

RECRUITED TO GET SUITED: THE CONTEMPORARY DIVERSITY RECRUITMENT TACTICS OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY

by

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ABSTRACT

This study includes an analysis of secondary literature on the issue of diversity in the Canadian Forces, and includes an extensive review of how employment equity regulations have impacted the Canadian military. Interviews were conducted with first generation immigrants who have joined, or are contemplating, joining the Forces, as well as with experts on diversity in the military. The purpose of the interviews was to glean experiential anecdotes, and professional knowledge about the issue of increasing the representation of visible minorities in the Canadian Forces, and the relative success of that endeavour. The intention of this research is to explore an area of research that is undeveloped outside of military-commissioned inquiry, and to provide recommendations to the government concerning how to improve the public's awareness of the military, how to address misconceptions, and the problems that deter newcomers in Canada from wanting to join.

Key words: Canada, immigrants, military, Canadian Forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, Employment Equity Act, labour market, discrimination, peacekeeping, foreign-born, credentialization, citizenship, security, multilevel governance, leadership

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In the contemporary milieu, the Canadian Forces' yearning for a more diverse army is clearly shown in the revised citizenship guide that was released in 2009, a document which must be read by all landed immigrants who want to write the citizenship test. In the document, it states that "there is no compulsory military service in Canada. However, serving in the regular Canadian Forces is a noble way to contribute to Canada and an excellent career choice" and "young people can learn discipline, responsibility and skills by getting involved in the cadets". Finally, it is expressed that "By helping to protect your community, you follow in the footsteps of Canadians before you who made sacrifices in the service of our country".

Immigration is one of the keystones of Canada's history, and between 2001 and 2006, 70% of population growth was fuelled by it. Not only have the major source countries of migration changed over time, but immigrants now comprise a larger subset of society, making up 20% of the population in 2006. As such, it is imperative to analyze this group's relation to the second largest employer in the country, the Department of National Defence. The Department of National Defence (DND) is the government ministry responsible for overseeing the Canadian Forces (CF). Together, they are the largest employer in the public service sector, with more than 111,000 employees in total.² The CF is a long-standing and influential institution in Canadian society. Although enrollment and recruitment efforts declined during the 1990s, the Forces have grown since 2001, reaching a mass of nearly 88,000 in 2006.³ The Canadian Forces helps

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¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship," 2009, 9. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf (accessed February 15, 2010).

² Department of National Defence, "Contributing to the Canadian economy," 2008. http://www.dnd.ca/site/about/economy e.asp (accessed April 9, 2010).

³ Jungwee Park, "A Profile of the Canadian Forces." Statistics Canada, 2009: Catalogue No. 75-00-1-X, 1. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2008107/pdf/10657-eng.pdf (accessed April 11, 2010).

contribute to the image and reputation of Canada that is conveyed to the Canadian public, and abroad, and has been taking steps to recruit employees from diverse backgrounds in order to reflect the demographic composition of the country. Consequently, the military currently recruits at ethnic festivals, high schools and universities. The literature analyzed has discussed the issue of diversity, and the challenge of persuading visible minorities to join, remain, and excel in the Forces.

Canada's military is called the Canadian Forces, and is composed of the Navy,
Air Force, and Army. Although in other contexts, the terms 'army' and 'military' are
used interchangeably, it is inappropriate to use the term army to refer to the Canadian
Forces as a whole, and since members from the Air Force, Navy and Army were
interviewed, the terms 'military', 'CF', and 'the Forces' will be used to describe this
institution. This paper will focus on how the entire Canadian Forces has attempted to
provide a more inclusive environment for foreign-born Canadians, many of whom could
be categorized as visible minorities. It will include research conducted prior to, and since
the ratification of the Employment Equity Act (EE Act), and will explore what the
sentiments of immigrants in the military are about being employed by this institution, and
why many immigrants are hesitant about joining.

This research is relevant because there is a dearth of research about the specific experience of first generation immigrants in the CF. The EE Act was slightly revised to accommodate the needs of the CF and thus, the Forces are bound by a specific Canadian Forces Employment Equity Act. This act reflects a changing organizational attitude in the military towards immigrants, but whether or not these changes have been put into

⁴ Major R.F. Keller, "Is There A Link Between Canadian Forces Recruiting, Diversity and Immigration?" (Master's thesis, Canadian Forces Joint Command and Staff Programme, 2007), 2.

practice has yet to be assessed. In 2009, landed immigrants were allowed to join the military, but this policy was soon rescinded a few months later. No research has emerged that questions why the policy regarding landed immigrants arose, and why this initiative was eliminated so soon after. Some of the questions that propelled this research were inquiries about whether or not the recruitment techniques of the military reflect the changing views of the institution as a whole, if being a first generation immigrant naturally encourages or deters one from wanting to join the military, and what it is like for a recent immigrant to be employed by the Canadian Forces.

The military has been involved in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and security missions for the UN and NATO, while internally the three branches are responsible for different duties, including assistance during natural disasters, protecting Canadian fisheries, intercepting illegal drug trade, and completing search and rescue operations. Needless to say, this institution has a tangible impact at the local, provincial and national level, and the estimated budget is indicative of its importance to the state, especially in lieu of the recent economic constraints Canada has incurred. The CF's budget for the 2010-2011 fiscal year is \$21.1 billion: an increase of nearly \$2 billion compared to 2009-2010. Although many of the documents analyzed do not expressly address immigrants, they nevertheless have an impact on the immigrant population, as most immigrants fall into one or more of the underrepresented demographics that the CF is encouraging to enroll, including women and visible minorities.

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⁵ "Canadian forces may recruit landed immigrants," *CBC News*, August 22, 2006 http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/08/21/landed-immigrants-military.html (accessed April 10, 2010).

⁶ Park, "A Profile," 1.

⁷ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat Departmental Planned Spending and Full-time

Equivalents, 2009 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/dnd/images/sec1f-table1-lg-eng.jpg (accessed July 16, 2010).

Overall, 5.9% of military employees are immigrants. They are better represented in the Reserves (10%) than in the Regular Force (4.1%) and make up 20.6% of the civilian workforce. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was assumed by the general public that the CF was representative of the majority, since that majority was Caucasian, but following the ratification of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 and a large influx of visible minorities, the perspective changed. The Charter was the precursor to the Employment Equity Act, which applied to all government bodies, and which revealed that the employees of government bodies were not demographically representative of the Canadian public.

The Canadian Forces describe themselves as an equal opportunity employer, and hiring targets are established based on the regulations set out in the Employment Equity Act, and those provided by the Human Rights Commission. ¹⁰ In addition, the Financial Administration Act enacted in 1985 called for the increased representation within federal institutions of designated groups including women, Aboriginal peoples and persons with disabilities. ¹¹ Two years later, persons classified as visible minorities were also given designated group status and added to the law. Visible minorities are defined as people who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour. ¹² The Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that each person is equal under the law, and is equally protected against discrimination on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or disability. In addition, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 states that all federal

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⁸ Park, "A Profile," 2.

⁹ Keller, "Link between," 3.

¹⁰ Park, "A Profile," 3.

¹¹ Joseph L. Soeters, "Diversity in the Canadian Forces." in Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison, ed. Jan Van der Meulen, 4 (UK: Routledge, 2006).

¹² Keller, "Link between," 5.

promotions.¹³ The initial Employment Equity (EE) Act was revised in 1996 to include a regulation that required employers to establish equity plans and sets out a method for ensuring that these plans are implemented.¹⁴ The purpose of the Employment Equity Act is to solidify the requirements of the Multiculturalism Act, and states that employers should focus on the person's ability to work in that position, and that employment equity is more than treating everyone equally, but in addition, requires special measures and accommodation of differences. The CF developed the Canadian Forces Employment Equity Plan to achieve this end and three objectives are outlined including: representative recruiting, equitable career development, and a supportive work environment.¹⁵ As of 2008, the CF produced the MPC (Milperscom) EE Plan based on the CF EE Plan, which acknowledged the impact of immigration on representation and recruitment. In addition, the document recognizes that the culture of the CF needs to change so that extra efforts are made to promote the benefits of employment equity.¹⁶

The CF refers to women, visible minorities, Aboriginals and persons with disabilities as Designated Group Members (DGMs) and approximately 80% of people entering the Canadian workforce as a whole for the first time are part of one of these

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¹³ Department of Justice, "Constitution Act, 1982," 1982,

http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/9.html#anchorsc:7 (accessed April 17, 2010).

Department of Justice, "Employment Equity Act," 1996, current to March 25, 2010. http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/E-5.401/index.html (accessed April 6, 2010).

Department of National Defence, "CF Employment Equity Plan: Advancing on a Wide Front", 2006, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/we-mt/eep-pem/eepl-peel-eng.asp (accessed April 9, 2010).

Department of National Defence, "Milsperscom Employment Equity Plan – Fiscal Years 2008/2009 to 2010/2010," 2010, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/ps/we-mt/eep-pem/doc/letter-lettre_eng.pdf (accessed June 17, 2010).

groups.¹⁷ Following a change in government, the impetus to grow the military increased and recruitment goals were raised to 13,000 Regular service employees and 10,000 Reserve employees. In neither instance, however, did the government describe how the CF should recruit these people.¹⁸ The Employment Equity Plan was instrumental in the creation of the Defense Diversity Council (DDC). The DDC is engaged in semi-annual briefings and presents recommendations, sets long-term goals, and takes a strategic approach in recruiting, training, promoting, and retaining members of the DGM groups. Moreover, Defense Employment Equity Groups were formed, and these groups are composed of military personnel as well as civilians.¹⁹

The Canadian Forces Employment Equity Act is upfront about the difficulties the CF faces, admitting that reaching representation targets is a long-term goal and that the military's current objective is to show that it is slowly progressing towards these goals by complying with government regulations, and gaining small successes in representation. In order to facilitate the recruitment of the Designated Group Members, one of the special measures of the act is to proactively make connections with marginalized communities, using staff who have cultural knowledge of them.²⁰

The contemporary issue of the integration of immigrants into the Canadian Forces occurs in the context of an older debate. The "civil-military gap" is a popular military theory that questions how much autonomy the military can be allotted while still being accountable to the populous, and so that it is not powerful enough to take over the state.

Challenges Associated with Young Recruits." (Master's thesis, Canadian Forces Command and Staff, 2006).

¹⁷ Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Vermeersch, "Military Recruiting and Retention Strategies and the

¹⁸ Keller, "Link between," 7.

¹⁹ Department of Justice, "EE Act".

²⁰ Major Helen Theiner, "Canadian Forces Recruitment of Visible Minorities." (Master's thesis, Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course, 2006).

Samuel Huntington's work *The Soldier and the State* has had the most lasting impact following the Second World War, and continues to be referred to today. Huntington advocated the notion that the military should be "a distinct society", and that civilian control over it should be minimal. In addition, he stated that the need for civilian control hindered the ability of the military to provide security to the state. Huntington, arguing in the American context, stated that liberalism was the greatest threat to military security, and that civil and military areas of activity are, and should remain, separate.²¹

Conversely, the most predominant adversary to Huntington was Morris Janowitz, who argued in *The Professional Soldier* that the military depended on society and that it was necessary for the military to reflect the values of the liberal democracy it served. ²² Janowitz stated that the military needed to adapt to the changes that occurred outside of its realm, and advocated a "constabulary role" for the military, predicated on the use of minimal force and conflict-avoidance strategies. Over time and with the increasing politicization of the world's militaries, critics began to shift away from Huntington's ideology, and most Western militaries post-1950, and in the current environment, strive to mirror Janowitz's philosophy more so than Huntington's. This paper will argue that although the Canadian Forces seeks to represent the public, it remains a distinct society.

Hans Jung breaks away from other scholars, arguing that it is a fallacy to assume the military ever represented Canadian society. He describes how the traditional recruitment pool for the CF has been fit young men aged 17-24 from small cities with populations of less than 100,000, and questions whether the values of small cities or towns can be seen as representing the values of all Canadians.

²² Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), 21.

²¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1981), 346.

The CF's attempts to represent Canadian society can be seen at an organizational level. ²³ The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) released a Strategic Intake Plan, and calculated the 2006 recruiting goals based on the multiplication of the Strategic Intake Plan and the external availability percentage, which measures the labour market availability of the four DGM groups. However, the Employment Equity Act revealed that because of the unique nature of the military, it is difficult to compare it to the outside labour market. The act admits that there has been insufficient progress in recent years, but resolves to make many changes in order to make the military an easier choice for some. ²⁴ In 2004, the military conducted its first Employment Systems Review with the objective of locating and removing barriers to employment for DGMs.

Another major initiative that was employed to track the progress of the CF's representation was a self-identification census that members were encouraged to complete, indicating if they are a DGM as well as their gender, but the census is not the only method being used to locate barriers. The goal was not to focus solely on demonstrating numerical compliance, and the most recent plan forbids quotas, yet alternative methods of assessing success have not been introduced. Abundant literature acknowledges that the least progress has been made with visible minorities; another reason the plan suggests making community connections in order to understand their needs.²⁵ In contrast, Christopher Ankersen and Losel Tethong contend that the pressure

²³ Hans Jung, "Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society?" Canadian Military Journal 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2007): 27-36.

²⁴ DND "CF EE Plan." 7.

²⁵ DND "CF EE Plan," 6, 7; DND "MPC EE Plan".

on recruitment is too high, and that recruiting standards should be lowered to gain more applicants.²⁶

Some scholars see the potential for further accommodation of DGMs as worrisome, given that majorities which risk losing majority status are likely to be sensitive to rising minority solidarity.²⁷ Major R.F. Keller recommends that visible minorities should be allowed to try out a role in the Reserves in a unit close to home before being assessed for employment in the Regular Force.²⁸ Special accommodations such as this may lead to increased resentment, as Caucasian members may also have wanted to try out the Regular Force before joining. Leuprecht identifies two main objections to diversity in the armed forces: the notion that diversity undermines cohesion and the organization's functional imperative, and the belief that minorities are not interested in joining the Forces anyway. Leuprecht continues to state that the prevailing misconception about the relationship between diversity and cohesion is led by assumptions based the idea that changing the kind and amount of people in the organization matters more than analyzing what actually does matter and measuring that.²⁹ Often the situation of gender integration is discussed in the literature alongside diversity as authors perceive parallels in the struggle for integrating groups that are not widely represented in the military. The 2004 Employment Systems Review required the provision of additional seats at the CF Command and Staff College so that women could achieve appropriate representation, while other authors have suggested the institution of a

²⁶ Christopher Ankersen and Losel Tethong, "Birds in Hand: The Need for a

Retention Based Strategy for the CF," Canadian Military Journal (Summer 2001), 44.

²⁷ David Last, "Evolution of Policing and Security: Implications for Diverse Security Sectors," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 386.

²⁸ Keller, "Link Between," 60.

²⁹ Leuprecht, "Litmus Test," 564, 566.

positive measure to allow well-established visible minority officers to have better access to the college as well. However, some women who graduated from the college expressed that they did not want special status and felt the initiative should be stopped. Called by some the "pink list", the female graduates felt that there was stigma attached to being a part of the initiative, revealing the perils of special measures.

A study by Farida Syed compared attitudes to diversity between 1996 and 2006 and found that the biggest improvement was a decline in overt racist and sexist behaviours and harassment, but asserted that the male-dominant culture was still present, and women were still being judged based on stereotypes, and often were not viewed as legitimate leaders. Syed discusses equity theory, which states that individuals want equal relations between their input and output, where input can be labour and output is often in the form of money or recognition.³⁰ It may be that special measures are viewed with disdain for this reason.

Karen Davis discusses the notion of cultural intelligence (CQ), meaning the ability to recognize the beliefs, values and attitudes of a group of people and apply this knowledge towards a specific goal or range of activities. Davis concedes that CQ is not just about knowledge of a culture but also about social intelligence. Although the 1999 Diversity Survey suggests improvement in CF member attitudes and behaviour towards cultural diversity since 1996, whether or not covert discriminatory beliefs are still held is not addressed. In fact, the increased knowledge of what is and is not politically correct may help individuals filter out their controversial beliefs from the public. Davis discusses the "change behaviours first, attitudes later" mantra used by the military, stating that this

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³⁰ Farida Syed, "Influence of Gender and Minority Issues on Recruiting and Retention," Department of National Defence, 3; Department of National Defence, "Employment Systems Review (ESR) Canadian Forces," 2004, xi, 6.

method limits the potential for the cultivation of gender diversity and cultural intelligence for members.³¹ She argues that behaviour that is enforced by the legality of equitable treatment, without a personal willingness to understand difference, is unlikely to result in culturally effective decision-making.

In order to implement such diversity or accommodation measures, much of the responsibility for personnel inclusion is vested in military leaders in the literature. Donna Winslow suggests that effective leadership that demonstrates a serious commitment to a zero tolerance policy can influence the culture of the organization, and its ability to address problems. Additionally, the Employment Equity Plan of 2006 states that the advancement of leadership through the promotion of EE objectives is a key priority.³² Edgar H.S. Schein's notion of a leader-driven model of organizational culture has informed much of the CF's leadership doctrine.³³ Although effective leadership has been toted as the best way to implement a diversity strategy, who these leaders are, and who they are not, has not been widely discussed. In addition, how these leaders are supposed to cope with the request to promote inclusivity and diversity while ensuring operational effectiveness, has only recently been addressed.³⁴ The expectations of leaders are onerous and multiple, and may be redundant, as Alan Okros argues that each individual has a particular perspective they apply when employing moral reasoning, meaning that even the best efforts to train leaders in a certain way, may only have a limited effect on what they do. Okros indicates that professional socialization is concerned with procuring slow

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³¹ Karen D. Davis, *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), ix, 45, 46, 122.

³² Donna Winslow, "Gender Mainstreaming: Lessons for Diversity," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 355; DND "CF EE Plan", 2.

³³ Davis, "CI & Leadership," 49.

³⁴ Davis, "CI & Leadership," ix.

growth attributes in CF employees that help them to internalize the profession's ethical framework. Regardless of such efforts, Okros asserts that people will look outside of their profession to exercise independent reasoning and make moral judgments, a problematic conclusion for those creating diversity training manuals and tools. 35 The independent nature of leaders can be an obstacle to integration, as William Bain asserts that at times, belonging necessitates coordination and the subordination of independent action to preserve the social relationship on which membership is based, but as of yet, CF leaders have not been forced to change the way they behave.³⁶

Okros identifies four possible outcomes that may occur when a minority group and a majority group interact: integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. However, he states that only the minority or new group is aware of which model is at play, and that even the best-intentioned message may be perceived differently by the recipient. This is questionable, since the mocking of the women who graduated from the CFC College seems to be driven by the deliberate intention of some to segregate or marginalize them. Consequently, leaders are advised to liaise with DGMs in the workforce to ensure that diversity strategies are working.³⁷ Okros recommends a shift from directive leadership to transformational leadership, and this is echoed by formal guideline books issued by the CF. 38 Employment equity and diversity training are required for all recruitment staff and training staff, and all key training courses had to be revised following the EE Act to ensure that course materials contained diversity content.

³⁵ Alan Okros, "Rethinking Diversity and Security," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 358, 360.

³⁶ William Bain, The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People (UK: Routledge, 2006), 140.

³⁷ Okros, "Rethinking," 365, 366; Department of National Defence, "Employment Equity and Diversity: One Team, Many Faces," (2003), 23.

³⁸ Okros, "Rethinking," 360; DND, "One Team," 7; Davis, "CI & Leadership," 45.

Unfortunately, only very senior leaders are exposed to new leadership training.³⁹ The suggestion to change modes of leadership may have been hindered by pressure from the military in the last 50 years to strengthen internal accountability and promote domineering leadership. 40 The ability for leaders to grapple with diversity has arisen in some research, and in one guidebook, it is asserted that there are leaders who have not done much about employment equity because they are unsure it is the right thing to do or they believe the timing is wrong. There is a prevailing perception among some leaders that employment equity and operational effectiveness exist as two opposing goals. Leaders are forced to advocate employment equity practices, regardless of their personal views and the strategy continues to be "change behaviours first, attitudes later". Moreover, leaders are advised to proactively prevent harassment, and not reveal any mixed feelings they harbour about employment equity to their personnel. This illuminates that there is resistance to employment equity among some leaders, but the trials of transitioning to employment equity practices has not been explored in the literature. The inherent problems of trying to change practices, without first trying to evolve the beliefs of the people who are ambassadors of a new human resources scheme, are a glaring omission in the research.

Not only are some leaders unsure about diversification tactics themselves, but there is great variability in the implementation of the strategies when they are used.

Leaders are advised to be involved in supporting visible minorities in achieving their career goals, but often think the best way to do this is promoting practices that focus on

³⁹ Robert W. Walker, *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues* (Kingston, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 157.

⁴⁰ Davis, "CI & Leadership," 75.

designated group members, thereby emphasizing their difference.⁴¹ In addition, diversity training is doled out unequally, as the 2004 Employment Systems Review indicated that although there was strong leadership and support at some senior levels, this was not evident in the middle ranks. The review suggested that CF members in employment, and leaders with HR responsibilities, require a deeper knowledge and understanding of employment equity and diversity.⁴²

Honing one's leadership skills has been an incentive that the military uses to entice young people to join the Forces. Adam Chapnick recommends that recruiters should emphasize that youth can develop leadership skills in the Forces, while Ankersen and Tethong indicate that young leaders in the CF are still waiting for responsibility, authority and opportunities for professional and personal development, suggesting that potential recruits are promised experiences they do not get until much later, if ever. ⁴³ Furthermore, youth in the CF expressed dissatisfaction with the excessive turnover of leaders, and more than 65% reported that their direct leader had changed four or more times in the past two years. ⁴⁴ In *Dark Threats & White Knights*, Sherene H. Razack asserts that militaries are structured to procure unquestioning soldiers, forcing one to question how vast the disparity is between what is conveyed about military life, versus the reality of that experience. ⁴⁵ In addition, with such rapid leader turnover, and the variability of implementation between one leader and another, how can diversification tactics be employed consistently across the organization?

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⁴¹ DND, "One Team," 12; DND "ESR CF", i, 12, 15.

⁴² DND, "ESR CF," i, v.

⁴³ Adam Chapnick, "Not Necessarily Conscription...Bringing the Forces up to Strength: A Question of Motivating Youth to Serve," 7, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007); Ankersen and Tethong, "Birds in Hand." 47.

⁴⁴ Ankersen and Tethong, "Birds in Hand," 47; Walker, "Leadership in the CF," 46.

Sherene H. Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: the Somalia Affair,

peacekeeping and the new imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004): 86.

Diversification is a two-way street, and the Forces want visible minorities to join for reasons that are both symbolic, and practical. However, the way in which they want to use DGMs is based on assumptions that may not be true. That is, new recruitment plans want to place marginalized members in conspicuous roles such as human resources, and as recruiters in marginalized communities, presuming that they will want to work within these types of roles. The Employment Systems Review echoes the advice of other authors, stating that increasing the representation of DGMs in HR and career management roles will raise diversity awareness and recognition. This recommendation is problematic, as it is founded on the conviction that visible minorities and the like are innately knowledgeable about diversity simply because they are somehow more diverse than others, and further, that they want to work in these areas. DGMs may not want to work in HR, or be pressured to work in that environment, and encouraging them to do so because of what they look like may be perceived as discrimination. Other authors have also recommended that the CF should place more designated group members in recruitment, training and career management positions, to give them a higher profile and so that more diversity-sensitive services can be provided to CF members. This suggestion ignores the fact that visible minorities themselves can harbour racist or sexist beliefs, and assumes that they are somehow more ethical because of what they look like, in a move that reeks of tokenism.

The review also calls for more visible minorities on merit boards where possible, illuminating the issue of reasonable accommodation. Although the scale of such behaviour has not been widely studied, some critics have stated that within the CF, there is a poor understanding of accommodation policies which leads to members of visible

minorities being mocked by other members. Consequently, those who support diversity initiatives or those who are ethnically diverse in the Forces, may feel uncomfortable about being proud of their identity or about supporting diversity programs. Again, the ubiquitous remedy for scenarios like this is strong leadership, and accountability for the principles and practices of employment equity, but new policies are hindered at middle levels or even ignored by senior leaders, and there is a widespread belief that until military managers and supervisors are held formally accountable for EE Plans, change in culture and attitude will be glacial. Due to the fact that there are no mechanisms in place to monitor how well leaders implement employment equity measures (if at all), the relative success of that endeavour is currently contingent on the subjective efforts of each leader, indicating that wild variability is occurring from one unit to another in terms of accommodation, and acceptance of equity practices.

Another recommendation that was discussed by several authors was the need for role models or mentors for visible minorities to help with orientation to military life. It is assumed that these role models will be DGMs themselves and a major dilemma for them seemed to be that being one of the first or one of the few garnered special attention from the media, including photos, presentations, newspaper articles, or interviews. As a result, trailblazing members often reported feeling more segregated, and this practice may foster sentiments that they are being praised and focused on because of tokenism, rather than because of their work. This extra attention may deter potential role models from wanting to help others, or from joining the military at all. Regardless, military promotions work in a bottom-up manner, meaning there is no opportunity for lateral entry into more

⁴⁶ DND, "ESR CF," v, xiv, 24, 17, 26.

senior ranks, and thus, it will take many years for visible minorities to attain senior roles in order to become role models.⁴⁷

The leadership issue is important because when the Canadian Forces was deployed to Somalia in 1993, several soldiers were accused of racial discrimination and violence towards Somali civilians. The soldiers in question stated they were "only following orders", but the only men who were actually convicted were men of lower ranks. Furthermore, Razack argues that the Somalia affair started with racist violence, moved to a criticism of "a few bad apples", and then transformed into a public discussion of bad leadership. She suggests that the public or the military institution itself, does not want to admit that the issues are more systemic, or that more than a few people are exercising very poor judgment overseas.⁴⁸ Winslow and others have suggested that new performance goals for managers and commanders should be added so that they are rated to see how well they are integrating DGMs, but for the military and in Canadian society as a whole, the issue of how to measure integration is elusive, yet paramount.⁴⁹ The Employment Systems Review of 2006 revealed that some visible minorities feel that they were penalized during their Performance Evaluation Reports because of biases on the part of leaders, and managers with significant clout. Leaders were criticized for a lack of awareness of EE and cultural diversity and there was fear that this ignorance could result in barriers hindering the career advancement of visible minorities.⁵⁰

Although the vast majority of the literature concurs that increased representation in the number of DGMs is the best way to be representative of Canadian society, some

⁴⁷ Captain H.W. Jung, "Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society?" Canadian Military Journal 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2007): 27-36.

⁴⁸ Razack, "Dark Threats," 100, 120, 123.

⁴⁹ Winslow, "Lessons for Diversity," 556.

⁵⁰ DND, "ESR CF," 71, 72.

scholars have suggested that the CF's goal of increasing representation by numbers is an inappropriate way to measure the organization's diversity. Anne Irwin acknowledged that while there are traditional methods of quantifying diversity, there are other kinds of diversity at work and describes two types of perspectives: etic and emic. 51 The etic is an outside view which often takes a universal framework and tries to apply it to the organization in question, while the emic is an insider view that generates categories based on insider views of the members of that culture, and may not be applicable beyond the culture in which it is produced. Irwin found that in one unit, diverse personal attributes had more of an effect on one's integration and group cohesion including: age, geographic origin, level of education, marital status, rural versus urban upbringing, whether the person grew up in a military or non-military family, and travel experience. She states that these "local categories" may not be useful for generalization or comparison, but reveal the values that are important to this particular group of soldiers. Soldiers were more concerned with whether someone was a hard worker or lazy, whether they were weak or physically fit, whether they were optimistic or "whiny", or if they were unreliable. A limited amount of complaining was considered appropriate, and only certain kinds of complaints were acceptable. In addition, being able to "take a joke" and being social versus being "a loner" were important factors in one's social integration. Those displaying anti-social behaviour were viewed with suspicion, and anyone displaying any of the negative behaviours mentioned above was generally disliked and in fact, displaying one type of negative behaviour often roused the belief that the person was engaged in other negative behaviours as well. Thus, Irwin concluded that soldiers were

Anne Irwin, "Diversity in the Canadian Forces: Lessons from Afghanistan," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 494, 496, 499, 502-504.

categorized based on personal qualities in this particular unit, and not on abstract demographic characteristics. Reliability and predictability were the most important qualities and diversity in terms of language, and knowledge of the civilian culture overseas was found to increase solidarity because soldiers' skills were valued for their contributions to mission success.

However, the driving ideology behind including marginalized groups is contested by various authors, as some rely on a more ethical perspective, conceding that it is to ensure that vulnerable groups are being served by, rather than abused by, the state.

Conversely, some suggest that inclusion can also be a means of dominating the group in question, and that minorities may be co-opted and manipulated by the power structure.

Christian Leuprecht contends that diversity cannot be avoided due to the contracting labour market, a decline in the recruitment cohort, and an increasing need for non-kinetic skills in mission success, demonstrating the pragmatism that may explain CF diversification.

diversification.

The diversification is contented as a more ethical perspective, conceding that it is to ensure that it is to

Major E.T. Padvaiskas argues that the military needs to change its recruiting tactics, simply because the future demographic of Canada will be much more diverse, and the Baby Boomers in the Forces will be retiring in high numbers. In order to fill the gap, she suggests that the military must present itself as an employer of choice for all.⁵⁴

Padvaiskas contends that the institution must act upon this in a way that is not solely compliant-based, but in a manner that is value-based, and demonstrates changes that are

David Last, "Evolution of Policing and Security: Implications for Diverse Security Sectors," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 381, 382.

⁵³ Christian Leuprecht, "Diversity as Strategy: Democracy's Ultimate Litmus Test," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 562.

⁵⁴ Major E.T. Padvaiskas, "The Canadian Forces as an Employer of Choice: Branding is not Enough" (Master's thesis, Canadian Forces College), 7.

willful on the part of the organization. She asserts that leadership, education, and systemic changes should be the driving force of this movement.

In terms of recruiting foreign-born applicants without citizenship, the CF will accept people who have served in the Oueen's Forces abroad.⁵⁵ If an applicant is applying for an occupation that rarely attracts recruits, they may accept them on a caseby-case basis, providing that the applicant will attain citizenship within three years. However, the military considers non-Canadian applicants to be a last resort and is unable to grant permanent resident status to someone except in the rare case that no current citizen or permanent resident could fulfill the job vacancy.

In a study done on visible minorities, it was found that they tended to rank competitive wages over interesting work as most important aspect of a job. 56 Interestingly, the majority of visible minorities polled did not believe that competitive wages could be found within the public service, suggesting one major factor as to why immigrants may not even consider the military as a source of employment. Even if visible minorities did work within the public sector, they were likely to leave when better economic opportunities became available. Jung states that these preferences should be taken into account when constructing recruitment strategies". Unfortunately, the pamphlets disseminated by the CF do not cater to the different populations that they are trying to recruit, likely due to budget constraints. Moreover, if the military in the native country of the immigrant in question was an oppressive arm of the state, the ideology behind the Canadian version of that institution may be tarnished prematurely.

Keller, "Link Between," 3, 11, 88.
 Jung, "Represent Society," 15, 16, 20.

Two major barriers to recruitment are that general awareness about the CF is low, and that foreign-born applicants encounter long processing times due to security requirements.⁵⁷ However, CF familiarity is increasing over time, with Caucasians being the most aware, then Aboriginal people, and racialized groups being the least aware. Surprisingly, visible minorities are twice as likely to be interested in joining as Caucasians, but they are the most unrepresented group in proportion to their size. In addition, visible minorities were three times more likely to report that they were going to visit a recruiting centre in the next year, and had more of an affinity for full-time positions. This gap has been recognized, but the reasons for the lack of follow-through remain unknown. Eric Fong recommends that newcomers should be exposed to the CF early on, as they may not have a clear understanding of it. He and other authors emphasize the importance of providing a more holistic image of the Canadian Forces.⁵⁸ Keller states that economic migrants are unlikely to be willing to join, but recommends that they be targeted for recruitment and that people who immigrate through the family class should also be targeted (i.e. spouses and children).⁵⁹

As previously mentioned, security clearances are a challenge for foreign-born applicants and prior to the incidents that occurred on September 11th, 2001, waivers could be granted under the Chief of Defence Staff's authority in situations where "an applicant show[ed] evidence of working towards obtaining citizenship and [did] so within a specified time period" but since that time, such waivers have rarely been granted.⁶⁰ Security clearances can take up to two years or more, and many visible minorities are lost

⁵⁷ Keller, "Link Between," 25, 55.

⁵⁸ Eric Fong, "The Diversity of the Chinese Community in Toronto: Implications for the Recruitment Strategies by the Canadian Forces," University of Toronto, March 2006: 11.

⁵⁹ Keller, "Link Between," 40, 42.

⁶⁰ DND, "ESR CF," 65.

in this process. For any applicants who have lived abroad, including Canadian citizens, a 10-year background check is required and, obviously, the ease of verifying information depends on the international relations with the state(s) in question. Depending on the existence of reciprocal agreements, and how highly prioritized the task is, this process alone could take one year or more.

For skilled newcomers, choosing the CF could be a viable option, since they encounter many challenges in the labour market. ⁶¹ The military can offer fairly competitive salaries, health insurance, many paid holidays and a generous pension plan, but whether or not the CF can provide work that matches the education of incoming skilled workers has not been addressed. Recently, the CF proposed a mentorship program for foreign-skilled applicants who fit the immediate needs of the Forces, but it has yet to be implemented. Even members currently in the Forces seem to feel there is a lack of professional opportunities, as more than half of CF employees who left stated this as the main reason, while 35% left to pursue educational and training goals they could not attain while in the Forces. As an added obstacle, the CF has to compete with the civilian economy, which is able to offer opportunities that the CF cannot, and some authors have alluded to a "war for talent", in which employers compete for the best and brightest. ⁶² In addition, there is an absence of research focusing on why people leave the CF, making the military's efforts to retain personnel more difficult.

Part of the reason for immigrants' reluctance is related to socioeconomic status.

Research by Leuprecht and Okros discovered that racialized group members and recent immigrants who were unsuccessful in the labour market were less likely to be involved in

61 Keller, "Link Between," 45. 85.

Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 47, 48.

politics and more likely to align themselves with ethnic groups. ⁶³ Jeffrey Reitz found that for ethnic families with lower incomes, identifying with their ethnic group had a negative impact on political participation, but ethnic identification had no impact on the participation of families who had incomes above the national average. Political involvement was highest in second generation immigrants and after the third generation, voter turnout fell below the national average. This is pertinent since many conceive that military service is tied to patriotism and there may be a connection between political participation and military service, although again, such a link has not been discussed.

Overall, visible minorities are younger than the average population and by 2040, will compose more than half of the Canadian population, another reason recruiting efforts have to evolve. Leuprecht and Okros found that people in ethnic economies are less likely to be involved in activities outside of those economies and only 11.6% of visible minorities over the age of 15 are currently attending school full-time. In addition, visible minorities are less likely to vote than anyone else, but exercise a high level of Internet use. For this reason, Leuprecht and Okros recommend using the Internet to disseminate CF info and create websites that appeal to newcomers. Fong suggests that while recruiting, the CF should emphasize that joining the CF is a possible means of civic participation. Leuprecht and Okros as well as Fong recommend that for the South Asian and Chinese community, high school dropouts should be targeted by emphasizing job training while for post-secondary students, recruiting should focus on professional and career development. 40% of the Asian population in Vancouver reported experiencing

⁶³ Dr. Leuprecht and Dr. Okros. "An Examination of Select Visible Minority Groups in Canada: Implications for Recruitment by the Canadian Forces," (2006): 2, 8, 11, 14, 20-22.

⁶⁵ Fong, "Chinese Community," 24

⁶⁵ Leuprecht and Okros, "An Examination," 35; Fong, "Chinese Community," 15.

discrimination and to counter this, the authors state that the CF should stress the equal opportunity environment and the non-discrimination policies in place, although their effectiveness as a deterrent are questionable. 66 Issues of citizenship arose during the Somalia affair, during which several Somali civilians were beaten, and tortured by Canadian soldiers. Razack reveals that men from subordinate groups bore almost total responsibility for the crimes committed.⁶⁷ Razack also contends that joining the nation also requires adopting a sort of hegemonic masculinity that engages in racial domination.

Another factor which has an impact on a recent immigrants' decision to apply is the influence of their parents. The Toronto Police Service found that parents who are recent immigrants exert a significant influence over their close and extended families and harbour a bias against service professions. 68 Many Chinese families encourage their children to enter professional programs, with the conviction that professional occupations will lead to economic security.⁶⁹ In response to this pressure, many immigrant children opt for professional training while in university. In addition, newcomers have limited political knowledge and view elected officials with cynicism.⁷⁰ However, even these individuals could be part of the CF without supporting the government of the day, as the military is an apolitical body. With this in mind, another obstacle facing recruiters is how to communicate information to people who speak neither official language and Leuprecht and Okros have suggested the use of ethnic media to publish CF recruiting materials in various languages. Keller advocates for the posting of profiles of visible minority officers on the CF website to increase exposure, while Fong states that recruitment should focus

⁶⁶ Fong, "Chinese Community,"44.

⁶⁷ Razack, "Dark Threats," 21, 89, 90.

⁶⁸ Keller, "Link Between," 84; Leuprecht and Okros, "An Examination," 44. ⁶⁹ Fong, "Chinese Community," 6.

⁷⁰ Leuprecht and Okros, "An Examination," 16, 17.

on how the working experience gained in the CF will be beneficial for immigrants and their offspring in the long-term. Approximately 50% of people said they would not join the military because of family commitments, employment issues or being too old, while 18% stated that their personal values prevented them from wanting to join, Numerous authors have expressed that when the economy is flourishing, there are less recruits available, unearthing the question of why the CF is considered a last resort. The RCMP found that first generation Middle Eastern and South Asian Canadians were skeptical of joining because of the impact of corrupt police forces in the nation of origin or because of discrimination from these forces and/or society at large. Negative perceptions of the CF were particularly prevalent among first generation newcomers who saw the CF is being a restrictive, homogenous institution. Underrepresentation in the CF seems to be a part of why visible minorities and Aboriginals also do not join, and they may associate the military with violence or coerciveness. Those who emigrate to escape state violence are less likely to join the CF.

On a macro scale, employment equity and improving DGM representation was not an idea created or promoted within the Forces, but was a regulation enforced by the government. As previously mentioned, the CF is bound by the legislation passed by the state, but also more specific regulations set out by the Department of National Defence. Okros discusses how integrated security solutions are necessary in the contemporary setting, and extrapolates the integration situation to apply to the multilevel governance inherent in government-military relations. He states that diversity is about

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⁷¹ Keller, "Link Between," 95; Fong, "Chinese Community," 7.

⁷² Keller, "Link Between," 55.

⁷³ Keller, "Link Between," 80; Leuprecht and Okros, "An Examination," 24.

⁷⁴ DND, "ESR CF," xii.

⁷⁵ Leuprecht and Okros, "An Examination," 25, 26.

comprehending another's point of view, and that this is applicable to departmental power relations as well. 76 Additionally, Okros points out that when the CF is perceived to be too slow in implementing legislation on employment, its autonomy is truncated by the state. Following the Cold War, rapid personnel reduction strategies were implemented, yet the needs of NATO and UN missions were increasing. The 1990s, or the "Decade of Darkness", marked a loss of public support for the Forces due to the failed mission in Rwanda, and the Somalia affair. Until the late 1990s, the CF did not officially admit that there were critical employee shortages, and shortly after, headquarters decided to dissolve the office responsible for personnel levels.⁷⁷ An exploration of why the Forces did not formally recognize the shortage and the (possibly resentful) relationship that the military has with DND is lacking in the literature. The military may believe that the government is jeopardizing cohesion by not understanding the nature of the work. If the military is resentful towards government initiatives, employment equity would without a doubt be treated with scorn.

The military is a unique employer, as its employee objectives as well as the type of training it provides, are drastically distinct from other government sectors. Discipline, authority and conformity are seen as essential to the social integration of military units and organizations. 78 These assimilative objectives naturally clash with the rhetoric of multiculturalism and diversity, which emphasizes understanding and sensitivity to difference. Moreover, the current trend of neoliberalism, which emphasizes individualism, is at odds with the militaristic focus on collectivity and unlimited liability,

⁷⁶ Okros, "Rethinking," 351, 356.

⁷⁷ Ankersen and Tethong, "Birds in Hand," 43, 44.

⁷⁸ A.F. Reuben. "Recruiting Visible Minorities: A Matter of Survival" (Master's thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2004). http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/nssc/nssc6/rueben.htm (accessed April 7. 2010).

or the idea of "service before self". Okros describes the CF as having a tight culture, and states that there are institutional concerns about integrating a more pluralistic perspective. The Canadian Forces faces the challenge of having to balance the need to inculcate common values and beliefs, with the public pressure that people should not have to sacrifice their identity in order to provide a service to society.⁷⁹

This literature review afforded a perspective on the glaring gaps in the body of research regarding the military. There is a dearth of research on the effect of legislation on leaders who have to implement changes they may not ascribe to, and there is a lack of analysis considering how much employment equity implementation varies based on the personal preferences of those leaders. In addition, aside from Anne Irwin and Al Okros, few researchers have contested the diversity by numbers framework, or discussed different ways of measuring diversity and integration. Also, very few have ventured to inquire about the nature of the relationship between the government and the military, and how this could impact the institution of new legislation, including employment equity. Evidently, there is a lack of consideration of immigrants as a separate category, who face specific challenges, and instead they are considered as a part of the designated group member cluster. Researchers working in the area of diversity and equal opportunity have not considered immigrants who are Caucasian, who may have accents and may face similar or different challenges entering the military. In addition, there is a lack of research about how the military could appeal to skilled newcomers and what the relationship is (if any), between political participation and propensity to join the Forces. Finally, there is a blind spot in the ample literature on leadership, and that is a consideration of CF

⁷⁹ Okros, "Rethinking," 359, 368.

members in the middle and lower ranks, and whether or not the leadership training given to leaders is trickling down to the lower levels or not.

Due to the fact that accounts of the personal experiences of CF members were lacking in the literature, empirical research was conducted in order to glean the perspectives of immigrants in the military. Interviews were needed to ascertain their thoughts about recruitment, factors affecting their propensity to join, public awareness of the military, military life, training, employment equity, and deployment. Six interviews were conducted in total, two with immigrants who were either in the CF, or who had gone through the application process, two with CF, and Canadian Forces College researchers who had experience studying diversity issues in the CF, one with a former diversity officer who was also an immigrant, and one with a retired senior officer who had managed a large unit.

The study was exploratory in nature, as it seeks to contribute to an undeveloped area of research, and inductive reasoning was used in the form of grounded theory to produce new theory based on micro-level events. 80 Snowball sampling was used to locate potential respondents. The target population was first generation immigrants over the age of 18 who were a part of the military. Also, experts who had experience working with diverse groups in the military, or who had done some research in that area were consulted. This sample is very small, and is by no means representative, nor is the intention of the study to illuminate broader trends felt by most immigrants in the military. Instead, its intention is to broach a subject that has not been explored by researchers outside of the military, to provide a snapshot of some issues that may be prevalent for

⁸⁰ Lawrence W. Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches Sixth Edition (University of Wisconsin: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006), 33-34, 60.

some people in the Canadian Forces, and to procure recommendations so that the CF may improve relations with civilians and ethnic communities. Finally, it is intended to educate the public about recent diversity initiatives the CF has adopted, and to glean the perspectives of a very small group of military employees and CF diversity experts on how the transition to employment equity legislation is progressing, and what effect it has had on them. The arguments made in this paper are grounded not only in primary research, but also in secondary research conducted of military theory, the work of military researchers, government documents, as well as external researchers.

Non-immigrants and immigrants that the principal investigator knew or had worked with, were asked if they knew anyone currently enrolled in the military. A Ryerson professor suggested one of the individuals who was interviewed. Using this information, the principal investigator contacted these individuals and after explaining the objective of the study, inquired about whether or not the contacts were foreign-born, or if their parents were foreign-born. After being directed to one researcher who had done work in the area of diversity, that individual suggested two other researchers to contact for interviews. In addition, family members were asked if they knew anyone who fit the criteria, and one relative suggested the retired senior officer and an interview was conducted. Finally, the recruiting centres in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) were contacted to look for other potential interviewees, and through this method, the former diversity officer was found.

For the three individuals who lived or worked in the GTA, in-person interviews were conducted, while the remaining interviews were conducted via telephone. The interviews ranged in style and length, from 23 minutes to 1.5 hours each. Although

initially the interview questions were structured and open-ended, the principal investigator would ask interviewees additional follow-up questions based on their particular experience or role, and based on the answers they had given to the formal prompts, provided that the participant agreed.

One of the three key informants was female, while the other two were Caucasian males. One key informant was also an immigrant, and was a visible minority, and the other two immigrants involved with the CF were also visible minorities. Although an attempt was made to diversify the pool of immigrants in the CF who were interviewed, all three interviewees were Iranian-Canadian. In addition, one of the immigrants in the army identified as being a homosexual. This means that any conclusions made in the paper only apply to one type of designated group member, as women, Aboriginal people and persons with disabilities were not included. Also, since all three informants were male, Iranian, and from large cities, the study is limited in that the informants were not demographically or geographically diverse. It may be more likely that their experiences were more similar because of how their gender, or ethnic background has partially shaped their perceptions. However, the study is valuable in that there was variability in the responses of the CF employees, highlighting different values and experiences even though they shared similar characteristics.

All of the interviews were audio taped, and there was a different set of structured questions made for immigrants in the Forces than for key informants. The fact that the questions were open-ended was extremely beneficial to the findings of the study. Most of the informants were talkative, and offered anecdotes, cross-national comparisons, and personal insights. If a question was asked that was outside the range of their experience,

they would simply indicate that. The structured questions were slightly adapted over time to take into account more controversial issues like citizenship.

This study revealed numerous reasons why immigrants may be less prone to enlisting in the Canadian Forces. It argues that longer processing times due to security clearances, deployments far from home, negative preconceived notions of the military produced in the country of origin, the truncation of rights and freedoms for CF members, and more job opportunities in the larger cities in which newcomers tend to reside, make this Canadian demographic an elusive recruiting market for the military. It also revealed that the public harbours significant misunderstanding of the nature of the Forces, and that the military has been unable to make drastic changes to its advertising and recruiting campaigns. In addition, it was found that the implementation of employment equity was volatile, due to the personal preferences and values of military leaders. Until alterations are made in these areas, this paper argues that although vigorous institutional attempts are in motion, the CF is a distinct society that does not represent the demographics of the Canadian public, and is not in good standing with it.

The issue of citizenship is paramount to the relationship new Canadians have with the Canadian Forces. The security clearances required by the Forces are more extensive than in other occupations and present a barrier to newcomers, particularly those who have lived in Canada for less than ten years. The CF requires a ten year background check and communicates with the country of origin to attain this data. For countries like Britain; this exchange is easier, but for some African and Asian countries where ties with Canada are ambivalent, expatriates will likely not be able to join unless they have resided in Canada for five years. This indicates that the CF discriminates between applicants on the basis of

country of origin due to varying levels of trust between nations. Canada has better foreign relations with Britain, the UK, and the US, than with the source countries from which most contemporary migrants originate from (China, Pakistan, India, and the Philippines). One informant mentioned specifically that the files of applicants, regardless if they were born in Canada or not, who have lived in countries that were not part of the Allies, are processed separately for security reasons. Another informant mentioned that the 9/11 attack was an affront to the values that Canada, the United States, and all Western Allies believe in, insinuating that these values are similar, if not identical. In this sense, the security clearance issue conjures up World War II rhetoric, and suggests that the alliances that were present then are still salient, and that new alliances with non-Allied nations have not been strong enough to break this divisive 70-year old mentality. In this way, the credibility of newcomers is still viewed through the lens of where they came from, and considering that most newcomers in the next twenty years are coming from nations that do not have strong ties to Canada, many will be restricted by the foreign relations (or lack thereof) between their country of origin and Canada.

If the CF wants to diversify its members based on demographical representation, it will need to forge better communication with these source countries, so that it can access the newer immigrant population. However, it is a problematic exchange, as the sending nation will have to agree to give this information to Canada and ensure its accuracy. Evidently, the very reason migrants exit their nation of origin is often due to the unreliability of the government, indicating that Canada may not want to engage in information-sharing with that nation until the government becomes more stable or proves it is trustworthy.

Akin to the process of multinational security clearance checking, military best practices are shared between a select group of countries "through the Technical Cooperation Panels which is Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada...human resources and designated groups is one of the areas they do share practices with", according to one correspondent. But even though there is discrimination in terms of which nations to discuss best practices with, most people who were interviewed including persons of colour, strongly believed that the ability to fulfill one's job requirements was more important than any other thing. Some even argued that the military was more progressive than the private sector. These findings mirror Irwin's study which reinforces that personality traits and work ethic matter much more for group cohesion and individual integration than demographics, while Okros' research states that numerical representation of different ethnic groups may not be the best way to measure how diverse the military is.

One factor that may explain propensity to join is the social progressiveness of the Forces. In terms of discrimination and racism, one source believed that historically, new Canadians have perceived the military as an avenue of social mobility and that they may be subject to less discrimination working there, than in the private sector. While the CF may boast about its progress, this may indicate that numerical representation is not needed in order to be a socially progressive organization, as the Forces have less marginalized personnel than the private sector, and other government bodies.

A sense of belonging or identity could be one of the reasons people want to join, and there is disagreement between informants and scholars about the primary reason behind propensity to serve. Some concede that the primary reason for joining is

ideological and for the exercise of patriotism, while others argue it is more about pragmatism, and enjoying stable employment.

Most informants did agree that military service somehow enhances a person's citizenship or Canadian identity. The reasons for this were numerous, including that CF members travel and see what is occurring outside of Canada, and through travel, they get to appreciate how fortunate they are to reside here. However, this reasoning ignores the fact that many CF members do not get sent overseas, and thus, an explanation as to why they are better citizens is left unanswered. Two respondents stated that the CF delivers a national identity to soldiers, illuminating a trend wherein some military personnel may perceive the Forces to be the source of their identity.

An additional citizenship issue arises when the CF attempts to recruit immigrant youth. One key informant revealed that high school students who would like to join the Royal Military College often cannot since their parents have not attained citizenship yet, and if they are under 18, they are unable to apply for it themselves. However, the avenue to join the Cadets is available for youth who do not have citizenship. Informants were asked if they felt there was an attempt on the part of the CF to produce a certain type of citizen, and one participant responded that being in the military is about shifting internal roles, so a woman who might be thought of as very feminine outside of the forces, makes a switch when she adorns the uniform. The respondent added that the shifting from one role to another does not mean that the hidden counterpart is compromised. Instead, he cautioned that because joining the Forces entails going through a strong socialization process, one's identity can be changed, and aspects can be lost, and recommended that the Forces should be aware of this. For several respondents, it seems that their military

identity overtook other aspects of themselves. Other informants agreed that the military attempts to produce similarity and a strong fitness culture, which may be a part of the reason why potential applicants and members see the CF as a beacon of masculinity. Another respondent relayed that when people join the CF, they are actually no longer citizens at all, nor are they perceived as citizens, but in fact, are seen as soldiers. This insinuates that soldiers and citizens to some, are mutually exclusive categories. Thus, there are mixed feelings about what the relationship is between the Canadian military and identity, as some believe that it is about switching between roles, while others believe that one's military persona or occupational role supersedes other facets of their identity.

One informant stated that he joined because he believed that the military reflected the values of the Canadian people, while another immigrant who was serving discussed Canada's military history with pride, and stated that he felt privileged to be part of it. This informant alluded to a lack of public understanding of why people join the CF as well as a lack of public appreciation for Canada's military history. One participant stated he would have sought out the same occupation in Iran, raising the question of whether devotion to Canada is really necessary in order to join. One informant's reason for joining was a crossover between the two perspectives. He stated that he joined for employment and to assert his masculinity, and thus, while the masculinity incentive is ideological in nature, it differs in kind from the patriotic ideological reasons that the other informants espoused.

The Canadian identity of newcomers is formed through a negotiation of the identity they had in their nation of origin, and therefore, their opinions of the CF may be biased based on the previous encounters they had with the military in their native nation.

Although many researchers and interviewees suggested that negative connotations of the military generated in the country of origin may be to blame for a lower propensity to join, formal research has not confirmed this. One key informant, who was a researcher for the CF for over 20 years, stated that this may be particularly prevalent for those coming from war-torn countries, as they may view the military as a violent threat. One of the immigrants who applied to be in the CF stated that his parents were against the idea, but their disdain was directed towards the military in general, rather than the CF specifically. The military in the nation of origin may have an effect on the parents of potential members. One informant who was involved in recruiting reiterated that it takes longer to change the views of the CF for people from war-torn nations. These statements reinforce that immigrants have preconceived notions of institutions like the military and that these views are modified and re-evaluated upon entry into a new state, although some may never learn the difference. Participants commented that immigrants' views of the police are formed in a similar way, and it would be interesting to explore whether or not they use preconceived notions to the same extent when thinking about other Canadian institutions (i.e. government, prison system, hospitals).

Immigrants and non-immigrants with parents or relatives who have served in the military or are military supporters seem to be more likely to join. Also, according to one soldier, having a relative who is a military supporter can assist in getting parents to support their child's decision to enlist. The Reserves are a more popular choice among designated group members, and parental influence and the fact that deployments can often be far from home, seem to deter them from applying to the Regular Force. One participant who had worked in recruiting claimed that he often spent more time talking to

the parents of potential applicants, than the applicants themselves. However, in another case, the participant's relatives had served in the military in other nations, but their parents still did not approve of their choice. Informants with veteran parents felt more comfortable in the military environment, and were able to ask questions about that occupation easily.

The family definitely plays a role for some, but it would be reductive to say that they always play a role solely based on ethnic group. For example, all three immigrants surveyed were Iranian-Canadian, and all had different experiences with their parents. Although all of them consulted with their parents, the impact of their parents' views on the military differed for each person. This is important for military recruiters because too often it seems that they only target the potential recruit themselves, without talking to the parents and clarifying misconceptions of the military that may have been forged in the country of origin. If the biased perceptions of parents are not broken down, it is likely that they will trickle down to their offspring, no doubt affecting their propensity to serve. The correspondent who was involved in recruiting referred to Sikhs as "a warrior race", and recalled that Sikh parents were very eager to enlist their children. The statement demonstrates an ethnocentric perspective on propensity to join, from a recruiter who is well-versed in the literature and practice of diversifying the force. Conversely, another interviewee who was asked whether or not native-born parents were more likely to send their children to the Forces than foreign-born families, responded that the life experiences of each person contribute to their view, not the location of their birth.

For the three Iranian males that were interviewed who had served or who had applied to the CF, each one's experience informing their parents was different, and this

serves as a example that blanket statements about familial relations within a culture are not always accurate. When asked about whether or not their family knew about their decision to join the CF or not, and what their reaction was, two out of the three participants reported hesitance from their parents, while for the third, his father had served in Iran so there was less resistance. Moreover, they explained that even when there was hesitance, eventually both parents supported the decision. For some, their approval was imperative in making the choice to join, while for others, they would have joined with or without support. For those in family situations where approval was not needed, the participant recalled asking his parents anyway, because it was more culturally appropriate. The mother of potential applicants also had an impact, and even in cases when she did not approve of the decision, she would often support or assist the prospective member with their application.

Another barrier to join for immigrants, but also the general public, is proximity to home, and this is related to family ties. The Reserves have been more attractive to native and foreign-born people, than the Regular Force. One key informant mentioned that Somali Canadians have strong familial ties, leading to reluctance to join.

Additionally, the relative isolation and distance of the locations of some bases may be more evident for seasoned Canadians than newer ones as one participant alluded to, meaning that they are not aware of how far from home they might be stationed.

Surprising comparisons were made between native and foreign born Canadians' propensity to join in regards to the barrier of proximity, and its link with family and the community. When asked if first generation parents were more likely to oppose their children joining the Forces, one correspondent stated that there was deep reluctance on

that newcomers become very attached to the locale in which they reside, and that the thought of themselves or their children moving across the country for a deployment would be very unsettling for them. This explains why people who want to join the Regular Force often opt for the Reserves first to try it out. Furthermore, an immigrant in the military brought up that refusing to commit to a deployment is viewed with scorn, and has serious ramifications for future career advancement for the next five to ten years. Immigrants who want to join the Regular Force may be torn between family pressures to work locally, and pressure from their employer to be deployed wherever they ask.

This conjures up notions of individualism and free will, both of which are truncated at times while serving in the Forces. In the modern age of neoliberalism, complete with rampant individualism and materialism, it is no wonder that military service is a sacrifice only made by a few. Given the choice between a job that forces them to make this decision, and a career that would not, individuals would likely need to have a strong ideological connection to the military, or a pragmatic reason for wanting to enlist. Moreover, immigrants often leave their country of origin because they want more rights and freedoms, so joining the CF is an unlikely career choice. Finally, if they had wanted to pursue a career in the military, if they were adults before they left, they could have simply joined the military in their native nation.

One participant believed that people from urban areas were less likely to be interested, and that the Regular Force recruits more from small communities where there are less jobs available, and are fairly successful because of the competitive salary they offer. Given that most newcomers to Canada settle in Montreal, Vancouver, Toronto, or a

suburb of one of these areas, this could be a hidden factor as to why they are less represented. Their propensity to join may be less simply because the job opportunities in bigger cities are better and the unemployment rate may be lower. In addition, the CF may be disproportionately recruiting in smaller cities and towns because they have had higher success rates in those areas in the past.

Given the labour market barriers immigrants encounter, it is surprising that immigrants (particularly older males) have not looked to the CF as a means of regaining the masculinity they may feel they have lost by being underemployed and losing the social status they may have had in their homeland. Most of the influential family members for the Iranian participants were other males who had served or were military supporters, either their fathers or their uncles, although one informant mentioned distant cousins who were not identified as male or female. The assertion of masculinity may be a covert reason why straight and gay individuals sign up however; there may not be enough accommodation for the expansion of male identity within the Forces. The former CF researcher interviewed, who now often teaches Majors about diversity, recalled that he often changes the rhetoric he uses when dealing with this kind of audience, and that in the past 25 years, greater leeway has been allotted for women, but the same has not been true for men. He teaches Majors that "girls can fight, boys can cry" and the senior officers tend to agree with female persona evolution, but are not prepared for that kind of role expansion for males. This runs counter to earlier statements made about the CF being a socially progressive body. This participant cleverly observed that although women have appropriated things formerly reserved for men, men have not been able to appropriate

things traditionally associated with femininity, especially in the military realm, revealing yet another facet of military life that has not been questioned in the literature.

One immigrant serving in the CF who identified as gay stated that to him the army symbolized a reinforcement of masculinity, and claimed that many young men, regardless of their sexual orientation, enlist in the Regular Force for the same reason. Another correspondent disagreed, stating that "this is not a man's army, it's gender-neutral". Importantly, the person who stated the latter was in a much higher position of power, relative to the speaker of the former quote. This may be indicative that leaders in the Forces are not in tune with the needs and issues that are being experienced by lower ranking officers. In many of the studies, gender integration was used as a guide for the integration of diverse identities, so the issue of the accommodation of women and LGBT individuals is relevant to the discussion of immigrants, but the challenges faced are likely different.

Moreover, the CF has a self-identification survey that is not mandatory, but strongly encouraged, and asks CF members to identify as male or female, a painful process for those who may identify as transgender, transsexual, or questioning. This same correspondent stated that although there is a no-discrimination policy against sexual orientation, he was unaware of a case where someone who had done something prejudiced was punished. He further relayed that most gay members serving in battalions and brigades in smaller cities with large male presences keep their sexual orientation a secret. He stated that officers are more educated and socially progressive because they are required to have a degree, but claimed that among non-commissioned members who are older and have more clout, "it's still very much a straight white gentlemen's club" and

controversial issues are discussed without sensitivity. This illustrates that the formal mechanisms to punish discrimination in the military may not be an effective deterrent to that kind of behaviour, leaving marginalized persons in the CF more vulnerable to abuse. The implications for EE legislation are frightening, as there are no formal punishments yet for members who do not promote it, or behave accordingly. Moreover, it reveals that old attitudes are still evident, even in the presence of politically correct organizational policy. Due to the intense power dynamics at play, it seems that low and middle ranking members may be the most vulnerable, and may be more likely to incur discrimination from other low, and middle ranking members, since they are less educated, and have not received diversity training. However, it seems that even among more senior officials who have received higher education, old stigmas may still be prevalent.

Testimonials from immigrants involved with the Forces revealed that the support of friends also had an impact on their decision. One participant claimed that they made it easier to make the decision while for others, friends in the CF were one of the informal ways they were told about what it was really like, and were an important factor in why they joined. One correspondent recalled that members engage in informal recruiting on their own, and are very influential among their friends.

There are still many misconceptions of the military among DGMs, but also the public at large. Caucasians still seem to be more aware of the military than racialized groups. Two of the immigrants questioned commented that they would have liked a more complete picture of what their occupation was going to be like before they joined or attempted to join. In terms of changing the advertising scheme they employ, the CF is

limited by the preferences of the government. One respondent connoted that the CF engages in strategic messaging about what it is and what it does. Again, this issue is related to the power dynamic between the government and the military. As one key informant described, all CF messages require political approval, and the CF tries to skirt this requirement through subtle messages, like Rick Hillier bringing the Stanley Cup to Kandahar. Programs to increase awareness have been produced through consultations with community leaders, and have attempted to cater to the needs of specific populations like Aboriginals. These initiatives have proven to be a successful means of recruiting, and according to another participant there are some community leaders who have seen the benefits of military service and show a willingness to work more closely with the military to help educate them about better recruiting strategies, and how to communicate with community members. For immigrants, it seems there is a delayed awareness, or a lack of awareness altogether, about military perks such as subsidized education and benefits. In regards to immigrants specifically, the same foreign-born respondent mentioned that immigrants harbour a view of the CF as a "white boys club", which he stated was at odds with the realities of the Forces.

Another person dissented from this view, stating instead that although the CF may be hierarchical and largely run by white males, it would be a misconception to believe that all Caucasian CF members are resistant to change in terms of gender or ethnic diversity. She contended that the public's view of CF employees is shallow, and does not consider the vast differences among them. Another informant described an ongoing debate concerning whether or not newcomers are "becoming informed and therefore withdrawing from the process or...the military [is] somehow inadvertently, indirectly

sending the signals to these people that they're not wanted?". Political correctness in terms of speeches, legislation, and reports to the public are just a few ways in which the military has tried to demonstrate its evolution. Two informants discussed the issue of political correctness; both agreed that at times, they found it to be overwhelming and counterproductive.

Canada's role in part as a peacekeeper is often one of the first perceptions foreign and native-born individuals have of our military. Three key informants brought up the notion of Canada's military as being the "Blue Berets" or ascribing to a strict peacekeeping or constabulary model. One informant mentioned that this was his first impression of the military and he appreciated their adherence to that philosophy. Others lamented the lack of public knowledge of the range of roles the modern CF is engaged in, and alluded to the idea that peacekeeping was seen as a softer kind of mandate which was cause for frustration. One respondent revealed that there is a disparity between the public's perception of the Forces as Blue Beret peacekeepers, and the actuality of the peacemaking and combat role that the CF is also responsible for. Immigrants who are attracted to the peacekeeping philosophy also need to understand that the CF does engage in violence before joining.

This lack of knowledge of the CF particularly for recent immigrants, may be directly related to old stereotypes, and a conviction that the Forces have remained static over time. A 2009 forum in Ottawa with racialized group leaders was held to discuss their perceptions of the CF and revealed that there were many things they did not know, including the range of professions and levels of compensation. Some believed that they had to be involved in combat roles before taking on non-violent positions, while others

used dated stereotypes to inform their opinions, believing that there were still height requirements, and that you had to be extremely fit to apply.

Two other informants briefly mentioned the role that film played in either their awareness of the Western world, or of the military itself. One of these individuals jokingly stated that the movie *Top Gun* was the reason he became so interested in military aviation, while the other mentioned that the initial image he had of the Western world was through biased mediums, and he assumed basic training would be much more difficult. This is interesting, as it may suggest that the public may unconsciously utilize popular military tropes shown in the media (Apocalypse Now, Top Gun, M*A*S*H) to replace actual knowledge of the Forces, and may believe that they understand military culture through these mediums. It could be that a second kind of fantastical military has been reified through popular American films and television shows, similar to way the CIA and other intelligence agencies have been portrayed in films like Mission: Impossible, True Lies and Enemy of the State. This is problematic because these films usually send the message that these organizations are keeping secrets they should not from the public, reinforcing the disdain newcomers may already have towards the institution. The films also illuminate the danger that civilians may incur if they try to discover or publish these secrets. What may be happening is that even though there are few, if any, popular films or sitcoms about the Canadian military, the Canadian public perceives the Canadian military and CSIS as identical to their American counterparts that are featured in popular media, ignorant of the major differences between them. Moreover, the public internalizes the danger of asking the military and intelligence agencies questions or learning more about them, because people who try to "expose" these

institutions in film are often punished, or their rights are truncated in some way. Thus, Canadians may be giving the Canadian Forces, and other national security organizations more leeway than they actually need to, in terms of what information they need to share with the public, what kinds of updates on the war in Afghanistan should be public knowledge, and how often they should be publicized. In lieu of the public's often misguided perception of the CF, the Forces should attempt to be as transparent as they can without jeopardizing national security, to prove they are a trustworthy organization. How are Canadians learning about what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan? In reality, how much does the CF reach out to communities? How often are soldiers in the public eye when they are not recruiting?

Knowledge of the CF needs to be shared without the contingency of joining, or the pressure to join. The CF needs to spread awareness, not simply for the sake of recruiting, but for the sake of dissolving popular misconceptions about an influential state institution. Currently, recruiting centres are described by one participant as being "a bridge into the community" and that "the job of the recruiting centres is as much an outreach, sales, education role, as it is an assessment role". Two of the immigrants who were involved with the Forces expressed some dissatisfaction with the amount of information given to them prior to applying, as one recollected that recruiters were not clear enough about what his training would be like. Recruiters enter high schools to recruit and educate simultaneously, but this is a problematic and extremely biased method of teaching. Although some informants suggest that immigrant recruiting techniques are driven by the question of what information needs to be provided so that potential applicants can make an informed choice, it would be interesting to know if the

information disseminated is more impartial when the economy is slower, because there would be more recruits available than during economic prosperity, when recruits are scarce. In addition, even though there are many recruiting resources available, in the end, each individual will communicate information differently, and their experiences will affect how they recruit. It is questionable, but probably unlikely, that CF members who have formally complained about something, or who have endured something traumatic, would be sent out to recruit, but their experience is important, and part of the experience potential applicants might have.

When knowledge is spread without the pressure to join, the attitudes of the public can be better assessed and broken down. Recruiting will not improve unless the populous has a more holistic, realistic view of who controls the CF, what their options are (and are not), and what the military does beyond peacekeeping (including the combat nature inherent in peacemaking). What needs to happen is that the Canadian Forces has to literally open the doors to military museums, armouries, the Royal Military College, the Canadian Forces College, and other military buildings so that the public knows that they can learn about what the military does, without being in the military. Currently, there seems to be a divide between a civilian public that is afraid to ask about the CF, and perhaps feels they are not allowed to know more, and members who are cognizant of the reality of the organization. If people are not aware of the fact that they can learn more about it without being in it, then it is arguable that the Forces is in fact, a distinct society away from the Canadian public. The Department of National Defence must realize that in order to represent the society it serves, the Forces has to engage in a reciprocal relationship with the public, in which information is shared. People are more likely to

become applicants if the people around them support their decision, so it is necessary to educate everyone.

Evidently, as a body looking for more recruits, it would be difficult to talk about the CF in a way that approaches neutrality, but perhaps if the Forces embarked on two different campaigns, one focused on recruiting and another focusing on general education, it would have more success. People who are sent to disseminate general information to the public should not have a hidden agenda to recruit, because this would only reinforce the latent perception people may have that military information comes at a price. That price may be seen as either being employed by the military, and therefore partially culpable for those secrets, or unable to share those secrets because of the "unspoken code", or that gaining military information leads to endangering one's own life. These two costs are not mutually exclusive, because being employed by the Forces for some, may lead to situations in which their life is in jeopardy.

Certainly, no military can be utterly transparent about what they have done to achieve missions, or what they plan to do, because those they are trying to attack could use this information, and it would void their efforts in peacekeeping or peacemaking abroad. However, if they want to improve recruiting, and deter the kind of military discrimination that seems to be occurring, they need to establish rapport with the society they serve. The government also has an important role to play. The Afghan detainee situation has not alleviated the public's fear of asking questions and demanding the accountability of their military. The CF needs to be more accessible to the public while the people must ask for more accountability from this organization than they have in the past, and must make an effort to look beyond popular military projections. If the military

does not want to do this, we must ask why it enjoys the cloak of secrecy that it has been afforded by the Canadian population. Upon their arrival, immigrants have many other things to worry about other than learning about the CF, especially since they are not eligible to join until three years later. Also, given the fact that they face more barriers in accessing housing, the labour market, and a social foundation, it is understandable why it may take them longer to learn about it. However, given that the native-born population does not seem to be overwhelmingly aware of the CF, how much can be expected of new Canadians?

Public awareness of the multilevel governance that occurs between DND and the military appears to be minimal, and academic research on the subject is scarce. Due to the top-down nature of the government-military relationship, it would be difficult to find out if the military actually welcomed the Employment Equity Act. One respondent argued that civilians do not understand the fact that the Forces merely listens to the government that they may have had a hand in electing.

As Padvaiskas argues, the CF is still recovering from the loss of credibility it incurred in the 1990s, and the leftover stigma still remaining in the mind of the public has to be eroded before the Forces can market themselves as an employer of choice. This illuminates a disconnect between the public at large and CF members, and being in the military in the contemporary era may now be a source of disdain and discrimination from outsiders who are misinformed about the government-CF power structure. CF members may bear discrimination based on the controversial nature of their employer, a problematic revelation for immigrants who likely already incur discrimination due to country of origin, accent, language, or race. One key informant relayed his feeling that

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⁸¹ Padvaiskas, "Branding is not Enough," 2.

many people "like to sling crap at the military or the government" and argued that the Canadian military must be an active force, or else the nation would have no clout at international conferences, NATO, and at the UN Council. This statement is fascinating, as it reveals that having a military might be the reason Canada even has a voice or role in international affairs. This same respondent contended that having an active military gives Canada a voice in world affairs, and about decisions that have consequences for the nation. He attested that people were eager to criticize the Forces, but that they did not understand that the military was protecting them from real outside threats like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The disdain for people who were ignorant about the military seems obvious, and was echoed by another interviewee who expressed that there is a social division between military members and civilians. He reiterated that if a civilian files a complaint against a military member, even if there's no evidence, that military member will be punished. In most cases however, if a complaint is filed against a civilian, unless it is extremely serious and a repeated offence, nothing would be done. Not only does there seem to be mutual disdain at play, but also a power dimension, wherein military employees are vulnerable to legitimate and illegitimate attacks from the public, and may be punished regardless of the merit of their case. In addition, this testimony unearths a two-tiered system of rights, in which CF employees cannot exercise the same rights as non-CF members. The irony of soldiers protecting and promoting a set of rights they have restricted access to, is stunning.

The pertinence of this for recent immigrants who join is that they are entering an institution where their rights might be informally eroded, and they may incur

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discrimination from some people in society, merely because of their government occupation. One interviewee discussed that he felt that people looked at him differently when he was in uniform, and he believed that they were categorizing him in a certain way because they believe he is in the military for a different reason than he actually is. What that other reason might be was not expanded upon. This puts military members into a new light, a position that is almost antithetical to the construction of the oppressive rogue military that some would describe as operating in immigrants' nations of origin. In addition, an immigrant who had applied to the CF stated that one of the downsides of being part of a competitive training program is that an applicant can be taken out of the program if they fail a mission or if they do not fulfill expectations, creating a stressful environment. This brings up questions about what rights, if any, do applicants have while immersed in training, prior to becoming full members. If applicants in this interim position incur discrimination or a problem with another member, it is not known if they have the same avenues of recourse that CF members do.

A discussion of the multilevel governance at play is also pertinent to understanding how the CF responded to the implementation of the EE Act, and whether or not it was welcomed with open arms or treated with hostility. What is curious, and what was brought up in two interviews and in the literature, was that there was a significant time lapse between when the military realized there was a lack of members in the early 1990s and when it acted upon it. Little was done until the early 2000s, and one participant described the hesitance of the CF, saying "Everybody knew we had to do it, but nobody approached it very systematically from the top" while another communicated that the "military is a federal agency so they really had no choice". A third correspondent

affirmed that the military is trying to reflect society partially because "the Employment Equity Act has got the military focused in this area and is compelling the military whether it wanted to or not". These testimonies come from one higher ranking officer and an immigrant in the Forces, and both seem to insinuate that the CF may have been apprehensive or simply against the idea of introducing employment equity, which undoubtedly has ramifications for its implementation. If this is accurate, and CF leaders are being forced to adopt diversity tactics, read diversity memos, and attend employment equity training without really believing in the cause, how effective can this effort really be?

However, another perspective was that the Chief of Defence Staff, Rick Hillier, was a strong advocate for the CF representing society and according to one participant, a multilevel approach has been used to integrate diversity tactics, and has been successful. Another respondent also mentioned that the military has been more proactive in recent years, marking a change in the methods of the mid-1980s, in which the military did not discriminate, but did not reach out to groups. Conversely, another formerly high ranking officer who had served for 35 years stated that he was only vaguely familiar with the EE Act, but believed that it was meant to open the doors and not turn away marginalized groups. The difference in the two statements is striking, as one concedes that the opendoor policy without aggressive encouragement to join was indicative of the 1980s, while the other believes that trend is indicative of the CF of today, indicating varying opinions of the CF's progression over time.

One key informant conveyed that the EE Act indicates that there are recruitment targets but another disagreed, stating that in fact, the EE Act was intended to produce

representation goals, but that somehow they evolved into recruitment goals. Another participant mentioned that the CF is progressing but is limited by the budget, and how far the government will let them go. If the military does not reflect society, as one participant suggested, there will be a loss of the public's confidence, and government funding will be more difficult to attain. One respondent was even convinced that there are three avenues available for the military: one, to be slightly behind societal trends and slightly apart (Huntington's argument), two, that it should reflect broader trends in society (Janowitz's argument) or finally, that it should lead the private sector, that "the federal government should be modeling to the rest of Canadian society what we aspire to see".

Much of the pressure to implement and monitor diversity regulations is placed upon unit leaders, managers and supervisors and although there is an abundance of internal work on leadership, it has not been studied whether or not even the best leader can change the values of their members. In addition, the effects of forcing leaders to advocate for diversity when they do not support it, has not been assessed, although leaders are being heralded as the catalysts of the organization's move towardsemployment equity. There is a lack of trickling-down to the middle and lower ranks of the values the leaders have been told are appropriate to espouse in terms of diversity, especially since some leaders admit that they do not know how to implement diversityfriendly values. What is even more disconcerting is that officers are now required to have a university degree, so one interviewer stated this makes them more "socially progressive" than non-commissioned members. This may indicate that the least educated members may be the ones least likely to be trained or taught about diversity, and their education on the subject is contingent on the ability of the leader to teach and instill those values in their subordinates. If leaders choose to continue the trickle-down process of CF diversity education, it seems there are no means of checking the progress or the effectiveness of such training. If a leader did not introduce or try to instill the diversity education they had been taught, there do not seem to be any obvious institutional penalties for such inaction, although several sources suggest that one of the criteria of the employment reviews of leaders should be if, and how they taught their subordinates about EE.

The military has an opportunity to be an employer of choice and is a particularly attractive choice for newcomers, given the aforementioned labour market barriers they encounter. The CF's willingness to train or re-train for free in the case of skilled migrants, combined with an above average salary may make it a good choice for older immigrants who need to provide for several dependents. However, the CF recruits at high schools and universities, where the immigrant population may be younger and thus, they may be neglecting the older demographic who has already worked in Canada for several years, attained citizenship, and might want to make a career change. The belief that military recruiting improves during economic downturns was discussed by many participants, one of whom stated that the CF gets the "best of the desperate".

This issue is pertinent for immigrants because often they are part of the middle class in their country of origin, and incur downward social and economic mobility after arriving in Canada. There may be a gap in the research concerning whether or not immigrants face more labour market barriers in small towns or big cities or how the barriers differ. Research of this kind might help explain the propensity to choose the military. Since some poor sending countries encourage emigration, emigrants who go to

developed nations have been construed in some cases, as national heroes because they send remittances home, and made the sacrifice to leave. However, for recent immigrants to Canada, their opinion of themselves contrasts with this depiction, as immigrants who are underemployed or unemployed endure a loss of social status as a breadwinner, as an employed person, and as a professional. Furthermore, immigrants felt that if they remained under or unemployed they would lose their skills.⁸²

Members of the CF advocate that there are not many employers that assist employees in developing skills, but the CF is an exception. One correspondent asserted that individuals who are yearning for upward social mobility and have skills often join the military for this reason. The literature and one of the interviews confirmed that recent immigrants are more likely to want to join the CF than older generations because they perceive less opportunities elsewhere. Indeed, newer cohorts of immigrants have experienced more barriers achieving income parity with the native-born population than older cohorts. One key informant reported that "the reasons for people joining, for a lot of people it is looking for opportunities to acquire training, skills, level of salary that they don't think they can get otherwise" and the CF offers extensive training and many educational programs. Another informant mentioned that the CF is engaged in "the 'battle for talent' because it's not everybody that wants to join the military so, if you're already going to select from a subset of those who are fit and those who are able to do it and willing to do it, if you then want intellect and initiative...you're really searching for a

⁸² Jennifer Asanin Dean and Kathi Wilson, "Education? It is irrelevant to my job now. It makes me very depressed ...': exploring the health impacts of under/unemployment among highly skilled recent immigrants in Canada," *Ethnicity & Health*, 14, no. 2 (2009): 198.

pretty small subset of the population", linking to Padvaiskas' argument about how replacing a substantial number of retirees will be a challenge for the military.

Professional bodies are given regulatory powers through provincial legislation and have the final say on the evaluation of foreign credentials. This system has been criticized for a lack of consistency in the evaluation process, as most agencies produce arbitrary standards which are applied on a case-by-case basis, and unaccredited programs tend to be "anything that is not Canadian, American, or British". One major problem identified is that immigrants cannot have their credentials assessed until after they have immigrated. ⁸³ The military seems to be a loophole for foreign-educated individuals, as one respondent noted that people with foreign credentials can be hired more easily by the military than in the private sector. Moreover, the military is willing to retrain, so people who have not been able to use their qualifications sometimes seek employment there.

Linking the qualifications debate with the issue of multilevel governance, one informant relayed that since the vast majority of regulatory bodies are provincial, there are unique legal provisions which allow the military to employ people in occupations without having professional qualifications. These legal allowances are used primarily during wartime. In addition, the military is negotiating with regulatory bodies so that hopefully, the training they provide can be recognized by them so that exiting employees can still use the skills they have acquired. This illuminates how the military can supersede qualification laws during times of war, but also that even during peacetime, the military is able to hire foreign-skilled workers more easily than other sectors, but the

⁸³ Erik R. Girard and Harald Bauder, "Assimilation and Exclusion of Foreign Trained Engineers in Canada: Inside a Professional Regulatory Organization," *Antipode* 39, no. 1 (2007): 42.

literature has not pursued the intricacies of this unique relationship. Also, it is not known whether or not this applies to other federal government bodies.

The public needs to be more informed about who really controls the mandate and actions of the CF, and they need to take into account what various politicians plan to do with it if elected. If they are not informed, they will continue to harbour resentment towards specific CF members and the military, putting CF employees in a vulnerable and marginalized position. Part of the problem may be that electoral candidates are not forthcoming with their military plans, but the second half of that is that the public is not demanding to know what those plans are. It may be apathy on the part of the public concerning the CF, or that people are unaware that the CF is a pawn of the state that they have helped elect. Additionally, it could be that they have already made a decision about how they feel about the Forces, and they feel the CF only peacekeeps and that that is not worth worrying about. But who will be held responsible for keeping the public more informed? Do citizens have a responsibility to know the role of the military? Certainly, they are not penalized for not knowing the details of political life, so it seems that if the CF wants to be more prominent, and represent society, they need to be more accessible to the public. The armouries should host tours for grade school or high school youth, and the Canadian Forces College should also be more available to the public. The military should get involved in volunteer activities, fundraising for local causes, and forge links with ethnic groups in that way.

On the part of recruiters, a more holistic perspective on what to expect, what opportunities are available, and what hardships one might face, must be delivered to prospects, to eliminate lost resources spent on applicants who leave the military, and the

time the applicant spends applying. For recent immigrants who are looking for jobs, the CF should advertise itself as a viable option to consider in the future, after landed immigrants have gained citizenship, and should highlight the special treatment the military gets when it comes to helping foreign-trained professionals get retrained. The Forces should work with local community leaders, similar to how it worked with Aboriginal leaders, in order to glean increased community awareness, and get new ideas on more effective recruiting from people who are most in tune with that group. To complement this, a two-tiered awareness and recruiting endeavour should be launched, to increase overall awareness without the pressure to join, and a separate campaign to attract new members. Also, the Forces needs to ensure that potential applicants are aware of the range of occupations available, especially non-commissioned positions like accounting, linguistics, or clerical work, which are much less likely to put that person in a dangerous position.

Although there is a lack of awareness of the Canadian Forces on the part of new Canadians, both the CF and new citizens are culpable for the lingering military stereotypes that still exist. In terms of propensity to join, military service was a major decision for all informants, but their parents always had some impact on their decision to enlist. The military should recognize that the choice to join is rarely made alone, but is usually enforced by a person's support network. Any and all Canadians might comprise that network, and thus, they should be educated about the positive and negative realities of it. Moreover, native-born and foreign-born citizens should be taught about the military so that CF members are not discriminated against. As it currently stands, military employees may have to bear the brunt of controversial decisions that are not even made

by the Canadian Forces, but by the government. For immigrants who may be interested, deployment, distance from family, and possible heightened discrimination from outsiders because of their employer, will likely keep them at bay unless the state allows the CF to advertise itself as an employer with good opportunities for newcomers experiencing barriers in the labour market. This, combined with the mutual disdain between civilians and military employees, indicates that unless the CF changes its approach, it will remain an organization apart from society, even while it tries numerically and legislatively, to edge closer to it.

This paper has asserted the arguments of some authors, but also discovered a gap in the issue of leadership, and more specifically, the problematic nature of forcing someone to teach about equity when they do not fully support it. In addition, it illuminated how the subjectivity of each leader is the only real determinant of whether or not low and mid-level members gain diversity knowledge, unless they choose to seek it out themselves. For immigrants, joining the Canadian Forces is akin to immigrating again, into an organization with a new mandate, motto, attire, and code of conduct which limits several personal rights. For example, military staff that get into a fight with a civilian can face more severe punishments from the CF, than from the courts. In addition, the stigma attached to refusing a deployment indicates that mobility rights are reduced for members in the Regular Force. Thus, newcomers or anyone who joins needs to be either ideologically or pragmatically tied to what the military offers. The deterrents to their enlistment in the Regular Force are numerous, and include the likely distance from family and urban societies they will experience during deployment, a possibly biased view of the Forces due to their parents views of the military in general, the length of time it takes for

their security clearance to go through, and perhaps even that the Forces do not prefer to recruit in the urban areas that immigrants tend to settle in.

Although the Forces have overtly eradicated discrimination, covert prejudice and a reluctance to adopt new equity legislation, still exist for some members. This would not be such a problem if the military did not rely mostly on the subjectivity of leaders for the implementation of the Employment Equity Act. If leaders are wary of the new legislation because they harbour disdain for DND, it is unjust for them to channel that dislike through the marginalized groups that DND is trying to protect. For those leaders who are reluctant to adopt and convey the message, attitude, and behaviour that the Act requires, the first step should be the implementation of a checking system to measure whether or not leaders are doing what they are supposed to, and the enforcement of penalties for those who do not. But prior to simply punishing leaders for holding on to their beliefs, regardless of how archaic, the CF has an opportunity to create a forum for the unpolitically correct notions to emerge, be discussed, analyzed, and refuted by a neutral third party in a safe environment. Up until this point, Canada has only been successful in shaming those views into silence but not oblivion, instead of discussing them, and letting people talk about why exactly they believe these things in the first place. If, after leaders go through this forum once or twice, they still find they are unable to believe in the equity practices they are supposed to promote, the CF should consider repositioning them into a role with less of an impact on the attitudes of other members.

Formal and effective mechanisms to monitor whether or not, and the degree to which, leaders instill the values of employment equity in their personnel need to be introduced. Strict penalties for not adapting must be enforced, because the Forces will

lose credibility and employees if they continue to allow such variability in the kind of environment diverse members will have in different units. Paradoxically, harbouring views that run counter to employment equity beliefs merely exemplifies diversity of opinion, and how strange that making room for one kind of diversity necessitates the albeit positive brainwashing of other kinds of differences. Nevertheless, the demographic changes that will occur in Canada in the upcoming decades make representation a necessary objective, and more will be lost in the long term by keeping a few inflexible leaders around, than by shifting them to other parts of the organization. Conversely, this gives leaders who are willing to be transformative the opportunity to initiate institutional change, because change on a systemic level, their subordinates will experience the kind of open, accepting environment that employment equity seeks to provide for marginalized, and non-marginalized groups.

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