Philosophy, history and progress

In this thesis, I will explicate the commitments and consequences of three metaphilosophical views: Metaphilosophical Realism (MR), Metaphilosophical Skepticism (MS), and Metaphilosophical Pragmatism (MP). These three views will be distinguished on several grounds, including their views on truth, reason, and progress. I will show that MR views philosophy’s relation to history as merely one as a form of pedagogy that is meant to give pupils the self-confidence to make sense of things in a particular way. For MS, philosophy lies forfeit to history, and historiography replaces philosophy as it shows an incommensurable plurality of ways of making sense. MP, however, takes historiography to be an essential part of philosophy for it reconciles distinct ways of making sense by redescribing them. In order to make redescription palatable both to redescriber and redescribed, we must conceive of a way of making sense as a skill rather than a collection of propositions.