiative or a strategy together. In the last five years, many civil servants have been questioning the right role of government in such initiatives (personal communication, PG 2). S/he explained that government as a partner would include government as an active supporter in industry initiatives where it could help define the problem and commit resources to a particular case (personal communication, PG 2).

This provincial government representative, like the industry representative before, suggested that government should be involved in policymaking and governance, not as a passive participant at the “table” or funder, but as an active partner, working alongside industry. Thus, government as a metagovernor, has a very strong role in food policy development; however, it acts as a facilitator and “bridge maker” between the different voices in the food system while developing the food policy.

6.2.2 Government as a Leader

When government is a leader of a policy initiative, it initiates the policy development process. There are no other leaders or partnerships. In this case, government calls

different actors to the table to consult and discuss with them what food policy should look like.

Some industry and non-governmental participants went a step further than others and acknowledged that government should not just manage a network of actors interested in food policy but should lead that network. It was shown through interviews, that many participants thought that food policy should only be led by the state. Other participants acknowledged that government not only must support but prioritize food policy. S/he explained that “government has to take a stronger role in the sense of making it a priority, putting it on the agenda, bringing the right people together, and it doesn’t seem like that’s happened”, not just participating in the conversation, but being a big promoter and advocate of food policy in Canada (personal communication, IND 2). The participant is from the processing sector and unsurprisingly mentioned that s/he would like to see food production, in general, be given a priority, not just the production that happens on the farm. S/he acknowledged that the CFS felt as if it was developed by and belonged to the CBoC. It did not feel as if government played a role in its development or promoted it. S/he also referred to other countries that take food policy more seriously, suggesting that the Canadian government should do so as well.

A food policy expert noted that many thought that the CFS process should have been led by the federal government given that they are largely responsible for the food policymaking mandate, adding that they would be able to bring everyone together,

> Quite a few people argue that it should have been government, particularly the federal government that initiated such a process, because if there is to be a national food policy, it’s reasonable that it would be the federal government that would want to bring everyone together, they’re the ones with the national mandate and it would seem that it would be in their interest. (personal communication, FPE 5)

However, a CBoC researcher felt that because of government inaction on this policy file and industry uncertainty, the CBoC felt the need to step in and convene these different actors, including government to discuss the development of a national food policy. Although the CBoC research participant did acknowledge that many thought that it was government's true role in formulating a strategy and convening these different actors (personal communication, CBoC 2).

One industry representative was very adamant about government leading the charge on food policy in Canada. S/he admitted that while industry can bring people together, ultimately government is needed. The participant claimed that "The federal government was at the table, but government needs to lead the change" (personal communication, IND 1). S/he continued:

> I think that ultimately if one is going to look at a model moving forward, from a high-level policy point of view, retailers can do that type of engagement, but it ultimately needs a very definitive commitment on government that they will support it - and actually in a sense, they have to be prepared to be equal partners, if not lead the charge… (personal communication, IND 1).

Here, the industry participant suggested that industry can engage other actors to discuss food policy, but it will not have the same effect as if government led the policy development. However, s/he continues noting that to get full support and buy-in from a broader audience, it must be government who leads the charge in this aspect (personal communication, IND 1). The participant also mentioned the importance of the federal government, leading this to engage provincial governments who also must play a key role in Canadian food policy (personal communication, IND 1). S/he emphasized that "it's got to have government, key government leadership. Not government engagement, it needs government leadership" (personal communication, IND 1).

Another industry representative reiterated the need for government as a leader and common denominator for every actor involved. S/he explained that industry could not and should not be the leader of a national food policy initiative because each industry player has their own interests and goals behind food policy. Again, government is needed to house and convene all interests and weave a common path for everyone. This suggests that government is needed to act as a neutral leader that can invite different interests to the policy table. S/he explains,

> …left to its own, industry will go down these various paths, but if you're really wanting to get common indicators of success, or common parameters, or common regulatory standards to address a market dysfunction, only government can do that (personal communication, IND 3).

A non-governmental representative who also had created their own strategy stressed the need for political champions in both the federal and provincial government who would lead and maintain the importance of food policy creation. This underlined the need for a government leader in the food policy realm (personal communication, NGO 4). Similarly, an industry representative argued that government must be at the table developing this policy, and again acting as a special actor that can mould discussions into programming and policy, only after this is done, should other actors join the conversation. The participant noted that,

> without government at the table it's [discussing policy development] kind of meaningless. Government has to help shape that kind of discussions and presumably put horsepower behind it in terms of program funding, perhaps some regulatory standards, whatever it's going to be, and then that might be a place when CAPI could come to the table, Conference Board come to the table, you know, federal government would have to be very inclusive, and then see where it goes. (personal communication, IND 3)

The participant also brought up FSC's idea of a national food policy council. S/he recognized this as a good idea. S/he explained that this would be an entity existing

outside of government and include leading experts from the food sector and a secretariat that does research and builds consensus, taking on a similar format to the former National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (personal communication, IND 3).

6.2.3 Summary

The theme explored above discussed the role of government in the development of food policy in Canada. Generally, all participants noted that government must have increased involvement in the development of the food policy. Two different approaches were identified through interviews: government as" metagovernor," and government as a leader.

"Government as a metagovernor" acts as a convenor and manager of a group of state and non-state actors involved in food policymaking. With so many different interests and values of stakeholders in the food system, and understandings of the food problem, as a metagovernor, government is the glue that binds these interests, values, and problem definitions together to come up with a policy in which everyone sees themselves.

"Government as a leader" puts government in charge of developing the policy and "writing the story." Other non-state actors are invited to the table to consult and share their perspectives on the matter, but ultimately, it is government developing this policy, because only it has the legitimacy to this.

6.3 Opportunities and Challenges in Multistakeholder Governance Networks: Structure, Process, and Actors in the Canadian Food Strategy

Many opportunities and challenges surfaced throughout the development of the CFS, which can be lessons for future multistakeholder food governance networks. The data collected and presented in this section centres on participants discussing their experience with the development of the CFS. Strengths and weaknesses of the development of the CFS were emphasized by many participants. The subthemes that emerged from these discussions were organized by drawing on theoretical discussions explored in Chapter 3. They were grouped into three components, making up a network and contributing to its policy outcome(s): structure, actors, and process.

Structure refers to the "bones" of the CFS project, the boundaries that were set up by the CBoC in order for this project to move forward. The actors involve the CBoC, the investors, and the relationships between them. Lastly, the process is the actions that created the CFS. The process of developing the CFS was a popular topic of discussion among research participants. Process is discussed as a significant characteristic that is often overlooked by network scholars. The following section examines themes discussed by interview participants that identify the three different characteristics contributing to the outcomes of a multistakeholder network. I begin with structure, then move on to actors, and finally ending with process.

6.3.1 The Structure of the CFS

Structure involves the design of the initiative and the boundaries and makeup of the initiative. There were two main themes discussed around the structure of the CFS initiative: the size of the CFS both physically and "intellectually", the beginning of the

CFS grounded in the relationship between Loblaw and the CBoC, and the “pay to play” structure that was created by the CBoC to attract investors in the CFS.

6.3.1.1 Physical and “Intellectual” Size of the CFS

Many participants criticized the setup or structure of the CFS, arguing that it impacted how it unfolded. Some of the biggest criticisms around the structure of the CFS was how big, broad, complicated, and unfocused it was. While most if not all participants acknowledged the complexity of food, many seemed to think that a successful strategy required focused and high-level thinking rather than detailed policy solutions.

Many government participants expressed frustration at the complexity of policy solutions to the food system in the final CFS document. Some provincial representatives noted the number of different objectives and goals that made the strategy too complex, explaining that a strategy has to be short and simple (personal communication, PG 1; PG 2). One of the participants was critical, observing that rather than the CFS taking three years to complete, it took four because CBoC made the CFS too broad and had too many reports that needed to be re-written after investor feedback (personal communication, PG 1). The participant explained that trying to cover too many issues to do with food hurt the CFS in the end because it became too complex and CBoC, without the skills needed, could not converge all the different policy areas involved in food (personal communication, PG 1). Another provincial government participant explained that there is a need to carve the CFS into workable policy pieces, perhaps refining it down to three to five policy priorities (personal communication, PG 2). Another provincial representative reiterated the same idea acknowledging that no one will be acting on the recommendations CBoC provided in the CFS because there are too many

of them (personal communication, PG 3). As such, every time, with every report, the confidence in Conference Board to bring different players together to a unified position was completely lost. The strategy became too complex, too big, with too many people at the table (personal communication, PG 1). The participant perceived that it became difficult to balance the actors involved and react to them based on the differing amounts of money they contributed (personal communication, PG 1). The federal government's sentiments resonated with the provincial government's comments. One federal participant noted that it was too ambitious (personal communication, FG 3) which seemed to have incited disinterest from government once they saw how broad the strategy became.

Industry investors agreed. They generally thought that the CFS became overly ambitious and broad. One noted that because of this, "we would've done it differently if we did it ourselves" (personal communication, IND 5). One food industry participant explained that they had too many priorities, and it ended up a bit like "boiling the ocean" (personal communication, IND 2). Another industry actor identified the number of different actors involved in the CFS as problematic, finding it too "collaborative" at the end (personal communication, IND 1), which contradicted some of the comments of other participants.

Non-state actors generally looked at how much information was included in the CFS, noting, like others, that the CFS was just too big and too complex to make anything of it. One participant explained that the CBoC seemed to be treating the CFS as the be all, end all document, rather than as a living document that evolves with time and with trial and error. He thought that this might be the reason why government

became very disillusioned with the CFS document (personal communication, NGO 5). The participant explained that if there was common agreement on some issues, these issues could carve up into bite-sized pieces (personal communication, NGO 5). Similarly, another non-governmental participant argued that the sheer number of topics included in the CFS ended up hurting the effectiveness of the CFS and the message it was attempting to craft. In the end, the participant thought that the CFS would have been much more effective if it stuck with the industry perspective, and only focused on industry issues (personal communication, NGO 7).

6.3.1.2 The Beginning of the CFS: Loblaw and the CBoC

Numerous participants discussed the partnership of CBoC and Loblaw differently. Many believed that Loblaw had started the initiative and invested substantially more money into the CFS than any other organization or company (personal communication, PG 1). However, CBoC researchers and Loblaw participants noted that CBoC had approached Loblaw (as opposed to vice versa) as a potential partner who would help bring in other investors (personal communication, CBoC 1; CBoC 2; CBoC 3; IND 7). A CBoC participant admitted that the CBoC attempted to start a food initiative a few years prior. He thought that Galen Weston, the executive chairman of Loblaw at the time, had heard of this previous initiative and approached CBoC to reinvigorate it (personal communication, CBoC 1). The true development of the initiative and the process behind the creation of the CFS was never uncovered through interviews because there were too many different versions of its development. However, what is important is that many other investors saw Loblaw as a key player in the development of the initiative and did not see the company like every other investor. Some industry players noted that a

weakness of the CFS was that it was perceived as a Loblaw initiative given the key position Loblaw had (or was perceived to have at times) throughout the process (personal communication, IND 1). The participant observed that the CFS ended up being perceived as not only a Loblaw initiative, but a “Galen initiative.” This likely discouraged other food retailers from signing onto the CFS as investors (personal communication, IND 1).

6.3.1.3 “Pay-to-Play” Structure

A big structural criticism of the CFS was the requirement of paying to invest in the CFS in order to affect what was happening at the CFIC. This was known as the “pay-to-play” (personal communication, FG 1) structure. Some participants were concerned that the CBoC named this strategy the *Canadian* Food Strategy, while their “pay-and-play” structure limited who would be involved in the CFS construction. Costs to participate in the Strategy as an investor were very prohibitive for certain players. One food policy expert noted that “this structural issue, this whole thing about having to invest, saying no to people, shutting people out” (personal communication, FPE 3) was particularly problematic. Some government representatives interviewed who were not investors felt that because they were not direct funders of the CFIC, their voice did not matter as much as those who were (personal communication, FG 7).

In the same way, other government investors found that once they stopped funding the CFIC, the CBoC door was no longer open to them (personal communication, PG 3). When asked about why a participant’s federal department funded the CBoC’s CFS rather than any of the other three food strategies (CAPI, FSC, CFA) that were also being developed around the same time, he explained that there

was no favouritism involved in that decision, but rather it was because of the way the CFS was set up,

> I don't know if I'd call it favouritism, they weren't favouring what they were coming up with, it was just, that happened to be the mechanism that was put in place to get it going, so they said yeah, we'll pay. I'm surprised the farmer guys didn't come back and say, well you should pay us too, we're doing the same thing. (personal communication, FG 2)

6.3.2 The Actors (Agency) Involved in the CFS

The actors and relationships were also a topic of discussion in many interviews. Two main themes came out of this: industry's influence, and individual influences within government and Galen Weston.

6.3.2.1 Industry's Influence

Industry was often identified as a very influential actor in the development of the CFS. When asked about who contributed more to the development of the CFS, after some thought, a CBoC employee replied, "well, industry" (personal communication, CBoC 3). The CBoC staff member explained that while both government and industry were active, they were active in different ways. Government behaved as more of an enforcer, fact-checker, ensuring that everything was being written correctly. Industry was more of an expert in what was actually happening in the food sector, willing and able to think into the future and envision different scenarios. However, government had very different perceptions of industry involved in the Steering Committee. A provincial government representative explained that,

> The general perception that I received was that there were a couple of big investors that are driving this project and their interest is being reflected in that, for example, Loblaws and Maple Leaf Foods. (personal communication, PG 1)

Another federal government representative agreed and explained that from their second-hand descriptions of the investor meetings, it did seem like industry was more in charge of meetings than any other actor there, claiming that some stakeholders were more equal than others (personal communication, FG 2).

A non-governmental actor also agreed with the government representative regarding the increased participation of industry players in the process in relation to everyone else,

> I think it tended to be largely the corporate representatives whose voices we would hear the most often. The bureaucrats, there were senior bureaucrats there, said less, there were a couple of academics who said less, and then the not-for-profit world sporadically, periodically, but not a lot. (personal communication, NGO 6)

Other industry players recalled that it was Loblaw that talked to them about joining the CFS (personal communication, IND 3). Likewise, a non-governmental actor repeated a similar story regarding the participation of other industry players in the CFS, explaining that Loblaw was a key player in persuading other food industry actors to join the CFS as investors, believing that there must have been some “arm twisting” (personal communication, NGO 4). This, of course, the participant suggests, attracted a lot of other big industry players to the initiative like Maple Leaf Foods, because of their business relationship to Loblaw, and because of the position of Loblaw in the food business in Canada (personal communication, NGO 4). Loblaw as a company was mentioned quite often as a big player in the CFS process. Loblaw was often perceived as a special investor that had a leading role as an initial partner in the CFS development. A few government representatives believed that Loblaw approached the CBoC and instigated and funded the CFIC and CFS (personal communication, FG 7;

NGO 3). Another federal government representative continued suggesting that Loblaw played a strong part in framing the strategy, which tied into supporting their own business strategy and product consumption. The government participant believed that Loblaw initiated this project so that they could claim that they developed a more sustainable and ethical brand (personal communication, FG 1).

One thing some participants centred on was the disproportionate degree of power some investors had versus others. Investors were stratified based on their financial contribution. Some found that because of this, certain investors had more power than others if they contributed more money (personal communication, PG 1; NGO 6). Several preliminary CFS investor meetings took place at Loblaw headquarters (personal communication, FG 8; IND 7). This revealed the company's importance in the CFS initiative.

This perception that Loblaw contributed much more money than any other government body or NGO was also discussed by a provincial government participant. An industry representative explained that while Loblaw did not contribute a significantly larger amount to the CFS as others thought, they did provide space and sponsored many meetings.

6.3.2.1.1 The Influence of Individuals in the Process

Some participants went as far as to identify certain individuals in their organizations as being very instrumental in the decision of joining the CFS initiative. Two key players were identified: individual champions within government agencies, and Galen Weston

6.3.2.1.2 Key Players: Individual Champions within Government Agencies

Some government participants identified the influence of single individuals within their ministry or department as reasons for joining the CFS process. A provincial government representative explained that their ministry joined the CFIC because their deputy minister was an academic, and she was very interested and bought into the proposal (personal communication, PG 1). Federal government representatives also expressed the view that particular individuals were responsible for their department's participation in the CFS, and also a subsequent decrease in interest. One federal representative said that the director of their department was one of the main drivers of the department becoming involved in the CFS, and when she left, the interest in the CFS decreased. The participant said, "shifting players can shift the level of and degree of emphasis that we place on things" (personal communication, FG 1).

One federal government participant also commented on the late involvement of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) as an investor in the CFIC. The participant explained that initially, their department wanted to coordinate other invited government bodies to make a single contribution to the CFIC to get a seat at the table. However, their decision was overruled by senior management, and interested government departments contributed individually to the CFIC. The participant noted that s/he even put this in a memo which s/he sent to senior management, explaining that the department should not be giving money to CBoC because they are a lobby group. The participant continued to explain that either way, if the department would not contribute money, they would still have a seat at the table because government was the target audience for the CFS and the research reports. S/he claimed that the CBoC had a "divide and conquer strategy" with the government which worked well. The late

participation of the DFO s/he thought “was a waste of money,” but it stemmed from the decision of a single person in the DFO that s/he claimed did not want to be subservient to other departments. Other federal departments already financially involved in the CBoC advised the DFO against paying to join the CFIC, since they would be given CBoC materials to comment on from other departments. Nonetheless, the DFO joined, and the participant explained that “egos got in the way a little bit on some of the decision-making because it wasn’t coordinated and thought through in advance” (personal communication, FG 2). Another federal government representative explained the federal department’s participation in the CFS, saying that, “it also has to do with the interest of who’s in charge.” (personal communication, FG 3) The participant continued to discuss Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s involvement and disinterest in the CFS down the road,

> I believe Agriculture also had a change in deputy ministers, so the one that came in towards the end wasn’t quite as interested in the Conference Board as the one who was there previously (personal communication, FPE 5).

6.3.2.1.3 Key players: Galen Weston

Participants also often identified Galen Weston as an actor of importance. In interviews, he was singled out as one of the founders of the CFS and driver behind its development. A non-governmental actor bluntly said that Galen Weston was the most influential person in the room (personal communication, NGO 6).

CBoC researchers acknowledged the importance of Galen Weston in the CFS initiative. One CBoC participant remarked that,

> There was a relationship between him and the Centre and the impact of his decision on joining helped attract and confirm the participation of many of the members of the Centre (personal communication, CBoC 2).

Another CBoC employee admitted that “having him on the inside gave us the initial leg up that we knew we would achieve this” (personal communication, CBoC 3).

A provincial government representative explained that,

> I think a lot of push came from Galen Weston to ask Conference Board of Canada to develop a food strategy for Canada, more so, to be very honest, from a retail perspective. (personal communication, PG 1)

A federal government representative remarked that “Weston was heavily involved in it. They [industry representatives] want to be seen as thought leaders” (personal communication, FG 6). The participant was referring to corporate leaders wanting to be ahead of the curve on new and upcoming issues in the industry. The participant believed that Weston wanted to be a thought leader in the food system by taking on the development of a national food strategy.

One industry participant explained that s/he thought the whole CFS process was very Loblaw driven (personal communication, IND 2). Industry representatives argued that because of Galen Weston’s heavy role in the CFS process, it was often seen as a Loblaw initiative, rather than a comprehensive process. One industry participant explained this, suggesting that this was not a good attribute for the initiative (personal communication, IND 1). The participant explained Galen Weston’s role in the CFS, noting that Weston had a grand vision for Canada’s food system. This vision s/he admitted was muted by his changing role in the Loblaw Companies, which left him with less time for big picture visions. However, s/he continued explaining Galen Weston’s interest in food policy in Canada saying,

> I think Galen was looking to see how he could make his mark on more high-level issues within obviously Canada, and certainly with sustainable seafood

> initiatives[11] which was an international initiative. There was no question in my mind that the bigger issue of this country needed a much more cohesive and more aggressive food policy around the future of the food supply system was very clear at the back of his mind. So, I think he was looking for who he could find as a partner who could help facilitate its implementation and that's where the Conference Board had come in. Actually, up until that stage, the Conference Board really hadn't had a reputation for being retail oriented, which I think they actually quite relished the idea of doing something like this, because it brought them into a domain that is obviously a very critical domain as far as Canada is concerned, but not one that they had really shown much leadership or involvement in the past (personal communication, IND 1).

While discussing the positive side of Weston's engagement in such high-level issues, the participant kept reiterating that the CFS initiative was hurt by the perception that it was a Loblaw initiative because that discouraged other industry stakeholders from joining. S/he also mentioned the importance of having a champion in an organization pushing initiatives like this.

Similarly, a non-governmental actor described the role of Galen Weston as the person who brought on other companies, who were also suppliers to Loblaw. This suggests a very key role for Weston bringing on some of the large investors from the food industry,

> They pitched 20 research projects as the basis of a Canadian food policy to Loblaw basically and Galen Weston. And he brought in his suppliers, Maple Leaf, etc., and so on, as contributors to this thing called the Centre for Food in Canada (personal communication, NGO 4).

An industry representative discussed Galen Weston's image and his family's as very respected by other industry players. As such, when Galen Weston and CBoC co-

[11] Loblaw has a partnership with the Marine Stewardship Council which is a certification for sustainable seafood.

wrote an invitation to invest in the CFIC, the participant believed that this was viewed as an important invitation (personal communication, IND 7).

6.3.3 The Process of the CFS

Process was the most discussed in interviews of all three network components. It encompassed the actions that occurred within the structure that were set up by the CBoC and maintained by the actors that eventually led to the final draft of the CFS. This is a network component that is not often discussed as contributing to effective policy outcomes. Several major subthemes were identified: leadership of the CBoC, CBoC's convening efforts, lack of diversity involved in the CFS, the development of ideas and knowledge throughout the CFS process, and consultation as not a key part of the CFS process.

6.3.3.1 Leadership of the CBoC Throughout the CFS Process

There were many topics discussed with regards to CBoC's leadership in the development of the CFS. The perceived influence of particular investors painted an image of who had more power and for whom CBoC was developing the Strategy. Throughout interviews, participants had different ideas of whose voice and perspective was influential in the CFS process.

Conference Board of Canada researchers explained their role in the development of the CFIC and the CFS. Often, they were very adamant about their neutrality and independence as a research institute regardless of their funding sources. Their comments often implied that the CBoC oversaw the process. As one CBoC participant explained, "we follow the rule that we are an independent group, so that the funders do not decide what we say in the end. We do. That's our duty" (personal

communication, CBoC 1). Another CBoC researcher echoed that perspective, saying that the CBoC's research agenda was independent of their investors, especially from industry, emphasizing that "in no way did they [investors] influence the research agenda" (personal communication, CBoC 2). Nonetheless, other participants felt that certain actors were more influential in the process.

Many participants discussed how CBoC performed its role as a leader of the CFS and how this impacted the initiative. Some thought this was a very "CBoC initiative," rather than perhaps one that reflected the investors involved. As a food policy expert clarified, "I think it's definitely more a Conference Board type thing" (personal communication, FPE 4). In particular, non-governmental actors voiced this idea. One noted that "The Conference Board was the secretariat, the facilitator, the person who was trying to hold the room, the person who was holding the pen, so they certainly played a very large role" (personal communication, NGO 6). Another non-governmental actor observed that "towards the end of their process, it almost started being a Conference Board initiative as opposed to an industry initiative" (personal communication, NGO 5). The participant also explained that investor meetings were also driven by and controlled by the CBoC (personal communication, NGO 5).

Others noted that even though there were different voices present and contributing to the CFS development, CBoC tended to have their own idea of what a food strategy should look like. CBoC would often go ahead with its own perspectives regardless of what investors or other stakeholders advised (personal communication, PG 1; PG 3; NGO 5; FPE 6).

A provincial government representative noted that “they were certainly focused on making some definitive statements on some policy issues regardless of all voices” (personal communication, PG 3). Civil society was particularly critical of this. One non-governmental participant explained that the CBoC refused to broaden its own vision to involve CSOs. S/he continued explaining that the CBoC was not interested in creating a document representing everyone’s views, but one that includes views supporting export-driven strategies (personal communication, FPE 6). Ultimately, s/he said that “the CBoC strategy failed because the people driving the process inside the CBoC had one vision and would not expand their vision to include a variety of visions.” (personal communication, FPE 6)

Although many investors and other participants were frustrated with the CBoC, many also recognized that the CBoC was frustrated with the whole process. A provincial government participant noticed that the CBoC was becoming frustrated with the divergence, multitude of views, and feedback. Civil society organizations were especially a thorn in the CBoC’s side (personal communication, PG 1).

CBoC itself mentioned some of these difficulties in their process of CFS development, especially paying attention to the number of varying views and the challenge of finding consensus and distilling it into a language where everyone could recognize their perspective (personal communication, CBoC 1). The CBoC participant also admitted that consultation was particularly difficult, because the CBoC while valuing the experiences and thoughts of others, wanted to ensure that their research could still be considered objective (personal communication, CBoC 1). The CBoC faced challenges when leading a large group of actors with differing views. In addition to this,

many participants discussed CBoC's lack of expertise and research capacity in the food sector. These impressions limited the leadership that CBoC could exercise in this process because it was not deemed a credible leader in this research domain.

A provincial government participant explained that because of the CBoC's approach and research skills, the CBoC began to lose credibility, suggesting that the CBoC was not following scientific research norms (personal communication, PG 1). Federal government participants noted that in the end, CBoC's research and reports were not taken seriously (personal communication, FG 2). Another federal participant commented that "we felt that the research was superficial and that we were disappointed in the quality of the research" (personal communication, FG 6).

6.3.3.2 The CBoC's Effort of Convening of Different Actors

The idea of bringing people together and convening was a popular strength of the CBoC cited by many interviewees. The Food Summits were mentioned as important places of convergence for different actors. A federal government representative noted that a positive outcome of the CFS process was bringing a lot of important people to the same table (personal communication, FG 1). S/he explained that the CFS was not the important outcome out of the whole process, but rather the act of convening different people together brought value to what the CBoC did (personal communication, FG 1).

An industry association representative noted the importance of the Food Summits given the number of different stakeholders in the same room expressing their views. The participant found that this experience informed them of different perspectives, which is something they could then take back and share with their members (personal communication, INDAS 3).

A federal participant admitted that the CFS process “created a shared understanding between different actors who wouldn’t necessarily interact regularly” (personal communication, FG 3) This means that the CBoC was able to bring different actors to the table that would otherwise not have come together to discuss food issues.

Most of the non-governmental actors observed the importance of the Food Summits in bringing diverse people together (personal communication, NGO 1). Another noted that the presence of some international actors at the Food Summits was particularly interesting (personal communication, NGO 2).

Industry participants had similar remarks. One acknowledged that there was value in bringing people together (personal communication, IND 2), while another admitted that “The Conference Board experience may have enabled us to be friendlier with each other” (personal communication, IND 7). This is an important outcome of the Strategy - the bringing together of people who do not usually communicate or even get along.

However, the convening aspect of the CFS development was also seen as something that deteriorated over time. Some participants blamed the CBoC for the breakdown of the CFIC. As a food policy expert mentioned, “I think the convening part broke down, and mainly I blame the Conference Board, not the food industry for that.” (personal communication, FPE 3). A non-governmental participant mentioned that s/he felt as if the whole process was rushed, especially towards the end, which seemed to fall apart. “It almost seemed like it was a ‘hurry up, quick, let’s get this done’ at the end of the Strategy,” s/he observed (personal communication, NGO 5).

An industry participant found that the CBoC and the CFS were no longer relevant because of the process of its development and because the CBoC wanted to continue to be the keeper of the Strategy, while also gatekeeping other research by requiring investment and fees (personal communication, IND 3).

Another issue with convening that some participants had was that Food Summits attracted too much of civil society. Some participants expressed the view that many Food Summits were dominated by civil society. Most of these comments were made by industry, which suggests that industry participants had different expectations of what the CFS would be and who would be involved. One industry participant thought that because of the pressure that the CBoC received from civil society and other NGO actors, the CBoC was forced to open the door to them. The participant seemed a little frustrated explaining there were too many views at the table, and that the CFS should have been more about the “vitality of the agri-food sector,” rather than “food deserts” (personal communication, IND 7). The participant’s perception was that NGOs and advocacy groups dominated the first Food Summit, which s/he felt was largely the group responsible for attacking industry (personal communication, IND 7). Another industry participant found that the Food Summits lacked the participation of big food industry. While the Summits had plenty of representation from small farmers, small organic organizations, and NGOs, s/he explained that it “worried” their the first year (personal communication, IND 2). One federal government representative agreed with some of the industry investors and said that s/he too perceived that many of the smaller groups including NGOs were quite vocal at the Food Summits compared with industry (personal communication, FG 3).

6.3.3.2.1 CBoC's Decisions on Whom to Include in the CFS Process

The way CBoC identified potential investors was not a process that sought to include a large array of food sector actors. It was CBoC who identified potential investors, and afterward, as a CBoC participant claimed, many organizations ended up joining the CFIC because they saw other actors joining,

> Once everyone knew that the large industry players such as Loblaw and McCain were involved, many governments were also very keen and interested and in that way, like a domino effect, once you had the first few then everyone else kind of felt that there was added value in this project (personal communication, CBoC 2).

At the beginning of the CFS development, CBoC attracted companies and governments to become investors in the CFIC, working with Galen Weston to develop a list of companies that could represent Canada. CBoC then added pertinent government departments and ministries as potential participants. As a CBoC researcher explained why they targeted big food companies,

> Typically, we looked at who are the larger companies because we find that larger companies tend to have more capacity in people and resources to get engaged in this sort of initiative. Smaller companies typically are very preoccupied with their day to day operation, and they may not have people at the time, to look at an issue that's outside of their operational sphere. Bigger companies do have people, and so we looked there. Also, we think you know, when you're talking about a national initiative the bigger companies often have reach across and it's more normal for them to be looking at the bigger picture (personal communication, CBoC 1).

CBoC targeted different government departments and ministries separately. As a federal government representative explained, rather than inviting the federal or provincial governments as a whole and asking for a single investment sum, the CBoC went to each government body asking for funding, "double-dipping" (personal communication, FG 2). However, not every government department invested. As a CBoC participant explained, regulators like Health Canada and the Canadian Food

Inspection Agency did not invest in the CFIC because they felt it was inappropriate; however, they continued to provide feedback on draft reports and participate in investor meetings (personal communication, CBoC 1).

6.3.3.2.2 Inclusivity in the CFS Process

While many criticized the CFS and the whole process for being too broad, others (and often the same participants) criticized the CFS for not being representative of all the important players in the food system, especially ones beyond their investor group. Some participants felt that the strategy was not as representative as it should have been.

A federal government participant noted that the government encouraged CBoC to include other stakeholders in their process who were not investors (personal communication, FG 8). Similarly, a provincial government representative explained that it was difficult to be involved at times when some of their key stakeholders were being alienated from the process (personal communication, PG 1). One federal government participant said that s/he felt that small producers were not represented in the final document (personal communication, FG 6). A non-governmental actor believed that the CFS did not represent the needs of civil society or people in general (personal communication, NGO 2).

An industry representative noted that farmers and NGOs were not represented, and farmers were originally not at the table until several other investors began questioning stakeholder representation around the investor's table (personal communication, IND 1). Another industry representative reflected the same position identifying farmers as a key player in the food sector that was not represented around

the table of the CFS process until some investors complained. The participant also noted some key NGOs that were not represented. As time went on, the CBoC added the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the University of Guelph as participants in the steering committee (personal communication, IND 3). S/he continued and explained that civil society organizations like Food Secure Canada were never included in the process and were prohibited from participating because of the high fees charged to become investors and to participate in the annual Food Summits. S/he thus identified inclusivity as a problem (personal communication, IND 3).

While a lack of representation was a big issue for many participants, others contradicted this statement and acknowledged that CBoC, at times, attempted to balance views. CBoC noted that they attempted to be inclusive and comprehensive (personal communication, CBoC 3). Some federal government participants recognized that “it looked like afterwards Conference Board wanted to talk to a bunch of other players because the beginning was very industry focused” (personal communication, FG 8). A provincial government participant also admitted that at the second Food Summit, the CBoC did try to bring in other players as speakers, including FoodShare, however, he found that this was a little late in the process of the CFS development, reflecting CBoC’s lack of understanding of the players in the food sector (personal communication, PG 1). Non-governmental actors also acknowledged CBoC’s efforts to be more inclusive and comprehensive. One noted that the CBoC did attempt to bring in more voices into the Food Summits and engage with more stakeholders in their consultation process (personal communication, NGO 2).

Another non-governmental participant observed that once Jean-Charles LeVallée, a food studies researcher, came on board the CFIC, the CFS started to become more comprehensive and more inclusive because he understood the sector and its complexities more than anyone else at the CBoC (personal communication, NGO 7). It was not until Jean-Charles joined the team that the CBoC began discussing equity, health, and sustainability as part of the CFS rather than just afterthoughts to the industrial wealth ideas in the strategy (personal communication, NGO 7).

6.3.3.3 Lack of Diversity of Actors Involved in the CFS Development

Many participants noted differences in stakeholder participation. Largely industry participants thought that the CFS included a broad spectrum of stakeholders. Many non-industry participants thought otherwise, especially when discussing the investor group.

One industry participant noted that the summits had a very diverse group of people attending, and then referring more broadly to the whole process, noting the "well-roundedness" of the group, except that there was only one retailer present (personal communication, IND 2). However, on the whole, it seemed balanced and "didn't seem to me to be overly influenced by anyone in particular" (personal communication, IND 2).

Two participants on the federal government level thought that the CBoC assembled a wide-ranging number of actors (personal communication, FG 1; personal communication FG 7). However, most of their comments did not refer to the entire process of the CFS development, but rather to the Summits in which that department was very active.

Concerns around leaving out key food players during the CFS' development were mostly expressed by non-governmental actors and government. Their concerns can be summed up by a comment made by a provincial government representative: "true engagement is about listening to all of the voices in the space, not about picking and choosing the voices based on who has funded you and who has not" (personal communication, PG 3). Often, civil society and small business/farmers were identified as being left out of the CFS process. A handful of participants mentioned government and other groups being left out as well.

A federal government representative explained that smaller industry and civil society's voices were left out of the conversations in between Summits. Small companies and CSOs were only able to attend the Summits, so when they did, that was their opportunity to speak (personal communication, FG 3).

6.3.3.3.1 The Exclusion of Civil Society

Throughout my interviews, civil society was most frequently cited as being left out of the CFS. It is important to note that many comments about civil society exclusion came out of non-governmental actor interviews rather than from industry or government. A food policy expert described the exclusion of CSOs from the CFS as very deliberate and structurally embedded in the CFS process. Investor fees that granted a seat at the table were prohibitive to CSO representatives. As such, the participant noted that regardless of whether or not the CBoC was saying that they were engaging CSOs, the pay-to-play structure acted as a boundary to participation. Even with the discount CBoC provided, which made the CBoC look accommodating, the fees were prohibitive (personal communication, FPE 1).

One CSO noted that “We certainly didn’t feel a part of it. They didn’t do enough to make us feel like we were part of developing that Strategy” (personal communication, NGO 2). The participant mentioned conversations they had with the CBoC, noting that

> We made repeated attempts to have a place at their table so we can be part of the more intimate conversation, where the research was happening, which was always turned down (personal communication, NGO 2).

A food policy expert also involved in government and non-governmental food policy initiatives claimed that they spoke with CBoC to express their interest in participating in the CFS initiative. However, they were never invited to any event to present another vision for food policy, even after they invited Michael Bloom from the CFIC several times to speak at their conferences, an invitation which s/he did not take up (personal communication, FPE 3). What CBoC did want, the CSOs claimed, was for civil society to do outreach on their behalf. In the beginning, civil society did outreach to ensure that their members were able to contribute to the CFS process, but the participant noted that CBoC must have “had a very, very specific idea about how they wanted us to participate” (personal communication, NGO 2).

One of the non-governmental actors said that the CBoC clearly did not want them to participate in the initiative, which led them to ask who they wanted as participants and why (personal communication, NGO 2). One of the foundations invested in the CFS was concerned about the lack of CSO participation in the CFS process. As such, they had paid for other NGOs who could not afford to participate in the Food Summits to attend them. The participant added that “our contribution, for example, to try and get non-profits in there, was to try and add other voices that weren’t

there which is part of the dynamic that's problematic" (personal communication, NGO 2).

Government also noticed the exclusion of civil society in the CFS process. One provincial government representative remarked that "as the process moved it increasingly alienated people, particularly on the social policy side, local food movement, environmental movement, food security movement, and all these kinds of things" (personal communication, PG 1). However, the participant continued noting that the CBoC did at one-point invite FoodShare, a civil society organization, to speak at its Food Summit. Nonetheless, the participant observed that there was much tension between the CBoC and not-for-profit actors because of the particular direction the CFS was taking without the voices of civil society which were based on a "right-wing pro-business ideological lens" and not taking into account a social policy angle (personal communication, PG 1).

A federal government representative also acknowledged the tension between CBoC and civil society. However, the participant suggested that the CFS was not meant to be comprehensive,

> I know some of the NGOs were upset that there wasn't a broader spectrum of stakeholders, but it wasn't their game, either right? That's a tough one. If you've intended to be fully comprehensive, sure you're missing people, but if that wasn't your intent, then no, not really (personal communication, FG 2).

6.3.3.3.2 The Exclusion of Farmers and Small Industry

Another often discussed actor excluded from the CFS process was farmers. Government was particularly sensitive to this exclusion, given that some of their most important stakeholders are farmers, especially at the provincial level. Farmer

organizations, like CSOs, were not able to invest in the CFS because of the prohibitive fees. As a result, they were left out. A provincial representative explained this,

> One of the things that we put on the table straight up with Conference Board of Canada was to make sure that they either got the Ontario Federation of Agriculture or the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, on the table, as a partner. CFA and OFA [the Ontario Federation of Agriculture] were in no position to provide funding for that initiative, but we certainly said that you know, it would serve Conference Board's interest to have the farming community on the table. Otherwise, there would be no legitimacy, and there would be no acceptance on the part of the stakeholders in whatever their findings would be. Conference Board did agree to it as one of the conditions that we put on the table for our joining and funding of the initiative (personal communication, PG 1).

A non-governmental actor recalled that in one of the first investor meetings, the New Brunswick Minister of Agriculture stood up in the meeting and threatened that if farmers were not invited to the table, they would withdraw their participation. That is when the CFA got a seat at the table (personal communication, NGO 4).

Industry also noted the exclusion of farmers, expressing their surprise at the small number of farmers participating in the CFS. One industry participant remarked, "If there's truly going to be a food strategy come out of this, I think they left out some important stakeholders" (personal communication, IND 4). The participant also discussed the exclusion of small and medium food industry, although s/he focused more on who he had encountered at the Food Summits rather than who was involved in the development of the CFS. However, s/he noted that the exclusion of some of these players was not beneficial for the Strategy, "The Strategy's going to land very badly if they try to implement it, because you still don't have very important groups at the table there" (personal communication, IND 4).

A provincial government participant echoed this sentiment, sharing what s/he heard from other stakeholders that the CFS does not reflect the experiences of small and medium businesses (personal communication, PG 2).

6.3.3.3.3 The Exclusion of Other Stakeholders

Some participants also mentioned other left out actors, including a federal government representative who felt that given the type of initiative and who was heading it, no one was really left out, except for consumers (personal communication, FG 2). Another provincial government representative was the only one who mentioned the exclusion of Indigenous communities in the development of the CFS (personal communication, PG 3).

6.3.3.4 Developing Ideas and Knowledge Throughout the CFS Process

Many participants discussed the creation of knowledge and new ideas in the CFS process. These creations were expressed in different ways. One of the most mentioned strengths of the CFS process was bringing attention to and generating a conversation about food in Canada, especially with actors who do not discuss food very often. Previously, only civil society discussed more social and environmental issues pertaining to food policy. However, many participants have found that since the CFS, others became more aware of social and environmental topics in the food system. A CBoC researcher claimed that CBoC was able to “raise the food profile in the country and raise awareness for all of the largest food industry businesses and organizations in the country” (personal communication, CBoC 2). Some food policy experts supported this idea and thought that “they [the CBoC] got a conversation going, it brought awareness”

(personal communication, FPE 5), and “I guess they created a conversation” (personal communication, FPE 3).

Government was particularly attentive to the increased conversation around food. Provincially, everyone interviewed agreed that it was beneficial that the CFS started a conversation around food. One participant noted, “The Conference Board in bringing it more firmly into the public discourse and giving it more policy profile, is nothing but good” (personal communication, PG 2). In addition, other provincial participants mentioned that the CBoC did add to the public dialogue on food, which was a good thing (personal communication, PG 1; PG 3).

This suggests that there is a lack of dialogue around food in the public arena, but the CFS was able to bring some of that dialogue out to the other actors and the public. Other participants from the federal government admitted that the CBoC seemed to have developed more discussion about food among stakeholders. However, the participants did note that they may be inflating the degree to which CBoC instigated the food conversation in the country, given that many other national food initiatives were happening around the same time, both within the country and abroad (personal communication, FG 8).

Industry seemed to have a more positive view on the idea of generating food discussions from the CBoC. One industry representative noted that while some issues developed down the road with CBoC’s process, s/he admitted that there were a lot of great discussions (personal communication, IND 1). Another participant observed that “I think the opportunity just to have a dialogue and focus on certain areas I think was good” (personal communication, IND 2).

Through reading the CFS and attending some Food Summits, representatives from industry associations also agreed and found that one of the positive outcomes of the CFS process was a good starting point for conversation. Some non-governmental actors also noted the contribution of CBoC's process to the national food conversation. One mentioned that CBoC succeeded in mainstreaming the food conversation simply because they had more influence than some of the other actors working on food policy at the time (personal communication, NGO 2). Another non-governmental actor reaffirmed that same idea, some of these food and agriculture topics were mainstreamed more in media, which the participant welcomed as topics that need public discussion (personal communication, NGO 5).

Some participants also discussed the usefulness of compiling information and data into topical reports as was done by the CBoC. Although the research conducted by the CBoC was one of the most criticized aspects of the CFS process, many participants noted that some research reports were well-written. More importantly, the idea of having research reports and organizing topics into different themes and reports was found to be very useful. While not everyone agreed that every report was comprehensive as claimed by the CBoC, a food policy expert noted that "it was helpful to identify some of the players and some of the issues" in the reports (personal communication, FPE 5). Another expert remarked that "some pieces of them do have value as part of the broad body of information around the food system and government policy" (personal communication, FPE 1). Government representatives echoed this sentiment, stating that

> it's a good aggregation of some of the key issues, some of the key debates in Ontario's and in Canada's agri-food sector, so you can at least get a good sense of what are those issues, big issues. (personal communication, PG 1)

Another repeated this sentiment, stating that just having all this information about food topics in one place is useful (personal communication, PG 2).

Some federal representatives noted that "the way they [the research reports] were packaged and organized was useful" (personal communication, FG 8). A non-governmental actor again agreed with this (personal communication, NGO 3).

Industry associations weighed in on this, and one participant said that the "ambitious review" in the reports by CBoC had "a few interesting ideas" (personal communication, INDAS 3), while another said that it added to the knowledge around the food industry (personal communication, INDAS 1).

In addition to the body of knowledge and reports developed through the process, some participants observed that there were some commonalities found in discussions regardless of which perspective participants came from. As one food policy expert explained,

> even though people were ideologically in different places and didn't normally hang out with each other, people quite enjoyed the process of being together, and some interesting things emerged around similarities across these different strategy platforms (personal communication, FPE 1).

Aside from the creation of reports and compiling information in one place, the research process itself was largely considered a weakness. The primary criticism of the CBoC's research was that the organization itself had no expertise, aside from one researcher hired later in the process to take on this complex research topic. An industry investor described his frustration with CBoC's research capacity and lack of expertise on the topic,

> they got together quite a large sum of money from the investor partners. They then used that money to hire or to contract research capacity which they did not have. This is where frankly the frustration comes in, they have and still have very little knowledge or competence in anything to do with agriculture and food. Now, through this process, they had built that up somewhat, in fact, they have now hired Jean-Charles LeVallée, as one individual for example that is dedicated fulltime to the work of their Centre for Food in the Conference Board, but many of the research, or all the research papers were put together quickly with hired contract research help…The frustration for me, mostly centred is on the quality of that research which for the most part was put together quickly… They like to believe that they have academic quality type research, but their research is nowhere close to academic quality, and there's all kinds of examples of errors of very flawed conclusions. (personal communication, IND 3)

The participant continued and said that it seemed like the CBoC just decided to take on this project because it was the next best research topic at the time[12] (personal communication, IND 3). Similarly, a provincial government participant noted that the CBoC was completely new to the food scene aside from one researcher. The participant compared this with the expertise in government, emphasizing the fact that hundreds of people think about these issues everyday (personal communication, PG 3). Another provincial government participant noted the long history of food and agricultural policy which requires background knowledge and some expertise on the subject to pick up on nuances and historic conflicts in the sector, explaining that CBoC did not have this sector knowledge (personal communication, PG 1).

Federal government participants observed that the quality in reports wavered depending on the authors of the report (personal communication, FG 8). Government recognized CBoC's researchers' lack of expertise when reading reports, as one participant mentioned (personal communication, PG 2). Another provincial civil servant

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[12] This could have also had to do with the global food crisis that occurred in 2008 and the possibility of generating more profit for Canada through food and agricultural exports, though the participant did not mention this.

again repeated that the CBoC simply lacked the skills to undertake such complex work as well as the background knowledge needed to do this research (personal communication, PG 1).

A federal government participant explained that for the majority of the time, government ended up feeding the CBoC data. This ended up not only costing the government money to invest in the CFIC but also personnel investment, who were tasked to give CBoC data they needed and to constantly provide comments on their reports, s/he said,

> It's the borrow your watch to tell you the time…You have to feed the beast. So, you're paying them, and you're sort of doing their work for them, a little bit, and that's always been the case with the Conference Board. I've dealt with Conference Board in 3 departments now (personal communication, FG 1).

In addition to believing that CBoC did not have the expertise and research capacity to take on a food strategy, the quality of research was brought up numerous times, and this substantially damaged the credibility of the CBoC as the leader of the initiative. Some thought the research was misleading. As one federal government participant noted, sometimes research was not set up in its proper context to make sense of it (personal communication, FG 4).

The quality of the research that was being published by the CBoC was being questioned. One food policy expert expressed their frustration, noting that discussions were happening at a very basic level because the CBoC researchers did not understand the policy issues (personal communication, FPE 3).

6.3.3.4.1 The Ideological Bias of the CBoC

Several participants noted an ideological bias present in CBoC's research, even though the CBoC continually thought of themselves as non-partisan and objective researchers. Once there was a bias present, even a perceived bias, the research was considered

skewed in favour of particular interests. As a food policy expert explained, once the CBoC decided which perspective or paradigm they are using, every piece of evidence and policy solution had to fit into that box – anything outside of that box did not exist (personal communication, FPE 1). Largely government and non-governmental actors strongly believed that CBoC's research was ideologically biased. One provincial government representative noted that the CBoC's right-wing ideological bias favoured big business and industrial agriculture models, excluding small and medium farming operations, food processors and local food interests (personal communication, PG 1). A federal government participant agreed with his colleague, stating that s/he also perceived CBoC as a biased organization, favouring big business and industrial agriculture. This bias emerged in their research reports and directly competed against the federal government that supported an environment where both small and large food businesses could compete (personal communication, FG 6).

When discussing the research with industry investors, government representatives found that even these industry investors felt that CBoC's research was very one-sided and incomplete,

> some of the bigger players like Maple Leaf and even Loblaws came out, or PepsiCo, and said, this is not the full reflection of the reality, there are other things out there as well (personal communication, PG 1).

Different government representatives admitted that they tried to get CBoC to consider other perspectives and to add them into reports to present a more balanced analysis of food issues (personal communication, PG 1). The participant added that in fact, not presenting a balanced view of these issues was against intellectual honesty, identifying supply management as a key polarizing issue. However, in the end, government gave

up on encouraging the CBoC to consider other perspectives and only focused on fact-checking,

> We decided that we were wasting our time advising the Conference Board of the kind of philosophical issues we had with some of their broad stroke approach, with some parts of it we just disagreed with the approach. We didn't feel that they were giving enough weight to all of the factors that we consider when we develop policy (personal communication, FG 6).

A provincial government representative mentioned that their concern was not about which ideology the CBoC was using, but rather that they were not reflecting any other perspective or outlook on these issues would likely lead many people astray when reading their reports (personal communication, PG 1).

Much like the government representatives above, a non-governmental actor took issue with the CBoC's claim to objectivity and neutrality as an organization when in fact s/he perceived the CBoC to be very biased in their work (personal communication, NGO 7).

6.3.3.4.2 CBoC Disregarding Other Canadian Food Policy Initiatives

Some participants identified the significance of CBoC ignoring other existing Canadian food strategies or food policy documents written by other non-state actors. When the CBoC was developing its Strategy, Canada had already seen the development of three other policy documents created by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, the Canadian Agri-food Policy Institute, and Food Secure Canada. However, many participants, excluding industry, explained that the CBoC did not take these past efforts into account and did not desire to collaborate with these groups. This set out a precedent for who the CBoC would include in the CFS and how, in addition to how others saw the CBoC. This action set up boundaries determining how CBoC would

interact with the other three strategy players. Food Secure Canada was completely ignored, CAPI was largely ignored, and the CFA was invited on as a non-paying investor after government investors threatened to pull out if farmers were not at the table.

A provincial government representative, who also had experience in the not-for-profit world, observed “the lack of appreciation for other people’s food strategies...” (personal communication, PG 3). The participant noted that “there was some good work done by other people that I don’t think was considered strongly” (personal communication, PG 3). A non-governmental actor also stated that collaboration with previous food policy efforts would have been very interesting (personal communication, NGO 2). Another non-governmental actor reflected the same opinion stating that the CBoC did not make the most of the resources and information available around them (personal communication, NGO 6). One food policy expert even shared that,

> David McInnis from CAPI. I know he was mad too, but I know he won’t say that, right? You know, because they were shut out too, in the same way. (personal communication, FPE 3)

6.3.3.5 Consultation Not a Key Part of the Process

Consultation was a popular topic discussed in interviews. The consultation process in the CFS was criticized. Largely government, food policy experts, and non-governmental actors expressed their disappointment in the consultation process. Generally, the reactions about consultations during the CFS development were negative and centred on the idea that the process was not meaningfully engaging participants. There were similar comments across interviews stating that the consultation methods used in the process of developing the CFS were not adequate. Some felt as if things were rushed to

publish more reports and finish the CFS (personal communication, NGO 5). Non-governmental actors often discussed the consultation experience.

A food policy expert noted that “there was too much of the presentation approach and not enough of conversations” (personal communication, FPE 5). A provincial government representative explained that there was never enough time to discuss anything the CBoC did during investor meetings. The meetings were mostly “one-sided talk” from CBoC. There was rarely enough time to provide feedback, and on the occasion that there was time, the feedback was usually in the form of frustration around the quality of work the CBoC was producing (personal communication, PG 1).

A non-governmental actor also explained how some meetings would be completely dominated by CBoC staff with little to no engagement of anyone else (personal communication, NGO 5). Even the Summits had little room for discussion argued a non-governmental participant. The Summits were very content heavy and had little time for participation and questions. The process s/he argued was “actually kind of a black box” (personal communication, NGO 2). The participant also criticized the CBoC’s form and effort of engagement, “they did some consultation processes which were not great” and expressed concern over whether some informal polls done at the Food Summits were indeed considered as consultation (personal communication, NGO 2). This participant added that the consultation and even the development of the entire CFS were not clear, largely hidden, and not transparent (personal communication, NGO 2).

One industry player admitted that,

> It [the CFS process] didn’t seem overly consultative. When I went out and looked at those answer the questions [audience polls], the trite little questions [during

> the Food Summits] …I sure hope they're not using that somehow to legitimize their Strategy (personal communication, IND 4).

6.3.3.5.1 Lack of Regional Consultation

Part of the consultations were regional meetings. These were conducted across Canada, and generally did not include investors, but rather stakeholders in the food system. These were instances when non-governmental actors tended to be involved in the consultation. However, these meetings were also criticized as being a waste of time. A non-governmental actor heavily criticized this method of consultation as one that was not genuine. The participant began by saying, "I don't think they [CBoC] understand the process side of it enough" (personal communication, NGO 2). S/he continued by discussing some of the regional consultation meetings CBoC arranged,

> They were invited to these amazing tables of people, a real mix of all the sectors, and they went through a questionnaire and checked off the boxes together, that was the consultation., I think they were policy statements… Literally they could just answer "yes" or "no". So, there was no room for dialogue. There were all these great people in the room and we didn't have a chance to have a conversation, because they just wanted us to check the boxes. I think they had really messed up ideas of what consultation was and how to build that consensus. I think they lost a lot of people's trust with that (personal communication, NGO 2).

Another non-governmental actor explained a similar situation, expressing disappointment,

> We all sat around and filled our papers for half the time, which was such a lost opportunity. Wow, you're bringing these people together from different sectors, and usually trying to sell their product, and they actually took the time to come to this thing, or someone from government took the time to come to this thing, and then they're filling out a form? It's kind of patronizing too, it's like you're going to come to this room and sit here and fill out the form because otherwise you won't fill out our survey, that was kind of the feeling I got (personal communication, NGO 2)

A similar experience was described by yet another non-governmental actor,

> I went to a focus group in Montreal that they did, but it too was insulting, and the people who were at the table were insulted by it, even the industry people were like, “I thought you wanted my views.” Then we got there, we collectively filled out little forms that we could’ve filled out online, and there was no opportunity to discuss or raise new issues. They weren’t really interested in what we had to say. They were interested to say, “we’ve had 12 focused groups across the country, and 250 people participated in them” and whatever, but at my table, where I was, with industry players, with whoever the big, Parmalat, and you know, Danone, Metro, all of those people were in the room, they were all kind of like “why are we wasting our time here?” because you did not get the impression that they really wanted to know what we thought (personal communication, NGO 7).

The participant continued, obviously feeling very frustrated recalling the event,

> we were all there sitting around in one of those expensive hotel rooms with those expensive tablecloths and those expensive hors d’oeuvres filling out forms together. It was the most ridiculous consultation I’ve ever been involved in, and I have been involved in many. I have never been invited to go physically to a place in order to fill out a form like a school child with other people. It was not a consultation, I don’t know what it was, it was just ridiculous. To have that many bright, interesting, informed, controversial people in a room and to not talk to them is beyond stupid (personal communication, NGO 7).

6.3.3.5.2 Problems with Reports and Documentation

Many investors discussed their experiences in providing comments on reports. This was a key point of consultation for the investors. Mainly government participants spoke about this because they were very frustrated and likely because they provided the most comments on research reports out of any other investor.

A provincial government representative explained they became very frustrated because they realized that often, the comments they provided on these research reports were not included in the final documents (personal communication, PG 2). Another provincial government representative described a very similar experience,

> my colleagues who were working on the file at the time were sent drafts of a number of papers. We did provide comments on a number of papers, and I would suggest 9 times out of 10, they were completely ignored. So, on local food, or supply management, etc., we would point out significant errors from an agricultural economic perspective or a lack of balanced approach, or faulty

> assumptions, and I think this isn't bitter grapes or anything like that, but you've got a team at the Conference Board of four or five people who are almost all universally new to the food space except Jean-Charles, who had a not-for-profit food background from Food Secure Canada, trying to contract out and wrestle and grapple with all sorts of food policy issues that for instance, at the Ministry, we've got 100 people in our policy division thinking about these things and have had so for decades (personal communication, PG 3).

The participant continued and explained that CBoC's lack of attention to their comments ultimately forced them to question their ongoing support for the CFS and the CFIC (personal communication, PG 3). Many federal government representatives described similar situations. One explained that,

> Well the first couple [of reports], they wouldn't take our comments, so we'd go back to them, and then we insisted that we have a conference call to go over them and have an argument, it became so painful that we just stopped doing that (personal communication, FG 2).

After that, one federal government participant admitted, they stopped commenting on reports (personal communication, FG 6). However, civil servants were required to continue editing what they saw misrepresented facts (personal communication, FG 2). Another federal government representative from a different department also described a parallel situation of comments being ignored by the CBoC (personal communication, FG 3). A non-governmental actor also shared the same experience as many government representatives; s/he explained that after they provided comments, they would not see any changes in the final reports which caused a lot of frustration (personal communication, NGO 6).

6.3.3.5.3 Lack of Meaningful Engagement

Engagement was one of the biggest process concerns discussed across interviews. By engagement, I mean the level of participation of stakeholders in the process of

developing the CFS. Participants generally found consultations to be lacking genuine engagement. One participant said: “I don’t think it was a process that encouraged engagement and participation” (personal communication, FPE 3). Others noted that the Food Summits, while open to the public, were very content heavy and provided few opportunities for engagement and participation. A non-governmental participant stated that,

> looking at Conference Board’s initiative is recognizing that you need to have people engaged and feel part of it [the process] if it’s going to be successful, and that’s for any new initiative, you would have to be conscious of that, because people don’t feel that they were really engaged in all the discussions and it won’t have that same support (personal communication, NGO 5).

Some participants spoke about the engagement as not being genuine, but instead called it “tokenistic at best” (personal communication, NGO 2). A non-governmental investor noted that the complexity of the food issue did not pair well with the process developed by the CBoC to create the CFS (personal communication, NGO 6). The participant continued, admitting that s/he did not think the process was great and that it did not benefit from the expertise of the people around the table (personal communication, NGO 6). This was also reflected when the CFIC did not engage with any other NGO food strategies (personal communication, PG 3; NGO 2; NGO 6).

One non-governmental participant discussed the opaqueness of the research and decision-making process and found that the whole process around how different participant feedback was being used to craft the CFS was not transparent.

> I would also say that I think that the process was a pretty black box in terms of information that went in from all these different players, and what gets spit out is the policy proposals, so very not transparent around how decisions are being made (personal communication, NGO 3).

A food policy expert reiterated this sentiment noting the “weird” and “not transparent research” the CBoC did, admitting that “the process is never perfect, but that was particularly problematic” (personal communication, FPE 3). The food policy expert continued stating that “There was so much animosity in the process” (personal communication, FPE 3) and that the CBoC took on a role that did not encourage the co-creation of a national food document, explaining that “they [the CBoC] shouldn’t have been content drivers, they should have been facilitators of a process to work towards consensus, towards a strategy” (personal communication, FPE 3).

Dialogue, or a two-way discussion, was also a concern discussed during interviews. Dialogue was embedded in the way stakeholders engaged in consultations. The issue of ideologically balanced dialogues was a common theme throughout interviews. Some participants found that the CFIC had an inherent ideological bias that prevented a balanced dialogue. Government representatives discussed this as a clear bias towards big industry. One government representative said, “If they had stayed away from it [the ideological bias], they could have done that, I think, at least create a balanced dialogue and they did not do that” (personal communication, PG 1).

6.3.3.5.4 The Importance of Investor Meetings

Investor meetings tended to be described differently than other consultations. The investor meetings were often held at Loblaw headquarters (personal communication, FG 8). The CBoC described investor meetings as “Constructive, respectful, positive, encouraging, and genuinely helpful” (personal communication, CBoC 3). Industry tended to agree with this perception. One industry representative explained that there were many opportunities to discuss issues, and that generally, these meetings were

quite valuable (personal communication, IND 7). Another industry representative described investor meetings as places where they could discuss more avenues for research but could not provide input into the research already conducted (personal communication, IND 2).

Government representatives had a negative view of the investor meetings. Some federal government representatives identified the meetings as “consolidation meetings to bring everyone up to speed as to where the Conference Board was at” (personal communication, FG 8). A provincial government player described the meetings at the beginning of the initiative as relatively positive, still filled with excitement around the initiative. However, as the CFS progressed, the meetings had a different feel, one where people showed up because they paid to participate and did not feel listened to when they provided CBoC with feedback (personal communication, PG 1). A federal government player echoed this sentiment, where initially meetings were upbeat and filled with excited; however, as time went on, this excitement disappeared (personal communication, FG 1).

Some federal government participants said that the “Intent behind the meetings was probably to open up dialogue, [however], it seemed like Conference Board wasn’t set up for receiving critique” (personal communication, FG 8). Another federal government participant described meetings in which the investor comments were challenges and criticisms towards CBoC’s work (personal communication, FG 3). It was quite a passive experience, with little interaction between attendees, mostly presentations from the CBoC, and some questions from investors near the end. Galen

Weston would also always give his remarks at the beginning of meetings (personal communication, FG 3).

A provincial government player also described the meetings as quite passive, not leaving much time for discussion, where CBoC packed the agenda with presentations. If there was time for questions or feedback, the discussion would largely be dominated by bigger investors, which had put more money on the table (personal communication, PG 1). A federal government participant spoke of the meetings a little more bluntly and said, “The capsule version of it, is that it was a forum that allowed business leaders to pontificate, and everyone else just sat there and listened” (personal communication, FG 2).

Non-governmental actors had similar experiences to government. One non-governmental actor described his experience as very passive as well (personal communication, NGO 4). The participant described the meetings in much the same way the government representatives did, ones filled with presentations about research results, some questions were asked, but no research formulation or discussion around where the research should go happened (personal communication, NGO 4; NGO 6). A different non-governmental participant also reflected on the passivity of meetings where there was little time to discuss any changes or amendments, calling it “an information overload for a very short period of time” (personal communication, NGO 5).

This passivity led some non-governmental actors to question whether the expertise that was sitting in the room was ever used (personal communication, NGO 6). While one non-governmental actor, when asked about the meetings acknowledged that the meeting was not structured for consensus building,

> there wasn't time or structure to be able to try and actually gain consensus, clear buy in or vote or anything like that, so I think it was more consultative. There would be a bunch of presentations and then some discussion and feedback, including on the strategies, but not any kind of detailed working through and approval or nod or that kind of thing around the strategies (personal communication, NGO 2).

The participant suggests that while s/he was not expecting a very democratically organized process, it fell short of their expectations of discussion (personal communication, NGO 2).

6.3.3.5.5 Conference Board of Canada on Consultation

Conference Board of Canada researchers also discussed their perception of what kind of consultation and investor and stakeholder involvement they provided. One participant discussed this more than others and began by attesting that, "we're a convener, we're a facilitator, we listen, and we incorporate those insights into our work, to be as balanced as we can" (personal communication, CBoC 2). This suggests that the CBoC's focus is on convening stakeholders to conduct their research. The participant admitted that the CBoC is not a specialist in food policy and for this reason, they enlisted the voices of other stakeholders who helped them compile a lot of information and develop reports (personal communication, CBoC 2).

However, the participant continued and said that "We also invited many, many foundations and farmer organizations, academics and others were provided opportunities to participate at the Food Summits and also civil society, freely, at no cost" (personal communication, CBoC 2). However, this in part contradicts the perspectives of civil society and others who were aware of how civil society participated in the Food Summits as delegates. The CBoC researcher continued to explain that ideas and analyses emerged from evidence-based research without preconceived notions of what

the strategy should be (personal communication, CBoC 2). The participant also explained that some of their other research was conducted because they realized that data from Statistics Canada and private companies was not sufficient. As such, the CBoC conducted a national food industry survey, and a national household survey on food. They also did interviews and consultations across Canada. The participant explained that after they had conducted some preliminary research,

> we had some idea how to fine-tune the 5 elements over time from the consultations; we let the evidence guide us, and then we would go back and validate those findings with participants, either from industry, government, civil society, and I made sure when I ran these focus groups across the country, that I had broad representation from various stakeholder groups. And from all the stakeholders, and we had a good range of participants (personal communication, CBoC 2).

Occasionally, other groups (i.e., agri-food processors in Ontario) would invite the CBoC to discuss some of their findings, and at that point, the CBoC would take that opportunity to ask questions and validate findings (personal communication, CBoC 2). Other consultations included,

> Three national Food Summits, one a year, with consultations in person, across Canada in French or English, in major cities, or small groups, or specifically with industry, or with government, depending on the kind of invitation or collaboration partnership we had, or with civil society and other stakeholders. We also went up to Iqaluit to get a better understanding of the food issues there, not just on food insecurity, but what, how the food economy operates, opportunities, barriers, that kind of thing, in fisheries or elsewhere (personal communication, CBoC 2).

Research reports were reviewed several times and by different people. The CBoC researcher explained that not only would all investors be asked to react to their work, but on top of that, the CBoC also had a quality review process. For a research report, the CBoC participant explained that it went through three steps, an internal review, and

investor review, and an independent external review process (usually academics, government, and sometimes industry) (personal communication, CBoC 1).

6.3.4 Summary

This section discussed unique opportunities and challenges in multistakeholder governance networks as experienced by participants through the CFS process and organized into three network components contributing to policy outcomes: structure, actors, and process. Each component also had several subthemes.

The structure section discussed the physical and intellectual size of the CFS, the beginnings of the CFS, and the pay to play structure. The physical and intellectual size was deemed to be too big and broad, which did not contribute to the CFS' success. Likewise, while the early relationship of CBoC and Loblaw helped develop the strategy and bring on different investors, it may, in the end, have hurt the initiative because it was seen as belonging to the CBoC and Loblaw. The pay-to-play structure where those who wanted to be on the "inside" of the CFS development had to contribute financially was not seen as a good method to encourage stakeholder participation.

The actor section discussed the influence of groups and individuals. Industry was identified as a group of actors in the CFS who were seen as having more influence than others. Some individuals were also identified as being influential in the process. Certain government champions were behind the decisions of government agencies becoming investors, and Galen Weston was identified as a key player with influence in the strategy's development. These key players encouraged the development of a perception by others that not only did they have more influence in the process, but more power and a louder voice, creating an imbalance between the players in the network.

Lastly, process was the most discussed in interviews. Several subthemes emerged out of “process”. The leadership of the CBoC was discussed as being too overbearing, where many participants did not feel ownership of the CFS anymore, because it felt like a CBoC initiative. CBoC’s efforts of convening were examined, where the convening aspect of the CFS was considered very important in terms of bringing different actors together who do not tend to communicate. However, issues with inclusivity and the haphazard decisions made by the CBoC to include different players at different times became problematic for several participants. This was further discussed in the subtheme regarding the diversity of actors involved in the process. Many felt that some key players were excluded from the process, including civil society, farmers and small industry, consumers, and indigenous communities. The development of ideas and knowledge throughout the process was seen as a very positive outcome of the CFS process. The food conversation in Canada was amplified, and a lot of useful information was compiled into key reports. However, the development of knowledge and ideas was considered problematic by some participants. Some participants identified an ideological bias in the CBoC that only presented one side of the story when developing the CFS, and some also felt that the CBoC should have collaborated and learned more from previous food policy/strategy initiatives completed recently by other NGOs. Finally, consultations were identified as being generally problematic. They were seen as a very important part of the CFS development process, but a large number of participants felt that not enough effort and time was given to developing effective consultations and meaningful engagements from a variety of stakeholders. This undermined the trust and commitment of many stakeholders and investors toward the CFS and the CBoC.

Chapter 7: Analysis

This chapter draws on theoretical and contextual insights from Chapters 2 and 3, in addition to my findings collected from interviews from both Chapters 5 and 6 to answer the following questions introduced in Chapter 1:

- What are some unique characteristics of multistakeholder networks in the policymaking process?
    - Why did the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy as a multistakeholder governance network policy development process fail?
    - What lessons does the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy initiative provide in terms of multistakeholder policymaking?

It follows a similar format to Chapter 6, where three main themes are discussed:

1. Food as a complex and wicked policy problem
2. Government's role in food policymaking
3. Opportunities and challenges in multistakeholder food governance networks: structure, actors, and process

Some subthemes are also explored in these sections.

7.1 Food as a Complex and Wicked Policy Problem

Food policy as a policy area that is very complex and multifaceted was clearly supported by the data collected. From discussing a lack of clear problem definition, solutions, differing values and interests, large numbers of stakeholders and food topics, and differing degrees of complexity, it is obvious that developing food policy is challenging. This had implications for identifying food policy as a "wicked policy problem". In Chapter 3, I examined different definitions of wicked policy problems, landing on one that considers wicked policy problems as multifaceted, complex policy issues that cross policy domains and jurisdictions, involve multiple stakeholders, are

value-based, and hover between the natural and social world, requiring a collaborative multi-actor approach to tackling them. Wicked policy problems may not be “solvable” in the traditional tame policy sense, but at best, they can be managed. Following some other wicked policy scholars, I had proposed that is it difficult to imagine a binary between tame and wicked policy in the world of policymaking. As such, food policy was considered to include a sliding scale of wickedness and tameness, depending on the clarity of problem definitions and solutions. Some key themes emerged from my data that pointed to the multifaceted character of food policy, but also to a sliding scale of wickedness. This implies that some parts of food policy can be managed, while others can be solved.

One of the biggest determinants of a wicked policy problem is the disagreement over the problem definition. If this happens, it is challenging to forge a problem definition that leads to a policy solution. Even something as basic as understanding the need for a national food strategy in Canada was not a certainty as was shown in the case of the CFS. Many participants claimed that several investors did not understand why a national food strategy was important, and many industry investors joined the CFIC to develop the CFS because they were either asked to join by Loblaw (one of their most important customers) or simply joined because Loblaw joined. This means that their participation in the development of the CFS did not occur because they shared a common vision for the future of the Canadian food system. In addition, a few government participants mentioned that their department’s or ministry’s involvement occurred because of a particular individual who became interested in the CBoC’s initiative. Sometimes a mounting disinterest occurred because that individual had

moved on to another position, no longer being the champion of the CFS in the department or ministry.

When participants join a policy development process for reasons other than policy development, it is unlikely that a common understanding or vision of the issue exists. As Shaw (2010) notes, social problems do not develop out of government's reaction to an objective societal problem. Instead, problems are recognized and developed by groups other than government. This is especially significant for an initiative that is led by non-state actors. Every actor can frame issues differently, developing a different problem definition, which then determines the problem solution.

According to Rittel and Webber (1973), one of the main characteristics of a wicked policy problem is the difficulty of forging a common problem definition. When there are several participants in a policy development process such as the one conducted by the CBoC when creating the CFS, who do not have a shared reason for joining the process, it is apparent that a collective idea of the "food issue" does not exist between the members. This makes the remainder of the process extremely difficult because a common solution will not be found without a shared understanding of the issue. This problem also likely stemmed from the fact that the CBoC itself did not identify the common "food problem" in the CFS or a common vision for what the food system should look like if the CFS were to be implemented. It is unclear whether this was discussed in investor meetings; however, no participant mentioned this. It is important that a common definition is forged, especially in a multistakeholder initiative which includes several actors with different understandings of the "food problem."

7.1.1 Food Policy Fragmentation: Policy Areas and Jurisdictions

A fragmented policy environment does not see the interconnections between the different pieces of the food system. Many parts of the food system exist in separate policy areas that rarely interact. One of the reasons why food policy has been difficult to enact in Canada is because of a very fragmented policy environment. In this case, when I refer to a fragmented policy environment, I refer to one that is disjointed and disconnected institutionally and procedurally. This also means that one actor alone cannot solve food system issues, requiring multiple actors to collaborate (Dentoni, Bitzer & Schouten, 2018). This was an issue that was recognized by the CBoC and was identified as a reason for developing the CFS through interviews.

Food policy is not limited to one policy domain. Because the food system is so vast, it touches several policy areas including agricultural policy, economic and trade policy, social policy, health, and nutrition policy, environmental policy, food safety policy, and more. This fragmented approach to food is exacerbated by the number of different jurisdictions involved in the different policy areas relating to food. One of the biggest policy areas relating to food is agriculture. Agricultural policy in Canada is shared by all three jurisdictions: federal, provincial, and municipal, where each jurisdiction oversees a different piece of the puzzle, and sometimes these pieces overlap. Canadian federalism presents a challenge for the development of food policy in Canada because many policy spaces touching food simultaneously fall within the federal, provincial, and municipal government policy purviews. Quite often, neither of the jurisdictions takes charge.

Because food policy touches so many different levels of government and government bodies, as well as policy areas, food policy cannot be approached as a tame policy problem. A change in one part of the food policy issue, for example,

touching on an environmental issue, can affect farmers, the way people interact with food, and international trade, to name a few. Mörçol (2012), therefore determines that policies like this cannot be solved with linear and mechanistic thinking. Following one of the characteristics of wicked problems outlined by Rittel and Webber (1973), every problem within the food system is a symptom of another problem in the food system. There may be various origins of the problem, but one origin is not truer than the other. Often food policy issues, like other wicked policy problems, are nested within each other, ranging from the local governance levels, to national, regional, and international (Head, 2008). Head (2008) and Weber and Khademian (2008) also note that wicked policy problems often cross jurisdictional and hierarchical boundaries on a national level, like food, intertwining, and fusing with other policy issues. As noted in Chapter 2, Canada is a federalist state with certain policy responsibilities like agriculture and health shared between the federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government. Food policy falls within some jurisdictionally shared policy areas, as well as within some policy areas that are strictly either federal, provincial, or municipal. In addition to these jurisdictional challenges, governments, especially provincial governments, must be able to work together to develop national (food) policy which has not been an easy undertaking historically (Bakvis & Skogstad, 2012). Given the vastness of the country, different provinces have different challenges and opportunities in their own food systems. Each wants to maximize its interests making it difficult to come up with national food strategy.

In addition to jurisdictional difficulties, food policy also crosses several policy areas. However, many participants discussed the continued existence of policy siloes in the Canadian policy environment. While we do have environmental, agricultural, food

safety, nutrition, and waste policies, none of these policies intersect to understand the complexities in the food system. Agriculture tends to be the most prominent "component piece" in the food policy system. Government does not tend to recognize food policy as an integration of different policy areas. This is more problematic when there is no institutional body that would connect these policy areas to develop food policy; for example, there is no Department of Food[13] (MacRae, 2011). For these reasons, authors like MacRae and Winfield (2016) are calling for a joined-up food policy that would connect policy areas and layers of government. However, it is important to take a lesson from the CFS, where many saw the CFS as too big and broad, which in the end, was one of the key reasons why it lost its meaning. Many government and non-governmental actors, including industry, simply did not know what to do with such an expansive document.

7.1.2 Disjointed Knowledge and Expertise in the Food System

The CFS managed to bring together a group of experts with the knowledge to address diverse problems of the food system. However, participants' knowledge base reflected their sector-specific issues. Integrating these differing sets of expertise created an epistemological challenge. This complexity was not lost on anyone I spoke with. The lack of shared knowledge is often a problem in solving complex policy problems.

Because the policy issue is constantly changing, and because it interrelates with so many other policy areas, food policy becomes a very complicated problem (Head, 2008). Knowledge of food policy is often inadequate and disjointed, as with many other

[13] Agriculture and Agri-food Canada have recently announcement the development of a National Food Policy Council to govern the new food policy for Canada (discussed in the conclusion).

complex policies. This inadequate and disjointed knowledge is exacerbated when government bodies hold different knowledge and expertise and do not share this knowledge between each other and connect different policy areas, as explained by one of the provincial government participants.

As Weber and Khademian (2008) argue, when involving a variety of different actors in policy development, you will also encounter an ever-changing number of stakeholders moving in and out of the policy initiative. This means that there will be changing worldviews, agendas, and interests as stakeholders move in and out of the initiative. Again, this, the authors argue, boils down to differing understandings of the issue which was explored above. Some participants discussed knowledge as being particular to one's interests and needs in the food sector. This becomes more problematic when there are so many food systems actors in the sector, creating disjointed ideas of what the food system is, and how it should look.

This discussion showed that complexity not only derives out of different jurisdictions and spillover into other policy areas, it is also complicated by the number of actors involved in the policy issue and the fragmented and insufficient knowledge on the intricacies of the food system. This also affects the development of a common problem definition. If every actor involved in the issue has fragmented knowledge, they perceive the problem differently than others holding a different piece of the knowledge puzzle. This was not solved by CBoC's documents and the CFS, because we never did see a common problem definition or solution appear. As some government representatives discussed, the background knowledge needed to understand the complexity of the food

system and the actors in it, escaped the CBoC until they hired a food researcher later in the process who had this knowledge and understanding.

7.1.3 Conflicting Policy and Governance Values in the Food System

Because wicked policy problems have a diversity of stakeholders, a diversity of values and interests follow. Due to this, definitions and solutions of policy problems like the food problem are very “knotty” (Head, 2008). Often, solutions or even definitions of policy issues require shifts in paradigms (Head, 2008), which makes it harder for different stakeholders to agree on a way forward.

Participants discussed differing values based on geography but also based on who and where you are in the sector and the supply chain. This was observed by an industry participant who noticed these differences during investor meetings and the way some investors placed more emphasis on certain issues than others. Investors were not considering the *Canadian* food system, but only the small piece that touched their organization. This means that there are many disagreements, conflicts, and differing interests. Often these disagreements tends to show differing interests between production and consumption, as well as bigger producers versus smaller producers, and how food is produced or cultivated. Because there are so many actors involved with varying interests and goals, there are also many voices and perspectives competing for attention looking to push their own idea of food policy. Quite often, if not always, there are diverging views in the food system between non-state actors on the civil society side and non-state actors on the corporate side.

There are many differences in terms of values, perspectives, and ideologies when thinking about food policy and its elements. The question then becomes, how

should complex policy problems be approached? If there are so many actors involved, both in terms of stakeholders and governments, policy areas, and values, can wicked policy problems ever be solved?

What becomes important, as some participants mentioned, is finding the commonalities within the disagreements. One food policy expert even noted the importance of changing, developing, and implementing food policy incrementally given its complexity, however, starting with those high-level ideas many food system actors agree on issues such as food waste and food safety (especially food fraud). Disagreements between actors, as some participants noted, tend to stem not from the high-level ideas, but the details involved in policy development and implementation. This suggests that given all the different values and ideas about food systems and food issues, as well as a large number of food system actors, it may be valuable to slow down to find common ideas that many could agree on. These could be the “beacons” used to guide the development of national food policy.

These “beacons” could be thought of also in terms of wicked and tame policy problems, where certain areas of food policy are tamer or more wicked than others. Based on Figure 8 from Chapter 3 (and inspired by Roberts, 2018), we can also imagine tame and wicked problems and solutions intersecting as in Figure 4 below:

Figure 4: **The intersection of wicked and tame policy problems and solutions**



For example, food security has been identified in the literature as a wicked policy problem (Anthony, 2012; Candel, Breeman, Stiller & Termeer, 2014; Grochowska, 2015). This is a problem that is very value-ridden, many controversies exist, and there is no agreement on how to eliminate it (i.e., produce more food, re-direct food waste to the hungry, guaranteed annual income, etc.). However, something like food waste, identified by one food policy expert, might be considered a tamer problem. We know what the problem is (too much food waste) and there have already been several solutions proposed for decreasing food waste (i.e., consumer (re)education, selling deformed produce, diverting food waste to different parts of the value chain or food system, etc.), none of which are particularly value-laden or controversial. Looking at Figure 4 above, food security would likely lie in the wicked problem quadrant in the

upper right corner, with multiple problem definitions and multiple solutions. Food waste, on the other hand, can be placed in the bottom left quadrant, where the problem is clear, but there are multiple solutions. Both problems make up food policy, but they exhibit different degrees of wickedness and tameness. As such, food policy challenges, rather than considered wicked or tame, could be considered as “tangled policy problems,” displaying varying degrees of “tameness” and “wickedness” in different parts of the food system. The true wickedness of food policy appears to come from the integration and joining of policy sectors and jurisdictions to see food policy as a continuous interconnection of different policy sectors. This is especially true in Canada given our federalist structure of governance, shared jurisdictional responsibilities, and a history of siloed approaches to policy development. Systems thinking is needed to connect actors, ideas, processes, and institutions to develop and manage food policy in Canada.

7.2 Government’s Role in Food Policymaking

This section will discuss some of my findings relating to the role of the state in governance and food policymaking using governance, metagovernance, and private governance frameworks. Governance literature has discussed the changing state-society relationship for years, largely focusing on the idea that the state has weakened and has receded from its policymaking role. More recent governance literature has been discussing a continuous role for government in the policymaking process, identifying the state as the primary player in policymaking even with the addition of many other non-state actors in the policymaking area. This was a theme present throughout my interviews.

My data showed clear support for the involvement of government in food policy, noting that the state should prioritize and support the development of food policy. What was particularly notable was that many of these comments were coming from either industry or industry association representatives. This suggests the opposite of what private governance scholars suggest, that the state is not receding and is not becoming dependent on non-state actors in terms of governance and policymaking. In fact, what we see in Canadian food policy is that non-state actors, including industry, continue to depend on government for policymaking[14]. For this reason, while my initial assumption was that the CBoC's CFS was a private governance initiative, the support for state involvement and even leadership in food policymaking in Canada shows that at the end of the CFS development, this was not an approach many industry players wanted.

Several participants, including many industry investors, called on the government to play a key role in the development of national food policy in Canada. This suggests that there is a role to be played by non-state actors in the development of food policy in Canada, as a food industry association representative suggested. The role of non-state actors is more peripheral, striving to attract the attention of the state and set the agenda, becoming what Kingdon (1995) might call, policy entrepreneurs. This involvement of non-state actors as policy entrepreneurs in food policy is also significant because it suggests that the state is not doing as much as it should in food policy

[14] This can exclude certain policies. For example, nutrition policies recently implemented or in development by Health Canada have been actively lobbied against by food companies and their relevant industry associations. Nutrition regulation tends to be an area where companies prefer to self-govern and engage in private governance. For example, sodium reduction, the trans-fat ban, sugar reduction (especially in beverages), and the recent Bill S-228, the ban on the marketing of food and beverages towards children have actively been lobbied against by companies and industry associations often arguing that they can do a better job of regulating themselves than government can do regulating them.

development, something some government participants admitted. For this reason, non-state actors must also be involved in food policymaking, as if to ensure that it happens.

While all research participants agreed that government must be involved in food policymaking in Canada, participants spoke of various degrees of the state's involvement in policy. This is why it is important to consider governance as a sliding scale (see Figure 8), between government as the sole policy actor on one side and non-state actors on the other depicting private governance. Participants proposed different ideas; however, private governance, or the participation of non-state actors in policymaking exclusively, was never on the table.

***Figure 8*: The Continuum of Governance**

Some discussed the participation of both government and non-governmental actors in food policy – stating that both have an equal responsibility to take up and push food policy forward. This is more in line with collaborative governance, or the cooperation between state and non-state actors in governance and policymaking. However, an interesting point here is that civil society and academics were not always thought to be part of the non-state actor group. Sometimes, participants only discussed the partnership between government and industry. This partnership does not suggest private governance but is more in line with the collaborative governance literature which promotes the partnerships of state and non-state actors in policymaking and

governance. While this vision may be closer to private governance where the role of non-state actors is the strongest, the state continues to govern and make policy.

A good mix of research participants found that government must play a special role in the development of food policy in Canada, acting as the master weaver of different perspectives, interests, and goals creating a “consensus quilt.” In this section, government was largely seen as a metagovernor, a manager of a multi-actor network made up of state and non-state actors. While the state may not have been leading in these cases, it was seen as a special actor within the multi-actor policy group, the “master weaver.” Metagovernance literature discusses government’s role as something in between state-centrism, where the prime and sole policymaker is the state, and society-centrism, where the state is just one of many actors in the policymaking arena (Daugbjerg & Fawcett, 2015). This positions metagovernance in state-centric relational governance, where the state has not receded, but continues to govern, albeit with the support and collaboration of non-state actors (Hughes, 2010). Some participants reflected on the idea that the state should indeed be a coordinator/convener, otherwise seen as a metagovernor, specifically referring to CBoC’s CFS development. As a metagovernor, the state continues to be the main governor but also ensures that the policy environment it creates is conducive to collaboration with non-state actors. Many research participants saw this as an opportunity for the state to act as a convener, bringing different non-state actors together to help develop a food policy. With government as metagovernor, more coordination between several actors and perspectives (Sørensen, 2006) could be possible. A government metagovernor would

have been beneficial in the development of the CFS to collaborate between all four non-state food strategies.

One industry participant discussed an idea originally put forth by a civil society organization, a national food policy council. The industry representative was advocating for government as a manager (or metagovernor) of a mixed state and non-state network for policymaking. However, while managed by government, he emphasized that it should not be housed within government. Instead, he suggested a small group of state and non-state actors that would act as the secretariat to help develop consensus between different interests and actors. This reflects what Provan and Kenis (2008) would call a participant-governed network which is more decentralized and shares governance responsibilities between its members, both state and non-state. This results in a shared form of metagovernance between certain state and non-state actors.

While some participants discussed the state acting as a manager or "metagovernor" of the multistakeholder network, some participants noted that government should lead the food policy development in Canada. This creates a more centralized network, something Provan and Kenis (2008) would call lead organization-governed networks, where all network activities and decisions are coordinated through one participating member, which in this case would be the state. This would also place the state in the most powerful position in the network, responsible for administrative and financial roles in the network. This understanding of where the state fits in food policymaking may signal a desire to return to traditional policymaking with the state in charge. However, in this case, there is still a multistakeholder network, including non-state actors in the policy process (albeit at a different degree). As such, we may be

moving closer towards the government side of the governance scale (see Figure 8), but we never reach a situation where only government is involved in policymaking. This means that current food policymaking looks very differently than it did under what Pross (1986) imagined, where we largely saw different agricultural government bodies and farmers associations. When CBoC was developing the strategy, we saw more non-state actors than state actors involved in food policymaking.

Figure 12 shows what the food policymaking community looked at the time in 2010-2014 when we saw four non-state actors develop their own national food strategies. At this time, these four non-state actors were the main actors in food policy which are shown to be part of the sub-government. Loblaw was included as a smaller actor in the sub-government because of its partnership with the CBoC in the development of the CFS. Food policy councils[15], while not the topic of this study, were significant in terms of local food policy development in Canada. On the other hand, although key provincial and federal government bodies relevant to food policy were dealing with parts of food policy in their own government bodies and continued to be part of the sub-government, they were truly only involved in food policy development through the non-state food policy initiatives, namely the CFS. Other CFS investors like industry actors and foundations were involved at a similar level as government. Some foundations were developing their own food programs (for this reason were also deemed to be part of the sub-government), while industry was deemed to be one of the more influential actors in the CFS initiative. Food civil society organizations have been

[15] A policy mechanism used at the municipal level, sometimes formally brought into the municipal government (for example, the Toronto Food Policy Council), to leverage local food interests and weave them into local food policy and programming.

fairly active in the last couple of decades. Even though they were largely excluded from the CFS development, they were included in the FSC initiative and continued to develop and promote their own local initiatives. Food and farming industry associations participated in the CFS Food Summits and the CFA and CAPI initiatives to some extent. Lastly, the parliament has had a very weak role in the development of food policy and remains the least powerful actor in the graphic. While Figure 12 does not show global actors as Figure 1 does, there are global forces and other countries influencing the policy of Canada's food system; however, it is beyond this study to determine who they are and why.

When comparing Figure 12 on page 237 to Pross' (1986) Figure 1 on page 23, there are noticeable differences in the policy communities, largely having to do with the role that state and non-state actors play in the respective policy communities. These changes reflect the governing shifts experienced over time, which prompted the inclusion of more non-state actors in the sub-government of the policy community. Pross' (1986) Figure 1 shows a subgovernment dominated by state actors and some key non-state agricultural organizations, while civil society is missing. Figure 12, on the other hand, depicts a sub-government largely dominated by non-state actors, with state actors remaining on the sidelines. Civil society groups have moved towards the sub-government because there have been many programs and standards developed by them to fill the food policy lacunae.

***Figure 12*: The Canadian Food Policy Community 2010-2014**



While the food policy community was different in 2010-2014 than what Pross (1986) depicted in the 1980s, the state has not receded and cannot be just one of several actors in a multistakeholder food governance network. Although many research participants noted a need for government leadership in the food policy process and networks, many continued to come back to the idea that government must also act as a convener, bringing different actors, interests, especially actors with diverging goals and perspectives. Government is not just another player in the multistakeholder network.

This agrees with the literature on metagovernance, giving the state a special role in multistakeholder networks. Doberstein (2013) even found that the state offers stability in terms of decision-making power in a network. The presence of a state actor in a multistakeholder network provides a form of democracy and legitimacy because it answers to its citizens, rather than a network only having non-state actor members who do not have a responsibility to citizens (Sørensen, 2006). Non-state actors are still necessary for the development of food policy in Canada to push government to take the lead on these issues and step into its role as the metagovernor. Food policymaking thus requires both state and non-state involvement, with the state holding an active role in the network. This involvement, however, was seen in different degrees from actor to actor, some suggesting that the state take a “stronger” role in the network (moving towards the right of the continuum), while others suggesting a role that is more of a partnership. Nonetheless, private governance was never suggested as a solution to the food policy problem in Canada. Since private governance reflects the private authority of non-state actors in a sector (Cutler, Haufler & Porter, 1999), in the food sector in Canada, it shows that private actors do not have the legitimacy to govern in this sector.

7.3 Unique Opportunities and Challenges in Complex, Multistakeholder Food Governance Networks: Structure, Process, and Actors

This section fuses insights from both network governance literature and multistakeholder literature to understand the complexities of state and non-state actor collaboration in complex policymaking, specifically in food policy. Network governance literature identifies the constructions of the CFS network, the structure, agency, and now process. Multistakeholder literature focuses on the inner workings of initiatives, on

power imbalances, and the effectiveness of initiatives. In contrast, as we saw earlier, network literature looks at collaborative initiatives like networks more theoretically rather than practically. Both literatures will be used to look at some of the opportunities and challenges that affect the efficacy of networks.

An MFGN's effectiveness depends on the internal and external characteristics of the network, as well as the current policy context. It generally focuses on two things, the political and social contexts within which the network operates, and the policy context. MFGNs cannot be disconnected from the policy world. A connection with the policy world ensures policy learning, incrementalism, and continuity of the initiative through implementation (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016), which was a problem for the CFS. However, if a multistakeholder network is effective, many benefits can come out of its development. These networks can be valuable tools for solving wicked policy problems because they can create dialogue, collaboration, and be inclusive (Rühli et al, 2015). They can also be more flexible, adaptable, and decentralized (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016) in comparison to traditional policy solutions. However, these networks also carry risks and challenges (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Wong, 2014). While research participants discussed both opportunities and challenges, the latter was more prevalent throughout interviews. It seems that no one actor was fully satisfied with how the process unfolded and with the final product, the CFS.

To analyze the opportunities and challenges in the CFS development, it is important to return to Figure 6 which looks at structure, agency, and process as factors related to network effectiveness (see Figure 9 below). Context was explored earlier in Chapters 3 and 5, which will be revisited in the conclusion outlining some of the most up

to date food policy developments in Canada since the collection of data. The dialectical relationships as described originally by Marsh (1998) consisted of structure, agency embedded in context. However, in this study, this figure has been altered to show structure, agency, and process as factors affecting and being affected by each other while being embedded in the current policy context.

Process is the series of actions, steps, and decisions, whether conscious or unconscious, taken to achieve a policy outcome within a multistakeholder network. Process has been largely overlooked by researchers when discussing policy outcomes in networks. However, there is research that discusses input/throughput legitimacies (which focus on process) but emphasizes the democratic features (rather than the policy outcomes) of networks and MSIs. Process is important for our understanding of policy outcomes in multistakeholder food governance networks. As shown in Figure 9 below, while process is significant on its own, it has a strong effect on both the structure and agency of a network. At the same time, structure and agency influence the way the process unfolds in the network.

Figure 9: **Dialectical Relationship Between Agency, Structure, Process in Networks**



7.3.1 Multistakeholder Food Governance Network Structure

The structure of the CFS food governance network determined who could be involved, how they could be involved, and the process of policy development. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the structure in the case of the CFS was both physical and intellectual. Physical, in terms of who was involved (i.e., membership), while intellectual was understood as the actual content boundaries of the document. Both characteristics not only affected the policy outcomes of the process, but also the agency (actors), and the process of the whole CFS development.

Physically, the structure of the CFS was generally identified as limited. The relationship between the CBoC and the differing food system stakeholders in Canada began with its positioning within the current landscape vis a vis other food policy initiatives. When the CBoC decided to not consider other previously developed

research, documents, and strategies by the CFA, CAPI, and FSC, this also determined the makeup of the membership of the CFS. This exclusion of previous organization's works set up boundaries around the CFS in terms of who was included in the process of the CFS development.

The process by which an organization became a member was also a filter for the type of stakeholders who could join the CFS process. This was the "pay-to-play" structure which cost to become investors in the CFIC and was prohibitive to many stakeholders in the food system[16]. This resulted in the exclusion of many civil society members, farmers, and smaller food businesses who simply could not afford to become investors of the CFIC. The exclusion could have contributed to the beginning of an asymmetrical constellation within the MFGN, creating what Foley et al (2017) would call an unequal playing field. Power asymmetries are detrimental to MFGNs. Foley at al (2017) determine that power asymmetries develop because of expertise biases, meeting locations, and elite decision-making, some of which were apparent in the CFS development.

Many participants identified CBoC as a gatekeeper in terms of controlling who became involved in the development of the CFS as an investor. This began with the initial co-identification of potential investors with Galen Weston from Loblaw. The result of this exercise was the inclusion of many big food companies and related government bodies. Another consequence of this was the exclusion of other actors, namely civil society, Indigenous communities, smaller businesses, and at the very beginning of the

[16] Champion investors paid $50,000 annually, partner investors paid $30,000 annually, and participant investors paid $11,400 annually.

CFS, farmers. It is vital for the leadership of a network to identify important actors near the beginning (Wigell, 2008). The legitimacy of a multistakeholder initiative stems from having the right players around the table (Gitsham & Page, 2014).

The identification of investors set the stage for the kind of food strategy the CFS would become. Many (especially government) questioned their own involvement in the process with the absence of many other important food system players. Towards the end, some participants noted that the CBoC was attempting to be more inclusive and trying to make the umbrella bigger for other stakeholders in the food system. This began especially when Jean-Charles LeVallée, a food researcher, was brought on the project by the CBoC. However, towards the end, some participants, from both government and industry, thought that the umbrella became too big. If key players are left out, mistrust and conflict can be embedded in the initiative from the start. Farmers and civil society seemed to be the two key players that were excluded at the start, although farmers were later included in the process. Several participants picked up on this. The composition of the members in an MFGN is vital to its performance. If important stakeholders are missing from the table, other members do not feel inclined to fully participate, or feel as though they cannot fully participate because of their relationship with the excluded members as seen in the case of OMAFRA and farmers. The MFGN, therefore, loses legitimacy and credibility.

Intellectually, the CFS was generally identified as broad. Many participants criticized the CFS as being too big, too complicated, and unfocused. Many government participants explained that a successful strategy must be focused and consist of high-level thinking instead of very specific policy recommendations. As such, with every new

report that came out, it was noted by some that CBoC's ability to unify the many members on common ideas became more difficult and complex. It also became difficult to even react to feedback and comments from members. As a result, government became disinterested because the CFS was too big and broad to ever consider implementing. Similarly, industry was not able to prioritize policy actions, also appearing repelled by the number of different actors involved in the CFS. Non-state actors likewise noted the broadness and complexity of the CFS as impeding the effectiveness of its outcome. Some even remarked that the CBoC should have only included industry interests in the strategy, limiting the number of priorities and actors involved in the strategy, while also renaming it the Canadian Food *Industry* Strategy. As such, while most, if not all participants acknowledged the complexity of food, many seemed to think that a successful strategy required focused and high-level ideas rather than detailed policy solutions. This was not discussed much in multistakeholder or network literature. A broader policy initiative like the CFS appears to make it more difficult to identify priorities, common interests, goals, and solutions both for the CBoC as the manager of the network, but also for those involved in the network. A broader initiative may be sought to be more inclusive; however, at the same time, it can alienate those who are already involved. The intellectual size of a multistakeholder food governance network must be thought through carefully. While it is important to identify the necessary stakeholders that should be involved in the initiative, it could be more significant to take time at the beginning of the initiative to identify purposes and goals to define both the intellectual and physical limits of the initiative.

It can be thus concluded that the size of the network, which includes the number of members as well as the number of topics discussed, contributes to the outcome of a multistakeholder food governance network. If a network is too big, and the topics it attempts to take on are too vast and complex, stakeholders will not be motivated to engage in and commit to the initiative.

7.3.2 Multistakeholder Food Governance Network Actors (Agency)

In addition to structure, the actual members involved in the CFIC and the development of the CFS affect the network policy outcomes. Individuals or even particular organizations were mentioned as having special influence. What was noteworthy in this case study was the influence of certain members throughout the process of CFS development. Some interview participants felt that certain members in the CFIC were more influential than others. Industry, in general, was identified as the most influential member in the CFS process. Industry voices tended to be louder and participated more frequently. Many seemed to associate industry's activeness with higher investment contributions. This was not always factual but was the perception of many participants.

Loblaw was frequently identified as a special investor, and indeed Loblaw did have a special position in the CFS development. It was the one food company that had a partnership with the CBoC when the CFIC was being developed. Galen Weston was at the helm of Loblaw's involvement in the CFIC. Loblaw was an important participant that encouraged other companies to join the CFIC. This was either done by Galen Weston or through a joint letter with the CBoC and Galen Weston. In addition, many investor meetings were held at Loblaw headquarters. Again, it was perceived by many that Loblaw's position and participation in the CFIC and the development of the CFS

meant that Loblaw had contributed a significantly higher amount of money than any other investor. However, it was later noted that Loblaw invested the same amount as any other champion investor but did sponsor a couple of Food Summits and provided space for investor meetings. Nonetheless, while the prominence of Loblaw and Galen Weston was sometimes an asset, especially in terms of encouraging other companies to join the CFIC as investors, it was generally also seen as a challenge. The entire CFIC and the CFS process was seen by some as a Loblaw initiative. It was noted that because of this, while some were encouraged to join, others shied away from joining the CFIC and investing in the CFS development. For example, it may have been perceived by other grocery retailers that because Loblaw was already involved in the CFIC and the CFS as a prominent investor, they were not going to encroach on its territory. It seemed as if there was room for only one retail champion in the CFS. Indeed, no other grocery retailer signed on as an investor in the CFIC. Many of Loblaw's suppliers signed on as investors, a few of them suggested they were strongly encouraged to do so because Loblaw was one of their biggest customers. Thus, while Loblaw encouraged new investors, the Loblaw suppliers may not have been interested or have had the same vision as Loblaw for the Canadian food system but simply joined to please one of their biggest customers. This threatened the cohesion of problem definition.

Secondly, the Loblaw leadership may have discouraged the participation of other industry players in the food system, which also threatened the cohesion of the CFS process. At the same time, some industry representatives observed high participation of civil society in the Food Summits. These were the attendees that tended to disagree with many ideas and approaches within the CFIC process, and often criticized big

business. Industry participants, however, always felt attacked. It seemed as if industry felt that their strategy and space was being taken over, and this takeover was not welcomed, resulting in industry losing interest and commitment in the process. If different groups, like industry and civil society, had diverse understandings of the CFS, this suggests that not a lot of preliminary work was done by the CBoC to define the purpose of the CFS and who it was for. Again, problem definition would have been key in terms of avoiding conflict. Multistakeholder food governance networks require a significant amount of preparatory work by the “manager” at the beginning of the initiative to ensure a process that encourages commitment, participation, and ownership from the members.

Aside from the influence of specific actors which threatened the cohesion of the network, some participants, including the CBoC, noted fewer participants in the annual Food Summits. Lower rankings of civil servants were being sent to subsequent Food Summits. One government representative noticed a loss of interest in the CFIC and CFS on the part of several investors because of many issues that occurred in the process. Another non-state actor mentioned, that while it can be hard to keep the attention of different organizations working on a collaborative initiative over time, it did seem like many people were becoming disgruntled with the CBoC and the process. This also included non-investors attending annual Food Summits. This decreased interest and participation shows commitment loss. The success of an MFGN depends on the continued and engaged participation of members. Decreased participation and engagement of members in multistakeholder initiatives is a major factor in network failure (Truex & Søreide, 2010), threatening the existence of any policy outcome.

7.3.3 Multistakeholder Food Governance Network Process

It was found that not only was structure and agency of the CFS important to consider; process also played a big part in the success of the CFS. Process influenced structure and agency, and vice versa. Following Marsh's (1998) model, (with my process addition see Figure 9), these components had dialectical relationships. Throughout the CFS process, there were many concerns raised by different members and investors.

Several participants discussed ideological bias in the research process. However, one participant discussed bias from a structural perspective, noting that the CBoC decided on a paradigm and perspective before the research process began, creating ideological boundaries for the process. This meant that any research or policy solutions that existed outside of those boundaries were not considered. The research that was done, as many non-state actors and government participants claimed, was tied to the interests of big food businesses and industrial agricultural. Government representatives noted frustration with the one-sided approach that the CBoC was using, expressing that it was not the problem that they were taking a particular side in the debate, but that the other side of the debate was never explored. Supply management proved to be a particularly problematic issue for government. There was clear concern from government around ideological bias or "intellectual dishonesty" in the process (personal communication, PG 1). However, because this concern was not addressed, government representatives became apathetic to the CFIC research and the development of the CFS. Government noted that their concern was that the CBoC was not factual in representing government programs and policies. As such, government wanted to ensure that no material diverging from government programming and policies

was being shared with anyone[17], specifically around a new strategy that was being developed by a government department at the time. The perception of bias produced distrust between the investors and the CBoC, causing issues for network cohesion and endangered the possibility of ever developing a common problem definition and policy solution.

In addition to the organizational and research bias that was perceived by many research participants, the actual research process was also considered an issue. The development of research and spread of information that occurs through MSI development is not discussed much in the multistakeholder literature. The general sentiment that came out of participants around research was that the CBoC had no expertise in the food issue until they hired a food researcher. CBoC's research capacity was identified as a big problem by industry and government, citing big frustrations around the money that they invested and the quality of research that was coming out of the CFIC. Government also noted that they had to "feed" the CBoC a lot of data and research while expressing the frustration around paying someone and doing the work for them (personal communication, PG 1). It did not seem as if government took the CBoC seriously because the CBoC was new and inexperienced in the food scene in the eyes of many participants. Many observed that the CBoC simply did not have the background to understand the complexities involved in the Canadian food system, including historical issues and stakeholder relationships. The perceived low quality of the CBoC's research damaged the credibility of the CBoC and discouraged more

[17] This was of particular concern to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency who was developing a food safety strategy at the same time.

meaningful participation of investors. However, the idea of having research and information developed out of a collaborative effort proved to be a valuable contribution for many investors. Several participants explained the benefits of having multiple research reports to access in one spot. According to Pattberg and Widerberg (2016), reporting and monitoring are important parts of the network process, which can provide transparency for members. This also helps build the body of knowledge around the policy issue, supporting the development of a common definition of the food issue, which is vital to effective policymaking. Despite this praise, consultations on research reports were one of the most criticized aspects of the entire process. Most of this frustration came from government, both provincial and federal, who felt that their comments and feedback were not considered. This was especially frustrating for them because many of those comments were made by civil servants who practice policy and research food and agricultural policy every day, while the CBoC (aside from Jean-Charles LeVallée) was considered a novice in this area. This again, caused government to lose interest and commitment to the project because they did not feel like co-creators in the effort. Participants from both levels of government suggested the lack of engagement in shaping the research agenda, which agrees with CBoC's stance on investors not influencing their research directions.

Many participants discussed consultation as part of the CFS process. Antonova (2011) found that often, people wanted to participate in MSIs to engage in dialogue and listen to other perspectives and values about the issue. The convening aspect of consultation in the process was considered to be one of the most valuable aspects of the CFS creation. This brought together different actors in the food system that rarely or

never interact. It also made industry more aware of some of the issues, beyond economics, that are impacting the food system. Bringing food policy discussions to the fore was seen as a positive accomplishment of the CBoC. Many participants mentioned that the increased conversation around food at that time was very beneficial. Being able to hear different perspectives and experiences around the room was considered a big advantage in the process. Bringing people together to discuss food policy developed new relationships and trust between members of the network which can overcome misunderstandings, prejudices, and stereotypes spurring new relationships and a foundation for more effective collaboration (Rühli et al, 2015). This is a good way of involving non-state actors creating what Bäckstrand (2006) calls “governance from below” (p. 291).

However, over time, participants explained that even the best aspect of the process, convening, deteriorated. Some participants remarked that the process was rushed towards the end. Others claimed that the convening broke down because of the CBoC and its desire to be the keeper of the CFS and the gatekeeper of any research which required money or investment to be shared. Through interviews, it was identified that leadership was, in fact, a big issue in the process. Many participants felt that the CFS turned into a “CBoC initiative,” rather than one that could perhaps be named a “multistakeholder” initiative. This showed that the identities and interdependencies between other investors involved in the strategy were not emphasized. CBoC was seen as the organization in the room with the most power since they were “holding the pen.” Investor meetings were perceived by a few investors as being “controlled” by CBoC. Many investors felt that they were not co-creators in the CFS, especially when their

feedback was not being considered. Some government representatives felt that the CBoC wanted to make a few very specific statements regardless of what feedback they got. Nonetheless, CBoC was frustrated with the process because of the divergence of views and the large amount of feedback they received. It became increasingly difficult to find consensus and create a document that reflected all interests. The CBoC also struggled with accepting feedback and maintaining objectivity. There was a clear struggle being experienced by the CBoC throughout the whole process. The CBoC likely underestimated the complexity, politics, and value-ridden nature of food policy at the beginning of the process. This is why the CBoC began to lose credibility as the process went on, where many said they were no longer taking its research seriously.

Gray (2007) notes that convening is an important part of leadership at the beginning of the MSI. Convening is not just bringing people together. Gray (2007) explains that convening involves different responsibilities including determining whether consensus is possible, ensuring that everyone's views and interests are represented in the initiative, as well as finding resources to design an effective process for the MSI. This also includes ensuring the right representation of members. While bringing people together was a successful part of convening, some of the other tasks required to successfully convene were not given enough attention since a few participants were unhappy about the process and the overrepresentation of a group of actors during the Food Summits. Thus, even though convening was seen as a very positive consequence of the CFS, aspects of convening were not commended. This clearly carved a distinction between stakeholders in the CFS development. Industry and government

were the big players attending exclusive investor meetings, while those who attended Summits were smaller players and largely made up of civil society.

The effectiveness of the network itself depends on how the initiative is led. Leadership is a particularly important feature of MFGNs. Good leadership successfully develops mutual problem understanding and is more likely to develop a common solution. Ineffective leadership can result in mistrust and inertia because of a lack of transparency in decision-making. Metagovernance literature discusses a fine balance of government leadership within a network. This can be translated to any MFGN leadership, even if it is not government leading the network. Multistakeholder literature notes that leadership in a network must be flexible depending on which phase the network is in (Gray, 2007); however, this was not apparent in the CFS. In phase 1 (problem setting), leadership should be engaging in what Gray (2007) identifies as appreciation, visioning, and convening. While convening was a constant forte of the CBoC throughout the initiative, appreciation (or the identification of interdependencies between participants) or visioning (identifying different social, political, economic realities of participants and how they affect collaboration) did not seem to materialize at the time. Without this crucial preliminary leadership phase, the MFGN can be perceived as apolitical, ignoring the power imbalances between different organizations. This, in turn, affects the development of shared goals and a common problem definition.

Phase 2 of the network (direction setting) should involve the development of common understandings of issues and solutions (Gray, 2007). However, considering how many participants felt about the dominance of CBoC's ideas in the CFS, it shows that a common understanding of problems and solutions was not accomplished. A

sense of ownership for investors was missing by the end of the initiative. This affected the trust between participants and the CBoC. The balance between leadership and the decentralization of governance was not achieved by the CBoC, which eroded the accountability of CBoC in the eyes of its members.

Many participants criticized the general consultation process throughout the development of the CFS. Whether consultations were the annual Food Summits, regional meetings, or investor meetings, many complained about too many presentations being done by the CBoC, and not enough time for discussion. Summits and meetings were run by the CBoC and were often content-heavy information updates. Some participants noted a sheer lack of effort to engage investors and other stakeholders in the food system. Others outright observed that the consultations developed by the CBoC were not ones that encouraged engagement and participation from investors and other stakeholders. For this reason, many investors and non-investors who attended Summits did not feel part of the development process of the CFS. One participant called the engagement process “tokenistic at best” (personal communication, NGO 2), suggesting that engagement was not genuine. It was clear that many participants were unsure as to what exactly was considered “consultation” by the CBoC. This created many transparency issues between the CBoC and the investors and other stakeholders. Some participants felt that meetings and Summits became a waste of time since their input was not being considered, and true engagement was not occurring. As such, it appeared that in the end, many felt that it did not matter whether they attended any consultations, because the CBoC would do what it wanted. However, based on participant responses, there must have been an imbalance in the way certain

investors were being treated. Often, industry (though not all industry participants), thought that consultations were effective and there was time for discussion and feedback, specifically referring to investor meetings. Government and non-governmental actors (and some industry participants) thought otherwise. Government and non-governmental actors described investor meetings as ineffective, not consultative, and lacking engagement. They also mentioned that many of the bigger industry players had the chance to speak and voice a few comments. Others described the investor meetings as very passive noting that the expertise in the room was never used. It seemed as if some investors felt their feedback was stifled in these meetings since they repeated that the CBoC did not seem well set-up for criticism. A few participants also felt that there was no effort made to create a consensus. As such, how the CBoC achieved their conclusions in the research reports and the CFS was not transparent to them. One participant called this a “black box.” There was never a vote or any form of consensus formation among investors. It was clear that some investors felt discarded in the process.

Dialogue was a popular topic in interviews, where many noted again, that it was not very present throughout consultations. Dialogue requires a two-way discussion, and the CBoC’s process was identified by many as one-sided and ideologically biased. Dialogue was, therefore, a concern in the formulation of the CFS. There were two general issues with dialogue: the creation of a one-sided conversation that did not provide opportunities for feedback or discussion, as well as an imbalanced conversation that favoured certain actors over others when developing ideas for a food strategy. This, to a large extent, was the reason why the federal and provincial governments felt

disconnected from a more genuine engagement in the development of the CFS. They generally felt that the CBoC's ideological bias was ignoring both sides of the conversation, and thus creating a very narrow perspective that prevented dialogue and the inclusion of different stakeholders in the CFS' development. Rühli et al (2015) argue that MSIs are valuable tools because they can create dialogue about the policy issue. This becomes especially important when dialogue is created between state and non-state actors affected by food policy, and more importantly, between actors who do not tend to interact with each other.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This dissertation set out to better understand food policymaking in Canada through a multistakeholder process. It was framed by one main question and some sub-questions:

- What are some unique characteristics of multistakeholder networks in the policymaking process?
    - Why did the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy as a multistakeholder governance network policy development process fail?
    - What lessons does the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy initiative provide in terms of multistakeholder policymaking?

The case of the development of the Canadian Food Strategy by the Conference Board of Canada was selected to better understand the complexity of food policy through a multistakeholder initiative. This was a qualitative study that used interviews from food policy experts, civil servants, civil society, industry, and industry associations to collect data.

A selection of literature was used to understand the development of the CFS and what this meant for food policy and public policy in general: wicked policy problems, governance and private governance, network, and multistakeholder literature. Wicked policy problem literature analyzed the complexity of food policy, identifying characteristics Canadian food policy contains that makes its development so difficult, especially in the case of the CFS. Governance and private governance literature examined the role of the state in the CFS and considered reasons for which non-state actors rather than state actors were developing food policy in Canada. Network literature investigated the form of collaboration the CBoC's CFIC took when developing the CFS and how this impacted the policy outcomes in the initiative. Finally, multistakeholder literature complemented network literature to explore the more practical challenges and opportunities that arose throughout the process of strategy

development. These bodies of literature were combined to arrive at some fundamental conclusions.

8.1 Summary of Findings

In 2011, three non-state actors (The Canadian Federation of Agriculture, the Canadian Agri-food Policy Institute, and Food Secure Canada) came out with their own versions of national food strategies for Canada. A few years after, in 2014, the CBoC came out with its CFS. This strategy was fairly comprehensive in terms of topics, it had several investors (though with a few important actors like civil society missing), and many more financial resources than any of the previous non-state food strategies. Industry and government were also key players in the CFS, which was not the case with the other three strategies. This was the first time that some of the biggest food industry actors in Canada were participating in the development of food policy. The CFS seemed like it had all the tools to become the first successful non-state national food strategy; however, in the end, it was not deemed successful by participants. Food policy in and of itself is complex, and at times “wicked,” however, there were also many challenges throughout the development of the CFS that impacted its policy outcome. This study took a closer look at both the complexity of the policy and the development of the CFS. Three major findings resulted. First, food policy is complex. It is made up of both tame and wicked policy problems. Thus, rather than labeling food policy a wicked policy problem or a complex one, I concluded that it is better represented by a sliding scale of “wickedness”, containing both tame and wicked policy problem attributes. Second, it was found that the state must be involved in multistakeholder food governance networks. Non-state actors must be involved in food policy development, but the state

must take on a prominent role in the network. Private governance is therefore not recommended for developing food policy. Lastly, when examining multistakeholder food governance networks and policy outcomes, while structure and actors of the network were found to be important, process was fundamentally significant in relation to the multistakeholder food governance network's policy outcome. Process became the most problematic element of the CFS initiative.

Food policy has been confirmed as a multifaceted and complex policy that is problematic to develop. Rittel and Weber (1973) identify wicked policy problems as having ten key characteristics. In this study, some factors common in wicked policy problems were revealed through the CFS development. Food policy was identified as a wicked policy problem, largely because it lacked a common problem definition or "food problem", which then prevented the creation of a common solution. This was revealed in various ways. First, and most generally, food policy is complex because there is no single problem definition of the "food problem." Various state and non-state actors in the food system understand the "food problem" differently. This understanding depends on their position in the food system, their own interests, goals, and values they bring to it. With so many different perceptions of the "food problem," it becomes very challenging to develop a policy that reflects everyone's interests, goals, and values in the food system. Second, food policy also involves many different state and non-state actors. Each of these actors carries knowledge and expertise with them. For example, government departments and bodies work in a fragmented environment, often without the knowledge of each other's expertise. Each actor working in their own part of the "food system puzzle" also has expertise that is typically not shared with other actors. This

creates a very fragmented approach to the food system, but more importantly, it creates different definitions of the “food problem” and the solution. All these actors also carry different values which further mystifies the food problem because each actor in the food system, may be defining the “food problem” from their own perch in the food system, but also their own values, interests, and goals in the food system. With so many voices and perspectives in the food system, it becomes quite challenging to unite them into a national food policy. Lastly, there is an additional complexity involved in food policymaking in Canada. On its own, food policy requires a comprehensive and joined-up approach which blends different policy domains because of the way the food system functions and the intricacies in the relationships within the system. This is a true challenge in and of itself. However, Canada has a federalist government, which means that roles and responsibilities are dispersed between different jurisdictions. Agriculture and health are two big policy domains in the food system that are shared between three jurisdictions: federal, provincial, and municipal. Other policy domains are scattered between the jurisdictions. This makes it difficult to join different policy domains and governments to work together on shared policy goals in the food system. Joined-up food policymaking is therefore challenging.

The lack of a common problem definition, multiple jurisdictions and policy sectors, and the involvement of diverse stakeholders often with contradictory priorities and values, make food policy a wicked policy problem. Wicked policy problems are often those policies that are impossible to solve because of their innate complexity. However, if that were the case, rather than dismissing food policy as too “wicked” to solve, I agree with Head (2018) noting that wicked problems may not be ever fully

solvable, but they can be *managed*. Moreover, the “food problem” is not in and of itself a wicked policy problem. There are many subparts within the “food problem,” and some, in fact, can be tame policy problems.

Given the amount of non-state actors involved in the CFS, and the fact that the CBoC is a non-state actor working largely with food industry, I originally approached the CFS as a private governance initiative. However, through interviews, I discovered that while the CFS might have initially started as a private governance initiative, it quickly became apparent to the organizers that the state’s involvement was crucial for the development of food policy. It was particularly surprising to hear that many of the biggest food companies in Canada discussed the need to involve government directly in the development of national food policy, whether as a “metagovernor” or a leader. As such, the idea of “governance” was understood as a continuum. At one end of the continuum government is the sole policymaker, while at the very opposite end, non-state actors are the sole policymakers. Different policy endeavours fall within different sides of the continuum, which means that policy initiatives do not have to be either purely governed by government or by non-state actors. There can be variations of their participation. This was a more flexible explanation as to why under the era of governance, we continue to see state-led policy initiatives alongside non-state led policy initiatives and other initiatives which have mixed participation. It was found that given the complexity of food policy, many actors thought that the state was needed to build consensus and legitimacy among a large group of actors with diverse interests, values, and understandings of the food problem. This led to the conclusion that the CBoC did not succeed in developing a national food strategy that was built on consensus and

legitimacy, because the state was not leading the initiative. This suggested that the idea of metagovernance, where government leads a network of state and non-state actors, is particularly important to consider in food policymaking. This may especially be important for wicked policy problems or even more complex policy problems developed nationally because of the state's ability to build legitimacy in the policymaking system. Non-state actors may only be able to play a more active role around tamer policy problems.

My third finding centres on the challenges and opportunities observed throughout the development of the CFS. These observations were analyzed using structure, actors (agency), and process aspects of the multistakeholder network. It was found that membership (the physical size) and the intellectual size (the scope) of the network was particularly important. Membership was limited given the "pay-to-play" structure that was enforced by the CBoC, where the CBoC played the role of gatekeeper in terms of who would become an investor. Many were not able to invest and therefore become members of the CFIC because membership prices were prohibitive. Having the right number of members and the key members around the table to craft a national food strategy was vital. The intellectual size of the network became too big because the CBoC attempted to discuss everything in the food system. This deterred many investors involved, especially the participants representing government agencies because the strategy no longer looked realistic to them and thus no longer had a purpose. For this reason, it is also important to balance high-level ideas with detailed-actions in a strategy to give network members enough flexible direction to guide them.

Actors were also identified as important within the network. There were organizations and individuals with special influence in the CFS. Industry, in general, was

identified by other investors and other participants in the Food Summits and meetings. Loblaw was identified as a special member given their hand in the development of the CFIC and bringing in other investors. Galen Weston was an actor often named as very influential in the process, seen as almost a partner of the CBoC in investor meetings. The perception that certain organizations and individuals have special roles in the development of the CFS, may have brought in a few more industry investors, but it discouraged many others from joining. In the end, this threatened the emergence of a common problem definition as many investors felt that they were brought in to satisfy Loblaw. This feeling threatened the cohesion of the network. Once a power imbalance was identified between members, some felt their contributions to the network did not matter as much as others'. This decreased their commitment and participation in the CFS overall. Power imbalance must always be avoided in networks and may be a reason why government as a metagovernor could be a necessary approach in networks dealing with more complex and potentially controversial policies. Government tends to be seen as a more neutral player than other non-state actors in policy development which legitimizes its leadership in networks.

Lastly, it was found that process was largely problematic in the CFS development and was most often discussed by participants. Process was particularly important in the CFS because it influenced and was influenced by the structure and actors in the CFS. Ideological bias, research, consultation, and leadership were identified as key challenges of the CFS process. Throughout the development of the CFS, the perception that the CBoC's vision was closely associated with the interests of big industry was a source of concern for several investors. When government investors, the biggest critics

of the ideological bias, attempted to rectify this big industry bias, they felt largely dismissed on these issues, which caused government representatives to become apathetic to the CFS. The CBoC's research did not live up to the expectations of investors, which damaged the credibility of the CBoC as well as the final CFS product. While reporting was considered a generally well-accomplished feat of the CBoC, the research was criticized heavily. This also related to the consultation process of the CBoC throughout the CFS development, which was also deemed to be inadequate by several participants. Many did not feel as if they were genuinely consulted, a genuine dialogue was missing, and several felt ignored throughout the consultation process. While the convening of different players in the food system was identified a success, the lack of accurate consultation posed a very big problem in the network. This was seen to be CBoC's project, not a process that involved the investors or any other participants, ultimately causing the CBoC to lose credibility. The process became a "black box," and there was a feeling of lack of transparency in the eyes of some investors.

Leadership was also an issue in the CFS process. The CBoC failed to take some of the necessary steps in constructing the network. To ensure cohesion and a successful policy outcome such as defining a common goal, addressing power imbalances and taking measures for conflict resolution. This failure reduced the trust of the investors towards the leadership of the CBoC. Distrust, disinterest, and disillusion ultimately led to the inertia and disbandment of the network once the final policy product was published. Future attempts by the CBoC to further the work of the CFIC failed to attract investors. While some of the same investors continue to attend the annual CBoC

Food Summits, recent summits seem to be nothing more than conferences rather than processes working towards the development of new policy products.

8.2 Contributions of the Study

Academically, my study contributes to two major fields: policy studies and food studies. In policy studies, I contribute to three different bodies of literature: wicked policy problems, governance, and network literature.

In wicked policy problem literature, I nuance the idea of the binary between tame and wicked policy problem, by suggesting that this binary is not fixed and is more blurry than originally suggested by wicked policy problem scholars. I therefore confirm the claims set forth by more recent wicked policy problem scholars (Alford & Head, 2017; Newman & Head, 2017; Roberts, 2018).

In governance literature, by examining the role of the state debate, I support the ideas of some other scholars that the state has not receded but continues to play an important role in policymaking (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Hughes, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Plattner, 2013). Also, I argue that the governance era has created a sliding scale of governance where there is some policymaking that requires a central role for government, and others which do not. These changes in state roles can happen within a policy domain. However, when it comes to wicked policy problems, the state is needed as a central actor.

Thirdly, in network literature, I use multistakeholder literature to help scholars better understand networks made up of state and non-state actors. I develop the idea of a multistakeholder food governance network which is specific to the food policymaking

environment and find that in addition to structure and actors, process is a crucial aspect of the network in terms of successful policy outcomes.

Lastly, I contribute to food studies. With the unveiling of the new Food Policy for Canada recently, more Canadian food studies scholars have been writing about food policymaking and its difficulties. My work, which takes inspiration from European food policy and governance scholarship, brings to light discussions on state and non-state actors in food policymaking, especially in multistakeholder processes. This will add to the growing food governance literature in Canada, but also hopefully encourage more scholars to approach food studies from a policy studies perspective and examine the intricacies within the process, especially as we start a new journey with the Food Policy for Canada.

8.3 Limitations of the Study

There were a few limitations in my study, which were methodological limitations[18], and those having to do with the study's breadth.

Methodologically, there were issues with elite interviews. First, it was very difficult to access some investors, especially the elite participants. For this reason, not as many elite interviews were conducted as was hoped, specifically industry investors. The time constraints of the doctoral program also limited the amount of time I could spend on elite participant recruitment.

Second, openness in elite interviews was also an issue. Elite participants tend to express professional opinions on behalf of their organization in interviews (Kincaid &

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[18] These limitations are detailed in Chapter 4.

Bright, 1957; Welch et al, 2002, p. 621). However, in these interviews, I was seeking personal opinions and experiences. After I established rapport with my elite participants, they often opened up more, but many still did not want to have certain comments on record or did not want to discuss or give further details on some topics. This limited the information that was shared with me and the amount of data I could extract from the interviews.

In terms of breadth of the study, four limitations were experienced. These would have been projects that would be too big and too long for the doctoral dissertation. First, it would have been beneficial to examine all four non-state food strategies developed in Canada between 2010 and 2014. This would have been a good opportunity to compare and contrast the initiatives in terms of the challenges and opportunities that arose throughout the initiatives' processes. Such an examination would have triangulated my results from the CFS with other non-state food policy initiatives.

Similarly, examining other similar international non-state food, for example, the Scotland Food and Drink Strategy, may have brought out some interesting differences and similarities between the processes, and perhaps the impacts of policymaking environments in both countries.

Thirdly, it would have been beneficial to do a longitudinal study of the CFS and interviews with key participants throughout the development of the CFS, at the beginning, during, middle, at the end, and a couple of years out to get a better sense of the process that was unfolding. This may have also brought out more details in participant interviews, and potentially more interviews because participants may have felt closer to the topic at different points in time. Some CBoC participants had also

transitioned out of the CFIC and may have had noteworthy comments reflecting on their years in the CFIC and their experience developing the CFS.

Lastly, examining the role of policy ideas in the CBoC's CFS may have provided more insights into the reasons why the CFS was not successful. This could be Some scholars like Kisby (2007) discuss the role of ideas in the relationship between policy networks and policy outcomes claiming that this is a relationship that is left out of Marsh and Smith's (2000) understanding of policy network analysis. Kisby (2007) finds that Marsh and Smith's (2000) theorization of policy outcomes from policy networks ignore the role ideas play in motivating agents to participate in networks and what impact external ideas can have on the network.

8.4 Implications and Applications of my Study

There have been some positive consequences of CBoC's earlier efforts of developing the CFS. Although these may or may not be directly attributable to the convening efforts of the CBoC during the CFS development, it likely was a factor in making food and food discussions more popular. The CBoC continued to put on annual Food Summits, later renamed Food and Drink Summits since the publication of the CFS. This continued to bring together different food industries, government, and sometimes NGOs. The Food and Drink Summit industry delegates are largely different from those who were involved in the Food Summits during the CFS development. Industry associations tend to be regular participants in the Food and Drink Summits, as are certain government bodies like Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. There has also been an informal budding multistakeholder initiative that followed the CFS. What is notable about this new multistakeholder governance network is that it includes one of the biggest meat

processing companies in Canada and one of the organizational leaders of the Canadian food movement who are working together on issues like food security and food policy governance in Canada. This informal network is linked with Maple Leaf Foods' Feed Opportunity Centre for Action on Food Security created in 2016. This network is a combination of food industry, civil society, academics, and other NGOs. In 2017, in partnership with the University of Guelph's Arrell Food Institute, the informal network coordinated and published a report on governing food policy in Canada which was sent to Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. While I am not attributing this informal network to the previous initiatives of the CBoC at the CFIC, it may be possible that CBoC's food initiatives helped many big food companies think about diverse issues in the food system and encouraged different actors in the food system to communicate. However, the most significant development since the CFS is the development of a national food policy for Canada by the federal government. Previous initiatives, not just CBoC's, have certainly helped bring the "food issue" to the fore of Canadian politics, as have many activists and civil society organizations for decades. This is where I believe my research has significant implications and applications beyond theoretical and academic contributions. There are also valuable insights that inform the readers of the challenges and opportunities regarding multistakeholder policy networks. This can be helpful for the potential food policy advisory council proposed by the Minister of AAFC in June 2019.

As the Canadian government begins its journey with a historic national food policy for Canada, there are a few things that must be considered. My research has clearly shown that it is difficult to create consensus within certain areas of food policy because it includes many stakeholders, values, interests, and goals. Problem definitions

of various food problems must be negotiated over time. While some aspects of food policy are wicked, other pieces can be tame, or tamer. It is important to thus consider that some food problems may never be completely solved but can be managed. This means that research, policy tools, and implementation related to the wicked aspects of food policy should be frequently evaluated and re-evaluated. The joined-up aspect of food policy in Canada requires special attention because this is where much of the "wickedness" in food policy is concentrated. Another vital action would be to identify the tamer aspects of food policy in Canada, the low-hanging fruit, the high-level ideas that many stakeholders can agree on. These are good starting points not just for discussion, but also for policy development and implementation. Future food policy can build on these stepping stones to encourage commitment and collaboration between different stakeholders. This also means that food policy requires multiple actors. Different actors throughout the food system hold different pieces of the food policy puzzle, with specialized knowledge and unique experiences that are vital for the development of effective policy. Developing MFGNs is imperative when creating and managing food policy. The government's role in these networks is critical. While other non-state actors should be involved in food policy development and implementation, government should be the principal actor in the network. Private governance approaches are not appropriate when working with wicked policy problems or even complex policy issues. As such, the federal government should continue to lead the initiative on a food policy for Canada, and continue to involve non-governmental actors, including civil society, industry, academics, and other NGOs working in the food system in a meaningful way. National food policy is a long-term and ongoing policy process.

Additionally, the federal government has also announced the creation of a Canadian Food Policy Advisory Council. If this council becomes a genuine governance and engagement mechanism, it will be a good tool used to ensure food policy becomes a long-term and continuous policy process. This is where some further lessons from this study will also be useful not just for the national food policy council, but for future collaborative work in the food system. Because this council will be populated with stakeholders from all over the food system, it becomes a formal MFGN. It is therefore important to consider three things: structure, actors, and process. The size of the network, both physically and intellectually, will be important. For the Canadian Food Policy Advisory Council, it may be more important to consider the membership makeup and size of the council. Key actors representing different sectors should be there; however, it is important to note that these stakeholders must be included in the council from the beginning. The council should also not be too big. While it is important to identify the key actors involved, it should not include everyone under the umbrella. It is important to discuss power imbalances and relationships at the beginning of the council formation to ensure that everyone feels they have equal power. The process of governance or research of the Canadian Food Policy Advisory Council or any other MFGN is also crucial. The research process must be free of ideological bias, supported by sound evidence and data. Academics, as members of the council, may be a positive reinforcement of this approach. Consultation done by the council must include genuine dialogue and discussion, where any feedback from food system stakeholders, citizens, and members of the council should be discussed and integrated into future work. The council should be a governance tool used to enhance the legitimacy and transparency

of food policymaking in Canada, rather than to mystify it. This will ensure that citizens, stakeholders, and members of the council are committed to the development and effectiveness of food policy in Canada. In this process, leadership is crucial. The government must take on a clear leadership role that allows it to convene members and stakeholders and act as an actor that can encourage common ground, actions on policy decisions, resolve conflicts within the council, and balance power between different member relationships. Problem definition must also be developed every time a new food issue is discussed, and it must constantly be evaluated and re-evaluated. This ensures that each member of the council steps off the same step, making it more likely that each member reaches the same policy solution.

8.5 Further Research

Future research should continue to explore cases of MFGNs noting other opportunities and challenges that arise, specifically paying attention to characteristics of wicked and complex policymaking. The Canadian Food Policy Advisory Council being developed in Canada, as well as the informal network between Maple Leaf Foods and other food system stakeholders could be good case studies. The former is more formal, led by government, while the latter is less formal with a non-state actor membership. This could be a good comparative study to understand some of the cleavages between formal versus informal and state-led mixed networks versus non-state actor networks. In addition, some private governance initiatives have also developed, including the Grocers/Manufacturers Collaborative in Canada, which is a collection of food grocers and manufacturers, though little public information is available on it. It could be interesting to compare and contrast networks dealing with food system issues along the

governance continuum. For example, comparing and contrasting private governance initiatives like the Grocers/Manufacturers Collaborative, with mixed non-state networks such as the informal one stemming from Maple Leaf Foods' Feed Opportunity, mixed networks including the state like the upcoming National Food Policy Council, and another network that is solely led by the state. What can we learn from the differences and similarities in terms of collaborative efforts in food policy from these varying governance networks? Which policy development works well with what type of network?

Collaborative governance can be additional literature explored in relation to MFGNs, identifying other conceptualizations of collaboration between state and non-state actors, especially in terms of process in collaborations. Civil society and industry traditionally are at odds with each other in many issues in society, and during the development of the CFS, this was no different. However, some industry actors and civil society members worked together following the CFS. Why was such a relationship possible in the informal MFGN? An examination into the relationships between industry and civil society in networks such as MFGNs is warranted.

Lastly, with the unveiling of the first Food Policy for Canada, many questions come flooding with it and merit in-depth studies down the road. However, now is also the time to trace the policy development from 2015's announcement of the policy to its unveiling in June 2019. What instigated the development of a national food policy led by the state? Were there policy entrepreneurs that encouraged or influenced this process? What was the policy development process? What were the power relationships between different federal departments and provincial/municipal level governments? What does the food policy community in Canada look like now? Why did it change again? As time

passes and we learn more about the food policy, more questions will arise. This historic process must be thoroughly documented and researched.

8.6 Concluding Thoughts

Many food system actors realize that our food system is failing. We have a “food problem”, a food system that is unsustainable, unhealthy, and unjust. We see unprecedented environmental problems associated with food production, health problems associated with diet, ethical problems through the entire food supply chain, and inequality in the access to healthy and culturally appropriate food. If there is one thing everyone in the food system agrees on, it is that “business cannot continue as usual” - something must change.

There are many ways to create the change many wish to see, and of course, many do not see the same required changes. This is one of the other biggest and arguably dangerous divides in our society regarding the food system. Many food system actors are at odds with each other. They may be discussing the same issue, but using a different language to understand it, and thus speaking past each other. Often, this ensures that actors who are not speaking the same “language” do not communicate at all. As a result, we hit standstills and impasses. No one can agree on anything, so nothing is done, and we watch as our planet dies, our bodies get sick, and people go hungry in a world where we have more food than we have ever had in history. This binary food policy debate (Clapp, 2016a) is what inspired and encouraged my research. While we can, and should always imagine ideals of what could be, swift but incremental change, through the building of bridges may be just what we need. Finding common ground between actors in the food system is becoming vital to see change in our current

food system. We face many forks in the road in food policymaking but closing that gap between the two paths might get us closer to a sustainable, healthy, and just food system. It is important that in the world of wicked policy problems we construct what Erik Olin Wright (2014) has called “real utopias,”

> utopian ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity, utopian destinations that have pragmatically accessible waystations, utopian designs of institutions that can inform our practical tasks of muddling through in a world of imperfect conditions for social change (Wright, 2014, p. vii).

This means that we should be building alternatives in our world today that show us what the world could be. We must experiment with alternatives and with alternative partners. As Canada journeys for the first time with a national food policy, the themes of collaboration, waystations, and experimentations could not be truer. We have never had a food policy before, and no single actor has the answers to solve our food system problems. Given the complex and tangled web of wicked, tamer, and tamed problems in the food system, we must create space for experimentation both for government and for non-state actors involved in policy development. Food policy is truly an exercise in the “science of muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959).

Appendices

Appendix 1 Food Policy Experts: Information Letter, Consent Form, Interview Guide

Information Letter

Dear *FOOD POLICY EXPERTS*,

My name is Margaret Bancerz, I am doctoral candidate at Ryerson University. I would like to invite you to participate in my research study on industry and food policy in Canada being conducted under the guidance of Dr. Mustafa Koc. This study has been approved the Ryerson University's Research Ethics Board.

The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally.

As an expert in Canadian food policy, I believe you are a crucial voice in this discussion and I would love to have the opportunity to interview you to get your perspective on how industry is working to develop a national food strategy in Canada and what this means for the future of governing in the Canadian food system.

You will be asked to engage in a 60 minute interview consisting of 8-10 questions on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

Some of the study's interview questions include:

1. Do you think the Canadian Food Strategy reflects a new tendency in the current food policymaking regime?
2. What are some strengths of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
    a. What are some weaknesses of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
    b. What would you change about it?

Thank you for your consideration.

For more information please contact **Margaret Bancerz**:

Email: **mbancerz@ryerson.ca**

Phone: **647-835-9075**

Ryerson University Consent Agreement

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this consent form so that you understand what your participation will involve. Before you consent to participate, please ask any questions to be sure you understand what your participation will involve.
Industry and Food Policy in Canada: A Case Study of the Canadian Food Strategy – Food Policy Experts

INVESTIGATORS:
This research study is being conducted by Margaret Bancerz (BA, MES), PhD candidate from Policy Studies at Ryerson University. This study is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Mustafa Koc.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Margaret Bancerz at mbancerz@ryerson.ca or phone 647-835-9075.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally. The study will be recruiting approximately 45 participants in total from four research participant groups: Canadian food policy experts, Conference Board of Canada researchers directly involved in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy, representatives of government agencies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada, and representatives of those companies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada. This study is being done in partial completion of a doctoral degree where the results of the study will contribute to a doctoral dissertation.

WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO:
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 40-60 minute interview on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS:
Potential benefits may include a greater understanding of the roles of non-governmental actors in policy development in Canada from different points of view.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO YOU AS A PARTICIPANT:
Potential risks are very low and should not exceed those encountered in your day to day activities. You may feel uncomfortable answering particular questions, in such cases, you may opt to skip these questions. All efforts will be made to maintain confidentiality of your identity, however, there is a potential risk that you may be identified in the study even if your name, organizational affiliation or job title are not used.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
Interview data will be collected through hand written notes and an audio recorder to effectively and accurately record data. Consent forms will be stored separately in a safe and secure location from the transcripts so as no correlation between personal identities and responses can be made. Transcripts will contain numerically coded pseudonyms so as to take out any identifiable data such as your name, your employer, and your job title. Data will be stored on a password protected and encrypted USB key. Codes will be stored separately from transcripts. Dr. Mustafa Koc will only have access to coded transcripts, where I will be the only one with access to consent forms and codes. Data will be stored for 10 years. After that period any paper documents will be shredded and electronic files will be permanently deleted.
You have the right to review and/or edit the recordings or transcripts from your interview. You will be notified via email once your transcript is ready. You will then need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like review and/or edit the transcript.
You will also be able to view the results of the study once the researcher's dissertation has been completed. You will need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like a copy of the results.
By agreeing to participate in this research, you are not giving up or waiving any legal right in the event that you are harmed during the research.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL:
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to answer every question or complete all aspects of the research. If you choose that a certain aspect of the conversation not be recorded or included in the study, please make this known to the interviewer. At any point, if you chose to withdraw your consent from the study, all relevant data will be removed and destroyed. You may also stop participating at any time during the interview. In such case, the collected data will only be used with your consent.
Your withdrawal from the study will not influence future relations with Ryerson University, the investigator, Margaret Bancerz, or her doctoral supervisor Dr. Mustafa Koc.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY:

If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. If you have questions later about the research, you may contact:
Margaret Bancerz, PhD Candidate, Ryerson University (principal investigator)
Phone: 647-835-9075
Email: mbancerz@ryerson.ca

OR

Dr. Mustafa Koc, PhD, Ryerson University (doctoral supervisor)
Phone: 416-979-5000 ext 6210
Email: mkoc@ryerson.ca

This study has been reviewed by the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant in this study please contact:

Research Ethics Board
c/o Office of the Vice President, Research and Innovation
Ryerson University
350 Victoria Street
Toronto, ON M5B 2K3
416-979-5042
rebchair@ryerson.ca

INDUSTRY AND FOOD POLICY IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN FOOD STRATEGY

CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT:

Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also indicates that you agree to participate in the study and have been told that you can change your mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of this agreement.
You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your legal rights.

_____
Name of Participant (please print)

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

I agree to be audio-recorded for the purposes of this study. I understand how these recordings will be stored and destroyed.

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

Interview Guide – Food Policy Experts

1. How would you describe the food policymaking arena in Canada in the last 20-30 years?
    a. Have you observed any recent changes? If yes, in what ways?

2. Do you think the Canadian Food Strategy reflects a new tendency in the current food policymaking regime?

3. What has been the role of industry (by industry I mean any corporation involved in the various facets of the food system such as retailing, processing, finance, transportation) excluding farmers) in food policymaking in Canada?

4. What do you think triggered the CFS initiative?

5. What do you think the role of the Canadian Food Strategy was intended to be?

6. What do you think were the roles of the investors of the Canadian Food Strategy? [industry, government, foundations]

7. What are some of the strengths of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?

8. What are some of the weaknesses of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?

9. What would you change about it?

10. If you could ask one of the industry investors in the Canadian Food Strategy one or two questions, what would they be?

11. Is there anything else you'd like to add to our discussion? Are there any additional points you think I should pay attention to that relate this topic?

Appendix 2 Conference Board of Canada Researchers: Information Letter, Consent Form, Interview Guide

Information Letter

Dear [CBoC staff and researchers],

My name is Margaret Bancerz, I am doctoral candidate at Ryerson University. I would like to invite you to participate in my research study on industry and food policy in Canada being conducted under the guidance of Dr. Mustafa Koc. This study has been approved the Ryerson University's Research Ethics Board.

The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally.

As an expert and developer of the Canadian Food Strategy, I believe you are a crucial voice in this discussion and I would love to have the opportunity to interview you to get your perspective on the role of industry in developing a national food strategy in Canada and what this means for non-governmental organizational roles in the policy process in general.

You will be asked to engage in a 40-60 minute interview consisting of 8-10 questions on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

Some expected interview questions include:

- Where did this idea of a Canadian Food Strategy come from?
- Are there any influences from global or international food initiatives? For example, from the World Economic Forum's *New Vision for Agriculture*?
- Who were the key actors in the development of the Strategy?
- Could you go into the process of the Canadian Food Strategy development?

Thank you for your consideration.

For more information please contact **Margaret Bancerz**:
Email: **mbancerz@ryerson.ca**
Phone: **647-835-9075**

Ryerson University Consent Agreement

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this consent form so that you understand what your participation will involve. Before you consent to participate, please ask any questions to be sure you understand what your participation will involve.

Industry and Food Policy in Canada: A Case Study of the Canadian Food Strategy – Conference Board of Canada, Canadian Food Strategy Researchers

INVESTIGATORS: This research study is being conducted by Margaret Bancerz (BA, MES), PhD candidate from Policy Studies at Ryerson University. This study is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Mustafa Koc.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Margaret Bancerz at mbancerz@ryerson.ca or phone 647-835-9075.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally. The study will be recruiting approximately 45 participants in total from four research participant groups: Canadian food policy experts, Conference Board of Canada researchers directly involved in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy, representatives of government agencies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada, and representatives of those companies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada. This study is being completed in partial completion of a doctoral degree where the results of the study will contribute to a doctoral dissertation.

WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO:
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 60 minute interview on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS:
Potential benefits may include a greater understanding of the roles of non-governmental actors in policy development in Canada from different points of view.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO YOU AS A PARTICIPANT:
Potential risks are very low and should not exceed those encountered in your day to day activities. You may feel uncomfortable answering particular questions, in such cases, you may opt to skip these questions. All efforts will be made to maintain confidentiality of your identity, however, there is a potential risk that you may be identified in the study even if your name, organizational affiliation or job title are not used. In addition, there is a minimal risk encountered, where after the collection of data, the dissertation and/or published and/or presented works may be interpreted as though perceiving the

Conference Board of Canada's Strategy negatively, giving the Conference Board of Canada bad publicity.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
Interview data will be collected through hand written notes and an audio recorder to effectively and accurately record data. Consent forms will be stored separately in a safe and secure location from the transcripts so as no correlation between personal identities and responses can be made. Transcripts will contain numerically coded pseudonyms so as to take out any identifiable data such as your name, your employer, and your job title. Data will be stored on a password protected and encrypted USB key. Codes will be stored separately from transcripts. Dr. Mustafa Koc will only have access to coded transcripts, where I will be the only one with access to consent forms and codes. Data will be stored for 10 years. After that period any paper documents will be shredded and electronic files will be permanently deleted.
You have the right to review and/or edit the recordings or transcripts from your interview. You will be notified via email once your transcript is ready. You will then need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like review and/or edit the transcript.
You will also be able to view the results of the study once the researcher's dissertation has been completed. You will need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like a copy of the results.
By agreeing to participate in this research, you are not giving up or waiving any legal right in the event that you are harmed during the research.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL:
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to answer every question or complete all aspects of the research. If you choose that a certain aspect of the conversation not be recorded or included in the study, please make this known to the interviewer. At any point, if you chose to withdraw your *consent* from the study, all relevant data will be removed and destroyed. You may also stop participating at any time during the interview. In such case, the collected data will only be used with your consent.
Your withdrawal from the study will not influence future relations with Ryerson University, the investigator, Margaret Bancerz, or her doctoral supervisor Dr. Mustafa Koc.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY:
If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. If you have questions later about the research, you may contact:

Margaret Bancerz, PhD Candidate, Ryerson University (principal investigator)
Phone: 647-835-9075
Email: mbancerz@ryerson.ca

OR

Dr. Mustafa Koc, PhD, Ryerson University (doctoral supervisor)
Phone: 416-979-5000 ext 6210
Email: mkoc@ryerson.ca

This study has been reviewed by the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant in this study please contact:

Research Ethics Board
c/o Office of the Vice President, Research and Innovation
Ryerson University
350 Victoria Street
Toronto, ON M5B 2K3
416-979-5042
rebchair@ryerson.ca

INDUSTRY AND FOOD POLICY IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN FOOD STRATEGY

CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT:

Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also indicates that you agree to participate in the study and have been told that you can change your mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of this agreement.
You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your legal rights.

_____
Name of Participant (please print)

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

I agree to be audio-recorded for the purposes of this study. I understand how these recordings will be stored and destroyed.

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

Interview Guide – CBoC Staff and Researchers

Part I Introduction/General

1. Can you tell me how long you have been with Conference Board
    a. What is your role and involvement in the Centre for Food in Canada?
        i. Why and how did the Conference Board become involved in food policy work?

Part II Background on CB involvement in food policy domain:

2. How would you describe the food policymaking arena in Canada in the last 20-30 years?
3. Where did this idea of a Canadian Food Strategy come from?
    a. Are there any influences from domestic initiatives? For example, Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute's (CAPI) food strategy?
    b. Are there any influences from global or international food initiatives? For example, from the World Economic Forum's *New Vision for Agriculture*?
4. Who were the key actors in the development of the Strategy?
5. Could you go into the process of the Canadian Food Strategy development?
    a. Leadership group of investors role
6. What was the most difficult task to handle during the drafting (consultations etc.) process of CFS?

<u>Investor/Stakeholder questions:</u>

7. Why did you need investors?
    a. What roles did they play? [particular type of investor, i.e. government, industry, foundation?]
8. How did you identify and select investors?
    a. Why do you think some sectors of the food system invested and not others?
    b. Why do you think particular industry players decided to invest in a Canadian Food Strategy?
        i. Why were some other large food corporations not investors?
            - *Did some corporations not agree to invest?*
    c. What about government ministries or departments, how did they become investors?
        i. Did some government bodies not agree to become investors?
9. Have you faced any consistent opposition from any particular sectors, organizations or partners? Could you elaborate on this?

<u>Part III Vision/Implementation of the Strategy:</u>

10. Could you elaborate on what the governing intentions are for the Strategy?
    a. How will the Strategy be implemented and by whom?

Part IV Future:

11. What role do to you envision for Conference Board in food policy in the future?

Part V Closing:

12. I am getting close to the end of my interview. Is there anything you'd like to add to our discussion? Are there any additional points you think I should pay attention to that relate this topic?
13. Who would be good industry representatives to talk to?
    a. *Can you recommend anyone?*
    b. *Can I use your name?*
14. Who would be good government representatives to talk to?
    a. *Can you recommend anyone?*
    b. *Can I use your name?*

Appendix 3 Government: Information Letter, Consent Form, Interview Guide

Information Letter

Dear *[INSERT GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE HERE]*,

My name is Margaret Bancerz, I am doctoral candidate at Ryerson University. I would like to invite you to participate in my research study on industry and food policy in Canada being conducted under the guidance of Dr. Mustafa Koc. This study has been approved by Ryerson University's Research Ethics Board.

The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally.

As a representative of a government investor in the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy, I believe you are a crucial voice in this discussion. I would value the opportunity to interview you to get your perspective on the role of industry in developing a national food strategy in Canada and what this means for non-governmental organizational roles in the policy process in general.

You will be asked to engage in a 40-60 minute interview consisting of 8-10 questions on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role of industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

Some interview questions expected include:

- Describe your department's/ministry's role in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy.
- What are some strengths of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
    - What are some weaknesses of the Strategy in your opinion?
    - Would you change anything?

Thank you for your consideration.

For more information please contact **Margaret Bancerz**:
Email: **mbancerz@ryerson.ca**
Phone: **647-835-9075**

Ryerson University Consent Agreement

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this consent form so that you understand what your participation will involve. Before you consent to participate, please ask any questions to be sure you understand what your participation will involve.

Industry and Food Policy in Canada: A Case Study of the Canadian Food Strategy – Government Organizations

INVESTIGATORS: This research study is being conducted by Margaret Bancerz (BA, MES), PhD candidate from Policy Studies at Ryerson University. This study is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Mustafa Koc.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Margaret Bancerz at mbancerz@ryerson.ca or phone 647-835-9075.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally. The study will be recruiting approximately 45 participants in total from four research participant groups: Canadian food policy experts, Conference Board of Canada researchers directly involved in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy, representatives of government agencies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada, and representatives of those companies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada. This study is being completed in partial completion of a doctoral degree where the results of the study will contribute to a doctoral dissertation.

WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO:
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 40-60 minute interview on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS: Potential benefits may include a greater understanding of the roles of non-governmental actors in policy development in Canada from different points of view, as well as the development of food policy in Canada.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO YOU AS A PARTICIPANT:
Potential risks are very low and should not exceed those encountered in your day to day activities. You may feel uncomfortable answering particular questions, in such cases, you may opt to skip these questions. All efforts will be made to maintain confidentiality of your identity, however, there is a potential risk that you may be identified in the study even if your name, organizational affiliation or job title are not used.

CONFIDENTIALITY: Interview data will be collected through hand written notes and an audio recorder to effectively and accurately record data. Consent forms will be stored

separately in a safe and secure location from the transcripts so as no correlation between personal identities and responses can be made. Transcripts will contain numerically coded pseudonyms so as to take out any identifiable data such as your name, your employer, and your job title. Data will be stored on a password protected and encrypted USB key. Codes will be stored separately from transcripts. Dr. Mustafa Koc will only have access to coded transcripts, where I will be the only one with access to consent forms and codes. Data will be stored for 10 years. After that period any paper documents will be shredded and electronic files will be permanently deleted.
You have the right to review and/or edit the recordings or transcripts from your interview. You will be notified via email once your transcript is ready. You will then need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like review and/or edit the transcript.
You will also be able to view the results of the study once the researcher's dissertation has been completed. You will need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like a copy of the results.
By agreeing to participate in this research, you are not giving up or waiving any legal right in the event that you are harmed during the research.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL:
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to answer every question or complete all aspects of the research. If you choose that a certain aspect of the conversation not be recorded or included in the study, please make this known to the interviewer. At any point, if you chose to withdraw your *consent* from the study, all relevant data will be removed and destroyed. You may also stop participating at any time during the interview. In such case, the collected data will only be used with your consent.
Your withdrawal from the study will not influence future relations with Ryerson University, the investigator, Margaret Bancerz, or her doctoral supervisor Dr. Mustafa Koc.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY: If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. If you have questions later about the research, you may contact:
Margaret Bancerz, PhD Candidate, Ryerson University (principal investigator)
Phone: 647-835-9075
Email: mbancerz@ryerson.ca

OR

Dr. Mustafa Koc, PhD, Ryerson University (doctoral supervisor)
Phone: 416-979-5000 ext 6210
Email: mkoc@ryerson.ca
This study has been reviewed by the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant in this study please contact:

Research Ethics Board
c/o Office of the Vice President, Research and Innovation
Ryerson University
350 Victoria Street
Toronto, ON M5B 2K3
416-979-5042
rebchair@ryerson.ca

INDUSTRY AND FOOD POLICY IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN FOOD STRATEGY

CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also indicates that you agree to participate in the study and have been told that you can change your mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of this agreement.
You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your legal rights.

_____
Name of Participant (please print)

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

I agree to be audio-recorded for the purposes of this study. I understand how these recordings will be stored and destroyed.

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

Interview Guide – Government

PART 1 Introduction/General

1. How long have you worked for the ministry/department?
    a. What is your role?

PART 2 Background on policy context

2. How do stakeholders typically engage with government when relating to food policymaking in Canada?
    a. PROBE: How does industry typically engage with government?
    b. PROBE: Has industry's engagement with government changed in any way in recent years?
3. *Do you think the Canadian Food Strategy reflects a new direction in the current food policymaking regime in Canada?*

PART III Canadian Food Strategy

4. How was your ministry/department involved with the Canadian Food Strategy development?
    a. Why do you think it got involved with CBoC's Strategy?
    b. Why were other ministries/departments not involved?
5. Who are the major stakeholders in the Strategy and what role do/did they play?
    a. Your ministry/department?
    b. Industry? (if didn't mention)
    c. Were there any stakeholders missing?
6. What are some of the strengths of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
7. What are some of the weaknesses of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
8. What would you change about the Strategy?
9. Do you think the Strategy, or parts of it, will be implemented by government federally or provincially?
    a. If yes, when do you see that happening?
    b. What do you see as the barriers/biggest challenges to its implementation?
10. Why was your ministry's/department's name not included in the final Strategy document? *(OMAFRA, PHAC, DFO, Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Government of Prince Edward Island)*

PART IV Conclusion

11. I am getting close to the end of my interview. Is there anything you'd like to add to our discussion? Are there any additional points you think I should pay attention to that relate this topic?
12. Who else would be a good person to talk to in government regarding food policy making/implementation and the Canadian Food Strategy?

Appendix 4 Industry: Information Letter, Consent Form, Interview Guide

Information Letter

Dear *[INSERT INDUSTRY NAME HERE]*,

My name is Margaret Bancerz, I am doctoral candidate at Ryerson University. I would like to invite you to participate in my research study on industry and food policy in Canada being conducted under the guidance of Dr. Mustafa Koc. This study has been approved by Ryerson University's Research Ethics Board.

The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally.

As an investor in the Canadian Food Strategy and a leader in the Canadian food and beverage sector, I believe PepsiCo is a crucial voice in this discussion. I would really value the opportunity to interview you to get your perspective on the role of industry in developing a national food strategy in Canada.

You will be asked to engage in a 30-40 minute interview on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role of industry in the Strategy's development.

The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

Some expected interview questions include:

- What are some particular issues the processing part of the agri-food sector is experiencing?
- Describe your organization's role in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy.

Thank you for your consideration.

For more information please contact **Margaret Bancerz**:
Email: **mbancerz@ryerson.ca**
Phone: **647-835-9075**

Ryerson University Consent Agreement

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this consent form so that you understand what your participation will involve. Before you consent to participate, please ask any questions to be sure you understand what your participation will involve.

Industry and Food Policy in Canada: A Case Study of the Canadian Food Strategy – Industry

INVESTIGATORS: This research study is being conducted by Margaret Bancerz (BA, MES), PhD candidate from Policy Studies at Ryerson University. This study is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Mustafa Koc.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Margaret Bancerz at mbancerz@ryerson.ca or by phone 647-835-9075.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally. The study will be recruiting approximately 45 participants in total from four research participant groups: Canadian food policy experts, Conference Board of Canada researchers directly involved in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy, representatives of government agencies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada, and representatives of those companies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada. This study is being done in partial completion of a doctoral degree where the results of the study will contribute to a doctoral dissertation.

WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO:
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 30-40 minute interview on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS:
Potential benefits may include a greater understanding of the roles of non-governmental actors in policy development in Canada from different points of view.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO YOU AS A PARTICIPANT:
Potential risks are very low and should not exceed those encountered in your day to day activities. You may feel uncomfortable answering particular questions, in such cases, you may opt to skip these questions. All efforts will be made to maintain confidentiality of your identity, however, there is a potential risk that you may be identified in the study

even if your name, organizational affiliation or job title are not used. There also exists a possibility risk, where after the collection of data, the dissertation and/or published and/or presented works may be interpreted as though industry is an illegitimate actor in food policy development.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
Interview data will be collected through hand written notes and an audio recorder to effectively and accurately record data. Consent forms will be stored separately in a safe and secure location from the transcripts so as no correlation between personal identities and responses can be made. Transcripts will contain numerically coded pseudonyms so as to take out any identifiable data such as your name, your employer, and your job title. Data will be stored on a password protected and encrypted USB key. Codes will be stored separately from transcripts. Dr. Mustafa Koc will only have access to coded transcripts, where I will be the only one with access to consent forms and codes. Data will be stored for 10 years. After that period any paper documents will be shredded and electronic files will be permanently deleted.
You have the right to review and/or edit the recordings or transcripts from your interview. You will be notified via email once your transcript is ready. You will then need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like review and/or edit the transcript.
You will also be able to view the results of the study once the researcher's dissertation has been completed. You will need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like a copy of the results.
By agreeing to participate in this research, you are not giving up or waiving any legal right in the event that you are harmed during the research.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL:
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to answer every question or complete all aspects of the research. If you choose that a certain aspect of the conversation not be recorded or included in the study, please make this known to the interviewer. At any point, if you chose to withdraw your *consent* from the study, all relevant data will be removed and destroyed. You may also stop participating at any time during the interview. In such case, the collected data will only be used with your consent.
Your withdrawal from the study will not influence future relations with Ryerson University, the investigator, Margaret Bancerz, or her doctoral supervisor Dr. Mustafa Koc.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY: If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. If you have questions later about the research, you may contact:

Margaret Bancerz, PhD Candidate, Ryerson University (principal investigator)
Phone: 647-835-9075
Email: mbancerz@ryerson.ca
OR

Dr. Mustafa Koc, PhD, Ryerson University (doctoral supervisor)
Phone: 416-979-5000 ext 6210
Email: mkoc@ryerson.ca
This study has been reviewed by the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant in this study please contact:

Research Ethics Board
c/o Office of the Vice President, Research and Innovation
Ryerson University
350 Victoria Street
Toronto, ON M5B 2K3
416-979-5042
rebchair@ryerson.ca

INDUSTRY AND FOOD POLICY IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN FOOD STRATEGY

CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also indicates that you agree to participate in the study and have been told that you can change your mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of this agreement.
You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your legal rights.

_____
Name of Participant (please print)

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

I agree to be audio-recorded for the purposes of this study. I understand how these recordings will be stored and destroyed.

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

Interview Guide - Industry

PART 1 Introduction/General

1. How is your company involved with the food and agricultural sector in Canada?
    a. What are some top challenges industry is experiencing in the food and agricultural sector?
    b. What do you do to do deal with these problems?
        i. How would industry approach government?
    c. What are some particular issues the [retail, processing….] part of the sector is experiencing?
2. In your opinion, what are some of the top global issues in the food and agriculture sector?
    a. How do they relate to the Canadian context?

PART II Canadian Food Strategy

3. Could you tell me a bit about the process that initiated of the Canadian Food Strategy?
    a. How did you become involved in it as an investor?
    b. What was your motivation to participate in this?
4. Describe your organization's role in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy.
    a. What were your expectations of the initiative?
    b. To what extent are you satisfied with the process? With the outcome?
    c. What did you learn during this process?
    d. Were there any surprising insights?
    e. Besides those that were part of the investor group, were there any other stakeholders you would've wanted to be in the room with?
5. Were there any points of disagreement in the development of the Strategy between particular investors or on particular issues?
6. Is it possible to say that this is a unique initiative?
    a. There have been international organizations and committees proposing a more active role for industry in agri-food policy. Are you familiar with any international examples? For instance, someone suggested World Economic Forum's New Vision for Agriculture or the UN's report on Food Sustainability: A Guide to Private Sector Action. Are you familiar with either of those?
7. What were some of the strengths of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
8. What were some of the weaknesses of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
9. Would you change anything in the final Strategy?
10. What parts of the Strategy are you hoping to be implemented by government?
    a. Which parts should be left as voluntary guides for different actors in the food sector?

11. Many organizations and committees create food strategy documents and often these efforts are later stalled. What needs to be done to ensure the continuity of industry's involvement in a consultative food policy process?

PART III Conclusion

12. I am getting close to the end of my interview. Is there anything you'd like to add to our discussion?
13. Who else would be a good person to talk to in the food industry sector regarding these topics and the Canadian Food Strategy?

Appendix 5 Hybrids: Information Letter, Consent Form, Interview Guide

Information Letter

Dear *[INSERT HYBRID PARTICIPANT],*

My name is Margaret Bancerz, I am doctoral candidate at Ryerson University. I would like to invite you to participate in my research study on industry and food policy in Canada being conducted under the guidance of Dr. Mustafa Koc. This study has been approved by Ryerson University's Research Ethics Board.

The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally.

As an expert in policy relating to the beverage sector, I believe you are a crucial voice in this discussion and I would really value the opportunity to interview you to get your perspective on how industry is working to develop a national food strategy in Canada and what this means for the future of governing in the Canadian food system.

You will be asked to engage in a 30-40 minute interview consisting of 8-10 questions on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

Some of the study's interview questions include:

- Do you think the Canadian Food Strategy reflects a new tendency in the current food policymaking regime?
- What has been the role of industry in the development of food policy?

Thank you for your consideration.

For more information please contact **Margaret Bancerz**:
Email: **mbancerz@ryerson.ca**
Phone: **647-835-9075**

Ryerson University Consent Agreement

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this consent form so that you understand what your participation will involve. Before you consent to participate, please ask any questions to be sure you understand what your participation will involve.

Industry and Food Policy in Canada: A Case Study of the Canadian Food Strategy – Not-For-Profits

INVESTIGATORS: This research study is being conducted by Margaret Bancerz (BA, MES), PhD candidate from Policy Studies at Ryerson University. This study is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Mustafa Koc.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Margaret Bancerz at mbancerz@ryerson.ca or by phone 647-835-9075.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
The purpose of this study is to use the Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Food Strategy to better understand the role of industry in food policymaking in Canada as well as in public policymaking more generally. The study will be recruiting approximately 45 participants in total from four research participant groups: Canadian food policy experts, Conference Board of Canada researchers directly involved in the development of the Canadian Food Strategy, representatives of government agencies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada, and representatives of those companies that have financially invested in the Centre for Food in Canada. This study is being done in partial completion of a doctoral degree where the results of the study will contribute to a doctoral dissertation.

WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO:
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in a 40-60 minute interview on the subject of food policy in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada's development of a Canadian Food Strategy, and the role industry in the Strategy's development. The interview will take place at your place of work or in another convenient and mutually agreed upon location that will provide privacy.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS:
Potential benefits may include a greater understanding of the roles of non-governmental actors in policy development in Canada from different points of view.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO YOU AS A PARTICIPANT:

Potential risks are very low and should not exceed those encountered in your day to day activities. You may feel uncomfortable answering particular questions, in such cases, you may opt to skip these questions. All efforts will be made to maintain confidentiality of your identity, however, there is a potential risk that you may be

identified in the study even if your name, organizational affiliation or job title are not used.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
Interview data will be collected through hand written notes and an audio recorder to effectively and accurately record data. Consent forms will be stored separately in a safe and secure location from the transcripts so as no correlation between personal identities and responses can be made. Transcripts will contain numerically coded pseudonyms so as to take out any identifiable data such as your name, your employer, and your job title. Data will be stored on a password protected and encrypted USB key. Codes will be stored separately from transcripts. Dr. Mustafa Koc will only have access to coded transcripts, where I will be the only one with access to consent forms and codes. Data will be stored for 10 years. After that period any paper documents will be shredded and electronic files will be permanently deleted.
You have the right to review and/or edit the recordings or transcripts from your interview. You will be notified via email once your transcript is ready. You will then need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like review and/or edit the transcript.
You will also be able to view the results of the study once the researcher's dissertation has been completed. You will need to follow-up with the researcher via email (mbancerz@ryerson.ca) if you would like a copy of the results.
By agreeing to participate in this research, you are not giving up or waiving any legal right in the event that you are harmed during the research.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL:
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You do not have to answer every question or complete all aspects of the research. If you choose that a certain aspect of the conversation not be recorded or included in the study, please make this known to the interviewer. At any point, if you chose to withdraw your *consent* from the study, all relevant data will be removed and destroyed. You may also stop participating at any time during the interview. In such case, the collected data will only be used with your consent.
Your withdrawal from the study will not influence future relations with Ryerson University, the investigator, Margaret Bancerz, or her doctoral supervisor Dr. Mustafa Koc.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY: If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. If you have questions later about the research, you may contact:

Margaret Bancerz, PhD Candidate, Ryerson University (principal investigator)
Phone: 647-835-9075
Email: mbancerz@ryerson.ca
OR

Dr. Mustafa Koc, PhD, Ryerson University (doctoral supervisor)
Phone: 416-979-5000 ext 6210

Email: mkoc@ryerson.ca
This study has been reviewed by the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant in this study please contact:

Research Ethics Board
c/o Office of the Vice President, Research and Innovation
Ryerson University
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INDUSTRY AND FOOD POLICY IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN FOOD STRATEGY

CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also indicates that you agree to participate in the study and have been told that you can change your mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of this agreement.
You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your legal rights.

_____
Name of Participant (please print)

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

I agree to be audio-recorded for the purposes of this study. I understand how these recordings will be stored and destroyed.

_____ _____
Signature of Participant Date

Interview Guide – Hybrids

Part I Introduction

1. How is your organization involved in food policy work in Canada?
2. How was your organization involved with the development of the Canadian Food Strategy?
    a. What was your role?

Part II Policy Context

3. What do you think triggered the CFS initiative?
4. What do you think the role of the Canadian Food Strategy was intended to be?

Part III Process

5. What do you think were the roles of the investors of the Canadian Food Strategy? [industry, government, foundations]
6. What was your organization's experience as a participant/partner with the Centre for Food in Canada and the development of the Strategy?
    a. *(for CFA and McConnell as participants in the closed consultations)* Could you tell me a little bit about the Steering Committee meetings with the partners?
    b. *(for Food Secure/CAPI) Have you ever been approached by the CBoC to become a partner? If you have been approached, why did you not join?*
        i. *Have you ever spoken with them face to face?*
        ii. *Would you go to a meeting with them?*
7. What are some of the strengths of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
8. What are some of the weaknesses of the Canadian Food Strategy in your opinion?
9. What would you change about it?
10. In 3-4 points, could you summarize how the Conference Board's development of a food strategy compare with your own development of a food strategy *(for CAPI, CFA, Food Secure)*
11. *FOR McConnell /CFA:* why was your organization's name removed from the final Food Strategy document?

Part IV Conclusion

12. If you could ask one of the industry investors in the Canadian Food Strategy one or two questions, what would they be?
13. Is there anything else you'd like to add to our discussion? Are there any additional points you think I should pay attention to that relate this topic?

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