THE 'COMMUNITY' IN COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS: THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY
CONTROL IN PURSUING COMMUNITY LAND TRUST ACTIVISM

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ABSTRACT

Housing in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA) is increasingly unaffordable due to rising housing costs. Community land trusts (CLTs) have recently emerged as a tool for providing affordable housing in the GTHA. This paper investigated the form that CLTs should take to ensure its long-term success for providing affordable housing. Through an analysis of academic and grey literature, the element of community control was identified as being a critical success factor. This paper explored four CLTs operating in American and European contexts to understand whether and how community control was manifested and the resulting implications it had on the CLT and residents. The findings of the paper confirm the importance of community control in the long-term functioning of CLTs, and that community control can be manifested in various forms. Planners operating in the GTHA must therefore be mindful of ensuring that community control is expressed in CLTs.

Key Words: Community land trust; affordable housing; community control; Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area

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List of Acronyms

ABCC: Anfield Breckside Community Company
ACTO: Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario
AHI: Affordable Housing Initiative
BNENC: Breckfield and North Everton Neighbourhood Council
BRA: Boston Redevelopment Authority
CED: Community Economic Development
CHT: Champlain Housing Trust
CLT: Community Land Trust
CMA: Census Metropolitan Area
CMHC: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
CPO: Compulsory Purchase Order
CRA: Canada Revenue Agency
DCLT: Durham Community Land Trustees
DSNI: Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
GTA: Greater Toronto Area
GTHA: Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area
HMR: Housing Market Renewal
IAH: Investment in Affordable Housing
LFC: Liverpool Football Club
NCLT: Northern Communities Land Trust
NHA: National Housing Act
OFSI: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
ONPHA: Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association
RBC: Royal Bank of Canada
RGI: Rent-Geared-to-Income

Chapter 1: Introduction

Everyone deserves a home. Having access to housing is important for maintaining a

healthy population, economic competitiveness, and a vibrant city (Scally, 2012; Wellesley

Institute, 2010). According to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), housing

is affordable when shelter costs are less than 30% of the before-tax household income (CMHC,

n.d.-a). When households spend 30% or more of their before-tax household income on shelter

costs, it can place significant financial strain on their ability to meet their daily needs, such as

food, health care, and transportation (Toronto Foundation, 2018).

In the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA) (*Figure 1*), the demand for housing is

consistently outpacing the supply of housing (CMHC, 2017a). The tight supply-demand

conditions in the GTHA have led to an overvaluation of housing, making homeownership and

renting highly unaffordable (CMHC, 2017a; RBC, 2017a; Royal LePage, 2018). While non-

market housing can insulate residents from the impacts of market conditions, non-market units

are scarce (ONPHA, 2016). Non-market housing is defined as housing that cannot be bought or

sold on the market; households pay a fee to the agency – either the government, a non-profit

group, or housing co-operative – that owns the properties (Sousa & Quarter, 2004).

Access to affordable market and non-market housing is therefore deeply unattainable for

some households residing in the GTHA. Given this, residents are vulnerable to one of two

housing outcomes: either the shelter costs leave the household unable to pay for daily necessities

(shelter poverty), or the household is eventually dehoused (Hulchanski, 2005). A dehousing

process occurs when households are unable to pay the monthly rent or mortgage, and end up

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"using unsatisfactory and harmful alternatives in terms of health and well-being – staying with friends, using homeless shelters and drop-ins, or living on the street" (Hulchanski, 2005, p. 3).

Figure 1: Map of the GTHA

In response to the affordability challenges in the GTHA, several solutions have been put forward by public and private sector actors. Examples include introducing inclusionary zoning (Dean, 2017), legalizing rent control (Ontario Ministry of Housing, 2017), levying a foreign buyers' tax (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2017), and reducing the red tape involved with the development approvals process (Green & Filipowicz, 2016). Community land trusts (CLTs) have emerged in rapidly gentrifying communities in the GTHA as a means of providing affordable

housing. CLTs are non-profit organizations that obtain and hold the title to a plot of land for the benefit of the community. By removing land from the market, land appreciation and inflation is greatly limited, therefore ensuring that long-term affordability is maintained in perpetuity (Gray, 2008). Local examples in the GTHA include the Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust (PPE, n.d.) and the Kensington Market Land Trust (Warren, 2016) in Toronto's Parkdale and Kensington Market neighbourhoods respectively, as well as the Hamilton Community Land Trust in Hamilton's Beasley neighbourhood (McCurdy, 2016).

Given the new and emerging interest in CLTs in the GTHA, this paper will investigate the following research question: what form should CLTs take to ensure its long-term success as a vehicle for creating permanent affordable housing for low- and moderate-income residents in the GTHA? Rather than attempting to explore whether CLTs should be created, this research begins on the premise that CLTs have the potential to deliver affordable housing at the neighbourhood scale, but that their effectiveness hinges on a key factor that drives its long-term success.

To answer the overarching research question, three sub-questions will be investigated:
(1) What are the basic characteristics common to all CLTs?
(2) What is the crucial ingredient that is foundational to the successes of CLTs?
(3) How is the crucial ingredient expressed, in relation to starting up and running a CLT?

1.1   Structure of the Paper

The paper will begin with a literature review on the historical housing policies that have led to the current state of housing affordability in the GTHA. The literature review will also discuss an overview on CLTs and the various critical success factors underlying the successes of

CLTs. A special focus will be paid to the element of community control, which is a key factor identified in the literature review as underlying the successes of CLTs. In Chapter 3, the methodology of the paper will be discussed. In Chapter 4, an analysis of four case studies will be presented to investigate how community control was or was not exercised by the CLTs. The paper will conclude with list of recommendations in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1   Overview of Affordable Housing

As mentioned in the previous chapter, CMHC defines housing as being affordable when shelter costs are less than 30% of the before-tax household income (CMHC, n.d.-a). Households that spend more than 30% of their before-tax household income on shelter costs, *and* reside in housing that does not meet one or more dimensions of adequacy, suitability, and affordability, are considered to be in core housing need (CMHC, 2016). Based on the most recent data available, CMHC (2017d) reports that in 2015, 19.6% and 10.1% of households in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) and Hamilton CMA were in core housing need respectively.

Core housing need differs from affordable housing and social housing, which are also commonly used terms. Social housing is one type of affordable housing, and generally refers to housing that is subsidized by a certain level of government (CMHC, n.d.-a). Affordable housing is a broader definition and exists as a continuum, from emergency shelters on the one end to homeownership on the other end (*Figure 2*). Affordable housing therefore incudes all forms of housing tenure and may be provided by private, public, or not-for-profit actors (CMHC, n.d.-a).

Housing Continuum

| Emergency Shelters	Transitional Housing	Supportive Housing	Subsidized Housing	Market Rental Housing	Market Homeownership Housing

Figure 2: Affordable housing continuum (Source: CMHC, n.d.-a)

2.1.1 Policy Context

In Canada, the federal government's commitment to the provision of social housing can be characterized as an on-again, off-again relationship since the post-war period. From the 1940s to 1963, the federal government played a minimal role in the production of social housing. The 1949 amendment to the National Housing Act (NHA) resulted in a small social housing program, building a meagre 850 units per year (Hulchanski, 2004). During this era, the main priority was providing single-detached, owner-occupied housing for middle-income households, based on the premise that demands for low-income affordable housing would be met through trickle down effects (Carroll & Jones, 2000). Specifically, when new housing is built, existing housing is vacated and becomes available to lower-income households (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2005). Carroll and Jones (2000) argue that the initiatives during that time "were national in scope with little flexibility or responsiveness to regional or provincial needs" (p. 278).

Starting in 1964 to the early 1980s, the federal government led a more active role to addressing demands for affordable housing. Amendments to the NHA in 1964 resulted in an extensive social housing program that was federally funded, and municipally administered (Hulchanski, 2004). Approximately 200,000 units were built over a ten year period, from 1964 to the mid-1970s (Hulchanski, 2004). Further amendments to the NHA in 1973 introduced inclusionary housing reforms that established various housing-related programs, such as an assisted homeownership program, a housing rehabilitation program, and a non-profit and co-op housing program (Hulchanski, 2004). According to Sousa and Quarter (2003), the period starting from the 1973 NHA amendments produced four distinct models of social housing:

   (1) Traditional public housing, which is funded, owned, and administered by the federal government;

(2) Private non-profit housing, which is managed by non-governmental, community groups such as churches, service groups, unions, or ethnocultural groups;

(3) Municipal non-profit housing, which is funded by the federal, provincial, or municipal government, and is managed either by a municipally-owned non-profit organization or an administrative arm of the municipality; and

(4) Cooperative housing, which does not receive government funding and is managed by residents who have a say on decisions that could impact the community.

Starting in the mid-1980s, the federal government launched massive cuts to housing programs due to budgetary constraints that consequently withdrew funding from new social housing construction. The social housing supply program was eventually terminated, resulting in a decline from 20,000 to 25,000 new units a year in the 1980s to zero starting in 1993 (Hulchanski, 2004). While this stage signalled a disengagement by the federal government, Carroll and Jones (2000) note that the removal of federal involvement from affordable housing initiatives greatly expanded the role of community-centred approaches, which included the development of third sector housing. Third sector housing is low-cost housing provided by non-profit, non-governmental organizations created independently from government intervention (Rewniak, 1997).

In 1996, the federal government downloaded the responsibility for administering social housing to the provinces. Under the *Social Housing Reform Act, 2000*, the province of Ontario then formally transferred the operational responsibility to 47 local housing service managers, most of which were affiliated with a municipal government. The 47 service managers essentially took on the responsibilities that the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs would have otherwise

managed (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). Policy development and analysis have remained at the provincial level (Dalton, 2009).

The early 2000s marked a modest return of federal involvement in affordable housing provision. In 2001, the Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI) was launched, eventually being renamed to Investment in Affordable Housing (IAH). Under IAH, the provinces and territories cost-match federal commitments. In its most current phase, the federal and Ontario governments have committed to providing more than $800 million over a six year period to improve access to affordable housing until 2020 (Ontario MMAH, 2016). Service managers have the flexibility to choose the program most appropriate to address the housing needs within their locales. The programs range from increasing the supply of affordable rental and off-reserve housing, to providing rent supplements, down payment assistance, and forgivable loans for major repairs (CMHC, n.d.-b).

In November 2017, the federal government released the *National Housing Strategy*. The Strategy is a 10-year, $40 billion plan aimed at helping vulnerable Canadians across the country gain access to housing (Government of Canada, 2017). The funds will build new affordable units, repair existing units, expand community-based housing, and work to reduce chronic homelessness and the incidence of households in core housing need (Government of Canada, 2017). The Strategy reaffirms that housing is a human right (Government of Canada, 2017), therefore signalling an acknowledgement of the importance of access to housing as it relates to societal and individual well-being.

2.1.2   Current Status on Affordable Housing Access in the GTHA

The Canadian federal and provincial governments currently rely almost entirely on the market to supply and allocate its housing stock (Hulchanski, 2004). Based on a recent study conducted by Gurstein *et al.* (2015), the researchers found that social housing represented 4.6% of the total housing stock in 2011. The remaining 95% of housing were therefore acquired through market mechanisms (see Hulchanski, 2007). The reliance on market mechanisms to meet housing needs is deeply problematic. Markets respond to where there is demand. Households with insufficient income or wealth are unlikely to generate market demand for a particular good. Instead, low-income households often generate a social need, rather than a market demand, for affordable housing (Hulchanski, 2005, 2007). In this regard, Hulchanski (2007) argues that a "housing system based on the market mechanism cannot respond to social need" (p. 1). Households without sufficient financial resources to pay for housing face precarious situations: they are at risk of being dehoused, or of being subjected to shelter poverty (Hulchanski, 2005).

Within the local context, both market and non-market housing are deeply inaccessible for many households in the GTHA. This in part can be explained by supply and demand. Demand for housing is driven by economic and demographic factors. Low unemployment rates, low interest rates, and increases in wages are economic factors that all enable households to enter the housing market, therefore driving demand and subsequently, housing prices (RBC & Pembina Institute, 2013). Demographic factors, such as inter-provincial and international migration and millennials reaching homebuying age, also drive demand for housing (Dehaas, 2017). A report by Scotiabank analyzing home sales in Canada notes that economic and demographic factors driving demand are forecasted to remain supportive in 2018 (Warren, 2018).

Recent debates surrounding the role of land use planning regulations, including the *Greenbelt Plan* and the *Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe*, in containing growth have been criticized for reducing the supply of land that otherwise would have been available to address market demand for housing through development (Burda, 2017). Critics of this argument contend that this position is misplaced – approximately three-quarters of the land that was set aside for urban expansion, as per the 2006 *Growth Plan*, remains unbuilt (Burchfield, 2016). Instead, lengthy approvals processes and barriers to servicing greenfield land have been identified as being factors hindering access to land supply (Burda, 2017).

To illustrate the implications that supply-demand conditions have had on access to market and non-market housing, the section below will discuss the current status on the ability of households in the GTHA in acquiring market and non-market housing.

2.1.2.1 Homeownership

The *Housing Affordability Report* prepared by the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) measures housing affordability as a share of household income needed to service the costs of owning a home – this includes, for example, paying the costs of the mortgage payments, property taxes, and utilities. A higher number on the affordability aggregate means that housing is less affordable (RBC, 2017a). For Q4 2016, the report indicated that the housing affordability for the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) was 64.6% (RBC, 2017a). By Q1 2017, housing affordability "deteriorated to its worst ever level" (RBC, 2017b, p. 1), with the affordability aggregate measuring at 72.0%, trailing behind Vancouver which had an affordability aggregate of 79.7% (RBC, 2017b).

In April 2017, Ontario introduced the *Fair Housing Plan* to bring stability to the housing market. The Plan lists 16 actions, including introducing a 15% non-resident speculation tax, expanding rent control, enabling municipalities to pass a vacant homes property tax, and using surplus provincial lands for the creation of housing (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2017). Following the introduction of the Plan, owners rushed to sell their properties while buyers were reserved to purchase real estate. Consequently, home resales dropped 44% between April 2017 and July 2017 (RBC, 2017b). It is important to note that while the resale market experienced a cooling, the Plan has had little effect on the new home market. Prices for new homes continue to increase, while the supply remains low (BILD, 2017). RBC's housing affordability aggregate for the GTA increased from 72.0% in Q1 2017 to 75.4% by the end of Q2 2017 (RBC, 2017b), and continued to increase to 78.4% by the end of Q3 2017 (RBC, 2017c).

New mortgage rules introduced by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) in Q4 2017 came into effect on January 1, 2018. The new rules include a "stress test" that will be applied to uninsured mortgages. The stress test previously applied to only insured mortgages: borrowers who put down less than 20% of the home's value were required by law to purchase mortgage insurance to protect the lender from borrower default (Evans, 2017). The purpose of the current stress test is to examine the ability of *all* borrowers to repay their loans, if interest rates were to increase. Under the OSFI's new rules, homebuyers will have to demonstrate that they can afford to make payments based on either (1) the greater of the five-year benchmark rate published by the Bank of Canada; or (2) the contractual mortgage rate plus 2%, whichever is higher (OFSI, 2017).

It is currently unclear whether the stress test will quell housing prices in the long run. Royal LePage (2018) predicts that although the stress test will cool housing prices initially, prices will still increase in the second half of 2018 when buyers become accustomed to the new requirements. The new mortgage rules will moreover do little to temper the overvaluation of housing due to high demand and insufficient housing supply. Royal LePage (2017) predicts that home prices in the GTA will increase by 6.8% by the end of 2018.

The overvalued housing market in the GTA has broader implications for housing markets in nearby CMAs, such as Hamilton, Barrie, Guelph, and Kitchener; the influx of GTA homebuyers seeking more affordable homeownership options in CMAs within commuting distance of the GTA have driven up housing prices in nearby CMAs (CMHC, 2017a). According to the CMHC (2017a), house price spillovers have the greatest impact on Hamilton – the CMA closest to the GTA. Specifically, a 1% price shock in the GTA leads to a 1.4% change on housing prices in Hamilton within one year. For instance, if house prices in the GTA increased by 10% in one quarter, then house prices in Hamilton will increase by 14% within one year. After three years, the impact of a 1% price shock in the GTA leads to a 2.0% price change in Hamilton (CMHC, 2017a). CMHC (2017a) found that compared to other CMAs, increases in Hamilton's house prices have consistently kept up with price increases in the GTA.

2.1.2.2 Market-Rate Rental

For prospective homebuyers priced out of homeownership, renting is potentially their only viable housing option. However, rising homeownership costs and lack of rental supply have driven vacancy rates for purpose-built rentals to extremely low levels. In the GTA, the overall

vacancy rate in 2017 was 1.1% (CMHC, 2017b). In Hamilton, the overall vacancy rate was 2.4% (CMHC, 2017c). According to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) (n.d.-a), a healthy vacancy rate is around 3-5%. Low vacancy rates allow landlords to increase rents astronomically. In the GTA, the average rent for all unit types was $1,296 in 2017, representing a 4.5% increase from 2016 (CMHC, 2017b). In Hamilton, the average rent for all unit types was $1,020 in 2017, representing a 5.1% increase from 2016 (CMHC, 2017c).

In light of low supply and high demand for purpose-built rental units, condominium apartments have been growing in prominence in the rental market over the past several years (CMHC, 2017b, 2017c). However, rents for condominium apartments are typically higher than rents for purpose-built rental units. For example, the average rent for a condominium unit in Toronto was $1,901 in 2016, compared to $1,233 for a purpose-built rental unit (ACTO, n.d-a). The average rent increases for condominium apartments are also higher than purpose-built rentals. For instance, the average rent for a condominium unit in Toronto increased by 26% from 2011 to 2016, compared to a 16% increase for purpose-built rentals (ACTO, n.d.-a). More importantly, tenants in condominium apartments have less security of tenure – they can be evicted within 60 days of notice if the owner wishes to occupy or sell the unit (ACTO, n.d.-a).

Both purpose-built rentals and condominium apartments are deeply unaffordable for many renters. In the Toronto CMA, 46.9% of all renters were spending 30% or more of their 2015 total income on shelter costs (Statistics Canada, 2017). In the Hamilton CMA, that rate was 45.2% (Statistics Canada, 2017). ACTO (n.d-b) notes that to afford a rent of $1,132, the hourly wage

would need to be $21.77. Even after minimum wage increases to $15/hr in 2019, the rent would still be considerably unaffordable.

The *Fair Housing Plan* introduced in April 2017 includes an action item to expand rent control to *all* private rentals, including those built after 1991 (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2017). The *Rental Fairness Act, 2017* was passed in May 2017, legalizing rent control retroactively to April 20th, 2017 (Ontario Ministry of Housing, 2017). Rent will only be able to increase according to the annual provincial rent increase guideline – rent increases are currently capped at 1.8% for 2018 (Ontario Government, 2018). While rent control will undoubtedly protect tenants from astronomical rent increases, some have criticized that rent control will discourage developers from building purpose-built rentals (Kalinowski, 2017). Some developers have already switched to building condominiums from purpose-built rentals due to the new rent control rules which they say make building rentals less profitable (Kalinowski, 2017).

2.1.2.3 Non-Market Rental

The retrenchment and devolution of government-led affordable housing initiatives, as explored above, have created critical shortages in social housing stock. Rent-geared-to-income (RGI) housing ensures that households spend no more than 30% of their gross income on rent. The Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association (ONPHA) reported a total of 171,360 households on waiting lists for RGI housing in 2015 in Ontario. This number has grown by more than 45,000 households since 2003, when ONPHA first began collecting data on waiting lists (ONPHA, 2016).

Due to the lack of available RGI units, new applicants joining waiting lists will have to wait for a significantly longer period of time than applicants who were housed in 2015: households that joined waiting lists in 2015 will have to wait 5.2 years before being housed, while applicants housed in 2015 waited an average of 3.9 years (ONPHA, 2016). In urban areas where demand for RGI housing is high, households may have to wait as long as 14 years before being housed (ONPHA, 2016). ONPHA (2016) attributes the increase in applicants and wait times to a variety of factors, including: "population growth, low vacancy rates, and low levels of rental housing production, despite strong demand" (p. 4).

The *National Housing Strategy* released in November 2017 is a 10-year, $40-billion plan aimed at ending homelessness and addressing affordable housing needs. The Strategy includes a commitment to building 100,000 new affordable units across Canada (Government of Canada, 2017). With more than 170,000 households on waiting lists in Ontario alone, 100,000 new affordable units across Canada will not completely absolve all affordable needs. Nonetheless, the Strategy is a good start.

2.1.2.4 Why CLTs?

Market solutions to housing are unlikely to address affordability issues. Indeed, commentary surrounding the recent *Fair Housing Plan* and the mortgage stress test remains mixed as to whether these measures will correct the deeply troubling homeownership and rental prices (e.g., BILD, 2017; Evans, 2018). Reliance on RGI housing to house low- to moderate-income families will also fail to address the affordability issue in a timely manner due to the long wait times that applicants must endure.

At this critical juncture, it is important for planners and housing advocates to explore other tools to provide permanently affordable housing to low- to moderate-income families – that is, those most at risk of being priced out of affordable housing options. CLTs are a tool that can enable communities to gain access to affordable housing, and moreover, allow communities to have control over the pattern and form of developments that would be most appropriate to their needs. CLTs should therefore be thought of as being part of the planner's toolkit for building affordable housing.

Access to affordable housing is important. Affordable housing can impact the health and socio-economic well-being of an individual. For example, access to affordable housing can improve academic performance, help secure and maintain employment, provide a healthy living environment, improve mental health, allow families to spend more money on nutritious foods and health care, and more (Scally, 2012; Wellesley Institute). CLTs can therefore make meaningful contributions to improving community and individual well-being.

2.2   Overview of CLTs

CLTs are non-profit, community-based organizations that have a mandate of creating and maintaining community assets and permanently affordable housing. What differentiates CLTs from other non-profit housing organizations are their focuses on the democratic stewardship of community assets and the equal balancing of needs between the individual and broader society (Crabtree *et al*., 2013). CLTs, fundamentally, aim to ensure that individuals do not gain benefits to the detriment to society, and vice-versa (Crabtree *et al*., 2013). The emphasis on individual versus societal benefits is rooted in the concept of "unearned increment," coined by John Stuart

Mill. This concept states that any appreciation in land value is attributed to market conditions or by the growth/development of the surrounding society, rather than as a result arising from private individual action (Davis, 2010). CLTs are therefore structured to ensure that the unearned increment is returned to the benefit of the broader community.

The concept of CLTs is not entirely novel. CLTs originated in the United States during the late 1960s in the United States as an offshoot of the civil rights movement in the Deep South (Davis, 2010), an era characterized by a social struggle for African-Americans to gain equal rights. In the following decades, the number of CLTs in the United States grew to a staggering total of 242 by 2011 (Thaden, 2012). Based on a recent search on the National CLT Network, there are currently 330 CLTs operating in the United States (*Figure 3*) (National CLT Network, n.d.). The top three states with the most number of CLTs are: California (34), New York (24), and Washington (22) (National CLT Network, n.d.).


Figure 3: Location of CLTs in the United States, based on a 2018 search on the National CLT Network website. (Image source: National CLT Network, n.d.)

CLTs are a less established tradition in Canada. While CLTs in the United States grew from community support for building affordable housing, the capacity to build affordable housing in Canada rested on the programs and funding made available by the federal government, "which meant that a strong network of private Community Land Trusts was less established here" (Todary-Michael, 2016, p. 4). In Canada, CLTs first appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). Recent pressures in the Canadian housing economy jumpstarted an interest in developing CLTs, with examples being seen in Vancouver (City of Vancouver, 2016), Toronto (Friends of Kensington Market; PPE, n.d.), and Hamilton (McCurdy, 2016). Today, there are approximately a dozen CLTs operating across Canada to help communities address housing affordability issues (Todary-Michael, 2016).

2.2.1   How Community Land Trusts Work

The classic CLT model possesses 10 common characteristics. These characteristics can be grouped into 4 categories: ownership model, legal status, governance structure, and operational principles (*Table 1*) (Davis *et al.*, 2008; Davis, 2010). It is important to be mindful that CLTs have often made modifications of their own, in response to what would work best within their contexts. As such, variability exists (see Davis *et al.*, 2008).

The lack of a deep tradition for developing CLTs in Canada has meant that much of the academic research on CLTs has been centred on the American perspective. For this reason, information on the organizational principles of the classic CLT model was derived from American literature on CLTs. Despite this, the characteristics listed below are fairly broad generalizations that can be applied to different economic and political contexts (see Housing

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Strategies Inc., 2005). The characteristics of the classic CLT model will be discussed in further detail below in the following four categories: ownership model, legal status, governance structure, and operational principles.

Ownership Model	Legal Status	Governance Structure	Operational Principles
Dual Ownership	Non-Profit, Tax Exempt Organization	Tripartite Governance	Perpetual Affordability
Leased Land		Place-Based Membership	Perpetual Responsibility
		Resident Control	Expansionist Acquisition
			Flexible Development

Table 1: Ten characteristics of the classic CLT (Source Tabulation: Davis et al., 2008, with modifications)

2.2.2   Ownership Model

CLTs emphasize the common good, based on the premise that land should not be a private commodity, but instead, should be community-owned and operated (Gray, 2008). The focus on the common good is reflected in the ownership model of CLTs.

Under the classic CLT model, low-income families become a member of the CLT, and then buy or lease a house on CLT-owned land. This type of arrangement is called dual ownership, where ownership of the land and housing is held between two separate parties: the CLT owns and controls the land, while the homeowners/lessees own the building situated on the land (Davis, 2006; Gray, 2008).

The rights, responsibilities, risks, and rewards for both the CLT and homeowner/lessee are set out in a long-term ground lease agreement (typically 99 years, but can be shorter)

(Abromowitz, 1992). Under a ground lease, the owner-occupants retain most of the "sticks" in the bundle of rights found in traditional market-rate homeownership. Examples include security of tenure, privacy of use, and the right to make changes to the living space (Davis, 2006). Failure to comply with the terms and conditions may result in eviction, or in other punitive measures, such as fines and penalties (Abromowitz & White, 2006). The extent to which occupancy and use restrictions are upheld is dependent on the level of monitoring and enforcement on part of the CLT. If the CLT does not employ sufficient measures to oversee the activities of their members, there is little that could be done to prevent owner-occupants from, for instance, becoming an absentee homeowner or failing to upkeep their unit (Abromowitz & White, 2006).

2.2.3   Legal Status

In the United States, CLTs are typically qualified federally as non-profit, tax-exempt, charitable corporations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Service tax code. Therefore, American CLTs are technically not a trust, and are similar to other non-profit housing providers (Abromowitz, 1992; Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). What distinguishes CLTs from other non-profit housing providers is their governance structure (Abromowitz, 1992), which is explained further in the next section.

In Canada, CLTs may seek to obtain charitable status from the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). Under *Guide CGG-014, Community Economic Development Activities and Charitable Registration*, released by the CRA in 2012, CLTs are considered to be a community economic development (CED) activity (CRA, 2017). CED refers to a wide variety of activities, including community capacity building, social enterprise, and social finance (CRA, 2017). The guide

stipulates that "Organizations that carry out CED activities may be eligible for charitable registration under the Income Tax Act if all their activities further charitable purposes" (CRA, 2017). Eligible charitable purposes include relieving poverty, advancing education, and providing benefits to the community in a manner that the law sees as charitable (CRA, 2017).

To successfully obtain charitable status, organizations must also meet the Public Benefit Test. This Test is a two-part test:

(1) A tangible benefit must be conferred, either directly or indirectly; and
(2) The benefit is public in character.

(CRA, 2006)

In a 2005 report prepared by Housing Strategies Inc., the researchers note that many CLTs within the Canadian context have a difficult time qualifying as a charitable organization, often undergoing a lengthy process to become registered by the CRA due to the lack of tradition of developing CLTs in Canada (Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). As a result, the CRA must assess each application individually (Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) contends that a further expansion of the Canadian CLT portfolio will enable the CRA to gain expertise with assessing CLTs. Since 2005, it is unclear as to whether the application process for CLTs in Canada has become easier.

2.2.4 Governance Structure

CLT membership is open to all residents living within the geographic area that the CLT serves, meaning that all CLT homeowners/lessees are members of the CLT under the classic CLT model. This service area is the CLT's geographically defined 'community' (Davis, 2010).

Different CLTs serve a different geographic area, and can range on various levels: neighbourhood, city, metropolitan area, regional county, provincial/state, etc. CLT members are able to vote on a range of issues, such as amending CLT by-laws, changing the resale formula, and nominating individuals to the governing board (Sungu-Eryilmaz *et al.*, 2007).

Under the classic CLT model, there is a board of directors made up of three parties, all of whom are empowered with decision-making:

- One-third of the board is elected to represent the people who reside in housing managed by the CLT (lessee members);
- One-third is made up of elected directors residing in the CLT's service area but do not reside on CLT-owned land or housing (general members); and
- The final third is nominated and selected by the elected two-thirds. They represent the broader interest, and may be made up of representatives of local government, private organizations, or other community-based groups.

(Abromowitz, 1992; Davis, 2010).

The tripartite governance model ensures that two-thirds of the control is in the hands of the leaseholders and those who live within the CLT's service area. By doing so, it ensures that the CLT's goals of providing affordable, high-quality community assets are valuable and beneficial to the broader community (Swann, 2010 cited in Lowe *et al.*, 2016). The emphasis on local control and residential engagement in CLT decision-making have been argued as critical success factors in building and preserving permanent affordable housing by capitalizing on local community membership, empowerment, and democratic stewardship of assets (Lowe *et al.*, 2016).

It is important to note not all CLTs have a tripartite board structure. CLTs that deviate from the classic model may choose to adopt an alternative structure that works best for their given context. Indeed, in a 2007 survey[1] of CLTs in the United States, Sungu-Eryilmaz *et al.* (2007) found that approximately 30% of all CLTs have a tripartite board structure. Reaffirming this finding, Thaden (2012) also found that of the 92 sampled CLTs in the United States, 41% did not have CLT residents on the governing board. It is unclear whether the lack of resident representation on the CLT board has had any negative impact on the overall functioning of the CLTs.

2.2.5   Operational Principles

The classic CLT model is characterized by a focus on serving the disadvantaged. Specifically,

> "Disadvantaged *people* who have been excluded from the economic and
> political mainstream and disadvantaged *places* that have been buffeted by
> successive waves of disinvestment and gentrification have the first claim on
> a CLT's resources."

(Roots & Branches, n.d., para. 11, original emphasis)

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, CLTs have a focus on developing and preserving permanently affordable housing. To ensure lasting affordability, CLTs use ground leases that regulate *resale price restrictions* and *buyer eligibility restrictions*. The former can be itemized, mortgage-based, appraisal-based, indexed, or fixed-percentage formulas (*Table 2*). The

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[1] There is currently no survey of CLTs within the Canadian context. As such, survey results from the United States were used in the literature review.

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latter refers to restrictions on the income of the buyers. Both resale price restrictions and buyer

eligibility restrictions encompass a pre-emptive option that enables the CLT to oversee the sale

of homes according to a prescribed resale formula, and entitles the CLT the right to be first to

repurchase the home using the formula-determined price (Davis, 2006). When a

homeowner/lessee decides to sell, the CLT can either: (1) purchase the house and resell it to

another income-eligible household for a price similar to the one paid by the CLT to the departing

seller; or (2) monitor and approve the transaction between seller-buyer, confirming that the buyer

is income-eligible to purchase the home (Davis, 2006).

The purpose of the resale formula is "to give departing homeowners a fair return on their

investment, while giving future homeowners fair access to housing at an affordable price – one

homebuyer after another, one generation after another" (Davis, 2006, p. 19). The sellers pocket

the equity they created or contributed themselves. They do not, however, walk away with the

value accrued as a result of actions taken by the broader community (Davis, 2010). By placing a

restriction on the resale price, this ensures that the unearned increment arising from socially

produced wealth is returned to the benefit of the community, rather than to the individual owner

(Davis, 2006, 2010). In this manner, housing is de-commodified by transferring control over

domestic property from individuals to the community (DeFilippis, 2002).

Type of Formula	Description	Application
Itemized	The resale price is adjusted, increasing or decreasing according to specific factors (e.g., inflation, damage, improvements)	It was widely used among early CLTs. In today's practices, itemized formulas

	that may have an impact on the homeowner's initial investment.	have been largely abandoned because they are good in theory, but not practical.
Mortgage-Based	The resale price is determined according to the mortgage that the buyer would be able to afford at the interest-rate in that moment in time.	It is rarely used because mortgage-based formulas create "serious problems for the homeowner who must sell in a time of increased interest rates" (White, 2011, pp. 8-9)
Appraisal-Based	The resale price is adjusted by adding a specified percentage of the increase in the property's appraised market value to the base price.	These formulas are commonly used. Of all the formulas, the appraisal-based method is the most commonly used.
Fixed-Rate	The resale price is adjusted by applying a fixed interest rate to the original price of the home. This rate remains the same each year.	
Indexed	The resale price increases proportionally to the increases observed in a certain index. Examples include the Consumer Price Index or the Area Median Income.	

Table 2: The different types of resale formulas. (Source Tabulation: White, 2011)

To ensure that those whom the CLT serves continue to be successful in their status as homeowners/lessees, CLTs conduct stewardship activities that help maintain affordability across generations of leaseholders; ensure that the properties are in good repair; and to intervene when households are at risk of foreclosure (Thaden, 2011; White, 2011).

While the CLT's steward function is described primarily as enforcing the conditions outlined in the ground lease, the actual practice of exercising legal enforcement is typically done as a last resort. Instead, much of the stewardship is centred around conducting day-to-day activities that ensure that the rights and responsibilities of the lease provisions are willingly observed without needing to employ legal compulsion (White, 2011). The day-to-day activities can be categorized into 4 groups: disclosure, monitoring, support, and approval (*Table 3*).

Type of Activity	Description
Disclosure	Homebuyers are given all the information necessary so that they are fully informed, and understand, their rights and obligations as owner-occupants of a CLT housing unit.
Monitoring	The CLT has adequate information regarding the homeowner's compliance with the stipulations set out in the lease, loans, and local laws. The CLT should also have knowledge on the status of the homeowner, and know whether there are any life events that may negatively impact their security as a homeowner.
Support	Homeowners are given training, assistance, and referrals to others for when specialized help is needed. This is particularly important in the context of homeowners who may have little financial resources or who have limited experience in dealing with homeownership problems.
Approval	Approval is needed for a variety of requests. Examples include, but are not limited to, subleasing; alterations or additions to the home; acquiring additional mortgage financing; direct conveyance of the home from seller to buyer; and transfer of ownership from the homeowner to their heir.

Table 3: The types of day-to-day stewardship activities of CLTs. (Source Tabulation: White, 2011)

Stewardship activities ensure that CLT residents stay and remain as homeowners, even in the face of crisis, by providing them with the necessary supports to avoid foreclosure (Thaden, 2011). Temkin *et al.*, (2010) analyzed the homeownership outcomes of seven shared equity homeownership programs located in the United States. Of the seven, three CLTs were studied: Champlain Housing Trust (CHT) in Burlington, Vermont; Northern Communities Land Trust (NCLT) in Duluth, Minnesota; and Thistle Homes in Boulder, Colorado. Temkin *et al.* (2010) found that foreclosure rates for all three CLTs were below that of their surrounding areas by the end of 2009 (*Table 4*).

	Champlain Housing Trust (Burlington)	Northern Communities Land Trust (Duluth)	Thistle Homes (Boulder)
% Currently in foreclosure	0.5%	1.1%	0.0%
% Currently in foreclosure in county	1.0%	4.4%	1.1%

Table 4: Foreclosure rates of three CLTs. (Source: Temkin et al., 2010, p. 28)

This benefit of enabling CLT homeowners to attain and sustain homeownership over the long-term allows them to build wealth. Temkin *et al.* (2010) report that homeowners selling their units in three of the studied CLTs received an individualized rate of return of 30.8% for CHT, 39.0% for NCLT, and 22.1% for Thistle Homes. The wealth-building asset of CLTs can further be illustrated by the type of housing tenure that departing CLTs homeowners moved into after reselling their home – this is an important indicator, as it demonstrates residential and economic mobility (Temkin *et al.*, 2010). Temkin *et al.* (2010) found that at all the CLT sites, 68% of

CHT's movers, 78% of NCLT's movers, and 71.8% of Thistle Homes' movers had moved into market-rate housing after leaving the CLT.

Beyond service delivery, CLTs are also focused on expanding their operations to ensure that it benefits the community as much as possible. CLTs can possess a variety of land uses, housing tenures, and housing typologies. They may choose to construct single-family homes, duplexes, condominiums, apartment buildings, and mobile home parks. CLTs may also develop neighbourhood and commercial facilities, as well as provide space for community gardens and parkettes (Davis *et al.*, 2008). Some CLTs embrace a single type of housing and tenure, such as building only single-family houses or townhomes. Other CLTs adopt a mixed approach, developing both residential and commercial projects (Davis *et al.*, 2008).

CLTs are also focused on growing their repertoire of land holdings and supply of affordable housing. Therefore, CLT units are rarely concentrated in one block. Instead, CLT units can be found scattered throughout the CLT's service area (Davis *et al*., 2008). It is important to note that funding and the timing in which properties are acquired can greatly complicate the acquisition process. In securing funding from external sources, there are several challenges. First, reliance on funding from government sources is highly unreliable due to its irregularity resulting from changing government policies and priorities, and economic conditions (DeFilippis, 2002).

Second, CLTs compete with other community groups to acquire seed funding, which is particularly difficult during times when the amount of funding available is scarce (Housing

Strategies Inc., 2005). Lastly, Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) found that a number of CLTs profiled in their study discovered that "you can only go to the well so many times" (p. 107), indicating that there is limit to how much funding is available from any given source.

The question of *when* the CLT decides to acquire property also matters. CLTs are most likely to acquire far more land during times of disinvestment and housing decay, or before gentrification sets in; by the time gentrification pressures become apparent, the property values would have become too costly for CLTs to acquire property (Blumgart, 2015; DeFilippis, 2002).

2.3   Overview of Critical Success Factors

The 10 characteristics discussed in the previous section can be thought of as a framework that provides CLT practitioners guidance to the basic ownership model, legal status, governance structure, and operational principles of CLTs. Merely embodying the 10 characteristics does not automatically guarantee that the CLT will flourish – it is possible that the CLT could be dissolved within a few short years. Through an examination of 12 CLTs across Canada and the United States, Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) outlines 9 instrumental factors underlying the successes of CLTs:

(1)   **A sustainable business plan** that includes a vision statement about the purpose of the CLT and market analyses of the current housing market, target clientele, and feasibility of the CLT to carry out its functions.

(2)   **Strong leadership and administration** ensure that the CLT does not deviate from its vision and business plan. The CLT may draw leadership from various sources, including an elected Board of Directors, an Executive Director, or local champion.

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(3) **Building community support** with government, community organizations, funders and lenders, and local residents can help the CLT access expertise and resources that may be critical to the CLT's operations.

(4) **Education and outreach** can build support and buy-in to the CLT model, given that CLTs are a relatively new concept centred around an unconventional model of homeownership. Such activities may help elicit support from government, funders, community organizations, donors, and the community-at-large.

(5) **Community partnerships** with various bodies to administer, fund, and develop housing. Partnerships may also be built with service partners to provide assistance and training to CLT households in order to build up their capacities to be successful homeowners.

(6) **Access to funding and capitalization** ensures that the CLT is able to carry out its functions, including obtaining land, constructing housing, and conducting outreach and education. Funding may be obtained from public entities, and public and private foundations.

(7) **Capacity building** of both residents and administrative staff helps to ensure that both parties are equally equipped to tackle any challenges that may arise.

(8) **A national network of CLTs** allows CLTs with to access technical advice, financial supports, networking opportunities, and training. Currently, there is no national CLT network in Canada.

(9) **Government supports** can be expressed in the form of government-provided funding and supportive legislation. The latter can include allowing CLTs to easily obtain charitable status and waiving fees for land transfers.

Approximately half of the critical success factors identified by Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) have a strong community undertone. Building community support (#3), conducting education and outreach (#4), forming community partnerships (#5), and capacity building (#7), all highlight the importance of community members as being crucial stakeholders in CLT affairs. Building relationships and educating the community on the CLT model can build support and buy-in for the CLT model (Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). Providing CLT residents with the necessary resources and training to flourish as a homeowner also ensure that they are able to overcome any challenges that may arise throughout their life course as a CLT homeowner (Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). These aspects all have impacts on the long-term viability of a CLT: declining community support for the CLT model and the lack of assistance provided to residents in times of need can greatly undermine a CLT's success. Placing the community as a central figure is therefore a key consideration for ensuring the long-term successes of CLTs.

Using this finding as the starting point, I sought to investigate the importance of the community in CLTs. The aspect of community control in CLTs is an element that was identified as being crucial to the successes of CLTs in academic literature. Despite this, community control remains relatively unexplored within CLT literature (DeFilippis, 2017; Gray *et al.*, 2011). In the following section, the element of community control within the context of CLTs will be explored in the further detail.

2.3.1   The Element of Community Control

The literature points to the importance of 'community control' in CLTs, whereby community members have power over shaping their built environment. The momentum in

developing CLTs has been increasing over the past several years worldwide, but this growth has

been accompanied by a loss of embracing the element of community control (DeFilippis *et al.*,

2017). In a study by Lowe and Thaden (2016), the researchers found that CLTs "do not appear to

operationalize community control of land solely by the bylaws or constitution of a membership"

(p. 613). While the development and maintenance of permanently affordable housing is a central

aim of CLTs, land trusts also have to work "to increase long-term community control of

neighborhood resources [and] to empower residents through involvement and participation in the

organization" (National Community Land Trust Network, n.d., para 2, quoted in Gray *et al.*,

2011, p. 241).

CLTs are constrained by the power relations embedded within the contexts which they

operate: CLTs working in partnership with government, funders, and developers that "control

access to both practical and political resources" must work within their parameters, and this often

means operating around a greater emphasis on producing affordable housing than encouraging

community control (DeFilippis *et al.*, 2017, p. 3). This is corroborated by DeFilippis *et al.*'s

(2017) analysis of several CLT mission statements, finding that most CLTs do not even include

an acknowledgement of community control. Most mission statements emphasize housing and

homeownership, using phrases such as "increasing homeownership opportunities," "creating

affordable homeownership opportunities," and more (DeFilippis *et al.*, 2017, p. 6).

The current trajectory of CLTs moving away from cultivating community control is

troubling. Community control, of both land and the organization, empowers communities,

therefore enabling them to be able to ensure that local development is driven by and is reflective

of local needs and priorities -- this is particularly important for people previously excluded from decision-making processes (DeFlippis, 2017; Moore, 2014). Indeed, since the very beginning, CLTs have been conceptualized as a vehicle through which disadvantaged people become empowered (Davis, 2010). According to DeFilippis *et al.* (2017), traditionally marginalized populations "realize their own agency, both individually and collectively, when they are able to act as agents with power over their homes and communities" (DeFilippis *et al.*, 2017, p. 11). DeFlippis *et al.* (2017) explain that eliminating the aspect of community control from CLTs "would rob the model of this vital political role, and – albeit inadvertently – enable the continued political marginalization of people in poor communities" (p. 11). Community control is therefore important for social and economic reform.

Merely creating a CLT for the community will not translate into successful resident betterment if the CLT does not present opportunities for the community to be engaged in, and are empowered to, influence decisions that impact their neighbourhood. For CLTs to embrace community control, Thaden and Lowe (2014) argue that "the actualization of community control relies upon both the depth and breadth of resident and community participation and leadership within a CLT" (p. 1). In other words, community control does not emerge from simply adopting governance structures and bylaws that give room for residents to have a voice, but rather, through "organizational accountability," where CLT staff and board members actively involve residents in decision-making and planning processes (Lowe & Thaden, 2016).

CLTs that prioritize community control demonstrate an effort to go beyond merely providing housing (Lowe & Thaden, 2016; Moore, 2014). Instead, residents are deeply engaged

in community planning processes. Participants in Lowe and Thaden's (2016) study explain that community control is most effective by being "very neighborhood based… [and] have residents plan" (p. 622). CLTs that cultivate community control allow residents to play a key role in planning and making decisions on matters that would produce the greatest benefit for the community. According to Lowe and Thaden (2016), CLT residents that were able to exercise significant community control led to the development of a host of activities and opportunities that were beneficial to the CLT and its residents. Examples include obtaining the power of eminent domain, developing affordable commercial spaces, youth programs and training, legal services, food pantries, and more.

DeFilippis *et al.* (2017) caution that while public and philanthropic funders may constrain CLTs from pursuing community control, it is not to say that CLTs should avoid receiving technical and financial assistance from public and private sector actors. Some partnerships will involve elites controlling the CLT, while some other partnerships will be more supportive of engaging with the community aspect of CLTs. Drawing on Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation, DeFilippis *et al.* (2017) argue that CLT practitioners should aim for the top rungs of the ladder where residents would hold significant decision-making power over CLT affairs.

2.4   Conclusion

Within the GTHA, market and non-market housing are deeply inaccessible to many households (CMHC, 2017a; CMHC, 2017b; CMHC, 2017c; ONPHA, 2016; RBC, 2017b; Royal LePage, 2018). CLTs can play a vital role in providing affordable housing to communities in need. Fundamentally, CLTs seek to ensure that affordability is maintained in perpetuity for

present and future generations of CLT homeowners by removing land from the market and allowing residents to take part in making decisions around the stewardship of community assets (Crab *et al.*, 2013; Gray, 2008).

The critical success factors underlying CLTs range from ensuring that the CLT has a sustainable business plan, to being active in conducting outreach and forming partnerships with public and private sector actors (Housing Strategies Inc., 2005). The element of community control is an equally important factor, yet it remains fairly unexplored in CLT research (DeFilippis, 2017; Gray *et al.,* 2011). Community control enables residents to be deeply engaged in community planning processes and to be involved in making decisions that would have a positive impact on their well-being and living conditions (Lowe & Thaden, 2016). To explore the element of community control further, the case studies in Chapter 4 will investigate how community control was, or was not, expressed, and the implications it had on the long-term success of the CLT. By doing so, it helps to ground community control from the abstract form into practice. The key lessons from the case studies will inform a set of recommendations for CLT practitioners.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to understand the form that CLTs should take in order to ensure its long-term success as a vehicle for providing affordable housing. The paper seeks to uncover the crucial element underlying the successes of CLTs. To achieve this goal, the paper relied on an examination of existing academic and grey literature on CLTs. I sought to first form an understanding of the basic structure that CLTs typically embody. I then conducted a further exploration in literature to find out the crucial element underlying the successes of CLT. The element of community control was identified as a recurring theme in the literature review as being a critical success factor.

Following this, I consulted a variety of secondary sources to identify case studies that explore whether and how the element of community control was implemented, and the resulting implications it had on the CLT and its residents. My methodology follows a similar process employed by Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) and Moore (2014). Both adopted a case study approach to explore how the various operational practices employed by different CLTs impacted the residents and CLT. The studies derived their findings from secondary research, by consulting web-based resources, studies, documents, and articles. The studies also supplemented their research with key informant interviews to help the researchers build a deeper understanding of the CLTs under their study.

Due to time constraints, my paper only consulted secondary sources to explore my case studies. My focus on deriving information from secondary sources greatly limited the choice and number of case studies. I was constrained to selecting case studies where information on the

crucial factor (i.e., community control) was well-documented, and was more importantly, documented in a manner that was comprehensive and in-depth. Because much of the literature written on CLTs are based on American and European contexts, my case studies were therefore limited to non-Canadian examples. In order to ensure that the case studies would be relevant to the GTHA, I selected the case studies based on two criteria: CLTs operating in urban contexts, and, CLTs operating in the Global North.

In my research, I identified a total of six CLTs that contained discussions on the role community control. However, my paper only discusses four of the six case studies in order to eliminate redundancies in the analysis. Specifically, the Cooper Square Community Land Trust in New York City (see Englesman *et al.*, 2016) and the East London Community Land Trust (see Bunce, 2016) were omitted. They both possess narratives on the role of community activism and the importance of forming partnerships with public and private agencies, respectively, which are analyses observed in the case studies discussed in the following chapter. As such, four CLTs from the following cities were selected: Boston, Massachusetts; Liverpool, England; and Durham, North Carolina. Key lessons were derived from each case study to summarize the actions taken by each CLT and the subsequent impacts those actions had on the long-term viability of the CLT.

Chapter 4: Case Studies

Community control is a critical element that should not be overlooked by CLT

practitioners. To move community control from a mere abstract concept into a tangible practice

requires an investigation into how it may be expressed, in relation to starting up and running a

CLT. Below, case studies from Boston, Massachusetts; Liverpool, England; and Durham, North

Carolina will be explored to understand how community control may be manifested and its

resulting implications on the CLT and its residents.

4.1   Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (Boston, Massachusetts, United States)

4.1.1   Background Context

The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) is based in the Roxbury neighbourhood

in Boston. The origins of DSNI is rooted in local activism that sought to revive a deteriorating

neighbourhood in the 1980s suffering from the same historical practices of housing

discrimination found in many other American cities (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). Discriminatory

housing practices included:

- Redlining practices, whereby mortgages were systemically denied to Black
  neighbourhoods based on the premise that Black neighbourhoods were areas in decline.
  This resulted in significant disinvestment in Black communities by lending institutions
  (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015; Massey & Denton, 1993)
- Restrictive covenants, whereby White homeowners and their heirs were prohibited from
  selling and renting their property to Black home seekers (Massey & Denton, 1993; The
  Fair Housing Center of Greater Boston, n.d.)
- Real estate steering, whereby Black residents were intentionally guided to non-White
  neighbourhoods (The Fair Housing Center of Greater Boston, n.d.)
- Blockbusting practices, whereby realtors would warn White homeowners of the
  imminent "invasion" of people of colour moving into the community (Bhatt & Dubb,

2015). By spreading white panic, it encouraged White homeowners to sell their houses. Realtors would then advertise the newly available units to Black families (Massey & Denton, 1993)

The development of new suburban subdivisions greatly accelerated patterns of residential segregation. Because Black families were prevented from purchasing or renting suburban housing, new residential subdivisions became White-dominated suburbs. Jobs and businesses soon followed to the suburbs (Meehan, 2014). Urban renewal in the Boston South End displaced numerous low-income, minority families, many of whom moved into the Dudley area. As the ethnic mix of the neighbourhood became predominantly non-White, city services were drastically cut back, and disinvestment began (Meehan, 2014). Due to the rapid depreciation in property values, landlords resorted to arson in order to collect insurance money to recover some of their losses. Vacant land soon became a dumping ground for businesses around Boston (Meehan, 2014). By 1981, approximately 30% of Dudley's land was vacant (Medoff & Sklar, 1994 cited in Bhatt & Dubb, 2015, p. 89).

4.1.2   Birth of the Idea for Developing a CLT

The state of affairs in Dudley was a catalyst for the formation of DSNI. In 1984, the Riley Foundation sought to revitalize the neighbourhood. At a community meeting, the Foundation proposed a 23-member board made up of primarily agencies – only four seats were reserved for local residents (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). The Foundation claimed that the organization would take a "community approach." However, the residents refused to accept the agency-dominated structure, the issue being the lack of participation and representation of residents on the board

(Nagel, 1990). Resident Che Madyun challenged the organizers on the validity of the organization as a community-based effort:

> "They kept saying the community was going to be involved... but where was the community participation? ... If the community's going to be involved, why are there going to be so few community residents on the Board? I raised my hand and told them this is not a community process."

(Quoted in Boucher, 1990, p. 41, cited in Nagel, 1990, p. 52)

Recognizing their mistake, the Foundation rethought their approach and proposed a new structure where the majority of the board's composition would be made up of residents. This was approved overwhelmingly, as it would allow for greater resident representation and community control (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015; Nagel, 1990).

4.1.3   The Outcome

DSNI built up its credibility as a community-based organization by enabling a greater community presence in the organization's affairs. This was achieved through a community-dominated and community-elected governance structure, as well as the adoption of several inclusive measures that sought to ensure fair access and representation of all residents in meetings and elections (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). Examples include using translation equipment at every meeting, implementing sliding scale membership fees, and outreach to all households (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015).

In addition to elections, DSNI also mobilized community action, involving residents from across the neighbourhood to tackle campaigns, such as the "Don't Dump on Us" cleanup

campaign – a project aimed at enforcing laws against illegal dumping on vacant lands in the neighbourhood (Nagel, 1990). This cleanup campaign engaged youth and included tactics such as distributing leaflets, reporting the license plate numbers of illegal dumpers, publicly criticizing the city's neglect on the neighbourhood radio station, protesting at City Hall, and threatening to dump the neighbourhood's garbage on the steps of City Hall (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). The demonstrations strong-armed the City administration to take action to improve the conditions of the neighbourhood. A working relationship between DSNI and the City was then formed. The City offered resources to DSNI to assist them in their cause, such as padlocking the gates to an illegal waste transfer station (Walljasper, 1997). Early campaigns such as this one mobilized diverse populations around a common problem, generated community power through organizing, and made positive changes in the community. According to one DSNI organizer, Ros Everdell, "People were galvanized in seeing that they could change things" (quoted in Walljasper, 1997, para. 14).

In the summer of 1986, DSNI entered a 9-month visioning and planning process to develop a neighbourhood plan (Nagel, 1990). The DSNI board saw the need to secure community involvement in the planning process to not only ensure that the plan would be a genuine reflection of the community, but also to foster a sense ownership of the plan amongst residents so that it can be "recognized as a testament of Dudley's residents' determination to see their neighborhood revitalized in a manner that benefitted them in the end" (Nagel, 1990, p. 68). To help develop the neighbourhood plan, DSNI hired DAC International, a Washington-based, minority-owned, multilingual consulting firm, following a resident- and board-involved hiring process (Nagel, 1990). DAC International conducted surveys, working sessions, community

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meetings, and interviews with Dudley business owners and residents. Issues brought up at community-wide meetings were subsequently teased out in smaller focus groups. Translation services were offered in the focus group sessions, so that non-English speakers were able to also participate. Moreover, DAC International made a concerted effort to ensure that the participants in the focus groups were representative of the broader community – where one group was over-represented, efforts were made to recruit under-represented groups (Nagel, 1990). Throughout the engagement process, DAC International acted as facilitators, rather than as the experts controlling the conversation. This allowed residents to be actively engaged throughout the planning process.

In 1987, the nearly year long process culminated in a document, entitled *The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative Revitalization Plan: A Comprehensive Community-Controlled Strategy*. All in all, approximately 200 residents participated in the development of the Plan (Nagel, 1990). It outlined a strategy to develop the Dudley Area, including creating 800-1000 affordable units, gaining control over vacant land, developing an "urban village" that would offer a wide range of services and amenities, development without displacement, and more (Nagel, 1990). The City of Boston endorsed DSNI's Plan (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015).

What needed to happen next was to implement the Plan in order to bring the neighbourhood vision into fruition. The key was to acquire the vacant land in the neighbourhood (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). The Mayor agreed to hand over the deeds to the vacant properties that the City had acquired through tax delinquency for a nominal fee to DSNI. However, the properties that DSNI had acquired from the City were interspersed with vacant lots held up by speculators.

This greatly hindered DSNI's plans to create a "critical mass" amount of development (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015; Meehan, 2014; Walljapser, 1997). To achieve DSNI's development plans, DSNI sought eminent domain, a legal tool that empowers public or private entities to expropriate private property for public good. DSNI sought to use eminent domain to acquire land for the purposes of neighbourhood revitalization and for the benefit to the community more broadly (Meehan, 2014).

Drawing on DSNI's long history of organizing, DSNI organized "Take a Stand, Own the Land" campaign. This campaign was structured around three main arguments: eminent domain would (1) prevent displacement and land speculation; (2) enable for greater transformative change than what could be accomplished by developing on the scattered city-owned parcels; and (3) avoid community opposition that would occur if the city themselves were to exercise eminent domain, given the city's problematic history of using eminent domain (Meehan, 2014).

DSNI's push for eminent domain eventually won support from local residents, and their application benefitted greatly from the support of Mayor Flynn and the director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) (Meehan, 2014). At this point, DSNI formed the Dudley Neighbors Incorporated (DNI), a CLT to serve as the urban development entity required for implementing eminent domain (Meehan, 2014). DSNI drew on a variety of charity and public groups to gather the necessary funds to purchase the lands. By 1994, DNI had obtained 15 acres of private land, along with another 15 acres of land donated from the city (Meehan, 2014).

Today, the vacant lots have been transformed into 225 affordable homes, gardens, playgrounds, schools, and commercial spaces (DNI, n.d.). DSNI continues to exercise a community-centred approach that honours an inclusive approach to participation. They use "facilitated meetings and employ moveable, physical props and spatial layouts to convey design ideas for non-expert community members" (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015, p. 89). An example of DSNI's inclusive approach is to have participants write their ideas down on Post-It notes and to name the clusters of themes that arise. This method of engagement ensures that meetings are not centred around the most vocal people with the strongest English capabilities, or around people who have an interest in forwarding their own agenda (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015).

DSNI's commitment to a community-centred orientation is further reflected in the governing board. The current 2017-2019 governing board is composed of 35 members of equal representation from four of the major cultures present in the community: African-American, Cape Verdean, Latino, and White (DSNI, n.d.). The board is composed of 16 elected residents from the whole area; 2 appointed residents; 4 youths (aged 15-17) from the core area; 7 non-profit agencies from the whole area; 2 community development corporations; 2 religious organizations; and 2 small businesses (DSNI, n.d.). Community members in the core area and in the community-at-large make up 22 out of the 35 (63%) seats on the board.

The involvement of youth on DSNI's governing board is part of DSNI's broader commitment to developing leadership skills in youth by engaging them in various community projects and embedding youth participation as part of the organization's values, programming, and organizational structure. Investing in youth has enabled DSNI to develop a new generation

of community leaders. Many youths have gone on to become DSNI staff and community organizers (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015).

4.1.4 Key Lessons

Firstly, communities can exercise community control through community organizing. In the DSNI case study, residents were able to acquire many successes through community mobilization that greatly helped to advance their various causes. The most notable example was their success in obtaining the power of eminent domain. It is important to be mindful that community organizing must mobilize diverse populations, going beyond the ethnic diversity of the community. This ensures that the multiplicity of voices is included. To keep community organizing alive, it is important to invest in developing leadership skills in youth. This will help develop a new generation of community leaders.

Second, CLTs, at its core, are community-based organizations. To build credibility as one, CLTs have to apply and implement measures that enable for greater community presence in the organization's affairs. As explored in the DSNI case study, the lack of community representation on the organization's board of directors was at odds with the claim made by the Riley Foundation that the newly formed organization would take a "community-based" approach (Nagel, 1990; Walljasper, 1997). In order to ensure that community preferences are voiced, the governance model that the CLT takes up should therefore have good community representation on the CLT board. The governance model may take the form of adopting the tripartite governance model, as referenced in Chapter 2, where CLT residents and the community-at-large

make up two-thirds of the governing board. In the DSNI case study, approximately 22 out of the 35 seats on the board are made up of community members in the core and broader area.

Beyond representation on the governing board, a diverse range of residents should also be engaged in decision-making processes. Barriers to access should be removed to ensure that the space is inclusive to the needs of different participants. For example, DSNI provides translation services at every meeting to allow all residents, regardless of English fluency, to still be involved (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). Contrived processes that discourage participation from non-expert community members should also be avoided. For instance, DSNI conducts facilitated meetings and use props to allow non-planning experts to convey their ideas in a space where the requirement to be well-versed in planning language is removed (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). Where it is identified that voices are overrepresented by one group over another, CLTs should also actively recruit underrepresented voices to be part of decision-making processes.

Thirdly, while providing opportunities for residents to have a greater representation in CLT affairs is a great first step, their representation must be met with an equal consideration of valuing their inputs. In the DSNI case study, the professionals engaged in assisting the CLT to develop the neighbourhood plan not only created an inclusive environment to include all members of the community, the professionals also acted as facilitators, rather than as the rational experts, in order to give residents the space to develop ideas centred around their needs and preferences (Nagel, 1990).

Lastly, politicians are powerful allies. Building alliances and working relationships with politicians will enable the CLT to advance their goals for the organization. For instance, DSNI's application for eminent domain benefitted greatly from the support of the Mayor and the director of BRA. What is also key for these relationships is that the politicians act as partners, working alongside and supporting the CLT, rather than as an domineering entity.

4.2   Homebaked Community Land Trust (Liverpool, England)

4.2.1   Background Context

Homebaked CLT is located in the Anfield ward in Liverpool, England. During the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, Liverpool was a thriving port and industrial city. It served as an important trading point between the industrial cities in Northern England and the rest of the world (Sykes *et al.*, 2013). By the 1960s, Liverpool became increasingly uncompetitive in the face of changing shipping technologies towards containerization and air travel, and a shift in Britain's trading away from exports towards imports (Sykes *et al.*, 2013). At the same time, rapid de-industrialization left severe shocks to the city's manufacturing and economic base (Sykes *et al.*, 2013). By the 1970s, Liverpool was no longer a booming port city (Sykes *et al.*, 2013).

The 2000s was a turning point for the city – Liverpool began experiencing a renaissance and many of the earlier signs of decline were starting to reverse (Sykes *et al.*, 2013). Despite this, Liverpool is still ranked as one of the most deprived local authority areas (Liverpool City Council, 2015). Within Liverpool, Anfield is a deeply deprived neighbourhood. According to a

2017 ward profile on Anfield, 83% of the ward's area is classified as the nation's top 10% most deprived areas (Liverpool City Council, 2017).

Currently, the primary policy intervention in Anfield has been the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) initiative (Ellis *et al.*, 2014). HMR was a £2.2 billion, 15-year program launched in 2002, with an aim of renewing and restructuring weak housing markets in nine sub-regional areas in the North and Midlands that exhibited evidence of high vacancy rates and neighbourhood abandonment. The program sought to rectify these issues through site demolition, refurbishment, and redevelopment (Leeming, 2010). Houses that were selected for demolition were under threat of Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) – a legal function that enables public bodies to force homeowners to sell their home in exchange for compensation (Polyàk, 2017). However, nine years into the program, HMR was suffering major setbacks from the economic recession, a stall in house building, and public funding cuts (McFarlane, 2012). In 2011, public funding for HMR ceased, causing the program to be prematurely terminated. This left many areas in limbo. With regeneration and demolition incomplete, residents who fought demolition now live on desolate streets filled with empty, boarded-up houses (McFarlane, 2012). Local residents find the physical decline of the neighbourhood upsetting (McFarlane, 2012; Pugh, 2017). Angela MacKay, a long-term resident of 20 years, describes the changes to her neighbourhood:

> "Everything was being knocked down and nothing was being put in its
> place. People say this is a deprived area, but if you are living here, working
> here and bring up your children here, it's your home."

(Quoted in Pugh, 2017, para. 12)

These conditions were exacerbated by the redevelopment of the local soccer stadium, Anfield Stadium. The redevelopment scheme involved the Liverpool Football Club (LFC) purchasing properties that were subsequently left empty due to (ongoing) construction delays. This had a deleterious impact on the neighbourhood – it worsened the social and economic conditions of Anfield by accelerating the pre-existing decline (Southern, 2014), with many of the boarded-up houses falling victim to vandalism, robbery, and arson (Conn, 2013). Indeed, residents accuse LFC of manufacturing decline:

> "The area started to decline in the early 1990s with the city's economic
> problems. But Liverpool football club accelerated the decline, by leaving
> good houses empty and boarded up. It wasn't a natural decline; it was
> engineered"

(Quoted in Conn, 2013, para. 7)

HMR was a very controversial project. The program was governed by a board of stakeholders made up of "elected members of each local authority, representatives of regional and sub-regional bodies, developers, lender and consultants" (Cole, 2012, p. 353). There was no resident representation on the board (Cole, 2012). Consultation processes were therefore criticized for being limited in scope and influence (Moore, 2014).

An understanding of the historical context of the HMR program is important, as the origins of the Homebaked CLT emerged against the backdrop of the demolition and renewal scheme.

4.2.2   Birth of the Idea for Developing a CLT

In 2009, artist Jeanna van Heeswijk was commissioned by Liverpool Biennial, an arts organization, to work on a collaborative housing design arts project, then known as 2Up2Down. The purpose of the project was to explore the issues associated with the regeneration of the neighbourhood, and to look at how the local community could take matters into their own hands in developing their neighbourhood around a common future (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012). Affected by the legacies left by failed regeneration schemes, the project offered residents an opportunity to imagine what could be done with the vacant properties in Anfield (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012).

The home base of the 2Up2Down project was at Mitchell's Bakery, which is also the current site of the Homebaked CLT. Mitchell's Bakery was a family-run business that was shut down after being placed under CPO under the HMR program. However, the premature termination of the HMR program left the bakery with an uncertain future (Moore, 2014). Van Heeswijk, seeing this opportunity, rented the bakery for the 2Up2Down project (Polyàk, 2017).

The 2Up2Down project engaged youth to remodel a vacant property comprised of Mitchell's Bakery and two adjoining terraced houses to create affordable housing, a bakery and kitchen, and meeting spaces. They brainstormed and prototyped their design ideas using various techniques: plasticine modelling, computer modelling, full-scale cardboard modelling, collage, and drawing. These techniques provided them with mediums to communicate their ideas "so that they could be translated into architectural form (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012, p. 21). The youth also worked with the community and end users of the bakery and terraced homes to ensure that the finished product was reflective of their needs and preferences (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012). Updates on

the design process were delivered to the public regularly through public meetings and websites associated with the project, where feedback was elicited from members of the community to help inform any needed revisions (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012).

It was during the design process that the idea of developing a CLT was spawned, with an aim of providing affordable housing and to re-open Mitchell's Bakery as a co-operative enterprise. A group of local residents, with support from Liverpool Biennial, established the Homebaked CLT in 2012 (Polyàk, 2017). The CLT board is comprised of primarily local residents who will be in charge of developing a vision and plan for regenerating the community, while the bakery will generate income, act as the 'public face' for the initiative, and serve as a meeting space for the community (URBED, 2012). In the same year that the Homebaked CLT was created, the CLT received an award from the United Kingdom's National CLT Network for its excellence in community engagement. The award recognizes the intensive engagement work that was done with local youth and residents in designing the bakery space (URBED, 2012).

4.2.3   The Outcome

Since the creation of the Homebaked CLT, the CLT has started a project named "Build your own High Street." The aim of this project is to convene community members to develop a master plan to Council regarding the development of the land adjacent to Homebaked. A strong emphasis of the project is that it is "Designed by the people, for the people," and that it is also "Community/resident led" (Homebaked, 2015b). This emphasis on the "community" is indeed reflected in the collaborative visioning exercises and decision-making that are deeply engrained in the process. In one workshop, Marianne Heaslip, an architect who has worked extensively

with Homebaked, expressed that the planning process "has to be community controlled… and the community is in charge of the ideas" (quoted in Homebaked, 2015a, para. 11)

The aspect of community engagement and participation, so central to the operations of Homebaked, is a reflection of the disempowerment experienced by residents during past state-sponsored regeneration schemes. Engagement provided opportunities for residents to have a say in how they wanted to develop their neighbourhood (Moore, 2014). In one study, interviewees lamented HMR for the lack of community focus:

> "…the ownership, interest and benefit from HMR lay with stakeholders external to the local community – social landlords, contractors, and 'new' residents to the area – rather than with local people themselves, and it was this feeling that provided a stimulus for a community-led approach."

(Moore, 2014, p. 37).

It is crucial to note that while Liverpool Biennial was a key player in supporting the creation of the CLT (Polyàk, 2017), the presence and involvement of the external agency never overshadowed the community as a central figure (Moore, 2014; Potts, 2014). The project, as described earlier, took on a community-led approach where young people and residents worked collaboratively alongside architects and design professionals to identify how best to develop the Mitchell's Bakery site and the broader neighbourhood (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012; Homebaked, 2015a). Indeed, the community's request to re-open Mitchell's Bakery only happened because the community "stepped up and owned it" (Potts, 2014, p. 14) -- Liverpool Biennial gave support to the idea and invested in workshops, events, and programming to build up the capacities of the residents so that the professional team, when the time was ready, would gradually depart and the

community would take over as the owners of the Homebaked CLT and bakery. Rather than

acting as the rational expert, Liverpool Biennial, along with various professionals, engaged in

reinstating Mitchell's Bakery, all adopted a co-operative ethos that valued the input of

community members:

> "I wouldn't contribute my knowledge as an architect, but I found ways for
> them to contribute their knowledge as expert users" (Architect)

(Quoted in Potts, 2014, p. 15)

By conducting meaningful community engagement, the Homebaked project empowered a

disempowered community that was previously hindered from mobilizing their social capital to

effect change (Potts, 2014). This aspect of giving residents the power to shape their surroundings

is particularly important in a context where community members felt disenfranchised and

excluded from influencing decision-making in past regeneration projects (Potts, 2014). In

describing their path to becoming a CLT board member, one resident explained that having the

ability to influence change in their community is important:

> "It was something that was important to me, to a) get involved in the
> community and b) that it was also something that I saw that I could have an
> influence on as opposed to being totally … I have no influence on what's
> happening in the area where I live, in my house and whatever, although
> there have been numerous consultations, so that's how I got involved and
> then it really just went on from there, it rolled on from just going on a
> Tuesday to then being part of a small group of people who were involved to
> being asked would I go on the CLT board. Ok, yes ok, would I be a
> signatory, ok, yes, would I be a director, yes ok and then you sort of think
> "oh God".

(Quoted in Moore, 2014, pp. 38-39)

This quote illustrates that community members have a desire to influence changes within their community.

Today, Homebaked is making strong strides towards building affordable housing for its residents. In 2017, the Homebaked CLT was awarded a £215,000 from Power to Change to refurbish the upper level of the bakery into a flat that will be rented out to local young people at an affordable rate (Pugh, 2017). In January 2018, renovations were complete and the CLT is currently in the process of securing their first tenants (Homebaked, 2018).

4.2.4   Key Lessons

Firstly, community control can be manifested in the form of resident-driven decision-making. This is particularly important in contexts where communities feel that previous state-sponsored interventions were a poor reflection of community needs. In the Homebaked case study, consultation processes under the HMR scheme were limited in scope and influence (Moore, 2014). The benefits produced rested with stakeholders external to the community, rather than with the local residents (Moore, 2014). The lack of community focus was a catalyst for developing a community-centred approach to redeveloping the area in order to ensure that changes to the neighbourhood are reflective of their needs and preferences (Moore, 2014).

Resident-driven decision-making involves allowing residents to take the lead in making decisions regarding the development of their neighbourhood. Engagement processes should therefore allow residents to have their voices be heard. Where meetings are facilitated by external partners, residents should play a critical role in shaping ideas where their opinions are

valued. As explored in the Homebaked case study, Liverpool Biennial and other industry professionals all adopted a co-operative ethos that valued the input of the community by taking a step back from dominating discussions as the rational expert and allowing residents to contribute to the dialogue as the expert users (Potts, 2014). The emphasis on allowing for community control in CLT decision-making in the Homebaked case study is highly reflective of the community-centred governance model discussed in Chapter 2, where local control and residential engagement in CLT decision-making are central for ensuring that the management and development of the community's assets are beneficial to the core community and community-at-large (Gray, 2008; Lowe *et al.,* 2016)

Secondly, community engagement should seek to involve a wide variety of residents. Community engagement should therefore not just involve adults, but also youths, as they too hold views and opinions that should not be overlooked. In the Homebaked case study, youths were a central part of conceptualizing and prototyping designs for Mitchell's Bakery (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012).

Third, to ensure that community engagement processes are accessible to everyone, techniques should be adopted to ensure that all people can be involved, regardless of their fluency in planning and/or architecture. In this case study, for instance, the 2Up2Down project used a variety of techniques to help youth communicate their ideas, including using plasticine modelling, collage making, and drawing.

Regular updates with the community are needed to ensure that residents not deeply engaged with the planning process are still informed of the progress of any project. Their feedback should be solicited, since this can help inform any revisions that may be needed to ensure that plans are developed in accordance with their needs and preferences. This ensures that a wide range of residents are still engaged in some capacity.

Lastly, the involvement of Liverpool Biennial highlights that CLTs do not emerge nor operate in a vacuum. Partnerships with external agencies bring in expertise that can help support and guide residents toward realizing their visions. Indeed, as raised in Chapter 2, Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) identified the importance of building support and partnerships with various external agencies to allow the CLT to access the expertise it may be lacking. In deploying outside expertise, it is important to work with a partner that will not exercise a high degree of control over the residents. Instead, the partner will work alongside residents, listening, valuing, and supporting the residents' visions. When working with a deeply disenfranchised and excluded group, it is important for the external agency to display a commitment to an ethos of co-operation and co-creation in growing the assets and capacities of the community. This is needed to build trust and assurance in the residents.

4.3   Anfield/Breckfield CLT (Liverpool, England)

4.3.1   Background Context

Anfield and Breckfield are two inner city wards located in North Liverpool that have suffered long-term decline as a result of deindustrialization and the restructuring of maritime trade and transportation industry (Sykes *et al.*, 2013). As explored earlier in the Homebaked CLT

case study, Anfield and Breckfield exhibit high levels of housing vacancy and abandonment rates, as well as crime and anti-social behaviour. These conditions stripped away the community's faith in the ability of the local state to provide adequate levels of public services, prompting the community to organize two neighbourhood councils – Breckfield and North Everton Neighbourhood Council (BNENC) and the Anfield Breckside Community Company (ABCC) (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). The two councils served as the community's voice, advocating for the needs of the community and to rally for greater public and private investment for the neighbourhood (Englesman *et al.*, 2016).

4.3.2 Birth of the Idea for Developing a CLT

The community groups, the City Council, and the local football club, all worked together to produce *The Community's Report on the Regeneration of Anfield and Breckfield, Liverpool* in 2002. The plan, while advocating for neighbourhood stability, spoke to demolishing almost 2000 homes over the course of 15 years (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). The plan laid the groundwork for the HMR initiative, and a formal neighbourhood assessment was carried out. In 2005, the neighbourhood was officially designated as a "Renewal Area" (Englesman *et al.,* 2016), effectively slating the area for regeneration in the form of refurbishment, demolition, and redevelopment.

By this time, the Housing Association, being the largest landlord in the area, came up with the idea of using their assets to help regenerate the area. They proposed creating a subsidiary of the Housing Authority that would adopt a community-led approach to housing development and management, where residents would play an integral part in decision-making (Englesman *et al.,*

2016). The Housing Authority argued that this approach would allow for the creation of a sustainable community, and moreover, would lessen the need for the Housing Authority to intervene in future years (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). In 2006, the Housing Association worked with the University of Liverpool to investigate the CLT model for the Anfield and Breckfield areas (Englesman *et al.*, 2010 cited in Englesman *et al.*, 2016).

4.3.3   The Outcome

The community was largely supportive of the idea of creating a CLT. Indeed, the community had previously commissioned a legal paper investigating the idea of developing a land trust in the neighbourhood (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). However, the community lacked the resources to push the idea forward and was largely dependent on the Housing Association and City Council to recognize their ideas. This meant that the community's demands for social and economic reforms centred around their needs and preferences remained secondary to the objectives of the technocrats in power (Englesman *et al.*, 2016).

Community meetings were run by public officials, which were "run in a way that would marginalize the contributions from local people" (Englesman *et al.*, 2016, p. 602). The meetings were led with an intent of it acting as a mechanism for the local state to convey what they had in mind for a community-led housing initiative. More often than not, the ideas were "more operational than visionary or strategic" (Englesman *et al.*, 2016, p. 602). The meetings were highly formal, top-down processes that, for instance, involved the use of presentations. This enabled the technocrats to control the meeting and decision-making, thus allowing them to protect their interests at the expense of the interests of the community (Englesman *et al.*, 2016).

Ultimately, the CLT failed to develop because of the top-down approaches that prevented the 'soul' of the CLT from finding its roots in the community (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). Citing Esteva (2014), Englesman *et al.* (2016) note that "domination of technocratic knowledge (and therefore practice) … restrict[s], in covert and overt ways, community involvement and action and resists any attempts to politicize community matters" (p. 602). In the end, local residents were left with yet another failed regeneration scheme.

4.3.4   Key Lessons

The Anfield/Breckfield case study highlights that in a situation where a community needs to have an external partner give approval and/or credibility to the community's ideas, a power imbalance favouring the political and economic elites over residents can result in residents having their needs and preferences being neglected. As referenced earlier in Chapter 2, a governance model, where control over decision-making rests with the residents, enables the residents to further community-identified goals (Gray, 2008). In this case study, the Housing Association and City Council had an interest in forwarding their agendas at the expense of the interest of the community (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). The inability of the residents to have control over decision-making meant that the community's needs and preferences remained secondary to the technocrats in power (Englesman *et al.*, 2016).

Secondly, the way community meetings are conducted can also greatly undermine the extent to which residents are able to influence decision-making. Community meetings that are highly formal and that use excessive jargon can exclude non-experts from participating in decision-making processes. Presentations, roundtables, and town-hall style meetings are not

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conducive for participatory, democratic decision-making. Instead, top-down measures allow political and economic elites to control conversations and to also protect their interests. In the Anfield/Breckfield case study, technocrats were able to control the conversation of the meeting by running community meetings using top-down approaches that subsequently marginalized the contributions from residents (Englesman *et al.*, 2016).

4.4   Durham Community Land Trustees (Durham, North Carolina, United States)

4.4.1   Background Context

The Durham Community Land Trustees (DCLT) is located in Durham, North Carolina, situated in between downtown Durham and Duke University's West Campus (Gray *et al.*, 2011). The neighbourhood in which the CLT is situated is at the centre of encroaching gentrification – the recent conversion of manufacturing buildings into commercial, residential, and office buildings, as well as their advantageous location to both the downtown and Duke University, makes the neighbourhood a highly attractive place for investment (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

DCLT has a tripartite board, composed of one-third land trust residents, one-third community representatives, and one-third public representatives (DCLT, 2017). The land trust serves 7 neighbourhoods: West End, Lyon Park, Burch Avenue, Morehead Hill, Lakewood Park, East Durham, and Southside (DCLT, 2017). DCLT is focused on affordable housing development and management, although it has also developed commercial property as well (DCLT, 2017).

4.4.2   Birth of the Idea for Developing a CLT

In 1987, DCLT began as a grassroots effort, initiated by a group of residents who were

concerned about "rising housing prices, absentee landlords, and housing disrepair in their

community" (DCLT, n.d., para. 1). While most of the founders of DCLT were White, they

recognized the importance of involving Black residents of the community to be part of the

movement:

> "Early on, the folks involved in starting it were, did more easily fit into that
> category of a bunch of white, highly educated do-gooders, trying to do
> good, and, and, but there was a conscious effort to make sure that the
> community itself ultimately were going to be stakeholders and board
> members in the organization, and they've been very successful in doing
> that."

(Quoted in Gray *et al.*, 2011, p. 244).

4.4.3   The Outcome

During the organization's "middle" years, the executive director created a community

organizer position. Staff occupying this role was responsible for conducting community outreach

and participation. However, funding for the position was cut, and so the position was terminated

(Gray *et al.*, 2011).

Over the years as an organization, DCLT has made significant improvements in "cleaning

up" the neighbourhood. One respondent in a study by Gray *et al.* (2011) commented that DCLT

"…made a positive impact on the neighborhood in terms of housing costs, and it's taken some of

the worst properties and fixed them up" (p. 245). Many residents also recalled other community

building and outreach initiatives engaged by DCLT, including lobbying for the city to pave the

dirt roads in the neighbourhood, mentoring emerging neighbourhood organizations, collaborating with the police to combat neighbourhood crime, assisting with opening a community centre for youth, and reducing absentee landlordism and vacant housing (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

DCLT's work in the community and community organizing "changed the spirit of the neighbourhood" (Gray *et al.*, 2011, p. 246). The organization took a proactive approach to assisting households in overcoming their personal challenges so that they could purchase a house. This conveyed a message to residents that the land trust cared about its members and the community. DCLT also engaged in other community building and outreach efforts that were outside the realm of building and providing housing. Examples include helping residents build a community centre and lobbying for street lighting and improvements to bus stops. These initiatives as well conveyed to residents that the land trust cared about them (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

For many residents, they believed that it was important to keep the 'community' aspect in the CLT. At the time of their study, Gray *et al.* (2011) note that the community organizing piece has waned. One respondent acknowledged that while much of the community mobilization should emerge from the community themselves, "a lot of times people need somebody to nudge them along, and they don't have anyone right now that's doing that, so it's starting to revert back to a lot of negativity …towards the CLT" (quoted in Gray *et al.*, 2011, p. 245). At the time of Gray *et al.*'s (2011) study, the pieces that had been put in place to improve the neighbourhood had begun to "go back in a different direction" (p. 245). Indeed, Gray *et al.* (2011) note that foreclosures were beginning to be a problem. Residents opined that a community organizer might have helped to prevent the issue by acting as residents' go-to right when they began

experiencing problems with mortgage or property tax payments. Many residents do not view the land trust as being a place where they could go for help.

According to respondents in Gray *et al.*'s (2011) study, they felt that the "community has gone out of the [CLT]" (p. 246). For one, there was not much energy for staff to engage in community organizing due to constraints in staff's time and funding. One resident voiced that "[The CLT] has grown as far as houses, but it has not built the community, has not empowered the community, it's only fixed up houses" (quoted in Gray *et al.*, 2011, p. 246).

Also contributing to the loss of community are the motivations of recent homeowners. The first generation of DCLT residents perceived homeownership as being an opportunity to build up the community and to improve the neighbourhood. The recent homeowners, however, do not "buy the ideology," purchasing homes only because they saw it as their only avenue to gain homeownership. Long-time DCLT members found this to be particularly disheartening (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

According to Gray *et al.*, (2011), the loss of a focus on the 'community' element seemed to be associated with the loss of the community organizer position. A community organizer could help keep the 'community' in the CLT by enabling the organization to devote itself to both developing and maintaining affordable housing and community organizing. Moreover, having a dedicated community organizer could help develop community leaders by dedicating their time in building up the skills, capacities, and knowledge of community members. The community

leaders could then in turn assist CLT staff with running initiatives that the staff do not have time to do (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

4.4.4   Key Lessons

The DCLT case study highlights that a CLT merely embodying the 10 basic CLT characteristics will not guarantee that the CLT will be effective and successful in developing, delivering, and managing affordable housing in the long-term. For example, DCLT has a tripartite board (tripartite governance), is committed to providing perpetually affordable housing (perpetual affordability), offers commercial property in addition to housing (flexible development), and is deeply involved with expanding their operations to provide affordable housing to more households (expansionist acquisition). Yet despite this, DCLT is experiencing issues with foreclosures and feelings of disengagement from residents (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

The DCLT case study points to the importance of the need for ongoing community control. As such, community control should not be a one-off process that ends once when an initiative has been successfully implemented. For DCLT, the organization was very proactive in securing resources for the residents through organizing. However, the decline in community organizing activities has seemingly resulted in DCLT and the community to lose their way – many of the pieces that were put in place in the beginning were reverting in a negative direction. One prime issue identified in the case study was foreclosures (Gray *et al.*¸ 2011).

At the time of Gray *et al.*'s (2011) study, DCLT was deeply involved with expanding its operations by developing more affordable housing. However, the land trust was not particularly

engaged with empowering the community. As a CLT expands its operations, having a community organizer could help keep the 'community' in the CLT by allowing the land trust to have the time to dedicate their work to both affordable housing and community outreach. Their role in conducting outreach helps people stay engaged in the CLT and informed about what is happening with regards to the CLT and broader community. A community organizer also helps to nudge people to advocate for the change they want.

It is important to note that the role of a community organizer can go beyond mobilizing the community for change. Firstly, the community organizer can work to develop the next generation of leaders by building up their skills and capacities. Secondly, the community organizer can also be engaged in ensuring that residents are continually reminded of the philosophy behind the CLT model. In the DCLT case study, recent DCLT homeowners were motivated to be part of the CLT because of the opportunity to gain homeownership, while the older generation of DCLT homeowners viewed the opportunity to be part of the CLT as a way of implementing positive neighbourhood change. The participants in Gray *et al.*'s (2011) study felt that the recent homeowners did not "buy the ideology." Having a community organizer to regularly remind residents of the CLT's vision can help keep the community cohesively held together.

4.5   Conclusion

Merely embodying the 10 basic characteristics of CLTs will not guarantee that a CLT will flourish in the long-term. Indeed, Thaden and Lowe (2016) argue that community control does not emerge from adopting governance structures and bylaws that merely speak to the importance

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of resident control. The case studies highlight that there is no one recipe for community control to be expressed. Community control can be expressed in various forms in CLTs, including community empowerment, community engagement, and community organizing.

Organizational principles that engage residents in all aspects of decision-making on an ongoing basis is one way in which the CLT can allow community control to be expressed. As such, while the tripartite governance model taken up by DSNI is one means in which residents have control and are able to have their needs be well-represented in decision-making (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015; DSNI, n.d.), it should not be necessarily interpreted that all CLTs should adopt a tripartite governance structure. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, not all CLTs adopt the tripartite governance model: approximately 30% of all surveyed CLTs in 2007 in the United States adopt the tripartite board structure (Sungu-Eryilmaz *et al.*, 2007). CLTs frequently make alterations to the classic model to ensure that the land trust is a good fit with the local context (see Davis *et al.*, 2008).

Other means in which community control can be expressed is by allowing for residents to undertake resident-driven decision-making and ongoing community organizing. As it was explored in the Homebaked CLT case study, experts ready to take a step back to allow residents to take the reins with being in charge of crafting ideas is also a way community control can be expressed. Because CLTs are inherently community-based and community-oriented, top-down approaches and power imbalances favouring expert knowledge prevent the 'soul' of the community from emerging within the CLT. As explored in the Anfield/Breckfield case study, the dominance of technocratic knowledge can constrain the extent to which the community is able to

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assume the role as experts. The community's ability to influence decision-making will therefore be limited, as their engagement will be just mere tokenism. Therefore, while Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) identified the importance of developing supports and partnerships with external agencies for the purposes of accessing outside expertise, it is important to be mindful that the relationships that are developed have to display a commitment to a co-operative ethos where the community's needs and preferences are valued.

Whichever form community control is manifested in a CLT, the most crucial point to keep in mind is that residents should be positioned at the upper most rungs of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation where they hold significant CLT decision-making power over CLT affairs (DeFilippis *et al.*, 2017). As such, the element of community control should hold a central place and permeate all aspects of the CLT – that is, the ownership model, legal status, governance structure, and operational principles (*Figure 4*).


Figure 4: Conceptualization of community control in relation to the elements of a CLT

Chapter 5: Recommendations

The case studies illustrate the various means in which community control can be expressed in CLTs. Community control is a critical success factor for CLTs. The expression of the community within the organizational and operational principles of CLTs should neither be neglected nor overlooked. This section categorizes the key lessons from each study into the following five recommendations:

(1) CLTs should conduct community engagement in a way that is long lasting, meaningful, and inclusive.

(2) Community organizing can build social change for CLTs.

(3) Investing in future leaders can help ensure that the community's interests continue to be protected in the CLT.

(4) Forming alliances and partnerships can bring in much needed professional expertise and political support that the CLT may be lacking.

(5) Having a dedicated community organizer can ensure that the element of 'community' is kept alive within CLTs.

Each recommendation will be explored further below.

5.1   Recommendations

(1) CLTs should conduct community engagement in a way that is long lasting, meaningful, and inclusive

In-depth and ongoing community engagement with residents over planning and designing community plans is a necessary process for ensuring that future development is reflective of the needs and priorities of the residents. Contrived, top-down processes that marginalize the contributions of residents should be avoided. As CLTs are developed by the community, for the community, actions resulting from discussions should therefore be reflective of the needs and preferences of the community. Meaningful community engagement provides opportunities for CLT members to have an opportunity to voice their opinions. There are several means by which community engagement can be meaningful.

First, a conscious effort must be made to include all residents in planning processes, regardless of their race/ethnicity, age, gender, ability, religion, etc. For example, in the Homebaked case study, youth were deeply engaged with developing a design for remodelling a vacant property (Heaslip *et al.*, 2012) – this is particularly noteworthy, given that youth are typically under-represented in planning processes (Ausberger *et al.*, 2017). Being proactive in recruiting under-represented groups to be part of planning processes is a necessary step for ensuring that all voices are as well represented as possible.

Second, barriers should be removed that may prevent groups from participating. This may include offering translation services and childminding, as well as ensuring that the method of engagement is inclusive of all levels of planning knowledge. Formal, top-down processes that

use a lot of planning jargon can exclude residents from participating (Englesman *et al.*, 2016). Using plain language and embracing more collaborative approaches enable residents who may not be particularly well-versed in planning to still be able to participate and convey their ideas.

Third, professionals involved in engaging with residents should allow community members to contribute their knowledge as experts where their opinions are heard and valued. The professionals involved should adopt more of a facilitator role, rather than acting as the rational experts controlling the conversation.

(2) Community organizing can build social change for CLTs

Community organizing can enable CLTs to become agents for social change. CLTs that require a particular community resource in order to advance their goals can use community organizing to obtain the resources they need. In the DSNI case study, for instance, community organizing played a central role in securing eminent domain, a tool which enabled DSNI to carry out the scale of development that they were looking for (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015; Meehan, 2014; Walljapser, 1997).

Community organizing can also place pressure on political leaders to alleviate problems that are hindering the goals of the CLT and broader community. For example, DSNI mobilized community action, involving residents to place pressure on City Hall to take action towards protecting the neighbourhood from illegal dumping (Nagel, 1990; Walljasper, 1997).

Lastly, community organizing can empower residents, and in turn, inspire them to become an activist and advocate of the community's interests. By effecting change via community organizing, people become galvanized seeing that they were part of a movement that made a positive impact for the community (see Walljasper, 1997). In this manner, community organizing can inspire residents to become engaged and demand for greater community control over neighbourhood affairs.

(3) Investing in future leaders can help ensure that the community's interests continue to be protected in the CLT

Taking steps to providing youth with opportunities to build their leadership skills will develop a new generation of community leaders that can help ensure that the community's interests continue to be advocated for and protected. A loss of community leaders can greatly hinder the CLT from achieving their goals. As discussed in the point above, community organizing is an effective means by which social change can be achieved. However, community organizing is dependent on the human capital that is available to lead and marshal support from the community around a common cause. Therefore, as the older generation of community leaders retire, it is important that new leaders are able to take their place.

CLTs can help youth build their leadership skills by offering opportunities to youth to be engaged in planning processes, community projects, and the CLT board. In the DSNI case study, the land trust deeply valued youth engagement. This was reflective in how DSNI would reach out and engage with youth in various community projects and involve youth on DSNI's governing board (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). Many of the youth who were engaged in the CLT

eventually went on to become DSNI staff and community organizers (Bhatt & Dubb, 2015). Investing in youth is therefore critical to ensure that the needs of the community continue to be advocated for in the future.

(4) Forming partnerships can bring in much needed professional expertise and political support that the CLT may be lacking

CLTs do not operate in a vacuum – rarely can CLTs achieve everything on its own. While CLTs do have staff and residents from which expertise can be drawn, there is a limit to how much knowledge they possess. Moreover, the types of resources and supports that they can offer may not be aligned with the aims of the CLT. Therefore, forming partnerships with external agencies can bring in the professional expertise that the community may be missing. Housing Strategies Inc. (2005) identified building partnerships with various bodies as being a critical success factor for CLTs, as it would enable the CLT to access expertise and resources that the CLT may be lacking internally. As observed in the DSNI case study, this may mean bringing in consultants to help the community develop a neighbourhood plan.

Partnerships go beyond working with private sector and non-profit organizations. CLTs can also form alliances with political leaders to help advance the goals of the CLT. This can be observed in the DSNI case study, where DSNI formed working relationships with the City of Boston. The City offered resources to DSNI to assist them in various causes, including padlocking the gates of an illegal waste transfer station (Walljasper, 1997) and lending their political support to DSNI to help them obtain the power of eminent domain (Meehan, 2014).

What is key in establishing partnerships is that power is well-balanced between the CLT and external agencies, such that CLT residents still hold considerable power and influence over decision-making. Therefore, external partners take on more of a supporting role, helping the CLT to achieve their goals, rather than entering the partnership as a controlling figure that oversees all of the CLT's affairs.

(5) Having a dedicated community organizer can ensure that the 'community' is kept alive within CLTs.

As the operations of the CLT grows, it may become difficult for the CLT to balance both developing and managing affordable housing and community organizing. Indeed, a growing attention towards the affordable housing piece may lead to a loss of 'community' within the CLT (DeFilippis *et al.*, 2017; Gray *et al.*, 2011). This was observed in the DCLT case study, where the loss of the community element seemed to be associated with the loss of the community organizer position. The pieces that were put in place were reverting in a negative direction. The result were feelings of resentment and a perception that the CLT was not a place where residents could go for help (Gray *et al.*, 2011).

A community organizer can help ensure that any progress made by the CLT does not revert back to the beginning state. A community organizer is needed to nudge people to advocate for the change they want by conducting regular outreach and informing residents of what is happening within the CLT and broader community. This means engaging with residents, building up their capacities, and providing them with opportunities to influence change. A community organizer therefore helps to place assurance in the residents that the CLT cares about

its members. As a result, residents will continue to trust that the CLT has their best interests, and in turn, is a place where they could seek help.

CLTs can establish a community organizer position in their staff roster, who will be primarily be responsible for conducting outreach and education. Funding for the position likely have to come from grants, monetary donations, and/or fundraising efforts.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This paper sought to investigate the form that CLTs should take to ensure its long-term success in creating permanent affordable housing for low- and moderate-income residents in the GTHA. Through an examination of four case studies from the United States and England, the element of community control was identified as a key factor in the successes of CLT. Community control may be expressed in various forms, such as community empowerment, community organizing, or community engagement. Central to community control is enabling residents to have decision-making power (DeFilippis *et al.*, 2017; Lowe & Thaden, 2016) in all aspects of a CLT's affairs.

Planners and housing advocates working in the field helping communities develop CLTs must therefore be mindful of their position in relation to residents. Professional expertise should not be elevated above local knowledge. Working collaboratively alongside residents, supporting their cause, and providing them with the tools to develop the capacity to influence decision-making should be practiced. Through this research, professionals should be reminded of the importance of the community – the knowledge they hold, and how the residents are the ones who will have to live with the decisions that are made regarding their community.

6.1   Next Steps

Further exploration of how community control is exercised by Canadian CLTs will help to build a deeper repertoire of knowledge. Due to the unavailability of in-depth, comprehensive Canadian literature on how community control operates within the Canadian context, the next steps to understand its manifestations will require in-person interviews with key stakeholders

involved with the initial conception and ongoing operations of various Canadian CLTs. This investigation into Canadian CLTs can also explore how the exercise of community control within the Canadian context compares to the American and European contexts.

Conversations amongst planners on affordable housing solutions within the Canadian context routinely bypass the potential that CLTs hold. Instead, much of the focus has been on introducing market fixes. Examples include introducing inclusionary zoning (Dean, 2017), legalizing rent control (Ontario Ministry of Housing, 2017), levying foreign buyers' tax (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2017), and reducing the red tape to the development approvals process (Green & Filipowicz, 2016). It seems that much of the action towards creating CLTs has been originating from communities themselves. Rapidly gentrifying communities have been very proactive, looking into the potential role that CLTs can play in providing much needed affordable housing to low- to moderate-income families.

As CLTs become more central in the affordable housing landscape, planners will find themselves either working directly with communities to develop CLTs, or in capacities where they are responsible for crafting and implementing policies that will in turn support the development and ongoing operations of CLTs. As such, planners have to develop a critical awareness of what CLTs are and what the necessary supports are that enable community control to be expressed. The latter may include closing policy gaps to make the process easier for CLTs to gain status as a tax-exempt organization (see Housing Strategies Inc., 2005), establishing a dedicated fund for communities initiating community-driven solutions for affordable housing, and working with provincial and municipal governments to identify surplus lands that can be

donated or given to CLTs at a nominal cost. Therefore, planners have to consider that CLTs will increasingly become part of the affordable housing mix and develop a set of planning tools and legislation that will encourage and allow CLTs to succeed in the long-term.

As a starting point, newly created CLTs in the Canadian context can be investigated to explore whether and how the element of community control was critical to the development of the CLT. Questions for consideration may include: was community organizing a central part in kickstarting the process in creating the CLT? Or did the CLT arise from a more organic process? Did the relationships formed with external agencies greatly assist with the creation of the CLT? If so, what were the power dynamics like and how did the various parties assert themselves in the planning process? These questions can be considered when investigating newly created CLTs, such as the Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust and the Hamilton Community Land Trust. Identifying the answers to these questions will help communities interested in developing CLTs to know the critical components that need to be in place to successfully drive the creation of a CLT.

For more well-established CLTs operating in Canada, understanding how the element of community control is sustained is important. As explored in the DCLT case study, ongoing and durable community control is needed to ensure that CLTs do not deviate from their vision and goals (Gray *et al.*, 2011). Understanding the dynamics of how community control is sustained in the long-term within the Canadian context is needed. This includes exploring: what is the planner's role in facilitating community control? For CLTs where significant community control is exercised, what are the social, economic, and political contexts? Do these contexts matter? If

so, how? Are there policies and political/financial/resource supports that are in place, or should

be in place, that help communities take charge in making decisions? Are there barriers from the

CRA around obtaining charitable or non-profit status that make exercising community control

difficult? Addressing these questions will help to identify the role that planners should take

within the landscape of creating and sustaining CLTs.

Because much of the academic and grey literature on CLTs are primarily based on

American and European CLTs, planners moving forward will need to take active strides to

understand how CLTs operate within the Canadian context and the critical success factors

underlying their successes. Doing so will allow CLTs to move from the fringes to assuming a

more central figure as a potential affordable housing solution. Given the deeply entrenched

affordability issue in the GTHA, and in Canada more broadly, CLTs have to be considered as

being part of the planner's affordable housing toolkit.

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